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The Louisiana State Board of Health was the first 
institution of its kind in the United States. No other 
state preceded Louisiana in establishing a permanent 
organization for the promotion of public health. During 
the early years of its history, however, the State Board 
of Health was engaged in a continuous battle for its very 
life. Those who opposed it were influential and artic­
ulate.
The foremost public health issue in New Orleans during 
the nineteenth century was the value of maritime quaran­
tine. When the Louisiana Board of Health came into ex­
istence in 1 future depended to a great extent 
upon whether it could prevent another yellow fever epi­
demic from descending upon New Orleans and surrounding 
communities. The great epidemic of 1B53 was the major 
factor leading to the creation of the State Board. The 
act which set up this institution also provided a state 
quarantine. The Board was to administer the quarantine.
No one could be certain whether the quarantine actually 
averted yellow fever epidemics, but those opposed to it 
could point out that millions of dollars in trade were 
being lost to New Orleans because presumably infected
iv
vessels were required, to stop at Mississippi Quarantine 
Station, some seventy miles below the Crescent City.
These ships were required to undergo inspection, cleans­
ing, and disinfection at their own expense.
Although the continued existence of the State Board 
of Health depended tc a great extent upon the success of 
the quarantine, the Board was also charged with main­
taining a sanitation program in New Orleans. Its success 
in promoting sanitary reform was not particularly great 
until after the Civil War, however. Beginning in 1S66 
the Board introduced new measures which gradually, over­
came the Crescent City’s uneviable reputation for filth.
A new complication was added to the quarantine 
controversy in 1$79 by the establishment of the National 
Board of Health. The National Board, which, like the 
Louisiana Board, was seeking to prevent the importation 
of yellow fever and other diseases believed to be con­
tagious, needed the cooperation of state and local boards. 
The Louisiana Board, jealous of its supposed prerogatives, 
refused to comply with the most important requests of the 
federal agency. In this struggle state health authori­
ties were eventually victorious. The Louisiana State 
Board of Health was determined to carry on its fight 
against imported pestilence without assistance or inter­
ference from- the outside.
This study is based largely upon primary sources.
v
Very little secondary material pertaining to the develop­
ment of the State Board of Health during the nineteenth 
century exists. Contemporary newspapers, medical jour­
nals, and medical periodicals, as well as the official 
reports of the State Board itself have provided the 
greatest amount of information utilized.
CHAPTER I
YELLOW FEVER PERPLEXES NE’.V ORLEANS
Louisiana was the first state to establish a board of
health. Local boards of health had been created by port
cities on the Eastern seacoast as early as the eighteenth
century,'*' but not until Louisiana took action in 1$55 was
there a state agency for the promotion of public health.
The Louisiana State Board of Health remained a unique or-
2ganization until after the Civil War. The establishment 
of the Board was the result of a popular clamor for quar­
antine protection against the importation of the dreaded 
yellow fever. Although its primary purpose was to function 
as a quarantine agency, the Board did not find smooth sail­
ing since the enforcement of a rigid quarantine was opposed 
by a formidable majority of the mercantile and shipping 
interests as well as oy most of the medical men in the state.
■^Baltimore organized a board of health in 1793; 
Philadelphia followed in 1796. Boston established a similar 
organization in 1799 with Paul Revere as its chairman. It 
is possible that Petersburg, Virginia had a municipal board 
of health earlier than any of those cities, but the records 
have been lost. Wilson G. Smillie, Public Health: Its 
Promise for the Future (New York, 1955), p. 77.
^Massachusetts owns the distinction of having 




Over and above the basic question of the validity of quar­
antine measures, the Louisiana State Board of Health found 
itself repeatedly involved in disputes with other health 
boards over the matter of jurisdiction in enforcing quaran­
tine laws. This unfortunate situation resulted primarily 
from the quandary in which the medical profession, as well 
as the general public, found itself regarding the cause of 
yellow fever epidemics. The Board was to have a stormy 
history until this riddle was satisfactorily resolved.
The exact hearth area of yellow fever has never been
ascertained with finality, although the prevalent belief is
that the disease originated on the west coast of Africa and
3was brought to the Western.Hemisphere by slave ships.
During the seventeenth century a number of pestilential sick­
nesses having some of the characteristics of Yellow Jack were 
recorded in. the American colonies, but in all probability,
li­
the initial appearance of real "black vomit" in this country
5
occurred at Boston in 1693. Cotton JViather noted in his Diary:
■^John Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America (Baton 
Rouge, 1953), p. 139. This study accords with the findings 
of Henry Rose Carter, the foremost authority on the early 
history of yellow fever. See Henry Rose Carter, Yellow 
Fever, An Epidemiological and Historical Study of Its 
Place of~Origin, Laura A. Carter and Wade H. Frost, eds. 
(Baltimore, 1931).
^Yellow fever was often called "black vomit" because 
a principal symptom of the disease was the vomiting by the 
afflicted of blood that had been partly digested in the 
stomach and was therefore dark brown or black in color.
5Duffy, Epidemics in Colonial America, p. 141.
"In the Month of July a most pestilential Feaver, was brought
among us, by the Fleet coming into our Harbour from the West-
Indie s. ” The disease, continued Mather, had "very direful
Symptoms, of turning Yellow, vomiting and bleeding every way 
£
and so Dying." Within a few years Philadelphia and Charles­
ton were scourged by severe outbreaks. During the eighteenth 
century the coastal cities of the entire Atlantic seaboard 
were subject to an alarming number of invasions of epidemic 
yellow' fever.
Fortunately, Louisiana escaped the yellow pestilence 
throughout the French period and during most of the Spanish 
period of her history. The precise date of the introduction 
of this scourge into New Orleans has remained the subject of 
some doubt. George Augustin records several years: 1769, 
1791, 1793, 1794, and 1795, any one of which may have wit­
nessed the first cases of Yellow Jack in the Crescent City.
Augustin then states that the "first authentic invasion of
7New Orleans" occurred in 1796. John Duffy, after carefully 
weighing the very fragmentary evidence that yelloiw fever 
had been present in Louisiana before this date, agrees that 
"there is no conclusive proof of its existence prior to
^Diary of Cotton Mather, 1661-1706, Massachusetts 
Historical Society Colle"ctions, Seventh Series (Boston,
1911), VII, 166-67.
^George Augustin, History of Yellow Fever (New 
Orleans, 1909), p. 66S.
1796."^ During the succeeding century New Orleans, and to 
a lesser extent the rural areas of Louisiana, were plagued 
almost perennially by this mysterious disease which approached 
without warning and took the lives of many thousands in the 
lower Mississippi Valley.
Until the latter half of the nineteenth century the
state of Louisiana made no concerted effort to provide for
othe accurate collection of vital statistics and other perti­
nent public health data. This fact makes an evaluation of 
the extent and the impact of the numerous epidemics exceed­
ingly difficult; outside of New Orleans the problem is a 
hopeless one. Hence the history of the prevalence of yellow 
fever in Louisiana throughout most of the century is restrict­
ed primarily to the repercussions felt in the state’s metrop­
olis, Luckily for medical historians, several remarkably 
able physicians were numbered among the residents of the 
Crescent City during the ante bellum period. Not only were 
these men usually successful in the practice of their chosen 
profession, but they, in many instances, found time to do an 
amazing amount of writing. Among all these medical men the 
foremost topic of the time was the perplexing enigma— yellow 
fever.
^John Duffy, ed., The Rudolph Matas History of Medi­
cine in Louisiana (Baton Rouge"j 1958), I, 206-207. CiteH 
hereinafter as Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana.
^Records of births, deaths, and marriages
5
The epidemiologists were certainly justified in the-in­
tense concern they manifested in yellow fever. As the decades 
of the nineteenth century passed into history, it became 
evident to all except the most confirmed wishful thinkers 
that Yellov.r Jack was not to be easily conquered, and that 
Louisiana would continue to experience periodic assaults until 
the cause of the pestilence was finally determined. J. D. B. 
DeBow, in attempting to publicize the salubrity of New Orleans, 
offered to his readers the feeble consolation that in nine of 
the twenty-four summers between 1822 and 1845 only scattered 
cases had been detected, and during one summer the dreaded 
malady had been totally a b s e n t . D u f f y  has found that de­
spite brief respites from the worst attacks, yellow fever 
invasions remained a constant problem in New Orleans between 
1804 and i860 and demonstrated no tendency to subside. At 
times it seemed as though the city had been struck by a tidal 
wave of death. In addition to these visitations of yellow 
fever, residents of the Crescent City underwent two great 
onslaughts of Asiatic cholera during the pre-Civil War years. 
The 1332-33 incursion took the lives of well over five thou­
sand, and during the eight-year period between 1343 and 1355
■^J. D. B. DeBow, ed, pie Commercial Review of the 
South and West (New Orleans, 1846), II, 73. Cited hereinafter 
as DeBowTs Review.
Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, Vol. 1, pp.
345-72 and Vol. 2, manuscript in progress.
nearly ninety-five hundred New Orleanians succumbed. Other 
sections of lower Louisiana as well as numerous river local­
ities were also ravaged by the oriental assailant. Yellow 
fever, however, attacked the state with terrifying regularity, 
focusing attention immovably upon Africa’s contribution to 
Louisiana’s infirmity rather than Asia’s.
Through persistent efforts by a number of physicians, 
most notably Carlos Finlay and Walter Reed, the cause of 
epidemic yellow fever was discovered early in the twentieth 
century. Several nineteenth century physicians had noted un­
usually large numbers of mosquitoes during years when Yellow 
Jack prevailed, but the difficulty was in finding the vital 
connection. In 1SS2 an article appeared in the New Orleans 
Medical and Surgical Journal written by Dr. Carlos Finlay of
Havana propounding the revolutionary theory that the mosquito
13was the carrier of yellow fever. Acceptance of Finlay’s 
discoveries was not immediate, but within the next two decades 
his findings were corroborated, and the riddle was solved-- 
the Aedes aegypti mosquito was the vector of yellow fever. 
Before the truth was established, however, many Louisianians, 
both physicians and laymen, acknowledged their adherence to
Joseph Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs (New 
Orleans, IB90), Vol. 3, Part I, p. cccvi.
Carlos Finlay, "The Mosquito Hypothetically Con­
sidered as an Agent in the Transmission of the Yellow Fever 
Poison,” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n,s.fix (la&L-sn,T r a i n s . ------------------ ----------------
a number of other theories quite at variance with what 
proved to be the real cause of the frequent epidemics.
Most nineteenth century writers can be classified into 
one of three schools of thought with regard to their theories 
of yellow fever transmission. First, there were the conta- 
gionists who believed that the disease was transferred from 
person-to-person. A splinter group of contagionists insisted 
that the yellow pestilence could not be transmitted by per­
sonal contact, but was disseminated by fomites (substances 
peculiarly capable of absorbing, retaining, and transmitting 
infection). Many of the contagionists believed that yellow 
fever could be transmitted in both of these ways. Vital to 
this theory was the assumption that the contagion was import­
ed from sane foreign source. A second group, opposed to the 
contagionists, were the non-contagionists. The non-contagion- 
ists can be subdivided into various categories, but in gen­
eral they claimed that Yellow Jack was a disease of local 
origin and prevailed at certain times because of the presence 
of "miasma” or of an "epidemic constitution" of the atmos­
phere.^ Between these two bitterly antagonistic factions 
were those who alleged that yellow fever was contagious only 
under certain conditions, and those who maintained that it 
was imported in certain instances while arising spontaneously
■^These terms will be discussed in some detail in 
the following paragraph.
in others.'
The first decade of American independence saw still 
another concept as to the cause of disease gain support 
among physicians in this country. Those who adhered to 
this creed contended that all illness was simply a conse­
quence of ’’bad air. ” The environment was contaminated by 
miasmata (the plural of miasma), imaginary, invisible gases 
which supposedly arose from stagnant water and decaying plant 
and animal matter. The great popularizers in the United 
States of this theory were Noah Webster and Dr. Benjamin
Rush. For nearly a century it was to remain the predominant
16etiological dogma among American doctors.
Some theorists chose to combine the miasma credo with 
the ancient concept that there w»as at times an epidemic con­
stitution of the atmosphere. Hippocrates had emphasized 
meteorological variations and seasonal characteristics as 
factors in promoting epidemics. A particular state of the 
atmosphere had a tendency to produce certain diseases. This 
theory survived the Middle Ages and was elaborated upon in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by such eminent men 
as the French physician Guillaume de Baillou (153^-1616) and
ISThe terms ’’contagious” and ”infectious” were elu­
sive ones during the nineteenth century. They were often 
used interchangeably. Some writers did differentiate the 
terms, contending that a contagious disease could be trans­
mitted only by personal contact, whereas an infectious 
disease was capable of being transmitted not only by per­
sonal contact, but also by air, water, and fomites.
■^Snillie, Public Health, pp. 9-11.
the English clinician, Thomas Sydenham (1624-1639). Sydenham 
not only coined the term epidemic constitution, but he also 
has been credited with being the first man to detect the 
mysterious presence of miasma. These notions persisted until 
comparatively recent times and played a major role in en­
couraging sanitary reforms during the nineteenth century.
Miasma, thought reformers, was an enemy which could be and
17should be vigorously assailed.
Two of ante bellum New Orleans1 most distinguished 
physicians, Edward H. Barton and Erasmus D. Fenner, wrote 
extensively in defense of the epidemic constitution as the 
causation for disease. Both men were prolific writers, ardent 
sanitary reformers, and noted yellow fever etiologists.
Barton, professor of materia medica, therapeutics, and hygiene 
at the Medical College of Louisiana, made himself one of the 
city’s most controversial figures by his argumentiveness, his 
presumption, and his fearlessness in promoting measures he 
believed conducive to public health. Barton was especially 
zealous in his advocacy of keeping accurate meteorological 
charts. In his account of the yellow fever epidemic which 
prevailed in New Orleans in 1333 Barton commenced with a 
discussion of thermometric and barometric readings, contending 
that such climatic factors tended to produce, in his words, 
an "epidemic constitution of the atmosphere." He then
17’George Rosen, A History of Public Health (New York. 
1933), pp. 103-105.
10
considered other causative factors, notably the filth in the
lg
streets. More than twenty years later, in an address de­
livered to the Louisiana State Medical Society, Barton 
stated: f,I suppose I shall be deemed an enthusiast when 1
express my belief, that when all the meteorological elements 
that influence man shall have become well understood, that 
the prevalence of each of the great classes of maladies will 
be known to the accurate meteorological observer. • « .”19
Barton repeatedly defended his position in writing. In 
1356 he stated: TTThe character of a fever will, in a great
measure, depend upon the degree of temperature and humidity,
the amount of filth, and the susceptibility of those ex- 
20posed." His thesis is further clarified by this excerpt
from an 1365 speech: "Filth is the electric spark which
fires the other elements. Typhus, smallpox, yellow fever,
measles, and many other diseases, as well as all inter- 
21mittents, may be, in my opinion, generated, without foreign
1 aEdward H. Barton, Account of the Epidemic Yellow 
Fever, which prevailed in New Orleans during the Autumn of 
1333 (Philadelphia, 133417 pp. 3-7.
^ % e w  Orleans Medical Nev/s and Hospital Gazette,
II {1355-55)7 352:
20Edward H. Barton, "Report on the Meteorology, 
Mortality, and Sanitary Condition of New Orleans, for the 
Years 1354 and 1355j1’ Transactions of the American Medical 
Association, IX (1356), 729*
21Types of malarial fever*
11
22importation." But above all, Barton was a reformer.
Early in 1B49 he delivered a warning that unless New Orleans 
were cleared and drained, a proper sewerage system adopted, 
the streets paved, the gutters cleansed regularly, as well 
as some other laudatory improvements, "a large mortality will 
inevitably ensue, together with such an occasional epidemic, 
with its devastating horrors, as will cast a lasting stigma 
on the salubrity of the place, and retard its permanent ad­
vancement to a prosperous and stable condition." Should his 
recommendations be honored, Barton confidently predicted
23that his city would become the healthiest in the country.
Dr. Erasmus D. Fenner, during his long career as writer, 
instructor, and practitioner, was co-editor of both the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal and the New Orleans 
Medical News and Hospital Gazette, the cityTs outstanding 
ante bellum medical periodicals, and was the editor and 
founder of the short-lived, but valuable, Southern Medical 
Reports. He served on the faculty of the Medical College 
of Louisiana, and was instrumental in establishing the New 
Orleans School of Medicine. As a student of yellow fever, 
Fenner agreed with Barton that a knowledge of meteorological
^^Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, LV (1$46),
729.
23Edward H. Barton, Vital Dynamics of New Orleans;
£  Report to the American Medical Association, May, 1#49 
TPhilad elphia, 1^49)> P» 19.
12
variations was basic to the understanding of all disease.
The first chapter of each of his Southern Medical Reports 
was devoted to a study of climatic conditions in New Orleans. 
Fenner had great faith in sanitary reform, believing that 
yellow fever could be completely eliminated from the Crescent 
City if proper measures were taken.^ It was his conviction 
that the practice of quarantine in Louisiana had to be thor­
oughly discredited in order that essential undertakings, jl.
_e., sanitary measures, would become the center of attention. 
Careful observers, he maintained, were of the opinion that
yellow fever originated in New Orleans and was not conta- 
2 5gious. ' Fenner probably ranks as the foremost figure
among the Crescent City’s non-contagionist faction.
Among others classified as non-contagionists was the
noted New Orleans sanitary leader, Dr. J. C. Simonds.
Simonds* work, which included valuable statistical studies,
will be discussed in chapter two. In concluding this
account of the non-contagionists, the following somewhat
ungrammatical statement from Dr. William B. Wood, a Centre-
ville, Louisiana physician, summarizes well their viewpoint:
I believe the poison that gives rise to 
yellow fever, to exist in the atmosphere. Is
2% e w  Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, 
II. (1S55-55T7 500-501.
2^e . D. Fenner, "The Yellow Fever Quarantine at 
New Orleans," Transactions of the American Medical Asso­
ciation, II (1849), 625.
13
generated under peculiar circumstances, 
requiring the influence of certain degrees 
of heat and moisture, added to animal 
vegetable decomposition. That this power, 
when generated, is of local origin, and 
confined to circumscribed districts of 
country, or portions of our country, and 
all who enter within the infected circle, 
and breathe tpe air, are liable to take 
the disease.2°
The contagionists, rejecting the miasma thesis and 
seeing no great importance in meteorology, favored a mari­
time quarantine as the best means of protecting the Crescent 
City from epidemic disease. Within the medical profession 
of pre-Civil War New Orleans, however, the quarantine fac­
tion was not strong. Only a small minority of physicians 
were contagionists, and very few others among the city’s 
influential citizens manifested any anxiety to carry on 
an experiment that might prove injurious to the prosperity 
of their city. Usually it was physicians from localities 
farther upstream, less concerned about the commercial activ­
ities of the Mississippi's great entrepot, who urged that 
quarantine regulations be enacted against vessels coming 
from infected ports. These men believed correctly that 
Yellow Jack had often been brought into New Orleans on 
board ships from the West Indies, and that the entire 
Mississippi Valley was thereby made subject to pestilence.
The history of maritime quarantine goes back to the
2^William B. Wood, T,A Report of the Yellow Fever, 
at Centreville, in 1$55>M New Orleans Medical News and 
Hospital Gazette, II (Id55-5^), 493*
14
27fourteenth century. ' The term quarantine is derived from 
the word quarantenaria, a period of forty days which a ship 
supposedly impregnated with contagious disease, or suspected 
of having sailed from an infected port, was forbidden inter-
osicourse with its destination. The first quarantine adopted
in North America was evidently that which Governor John
V/inthrop of the Massachusetts Bay colony directed against
29Barbados in 1647. Various forms of quarantine continued 
to be utilized throughout the colonial era,^ Immediately 
after the American Revolution the new states assumed re­
sponsibility for the health of their citizens by enacting 
legislation providing for snip q uarantine.However, the 
concluding decade of the eighteenth century brought several 
vicious assaults of yellow fever to the Atlantic seaboard, 
and a question arose as to the efficiency of state quarantine 
laws.32
^Rosen points out that Venice inaugurated the 
practice in 134&. Rosen, History of Public Health, p. 6S.
28lbld., p. 69; Augustin, History of Yellow Fever,
p. 6.
^Elizabeth C. Tandy, "Local Quarantine and Inoc­
ulation for Smallpox in the American Colonies (1620-1775)," 
American Journal of Public Health, XIII (1923)* 203.
3i3Smillie, Public Health, pp. 64-67.
33,Ibid., p. 71.
3^1791* 1793, 1794, and 1795 were years of especially 
severe epidemics. Joseph Jones, Outline of the History, 
Theory, and Practice of Quarantine (New Orleans, 18$3)»
pp. 9-10.
In 1796 the Fourth Congress of the United States, 
meeting in Philadelphia (one of the cities hardest hit by 
yellow fever} considerea the advisability of granting the 
federal government the exclusive duty of establishing and 
maintaining quarantine. Representative Samuel Smith of 
Maryland proposed a resolution authorizing the President to 
impose quarantine against foreign vessels whenever, in his 
opinion, it was necessary. The House Committee on Commerce 
and Manufactures considered the resolution and reported a 
bill empowering the President to provide for quarantine 
stations in American ports as well as giving him authority 
to proclaim quarantines at his discretion. Serious opposi­
tion was voiced against this bill because it seemed to be 
depriving the states of their police powers in the area of 
public health. Mention was also made of the inconvenience 
presumably involved in having a general quarantine main­
tained by an authority many hundreds of miles away. Repre­
sentative Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania was convinced that 
the only clause in the Constitution which would at all coun­
tenance a federal quarantine was the commerce clause, and 
that seemed to be stretching the point.
In the billfs defense Congressman Smith argued that the 
states were incapable of forcibly preventing infected vessels 
from entering their ports, and therefore broader control was 
needed. The bill finally approved was materially weaker than 
the original. Certain federal officers were empowered merely 
to assist the respective states in the execution of their 
quarantines. Three years later this law was superseded by
16
the Quarantine Act of 1799 which somewhat enlarged the powers
of the federal government, at the same time reserving to the
states the primary authority in most matters pertaining to 
33quarantine,
The state of Louisiana had two significant experiences 
with quarantine legislation early in the nineteenth century.-^ 
The first law was enacted in March, 1&18. It contained pro­
visions specifying which vessels were to be inspected, when 
they were to be inspected, the length of time they were to 
be kept in quarantine, the charge for this service, and the
amount of fine that violators of the statute would be required
3 5to pay, A quarantine station with a lazaretto ' was to be
constructed, at an undeten: ined place below New Orleans. Some
of the details of the act are interesting:
. . , all vessels at the quarantine ground, 
from any place in the West-Indies, and from any
33j\nnals of the Congress of the United States, Fourth 
Congress— First Session (Washington, 1049), pp. 1347-59;
Fifth Congress (Washington, 1#51)j PP* 3^02-$04*
34During the Spanish Period Governor Salcedo had in 
1$02 attempted to institute a quarantine. The failure of 
that measure was caused chiefly by an inefficient inspection 
system. In 1$17 the City Council of New Orleans tried un­
successfully to enforce a maritime quarantine, Duffy, ed., 
Medicine in Louisiana, I, 229-30; Proceedings of the City 
Council, Vol. 3i Book 1, W. P. A. tr. in New Orleans Public 
Library, New Orleans, Louisiana, pp. 5-6, 11-12, 19-20.
35a lazaretto was a "pesthouse" for the detention 
of persons arriving on vessels subjected to quarantine. 
Smillie, Public Health, p. 63.
17
port or place in America, as far north 
as the state of South Carolina, or from 
any port or place on the coast of Africa,
. . .  or from any port, island, or other 
place in the Mediterranean or in Asia, 
or from the Madeira, Canary, Cape de Verd,
Bermuda or Bahama Islands, between the 
last day of May ana the first day of De­
cember in any year, shall remain at quar­
antine not less than four days after 
their arrival, and that no intercourse 
shall be permitted during ti;at period 
between the crew or crews, or passengers 
of such vessels and the city of New Or­
leans. . .
This was trie type of general quarantine, indiscriminately 
applied to all vessels arriving from a great number of ports, 
that was greeted with irate condemnation both in lBlo and 
later whei it vras attempted by the State Board of Health. 
Powerful business interests, supported by a majority of the 
medical faculty, complained of an unjustifiable interference 
with the commerce of New Orleans, and as a result the quar­
antine was abolished in 1B19. The very next summer the city 
suffered one of its worst invasions of Yellow Jack, and the 
advocates of quarantine renewed the clamor for protection.
The ever-increasing menace of yellow fever in New Orleans 
moved the Legislature in 1$21 to approve a measure entitled, 
"An Act to provide against the introduction of Infectious 
Disease." Indicative of popular, as opposed to professional, 
opinion, this act classified yellow fever as an infectious 
disease. Maritime quarantine was to be invoked against 
vessels suspected of transporting disease, the term of
3^Acts passed at the Second Session of the Third 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . T&21~7New 
Or1eans, 18117j pp. 124-52.
IB
quarantine being a minimum, of fifteen days for those exper­
iencing sickness during the voyage and a minimum of ten days 
for those sailing from infected ports. The law provided 
that all craft considered dangerous must stop at a detention 
station, or quarantine ground, which was to be located near 
Fort St. Philip. These vessels were not only to be detained, 
but they were also required to undergo thorough cleansing 
and purification.-^
The onslaught of Yellow Jack could not be restrained.
New Orleans sustained a fairly heavy mortality from that 
disease in lo22, 1$23> and again in l£24» Quarantine seem­
ingly had failed, and as in 1$19> the business interests and 
the non-contagionist faction among the city's physicians 
induced the state Legislature to repeal the quarantine law. 
But the quarantine issue was far from dead. Doctors, busi­
nessmen, and most New Orleans newspapers continued to point 
to the necessity of keeping commerce free from any restric­
tions which might adversely affect the city’s prosperity. 
Unquestionably quarantine did involve serious inconvenience 
and expense. Nonetheless, many New Orleanians held to the 
conviction that despite all the objections to quarantine 
it might yet prove to be the most effective manner of cop­
ing with the mysterious enemy. Their argument seemed con­
vincing. They said the greatest threat to the prosperity
3?Acts passed at the First Session of the Fifth 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . ... 1&21 (New 
Orleans, 18217, pp. "68-92•
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of New Orleans was disease, notably yellow fever. Aside from 
the frightful mortality, each epidemic was likely to cost the 
city millions of dollars through the diversion of trade. Why 
not, then, expend every effort and utilize all possible means 
to avert those costly scourges?
Others among the medical faculty of New Orleans denied 
both the contagious nature of yellow fever and the theory of 
meteorological-miasmatic causation. The eminent, though 
aberrant, Dr. Samuel A. Cartwright complained that these an­
tagonistic factions were alike in their unscientific approach 
and their adherence to abstractions. He spoke of quarantine 
as the "perish commerce" doctrine, and declared that efforts 
to eliminate filth from New Orleans were "worse than useless 
as a preventive of disease." Cartwright’s solution was to 
provide work in the shade for poor whites and immigrants, 
the classes most susceptible to yellow fever, ana to reduce 
taxes so that the poor would not be deprived of food, cloth­
ing, and shelter. "All those sanitary measures . . . which 
may be instituted to protect New Orleans against pestilence, 
would be incomplete and ineffectual," he averred, "unless 
the practice of making negroes out of the master race of 
men, and turning them out to labor in the hot summer’s sun, 
be abolished.
Samuel A. Cartwright, "Prevention of Yellow Fever," 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X (1&53-5k)»
2_94~306; DeBow’s Review," XXVI (T359)» 411*
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Credit for a somewhat novel theory of combatting 
epidemics must go to Dr. Albert W. Ely of the Crescent City. 
Ely contended that too much attention was given to the ex­
ternal causes of disease, and too little to the human boay. 
Governments had been notoriously unsuccessful in preventing 
the spread of disease, declared Ely, because they had con­
cerned themselves with such things as quarantine, fumigations, 
and imaginary miasms. The panacea was the construction of 
public baths. The body could be mightily armed by cleanli­
ness, and pestilence would be summarily routed. “Modern 
nations have borrowed from the ancient Romans almost every­
thing worth borrowing,” asserted Ely, “except their magnif- 
3 9icent baths.” 7
Dr. Bennet Dowler, for many years editor of the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, advised yellow fever 
theorists to keep an open mind. Since the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, yellow fever attracted so much 
attention in New Orleans that all kinds of opinions were 
expressed concerning the cause of epidemics, Dowler stated, 
and such hypotheses tended to become increasingly positive 
and dogmatic. It was reported, he said, that a public 
lecturer had recently maintained, that yellow fever in the 
South was caused by eating the opossum. Dowler declared
39Albert W. Ely, "On the Revival of the Roman Thermae, 
or Ancient Public Baths," DeBow’s Review, II (1&46), 22S-39*
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that the public was so desirous of knowing the reason for 
New Orleans’ recurrent pestilential invasions that ’’almost 
every writer on this malady /"yellow fever_7> whether born 
to solve this problem or not, thinks it his bounden duty to 
satisfy the public, and to glorify science and himself, by 
conceiving clearly and revealing fully what no one thor­
oughly acquainted with both the amount of our positive 
knowledge and deplorable ignorance of . . . causes can pro­
nounce upon with certainty.”^
New Orleans’ unenviable reputation for filthy streets 
and an air permeated with foul odors was well known. No one, 
not even those who proclaimed the salubrity of the city, had 
the temerity to deny that this infamous reputation was jus­
tified at least in part. This situation was especially ser­
ious for those within and without the medical profession 
.who placed filth and disease in very close association. But 
in spite of the sanitary problems, newspapers and periodi­
cals repeatedly made the claim that New Orleans was indeed 
very healthy. The editor of the New Orleans Medical and 
Surgical Journal boasted in 1846 "that when a fair compar­
ison should be instituted, the annual mortality of New Or­
leans would be found to be as small in proportion to the 
population as any large city in the Union; or indeed, the
^Bennet Dowler, ’’Yellow Fever Epidemics of Norfolk 
and New Orleans in 1855; with General Remarks and Reflec­
tions," New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XII
(1855-5677” 321-39.
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world. The New-Qrleans Directory for 1342 declared:
"No City on earth has been more slandered on account of its 
general health than New-Orleans. The bugbear of its dread­
ful mortality is, however, fast fading away before the 
light of truth. Frequently statements appeared in the
press that the city was enjoying "uninterrupted health" or 
"perfect salubrity." Only an occasional epidemic marred 
the record, said these writers. J. D. B. DeBow asserted 
that in ordinary seasons yellow fever was "almost unimpor­
tant," and that "on an average of the year-round, New Or­
leans exhibits as small a mortality as any other great 
commercial city in our country."^ Witnin a few years, 
however, these claims were perceptibly modified by the 
findings of Drs. Barton and Sirnonds.
Usually, whenever an epidemic forced the press to 
acknowledge a high mortality, the announcement was accom­
panied by a reassurance that the "resident and respectable" 
population had not been attacked, and that the deaths were 
confined almost entirely to the lower classes, especially 
immigrants.^ DeBow alleged: "The cautious, the prudent
^•%ew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, II 
(1345-46 ),T91.
^New-Orleans Directory for 1342 (New Orleans,
1342), II, 14.
^DeBow1s Review, IV (1347), 401.
^ T h e  thousands of poverty-stricken Irish and German 
immigrants who settled in New Orleans during the 1340*s and 
1350’s constituted a very real problem.
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and the more regular classes entirely escape the danger, 
while the destitute and dissolute fall."^5 The "unacclimated" 
person was indeed in danger. Medical men were in disagree­
ment as to the precise definition of the term "unacclimated," 
but there was a positive consensus tnat among this class 
Yellow Jack and other epidemic diseases took by far the 
heaviest toll. The New Orleans Directory for 1$3$ affirmed 
the belief that "500 die every year in passing through the 
acclimating process."^
Dr. Barton, a prolific writer on most aspects of yellow 
fever, agreed that the "cost of acclimation" was very high. 
Barton*s definition of acclimation was "the adaptation of 
man's physical and moral nature to the physical and moral 
conditions of a country." By physical conditions he meant 
"elements of climate," ana by moral conditions he meant 
"manners, modes of life, etc." Barton was a determined ad­
vocate of "temperance" for the unacclimated. By observing 
a proper diet, abstaining from stimulating drinks, wearing 
heat-repellent clothing, exercising, and bathing frequently, 
the acclimating process could be made easy. "Unfortunately,"
wrote Barton, " . . .  this climate has to stand answerable for
A.7all the sins of juleps and champagne— beef and bacon I"
^QeBow*s Review, IV (l£47)> 401,
^ Gibson*s Guide and Directory of the State of 
Louisiana j£l’8'3&_/""• • • (New Orleans, lEJ£), pi 2^ .
47gdward H. Barton, Introductory Lecture on Accli­
mation . . . (New Orleans, 1&37)» pp• 1-9•
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Most physicians of the mid-nineteenth century believed that 
acclimation to yellow fever could be acquired only by having 
recovered from the disease. The comparative exemption of 
creoles from the pestilence apparently resulted from an 
inherited immunity. Thus, the rather common assertion that 
"our creole and acclimated citizens enjoy as good health as 
any in the world. . . ,
Most New Orleanians were certain their city was destined 
to enjoy a bright future and claimed that the sanitary re­
formers had been exaggerating. Even if New Orleans were a 
filthy city plagued by nuisances, it was felt that the less 
said about it the better. Denunciations were heaped upon 
enemies from the outside who tried to picture the Crescent 
City as "the black-hole of a modern Calcutta." City offi­
cials and responsible citizens argued that the appalling 
mortality tables of New Orleans were not only incomplete 
and inaccurate, but also deceptive. Many of those who died 
in the city, went the argument, were incurables who had 
migrated there because of the "genial climate and temperate 
l a t i t u d e , j f  only the facts were made known, New Orleans 
could no longer be slandered.
The facts, when they were compiled and published by
^ N e w  Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, II
(1845-46) ,”T57•
^Ibid., VIII (1851-52), 135-
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illustrious members of the medical faculty, came as a 
shock. Even after omitting from the mortality lists the 
deaths caused by epidemics, hew Orleans was demonstrably 
unhealthy. It was only with this salient realization that 
public health in Louisiana achieved any substantial pro­
gress. Furthermore, the most fatal epidemic in the state’s 
history was required before Louisianians were ready to in­
stitute a permanent health organization. However, the half 
century preceding the creation of the State Board of Health 
was not entirely barren of reform, and consequently that 
era deserves adequate attention.
CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN LOUISIANA, 1804-53
The history of public health and sanitation in Loui­
siana can be traced back to the forty years of Spanish rule. 
New Orleans was at that time only a small city> and the 
entire province was very sparcely populated."'' Fortunately 
there were New Orleanians, sometimes influential ones, who 
were interested in improving the appearance as well as the 
salubrity of their city by promoting sanitary reforms. 
Measures aiming at swamp drainage, street cleaning, improved 
interment practices, and maritime quarantine were discussed
pand acted upon during the era before the Louisiana Purchase. 
Little material progress was achieved, however, because of 
the general indifference and inertia which characterized 
both the Spanish officials and the residents of the city.
Only the ravages of a fearful epidemic seemed motivation 
enough to rouse the populace from its lethargy.
Within the first year after the establishment of the
-'-Estimates as late as 1785 placed the population of 
the Crescent City at barely five thousand, and that of the 
vast area known as Louisiana at between ten and fourteen 




American regime in New Orleans, the City Council created 
what evidently was the city’s first effective Board of 
Health* A permanent "health committee" was chosen by the 
Council, and its five members, two of whom were physicians, 
were commissioned by Governor William C. C. Claiborne July 
9, 1304. This Board of Health met each week and presented 
reports to the Council. It had power to enforce sanitation 
and was authorized to assume control of the decrepit quar­
antine system established by Spanish Governor Salcedo in 
1302. In the interest of public health the Council on 
July 25 adopted an ordinance requiring butchers to clean 
slaughterhouses of all accumulated filth "so as to remove 
the danger of the very contagious diseases which all this 
decaying matter might cause."^ During the August 3 session 
of the Council the Board of Health advised that the Commis­
sioner General of Police be urged to require that all garbage 
and filth be thrown into the river instead of being dumped 
near the Protestant cemetery, and second, that an ordinance 
be passed necessitating that "all Physicians, Surgeons, and 
Apothecaries pass an examination before the Faculty, when 
they cannot produce their diplomas. . . ." The Council re­
solved that the first proposal was not practicable because 
of the batture;^ but the examination requirement was approved,
3lbid., pp. 333-34.
^Proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 1, Book 1, 
pp. 143-44.
^The elevated river bed that was laid bare when the 
river was low. It tended to collect all sorts of deposits.
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thus aiding the Board in combatting quackery.^
The Board of Health attacked such abuses as the prac­
tice of burying the dead too close to the surface of the 
ground and the failure to maintain sanitary conditions at 
Charity Hospital; it asserted also that the "incapacity of 
women of every color practicing Midwifery is making daily 
more victims of their ignorance. . . »" The Board's at­
tempt to expose conditions at Charity Hospital provoked 
bitter replies from the director of the hospital, Dr. Louis 
Fortin. Fortin, who was ultimatly dismissed, denied that 
conditions were as intolerable as portrayed, and claimed
that the information which was the basis of the expose' had
7been obtained by questioning patients.'
During 1H04 the achievements of the New Orleans Board 
of Health were indeed extensive. On September 12 the Coun­
cil considered a letter from the Board declaring its in­
tention to organize a medical society so that doctors might 
"submit the result of their observations, which would be 
recorded in a periodical journal and form a treatise on 
diseases in Louisiana and their cure.” The Council, being 
aware of "the discord existing among physicians,” implored
the governor to intervene in the hope of consummating this
asalutary project. Claiborne expressed his hearty approval
Proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 1, Book 1, 
pp. 151-52.
?Ibid., pp. 154> 169-75.
gIbid., p. 174.
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of the proposed monthly meetings of the society, but be­
cause he professed to know little about "medical subjects," 
he declined the honor of delivering the initial lecture. A 
meeting of the medical society was held in November, but 
there is no further record of its proceedings. The sharp 
conflict developing between the French and the American 
physicians in New Orleans may well have made this organiza­
tion unworkable.9
Early in 1305 the Board of Health seems to have been 
permitted to fall into desuetude. The energy manifested by 
the Board during the year 1304 was in large measure a result 
of the major epidemics of both smallpox and yellow fever 
which descended upon the city. The improvement of general 
health conditions in 1305 apparently convinced most New Or­
leanians that the Board had outlived its usefulness, and 
during the succeeding decade no similar institution was
n ncreated.
Public health was not entirely neglected in the years 
following the death of New Orleans1 first effective health 
organization. Dr. John Watkins, who had supplied the Board 
of Health with much of its energy, became Mayor of the city 
in July, 1305* Shortly thereafter, he and the Council se­
cured the Governor’s permission to eliminate certain pools 
of water which were deemed injurious to the city’s health.
^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 336-37. 
^°Ibid., pp. 339-90.
Furthermore, both the Territorial Legislature and the City 
Council showed considerable interest in conditions at 
Charity Hospital.^ One piece of early legislation is 
worthy of attention. The Legislative Council of the Terri­
tory of New Orleans, during its first session enacted a law 
empowering the Governor to appoint one or more inspectors 
of flour, beef, and pork. All such provisions coming into 
New Orleans were to be examined carefully and graded in 
order that accurate weight and fair representation of qual­
ity would be maintained. The fine for altering the mark of 
an inspector was fifty dollars, half of which would go to
12the prosecutor and the other half to the Charity Hospital.
It is not known whether this law was efficiently executed, 
but certainly the mere fact the legislation existed indi­
cates an awareness of the importance of food in determining 
the general healthfulness of the populace.
Though very little progress was made in sanitation 
during the decade after 1&05, Mayor Girod in 1&12 proceeded 
in the right direction by decreeing that excrement had to 
be thrown into the river. ^  Unfortunately, little attention 
was given to the problem of getting the waste into the 
current. The resulting conditions were described by
llVoid,} pp. 390-91.
^2Acts passed at the First Session of the Legisla­
tive Council of the Territory of Orleans, December 3i 1804 
(n .p ., n .d.) pp. 39&-406
13 Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 392.
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Governor Claiborne: ". . . the pollution constantly strik­
ing a person walking on the Levee, and which arises from the 
filth of the city thrown into the water’s edge, is too offen­
sive for a civilized person to submit to."^
A great flood precipitated the next important measure 
in the long and arduous battle against filth in the Crescent 
City. New Orleanians were sufficiently aroused by the dread­
ful inundation of 1816 to grant a body of medical men author­
ity for the maintenance and promotion of public health. The 
Comite' Medical, or "health committee of New Orleans," a body 
originally established to regulate medical licensing, was 
assigned the task of dealing with the dangerous health situ­
ation created by the uncontrolled waters of the turbulent 
Mississippi.^ On May 10 the Council requested that this 
Board render advice as to what means should be taken to 
prevent miasmata from vitiating the air when the flood waters 
receded.^
The Committee recommended that all streets, gutters, 
and houses be thoroughly washed as quickly as it became 
feasible to do so. Homes were not to be re-entered until 
they were completely dry and had been fumigated. Six inches
l^The Louisiana and Mississippi Almanac for the year 
1&131 quoted in ]_ Jones__/, Annual Report of the Board of
Health of the State of Louisiana, to the General AssemSTy,
for the Year 1882 (Baton Rouge, lS'SJ), p. 29f»
■ ^ D u f f y ,  ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 393.
^Proceedings of the City Council, Vol. 2, Book 6,
p. 9.
of quick lime was to be thrown over the cemetery upon the 
recession of the flood waters, and bodies which had become 
exposed were to be reinterred in deep graves. The Charity 
Hospital was to be subjected to an exhaustive cleansing be­
fore it could resume operation. The Board also suggested 
the construction of three dumping wharves on the river bank 
to dispose of refuse, dead bodies, and sewage. But even if 
these recommendations were followed, thought the members of 
the new Board of Health, the epidemic might still be unavoid­
able. Reflecting contemporary medical theory, the Board 
asserted that vast areas had been flooded and later exposed 
to the sun’s rays, and warned that Trif some favorable meteor, 
such as rain or a strong wind in a favorable direction, does 
not come to the aid of the said means . . . disease, more or 
less grave, will spread its ravages among the inhabitants of 
the city." Individuals were exhorted to strengthen their 
resistance against disease by bathing;, living temperately,
and eating wholesome food. Fumigation was also counted upon
17heavily to battle the terrifying miasmata. ' Undoubtedly 
the Board’s advice was sound, and it may have contributed 
to rendering the year l£l6 free from serious pestilence.
On March 1$, 1317 the City Council established New 
Orleans’ first great sanitary code. The twenty-four ordi­
nances comprising the code dealt with a multiplicity of 
abuses, many of which had attracted the attention of previous
^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 393-95.
councils. Property owners and tenants were required to 
clean the sidewalks and gutters in front of their houses 
daily, and during the summer they were obliged to water the 
streets. Oysters were not to be sold in the city during 
the summer. Privies had to be dug at least three feet from 
the property line and at least seven feet deep; they could 
be emptied only during the night, at which time the contents 
were to be dumped into the river or poured into deep trenches. 
A prohibition was ordained against the deposit of excrement, 
garbage, liquor, or filth of any kind in gutters, ditches, 
canals, and on sidewalks, as well as on the levee and the 
river bank.
The sanitary code forbade the raising of hogs within 
the city limits and stipulated that stables and cattle sheds 
were to be kept Min the greatest condition of cleanliness.” 
Stagnant water was not to be allowed to stand on lots, yards, 
or grounds within the city. Permission to construct addi­
tional slaughterhouses, tanneries, starchworks, private 
hospitals, or sanitariums within New Orleans or the incor­
porated suburbs was to be denied. The killing or skinning 
of cattle within the city limits was absolutely forbidden. 
There were to be no burials in churches, temples, chapels, 
or any building where people assembled ”for the celebration 
of their cults;” all burials within the city’s confines were 
restricted to the cemeteries. Graves had to be at least 
four feet deep, and no more than one body was to be placed 
in a grave. Owners of dead animals were required to bury
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them outside the city limits. The Mayor was authorized to
prevent the unloading of leather, furs, coffee, salt meat,
or other provisions damaged to an extent they might be
dangerous to the public health. It was made unlawful to
keep spoiled meat or fish anywhere in the city. Fines were
1 aspecified for violations of each of the ordinances. This 
sanitary code shows clearly the immense concern felt by New 
Orleanians regarding putrefaction believed to emit miasma, 
and in turn, to produce the spread of disease.
The year 181? brought the return of yellow fever to New 
Orleans. The Council attempted to head it off by adopting 
a quarantine, but this measure was put into operation much 
too late. Early in June news was received of an outbreak in
the West Indies, but the quarantine could not be readied
until July 26 because the details of inspection had to be 
worked out. The quarantine, when it did finally go into
effect, provided a strict control of incoming vessels. No
ship was to enter the port of New Orleans without a certif­
icate signed by at least two physicians. Significantly, 
recognition was given by the Council that the quarantine 
could scarcely operate without the cooperation of the Gov­
ernor, the Parish Judge, and r,the commodore.tT It became 
evident that the state was much more able than the city to
-^Ordinances and Resolutions of the City Council, 
December 24, 1816, to February 19, 1821, W. P. A. tr. in 
New Orleans Public Library, pp. 229-38.
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provide the needed quarantine station downstream.^ The 
epidemic raged with unremitting fury during August and Sep­
tember. On September 20 the Council adopted a resolution 
"to insure public sanitation and to find means of giving 
assistance to the indigent sick. . . . "  In addition to 
providing for daily cleansing of the streets and gutters, 
this measure made it possible to care for the sick and des­
titute at city expense. Medical treatment, drugs, and food
o nwere made available to those in need during the emergency. 
The alarming mortality resulting From the visitation 
of Yellow Jack, together with the signal failure of the city 
of New Orleans to act with resolve in imposing quarantine, 
goaded the state Legislature to action early in l£lS. "An 
Act to establish a Board of Health and Health Office, and 
to prevent the introduction of Malignant, Pestilential and 
Infectious Diseases into the City of New Orleans" was passed 
March 17. The Board of Health, as it was officially termed, 
was comprised of five men, three of whom were licensed phy­
sicians. The primary function of this body was to adminis­
ter the new quarantine imposed as a part of the same act.
The details of the quarantine and of its demise were related 
in chapter one. The Board was also charged with the duty of 
seeing to the removal from the city of all filth which might




piendanger the public health.
The Board of Health found itself confronted by formi­
dable opponents. Aside from the expected antagonism of 
commercial interests and a large faction of physicians, the 
Board also discovered the City Council to be aggravatingly 
hostile. One Board member reported* in the Louisiana Courier 
that city officials had been notably uncooperative, espe­
cially with regard to the vital matter of rendering financial 
assistance. Despite the explicit provision in the act re­
quiring the City Council and the Police Jury of Orleans Par­
ish to levy a tax on slaves and real estate, complained the 
writer, no action had been taken. The Council, resenting 
the transfer of some of its powers to the Board of Health, 
"took umbrage" against the health authorities, he continued, 
and "observed profound silence" when the Board attempted to 
borrow the needed c a p i t a l . ^2
The act creating the New Orleans Board of Health and 
the quarantine was repealed within the space of one year.
The Governor, by the act of repeal, was authorized to pro­
claim any further quarantine at his own discretion, but in 
granting this power to the Chief Executive, the Legislature
seems merely to have been pacifying disgruntled contagion-
. 23ists.
21Acts passed at the Second Session of the Third 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 1^1^, pp. 124-52.
^Louisiana Courier, August 23, 1313.
^Jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, Vol. 3>
Part 1, p. cxliv.
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Two years later, in 1321, the Louisiana lawmakers again 
attempted to halt the nearly perennial incursions of Yellow 
Jack by establishing another state quarantine. A new sani­
tary code was also formulated. The Board of Health was re­
established and was granted extensive powers in matters 
pertaining to quarantine and to sanitation. The Board was 
to be responsible for establishing and maintaining quaran­
tine stations and for seeing that streets were cleaned and 
nuisances removed. This act also required the daily publi­
cation during the summer of a detailed account of deaths in 
New Orleans. ^  Little is known of the Board's effectiveness 
in promoting sanitation, although it is evident from Board 
of Health notices appearing in New Orleans newspapers that 
its members were actively at work in their official capaci­
ty. The Mayor of New Orleans was the ex-officio President 
of the body, and unlike the situation in 131$, the health 
officials and the City Council were able to work together 
harmoniously. The l^ayor appears to have been particularly 
interested in sanitary reform. Unfortunately the majority 
of New Orleanians had become inured to the opprobrious
condition of their city and were apathetic regarding any
25kind of change. '
Reformers endeavoring to transform New Orleans into a
^Acts passed at the First Session of the Fifth 
Legislature . . . 1321, pp. 63-92. The features of the 
quarantine were described in chapter one.
^^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 401-404.
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clean, healthy city were repeatedly thwarted by a much 
larger number of citizens who denied that their city was 
unhealthy. This latter group claimed to the contrary that 
New Orleans was unusually salubrious, and regarded both quar­
antine and sanitation as expensive, useless innovations. The 
advocates of quarantine against the importation of yellow 
fever were dealt a crushing blow by epidemics which followed 
the establishment of the most recent quarantine law. The 
year 1321 was free from pestilence, but the following summer 
witnessed the return of Yellow Jack in all its fury. The 
result was a mass meeting which took place in the Crescent 
City in January, 1323. The participants moved and carried,
11that the late epidemic had tested the total inefficiency 
of the quarantine laws and regulations; we consider them not 
only useless, but in the highest degree oppressive and in­
jurious to the commerce of this city; and that application 
ought to be made to the Legislature for the purpose of 
having them annulled.11 A memorial to that effect was 
straightway addressed to the Legislature, but without imme­
diate success. Governor Robertson echoed the prevailing 
sentiment: "The State resorted to quarantine, under the
expectation that it would add to the chances of escape from 
this dreadful visitation ^“yellow fever__7 « If this hope be 
fallacious, if not good effect has been produced, if even 
a procrastination of its appearance has not resulted from 
the measure, then should it be abandoned, and our commerce 
relieved from the expense and inconvenience which it
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occasions.
Sentiment for repeal of the quarantine law became in­
creasingly strong among influential classes in New Orleans. 
Nonetheless, the Legislature granted the quarantine a rather 
lengthy trial. Eventually, however, the experiment had to 
be written off as a failure. Early in 1$25 the Legislature 
abolished the Board of Health and ordered the Governor to 
dispose of the quarantine station and the property previously 
held by the Board,^ Thus New Orleans had three Boards of 
Health during a period of less than ten years, and all of 
them might reasonably be classified as failures. The ex­
piration of the first quarter of the nineteenth century 
found the public health movement in New Orleans, and in 
all of Louisiana, still in its infancy.
New Orleans was rapidly becoming a great commercial 
city. As the settlement of the Midwest proceeded apace in 
the thirties and forties, produce in ever-increasing quan­
tities descended the Mississippi to New Orleans where it 
was transshipped on ocean-going vessels. During its com­
mercial ’'golden age,” between 1825 and 1&40, the Crescent 
City became renowned for its wealth and was rivalled only 
by New York as the first port in the nation. The intense
26jones, Medical and Surgical Memoirs, Vol. 3? Part 
1, pp. cxlvi-cxlviii.
2^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, I, 405.
2#Jerome St. Julien Ducrest, ’’New Orleans Commerce, 
1830-1860” (M. A. thesis, Louisiana State University,
1926), p. 3.
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activity and prosperity characterizing New Orleans during 
those years did not fail to attract travelers from the 
East and from Europe. Florence Brink has noted that ac­
counts of the bustling metropolis written by visitors al­
most invariably contained a description of muddy streets, 
filthy gutters, odious mosquitoes, dread of epidemics, and 
general untidiness and lack of sanitation.^9 New Or­
leans came to rely increasingly upon foreign and domestic 
trade, residents tended to become ever more sensitive to 
criticism by outsiders. To those inconsiderate enough to 
mention New OrleansT unhealthfulness and heavy mortality, 
its defenders could point out, with a considerable degree 
of truth, that the sizeable "floating population" was in 
large measure responsible. There was certainly some foun­
dation for the ubiquitous fear that to admit New Orleans 
was more unhealthy than other port cities would be detri­
mental to her future prosperity. Moreover, despite re­
current epidemics, most of the residents of the booming 
entrepot were too busy to concern themselves with matters 
of public health and sanitation.
The yellow fever invasion in 1337 brought the creation 
of a new health board by the Society Me'dicale de la Nouvelle 
Orleans, the cityfs French medical society. However, little,
^Florence Roos Brink, "Literary Travellers in 
Louisiana Between 1$03 and 1360," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly, XXXI (194-3), 399.
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10if any, use appears to have been made of this body." Four 
years later a combination of public pressure and an impend­
ing yellow fever outbreak bestirred city officials to in­
stitute another Board of Health for New Orleans. The 
General Council^1 passed an ordinance in June, 1$41 estab­
lishing a Board to consist of three aldermen, three phy­
sicians, and three private citizens. This new body was 
invested with authority to adopt and enforce sanitary reg­
ulations and was required to publish a mortality list at
12stated intervals. The Board, under the presidency of 
Dr. Edward H. Barton, appears to have been quite active 
daring the epidemic of 1B41> but public interest in san­
itation was still noticeably lacking. The Picayune, on 
August 26, printed a notice from BartonTs office pro­
claiming the prevalence of yellow fever in New Orleans, 
although noting that the disease was "mostly confined to 
the laboring classes and the intemperate." Barton warned
the unacclimated to be especially careful of intemperance
33in their "drink, food, or indulgence of the passions."
^Duffy, ed., Medicine in Louisiana, II, manu­
script in progress.
^Between 1&36 and 1$52 New Orleans was divided 
into three municipalities, each having its own council. 
There was, however, a General Council empowered to deal 
with matters of concern to all three municipalities.
32New Orleans Medical Journal, I (1644-45)> 96-97.
33New Orleans Daily Picayune, August 26, 1&41.
The 1341 epidemic was one of the most deadly in the 
history of New Orleans. The Board of Health could do little 
against its unsuspected foes, the Aeaes aegyptl, although 
it did provide mortality figures which were printed in the 
newspapers until the yellow pestilence disappeared in No­
vember. During 1342 the Board became virtually inactive, 
and before the close of the following year it had ceased 
to function.Consequently the General Council in 1344 
constituted the Hedico-Chirurgical Society, an organization 
of both French and American doctors, as the Board of Health 
for New Orleans. The Society, in turn, created nine of its 
members into a "Committee of Public Hygiene." Sanitary re­
forms were promulgated, but as in the past, very little of 
a practical nature seems to have been accomplished,-^
The Council was commendably rigid in its determination 
to bring into existence an effective health board. On July 
16, 1346 another organization was created, this one com­
prised of twelve practicing physicians. The Board of Health, 
as it was again termed, was charged with keeping accurate 
meteorogical records, complete morta_Lity statistics, and 
instructed to give early notice of the existence of an 
epidemic disease. In addition, the new' body was to have 
the entire sanitary condition of the city under its
34New Orleans Medical Journal, I (1344-45)» 97• 
35ibid., pp, 97, 217.
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supervision and control.-^ At the organizational meeting 
held August 20, Dr. James Jones was elected President of 
the Board, although he relinquished the post to Dr. William 
P. Hort before the end of the year.
The new Board of Health was assailed later in the year 
by some New Orleans newspapers for having failed to report 
the presence of a yellow fever epidemic. The Board replied 
that many of the reported cases were in reality malaria, and 
the public should feel assured that well-authenticated cases 
would be made known.3? The Daily Delta printed a letter 
from TTF.n (possibly Femmer) defending the position of the 
Board:
It is lamentable to witness the state 
of feeling among the community in regard 
to the Board of Health and the prevailing 
sickness. It is known that v/henever any 
thing like fellow Fever appears at this 
season of the year it becomes a subject of 
the most vague, perverted or exaggerated 
rumor. As a vast number of persons in all 
parts of the country are upon the eve of 
coming to the city for the purpose of 
commencing the business of the season, the 
most intense effort is felt and all sorts . 
of inquiries are made in regard to the 
safety of the step. . . . It is by no 
means an easy matter to make a perfectly 
correct report of the existing state of 
health when an epidemic is just beginning 
to prevail. The position of the Board of 
Health in this city is any thing but an 
enviable one— they are urged, entreated, 
commanded to report, and perhaps as soon
3^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, III, 
(1B46-47) .T7l 7 741 /-72; Picayune, July 17, 1^46.
37New Orleans Daily Delta, August 22, IB46; 
Picayune, October 1&, 13457
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as they have done so with the best lights 
they could obtain, they are accused of 
falsehood by some, of ignorance by others, 
and totally damned by another set, as 
prejudice or sordid pecuniary interest 
may dictate.'®
The letter accurately presented the problem. Whenever pes­
tilence struck New Orleans, the officials whose power it 
was to declare an epidemic were attacked bitterly by one 
faction if they did so, and by another faction if they did 
not. In this case the Board of Health seems to have been 
correct in refusing to proclaim the prevalence of yellow 
fever.
The importance attached to the problem of epidemic 
diseases did not prevent the Board from devoting a great 
deal of attention to sanitary reform. The first Report of 
the New Orleans Board of Health, written by Dr. William P. 
Hort, contained a warning against undue confidence that epi­
demic yellow fever would never return. Hort was greatly 
disturbed that regulations would not be carried out fully. 
The city was unusually filthy, declared the Report, and 
attention was directed particularly to the river banks 
upon which filth and garbage of every description had been 
deposited. The Report asserted further: "Complaints of
stagnant and putrid water in vacant lots, and even under 
houses in some instances, in the back streets of the city, 
were made early in the season; and the stagnant and putrid
-̂ Daily Delta, October 1B, 181+6.
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condition of the gutters, and the accumulation of filth at 
the crossings of the streets . . . was a subject of general 
remark." Approbation was given to the recommendations made 
in 1$45 by the Physico-Medical Society, an organization of 
New Orleans’ English-speaking physicians. Among the recom­
mendations were those for removal of nuisances from back 
yards and lots, filling of swampy places within the city 
limits, removal of offal from the streets, cleaning the 
streets by using the free flow of river water whenever 
possible, and requiring scavengers (collectors) to throw 
garbage and offal into the current of the river rather than 
in empty lots or in the rear of the city. The Report also 
commended Dr. Ely’s proposal that free baths be made avail­
able to the public. ^  The measures advocated by the Board 
of Health contained very little, if anything, new. Sani­
tary codes had been on the books for three decades, but 
adequate attention had never been given to the problem of 
enforcement. Despite the Board’s efforts, general health 
conditions in New Orleans at the end of IB46 were indeed 
deplorable.
The following summer, the General Council of New Or­
leans adopted an ordinance providing a mild quarantine 
for the protection of the city. Vessels arriving at New 
Orleans with infectious or contagious disease on board
•^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, III
(1&46-47)
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had to anchor in the middle of the river just below the city 
until the disease disappeared. The Mayor was empowered to 
enforce this provision. The Board of Health was charged 
with the duty of inspecting infected vessels and diseased 
persons and reporting the results of its investigations to 
the Mayor. Vessels were forbidden to move from their an­
chorage until the Board certified that they were no longer 
infected. One hundred dollar fines were to be paid by 
owners or captains of vessels for violations of the ordi­
nance. Ail fines and penalties collected under provisions 
of the ordinance were earmarked to the Board of Health. This 
quarantine remained in force for several years, but received 
little attention. During the quarantine’s first few months 
in operation in 1847 New Orleans suffered one of its most 
severe yellow fever outbreaks, thereby undermining public 
faith in it right from the beginning. ^
The obvious bewilderment that resulted from the peri­
odic scourging of Mew Orleans by yellow fever produced 
during the 1840’s renewed activity by the advocates of a 
rigid state quarantine. A feeling developed gradually among 
the general populace that sanitary reform was not the entire 
answer, and that Louisiana had never given quarantine a 
really fair trial. In 1844 a committee of the state House 
of Representatives reported that it had decided "almost
^°E. D. Fenner, ed., Southern Medical Reports 
(New Orleans, 1851) > II» 57-5"^
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unanimously, that the disease Z~y ellow feverJ7 is infectious 
and transmissible, and in most, if not all instances, has 
been introduced in vessels from other ports, into this city." 
Accordingly, the committee recommended passage of a quar­
antine law.^ The Legislature failed to act, in all prob­
ability because of the heated controversy any such proposal 
invariably provoked. Dr. Hort, the prominent sanitarian, 
remarked in 1345 that the Legislature had not enacted a 
quarantine law because of the opposition of public opinion 
and a large majority of the medical profession.^2 pn dem­
onstrating the inefficacy of quarantine legislation, Hort 
stated a simple, and by no means unusual, explanation of 
the rising tide of "black vomit":
Disease follows in the track of civili­
zation, not carried by the people from one 
country to another, but developed by the 
great physical changes brought about by 
industry, and agricultural pursuits. The 
surface of the earth once sheltered from 
the sun’s rays by luxuriant vegetation is 
laid bare to the action of those rays; the 
surface of the earth is turned up by the 
plow, exhalation and evaporation follow; 
vegetable matter is decaying in large 
quantities, or large cities are built, 
and people become crowded together within 
a very limited space, and filth and offal
^-Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, Second Session- 
Sixteenth Legislature, January 1, 1844 (New Orleans, 1844),
pp. 80-8l.
^William P. Hort, "An Essay on the Subject of 
Quarantine Laws . . . New Orleans Medical and Surgical 
Journal, II (1345-46), 1. Hort was certainly correct in 
stating that most physicians were against quarantine. Public 
opinion, on the other hand, was moving in the opposite 
direction.
accumulate. Then marshes are exposed, 
and great changes must be going on in 
the atmosphere near the surface of the 
earth; and is it at all strange, that 
under such circumstances, new diseases 
should be developed?^
In 1848 a quarantine for Orleans and Jefferson Parishes was 
considered by the Louisiana lawmakers, this time as part of 
a bill re-constituting the New Orleans Board of Health. The 
measure, when it finally was enacted into law, contained no 
mention whatever of quarantine.^
The action of the Legislature in creating a new, strong­
er Board of Health for New Orleans was, as usual, the result 
of a savage epidemic. Yellow fever mortality rose in 1847 
to well over two thousand, a figure high enough to shake 
the complacency of all but the most immovably conservative. 
The sanitationists were still strong enough to prevent the 
enactment of another quarantine law; thus the "Act To 
Establish a Board of Health in and for the Parish of Or­
leans" represented a signal victory for this faction. The 
Board was to resemble rather closely the one created by the 
General Council of New Orleans in 1846, but the new insti­
tution was granted more authority in promoting sanitation 
than had any body in the past.
^ Ibid., p . 3•
ournal of the House of Representatives of the 
State of Louisiana, Session of TS48 (New Orleans, TS48), 
p. 87; Acts passed at the "First Session of the Second 
Legislature of the 'State of Louisiana , . . 1848 (New 
Orleans, IS4STj Act No. ITS, pp. 110-11.
The Board of Health was to consist of twelve members, 
four of whom were to be appointed by the New Orleans General 
Council, and the Mayor of New Orleans was designated its 
President. The Board was empowered to appoint for each ward 
of each New Orleans municipality a "Health i/arden" whose 
duty it was to provide for the removal of "any nuisance 
likely to prove injurious to the public health." Property 
owners and tenants were liable to a lawsuit if they failed 
to comply with an order to remove a certain nuisance. Those 
having contracts with the city were to be held strictly 
accountable for failure to keep the streets clean. The sex­
tons of the cemeteries were made subject to fines for neg­
lect in reporting all interments to the Board. The three 
New Orleans municipalities were to provide the Board a 
maximum of five hundred dollars in operating expenses per 
year. The Board was required to report annually to the 
several councils on the health of the city and the means 
whereby it might be improved.̂  Governor Isaac Johnson 
consented to the measure March 16, 184$, the very same day 
he approved a bill authorizing him to appoint a five-man 
sanitary commission. This commission was assigned the task 
of gathering information concerning health conditions in 
New Orleans, after which these finnings were to be presented
^ Acts passed at the First Session of the Second 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana . . . 184$» Act No.
172, pp. 110-11.
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to the next Legislature.^
Despite the well-meaning efforts of the sanitationists, 
the war against filth seemingly could not be won. One month 
after the Legislature re-vitalized the Board of Health, the 
editor of the Picayune remarked: "Our citizens have just
reason to complain of the filthy condition of our streets, 
which are apparently growing worse and worse. , . . The 
offence is rank, and ’smells to heaven.'” He asserted that 
the Board of Health, with the aid of the sanitary commis­
sioners, was duty-bound to seek some way of improving the 
system whereby street collecting carts "succeed in gather­
ing about three pints of unpleasant compost within a square, 
with which they triumphantly retire. The editor of the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal found fault with 
the city’s drainage system, and indicated his uncertainty 
whether the new Board had yet been given sufficient power 
to regulate ’’the entire hygiene of the city.’’̂
Dr. Hort, a few months later, defended the Board by 
explaining that very little had been accomplished only 
because health officials had not received proper cooperation 
from city authorities.^ This theme was elaborated upon in
46Ibid.a p. 12.
^ P icayune, April 19, 1&A-S.
j g
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, IV
(ldV7-48),"797.
^William P. Hort, ’’Remarks connected with the sanatary 
condition of the city of New Orleans,” New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal, V (lSlS-49), 261, 263.
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the Report of the Board of Health for 1&4& which described 
the lack of sanitation in New Orleans. The Report, of which 
Hort was in all likelihood the author, declared that munici­
pal Councils had sometimes adopted wise police regulations,^ 
but all resolutions and ordinances were unavailing because 
of failure to enforce them. The Report stated that the Board 
in 1$4# had established the requirement that contractors 
must remove filth from the streets within two hours, but 
despite this, two days often elapsed before anything was 
done. Furthermore, care had not been given to seeing that 
garbage was cast into the current of the river. Another 
problem was the inadequate compensation received by the 
Health V/ardens. The Report called attention to the diffi­
cult task which confronted those officers in endeavoring to 
carry on inspections in the face of antagonists who resented 
the intrusion.51 Nearly half of the Report was concerned
This statement was certainly true. For example, 
an ordinance passed by the Council of the First Municipality 
December 20, 1&47 compelled contractors to clean daily all 
gutters, streets, alleys, etc. Garbage collections were to 
be made twice each day, and all residents of the municipal­
ity were required to have their waste ready in "suitable 
vessels." On December l£, 1&4S, the Council of the First 
Municipality created a three-man committee to work with the 
Mayor on providing for the cleaning of streets and private 
homes. City Council Minutes and Proceedings, First Munici­
pality, July 21, 1347-February 19> 1^49> pp. 126-32; City 
Council Ordinances and Resolutions, Municipality No. 1, 
January 3 j 134&-December 31* 1349 > Manuscripts in New 
Orleans Public Library.
51nThe Annual Report of the Board of Health, On the 
Sanatory condition of the City of New Orleans, for 134 3»TT 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, V (1343-49)> 
W 7-Q8, 616-17.
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with the cholera outbreak that began in December. The 
author refused to take a stand on the question of whether 
or not the cholera was imported, although the inference 
can be drawn without great difficulty that he believed the 
disease to be of local origin— that it was something other 
than Asiatic cholera. A definite assertion was made that 
the pestilence still prevailing when the Report was written 
was not contagious but had been transmitted through the
air.^2
Some local newspapers were rather critical of the 
manner in which the Board of Health handled the epidemic. 
Mayor A. D. Crossman, President of the Board, issued a 
statement December 15 that two cases of cholera had been 
reported.55 Two days later the Daily Delta commented on 
the excitement caused by exaggerated reports of the preva­
lence of Asiatic cholera.^ The Board declared the existence 
of an epidemic December 22, at the same time warning the 
public that the powers possessed by the Board were limited 
to enforcing health regulations, reporting on the general 
health of the city, and making recommendations for the pres- 
ervation of the public h e a l t h . T h i s  declaration brought
52Ibid., pp. 617-23.
^ Picayune, December 15, 1S/*.B.
5^-paily Delta, December 17, 134S.
55ibid., December 23> 1$4$«
a bitter denunciation from the editor of the Picayune who
56blamed the Board for having precipitated a panic.J An 
editorial appearing January 2, 1$49 assailed health offi­
cials for having done nothing more than report the number 
of cholera deaths. The "Board of Death" had greatly exag­
gerated the extent of the pestilence, it was alleged, 
thereby causing the city to become deserted. The Picayune 
maintained the true situation to be that cholera deaths had 
been restricted, almost entirely to homeless, pennyless 
immigrants.^7 The Picayune1s attitude was as common as it 
was understandable because much of New Orleans* prosperity 
resulted from a booming business carried on during the 
winter. The proclamation of an epidemic undoubtedly cost 
the city many thousands of dollars by diverting business 
to competing cities. Months later, when cholera deaths 
were numbering well over two hundred per yreek, the Picayune 
was sti'll reassuring the public that the disease was con­
fined primarily to strangers and the lower classes, and 
that talk in other cities about an epidemic in New Orleans 
was highly contemptible.^
New Orleanians had shown no inclination to face the 
truth and admit that their city was inexcusably unhealthy. 
At mid-century, however, this characteristic complacency
^Picayune, December 24, 1$4$. 
57ibid., January 2, 1$49« 
5%bid., March 25, 1$49.
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was shaken as never before by the publication of statistics 
by Dr. J. C. Simonds portraying New Orleans in a very un­
favorable light. In a series of nine articles published in 
the Daily Delta during the summer of Simonds sought
to prove New Orleans* desperate need for sanitary reform. 
Mortality rates of cities in the United States and Europe 
were compared, and these figures tola the almost unbelievable 
tale that mortality in New Orleans was from two to four 
times greater than in any of the other great cities for 
which' Simonds supplied data. Before presenting his re­
markable findings, he noted New Orleans’ reputation for 
being the most unhealthy city in the country and the need 
of a thorough investigation to get at the truth. Simonds 
carefully analysed his statistics in the Daily Delta and 
later in volume two of the Southern Medical Reports. ^
Simonds remarked on the common assertion by its cit­
izens that except for epidemics New Orleans was very healthy, 
and he immediately proved it to be utterly false. Simonds 
attempted further to show the absurdity of attributing 
high mortality rates to the city's floating population by 
pointing out the equally large numbers of immigrants and 
visitors in cities having a much lower mortality rate. 
Attention was particularly directed to the prevalent
59paily Delta, June 28, July 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12,
13, 18, 1850.
6^J. C. Simonds, "On the Sanitary Condition of New 
Orleans, as Illustrated by its Mortuary Statistics,"
Southern Medical Reports, II, 203-46.
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practice of greatly over-estimating New Orleans' population 
in order to make the mortality rate appear lower. The Board 
of Health was a special target for Simonds' attacks. During 
1B50, declared Simonds, the Board and the Mayor were busy 
congratulating the citizens of New Orleans on the city's 
healthfulness while two epidemics prevailed and. the lives 
of one in every sixteen inhabitants were taken.^ Simonds 
urged the usual reforms such as keeping the streets clean, 
but in addition, he called for an investigation of hygienic 
conditions in hospitals, asylums, workhouses, private dwell­
ings, factories, "butcheries," and dairies. Above all, he 
emphasized the need of compelling the Board of Health and all 
its officers to enforce sanitary regulations.
Another physician who sought to awaken New Orleanians 
from their lethargy was the irrepressible Dr. Edward H. 
Barton. A veteran sanitary reformer, Barton, in 1$50> 
renewed his assault on the abominable conditions he saw 
abwut him, conditions which he believed brought grief to 
his city in the form of epidemics. The Annual Report of 
the New Orleans Board of Health for the year 1$49> written 
by Barton, must rank as one of the most important documents 
in the history of public health in Louisiana. The Report 
related the Board's unceasing efforts to enlighten the
. C. Simonds, The Sanitary Condition of New 
Orleans (Charleston, South Carolina, lt>5l) , p. "53«
^ I b i d . , pp. 6, 71.
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public about sanitary matters and to prescribe cures for 
acknowledged ills which infected the city. Rather sur­
prisingly, Barton's Report did not show New Orleans to be 
unhealthy in some respects when placed on a comparative 
basis with other large cities. Simonds, writing later, 
manifested impatience with the Report's obvious tendency 
to defend New Orleans from the most damaging accusations 
by outsiders. Even so. Barton did point out clearly that 
the Crescent City had "a mortality exceeding any city in 
America, and mainly attributable to removable causes."
The mortality was at least double what it should be, 
claimed Barton, and much could be done to reduce it. There 
never had been any real attempt to drain New Orleans; offal 
had never been removed from the streets as ordered by the 
Board of Health; and there had been an inexcusable will­
ingness to allow filth of all descriptions to accumulate 
in the gutters. Simply by giving proper attention to 
sanitary measures, thought Barton, mortality could be
materially diminished; no expense, he maintained, should
£ ̂
be spared in achieving that goal,
Simonds and Barton by no means succeeded in converting 
everyone in New Orleans to their way of thinking. Five 
months after having printed Simonds’ devastating articles, 
the editor of the Daily Delta remarked: "We aver, and
"The Annual Report of the Board of Health 1$49_7," 
Southern Medical Reports, I, 92-94*
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we challenge contradiction to our declaration, that New 
Orleans, at this present moment, in point of health and 
salubrity, is not exceeded by any city in the Union, and 
greatly surpasses four-fifths of the towns, villages, and 
localities in the South-west. One of ante bellum New
Orleans' greatest publicists, J. D. B. DeBow, took an en­
tirely different attitude. Shocked by what he realized 
were facts, DeBow printed statistics proving the insalu­
brity of his city and urged that an even more intensive 
investigation be made. His duty was plain, he stated; 
the alarm had to be sounded to shake citizens and city 
officials from their inertia. Nonetheless, it -was with 
reluctance that DeBow remarked: "We have been the last
to yield assent to the proposition that New Orleans is an 
unhealthy city, very unhealthy, and have done as much, 
perhaps, as any one in circulating the contrary opinion.
. . • The facts are, however, against us, . . . ^5
The state Legislature, not totally unaware of the 
gigantic task which lay ahead, passed an act in 1B50 in­
creasing slightly the police powers of the Board of Health
and extending'its jurisdiction to include the neighboring
66city of Lafayette. The Board as re-constituted was to
^^Daily Delta, December IB, 1B50.
^ D e B o w ’s Review, IX (1B50), 245-46.
Lafayette was a suburb of some fourteen thousand 
population located immediately above the American sector of 
New Orleans. The two adjacent communities were consolidated 
in IS52, with Lafayette terminating its nineteen year history. 
John Smith Kendall, History of New Orleans (Chicago, 1922),
II, 747-50.
5̂
comprise sixteen members including the Mayor of New Orleans. 
The Board of Health was enabled to require of physicians at 
any time na statement of such contagious maladies as may 
exist under their charge.’* The Board was also empowered to 
impose, by majority vote, fines for breaches of sanitary 
regulations. Aside from those additions the new act changed 
very little.^ The Board of Health Report for lB$o most 
assuredly gave no indication that anything important had 
yet been achieved in the realm of public health. The Re­
port stated two "great objects’* deemed essential goals for 
the city, and placed the blame on municipal authorities and 
certain uncooperative physicians for New Orleans’ failure 
to reach those goals in the past. First, no unauthorized 
burials should be permitted in order that the cause of 
death and the number of deaths could be accurately deter­
mined. The Report complained of physicians who refused to 
sign burial certificates for patients they had attended.
The second objective mentioned in the Report was the im­
provement of public hygiene. Attention was called to a
variety of nuisances, chiefly those connected with accu-
6$mutations of filth.
The value of the New Orleans Board of Health remained
^Acts passed by the Third Legislature of the State 
of Louisiana . . . 185(1"(New Orleans, 1850}, Act No. 430, 
pp. 252-54.
^"Annual Report of the New Orleans and Lafayette 
Board of Health, for the Year 1$50,” Southern Medical 
Reports, II, 40-72.
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a controversial question. One of the institution's most 
outspoken defenders was Dr. Abner Hester, editor of the 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal. An editorial 
appearing in the September, 1S50 issue commended the "con­
stant and unceasing efforts made by the Board of Health,
through the Health Wardens, to improve the sanitary con-
69dition of our city, during the past summer." A year 
later Hester ascribed the good health enjoyed by New Or­
leans during the summer of 1$51 to the clean streets and
70gutters placed under the Board's supervision. In the 
November, 1851 issue the Board of Health was again credited 
with having maintained the health of the city:
Quietly and without ostentation did 
the members assemble regularly every week 
to examine the cemetery reports, and the 
reports of the Health Wardens, to learn 
the actual sanitary condition of New 
Orleans and Lafayette, and to suggest 
and have carried out every measure cal­
culated to preserve the health of our 
population, and to ward off all epidemic 
diseases. Although the members of the 
Board receive no reward for such labors, 
and wield but little power, yet through 
evil as well as good report they have 
faithfully discharged their duty to the 
public and set an example in this re­
spect, which some of our municipal 
bodies might emulate with credit to 
themselves and advantage to the public 
good.71
6 % e w  Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, VII
(1850-51) ,“ 252.
7°Ibid., VIII (1851-52), 265.
71Ibid., p. 399.
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Four months later the Board no longer existed. The 
following February the Legislature completely reorganized 
the government of New Orleans, ending the arrangement 
whereby there were four councils for the Crescent City and 
another for the city of Lafayette. A "Common Council" was 
provided for all of New Orleans, including Lafayette which 
was annexed. No mention whatever was mode of the Board of 
Health by the Legislature, so automatically the Board be­
came inoperative.*'7'̂ Shortly thereafter, the House passed 
a bill granting the new Council the power to make all san­
itary regulations. No action seems to have been taken by 
the Senate, probably because legislation was deemed un~
73necessary. The May, lh‘52 issue of the New Orleans Monthly 
Medical Register contained an editorial rejoicing that no 
Board of Health existed. The editor asserted: "Perhaps
the highest and only service it performed was that, which 
prayed for its own dissolution, under a conscientious con­
viction, that, organized as it was, it was a burden and a 
fraud on the community." The editor declared that the 
Council’s practice of delegating public health powers to 
a subordinate body had never worked:
The evil lay precisely in the division 
of functions. The old Board could legislate,
^Acts passed by the Fourth Legislature of the 
State of Louisiana . . . 1$52 (New Orleans, 1852J7 Act No. 
71, pp. 42-55.
73journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana, 
First Session-Fourth Legislature, January T 9 , 1&52 (n.p.,
n .d .), p. 173*
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with wisdom and propriety suitable to 
our exigencies, but it was powerless to 
enforce its ordinances. Its authority 
was scoffed at in the four quarters of 
the city, its officers defied and its 
advice respected as a oiece of gratuity, 
for which no one was obliged. Yet the 
public expected of this body, thus dis­
armed and contemned Z"sic_7, to guard 
the avenues through which the disease 
was introduced, and to preserve the 
public health, while its voice as,a 
public sentinel was disregarded. ^
The advice went unheeded. On May 10 the Council re-
75solved to organize another Board of Health. Just what 
powers were granted to the new Board cannot be precisely 
ascertained, but certainly this institution accomplished 
virtually nothing. No one cared until the following year, 
1053, when the return of Yellow Jack to New Orleans pro­
duced almost indescribable scenes of death.
^%Iew Orleans Monthly Medical Register, I (1051- 
52), 94-95.
75p icayune. May 19, 1052.
CHAPTER III 
THE GREAT EPIDEMIC AND ITS AFTERMATH
The yellow fever epidemic of 1$53 was raost deadly 
invasion of pestilence to strike New Orleans throughout its 
long history. Moreover, Yellow Jack was bp no means con­
fined to the Crescent City, as several areas in Louisiana 
and neighboring states were also attacked and suffered an 
enormous mortality. The epidemic was made all the more 
terrifying by the belief so commonly held among residents 
of New Orleans during the years just preceding 1353 that 
yellow fever would never again return to their city with 
the malignancy which characterized this disease in the past. 
The prevalent optimism resulted from the fever1s failure to 
produce a heavy death toll in the five year period following 
the deadly outbreak of 1&47. Dr. Hester commented in the 
May issue of the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 
that New Orleans had been "blessed with extraordinary 
health." He asserted that after having prevailed four 
years, cholera had become " e x t i n c t , a n d  very little ship 
fever (typhus) had been brought in by recent immigrants. 
Interestingly, Hester then remarked:
■^Hester was notably incorrect in making this affir­
mation. The following December he v/as among hundreds in 
Louisiana who succumbed to cholera.
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It is somewhat extraordinary tnat_up to 
this moment . . . but few musquitoes [_ sic J  
have been seen. We generally have myriads of 
these troublesome insects by this time of the 
year. The rela ,ion that this fact may bear 
to the state of health both now and hereafter 
will be worthy of notice, as the elements 
that enter Into their generations may be 0 
intimately connected with morbific causes.
Hester was much closer to the truth than he could have sup­
posed. Two months later the editor of the Daily Delta com­
plained tiiat he had never known mosquitoes to be quite so 
bothersome. Not only had the "ordinary Creole mosquito" 
been present, but there were also great numbers of what he 
called the "black intruder." He did not fail to see the 
bright side to the situation, however, as he editorialized 
philosophically: " . . .  we don't believe Yellow Jack will
favor us with his grim presence this year, for the simple 
reason that Providence does not afflict us with two curses 
at one and the same time. . . ."3 This bit of wishful 
thinking was published a month after the first cases of 
yellow fever had been reported.
The first of the Crescent City's more than eight thou­
sand yellow fever deaths in 1353 was reported by the Board 
of Health as having occurred during the week ending May 23. 
The Board advised the public June 13 that seven deaths had 
taken place during the preceding week, and that new cases 
of the disease had appeared every week since May. Nine
2New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, IX
(1352-53)7~343.
^Daily Delta, June 29 > 1353.
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more deaths were reported on June 25.^ The New Orleans 
newspapers, believing that nothing should be printed which 
might injure the city’s prosperity, refused for many weeks 
to countenance anything as totally undesirable as another 
epidemic. On June 22 the editor of the Crescent stated, 
apparently without flinching, that yellow fever had become 
an "obselete /~sic_7 idea” in New Orleans.  ̂ The next day 
the Picayune printed a letter to the editors from a person 
termed a ’’good authority.” The gist of the epistle was that 
no cause for alarm existed over ”the fancied existence of 
yellow fever in this city to a very great extent.” The 
Board of Health was assailed by the writer for having un­
just! fiabljr created an alarm, thereby causing many New 
Orleanians to leave the city. The Board had evidently 
been inactive before the issuance of the yellow fever 
reports because this "good authority” did not know of its 
existence until this time.^
An editorial by Dr. A. Forster Axson appearing in the 
New Orleans Monthly Medical Register July 1 decried the
^DeBow’s Review, XV {1$53)» 59$. According to Dr. 
Fenner, yellow fever was introduced into New Orleans in 
May by the ship Augusta. The Augusta had presumably be­
come infected from close contact with the disease-laden 
Camboden Castle from Kingston, Jamaica. E. D. Fenner, 
History of the Epidemic Yellow Fever, at New Orleans, La. 
in i'8'53 TNew York, 1854) > pp. 15-16.
% e w  Orleans Daily Crescent, June 22, 1353.
^Picayune, June 23> 1353.
sanitary condition of New Orleans and the city’s failure to
provide accurate mortality figures. The first remedial
step to be taken, asserted Axson, should be the organization
of a really effective, non-political Board of Health. Axson
attached a great deal of importance to his claim that in the
past political bias had been largely responsible for the
7selection of Board members. The newspapers, in the mean­
time, had begun a campaign for vigorous action to cope with 
the city’s sanitary problems, although care was taken not 
to mention the motive of the renewed effort. Only the New 
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal would admit that there 
had been deaths caused by yellow fever, and this admission 
was coupled with a statement that the general health of the 
city was "extraordinarily good."
During July the epidemic gained momentum at a reckless 
pace. The Board of Health reported 204 yellow fever deaths 
in New Orleans during the week ending July 16. Even at this 
late date the only city paper willing to acknowledge the 
presence of the yellow pestilence was the Orleanian. But 
the true seriousness of New Orleans’ plight could no longer
be concealed froin local residents, and the usual mass
9exodus from the city was well under way. The increasing
?New Orleans Monthly Medical Register, II (1852-53),
118-19.
aNew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X 
(1853-54), 137.
^DeBow’s Review, XV (1853), 603.
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gravity of the situation produced among the newspapers a 
gradual and reluctant surrender to the facts during the 
ensuing weeks. The Daily Delta apprised the public of 
the presence of yellow fever July 20, but made itself 
appear ludicrous by stating that it was the ,Tleast serious 
of several descriptions of fever,” and that if victims 
would avoid excesses, discard their fears, and use simple 
remedies, mortality would be ’’very insignificant."'^ The 
Weekly Delta, in a similarly optimistic vain, commented: 
"From its early appearance in our city, we are led to be­
lieve that the present visitation of this disease will be 
of short duration, and of comparatively moderate severity. 
The Picayune confessed July 21 that Yellow Jack was "spread­
ing" and "fatal," but attached the reassuring note that it
had been "mainly confined to the unacclimated laborer and
12the poor emigrant."
The Common Council was implored repeatedly to take 
action of some sort to prevent the spread of disease, but 
the pleas were apparently ignored as long as possible. 
Mounting public pressure finally bestirred the Council to 
call a special meeting July 25 at which time a new Board of
10Daily Delta, July 20, 1353.
•^New Orleans Weekly Delta, July 20, 1353* 
•̂ Picayune, July 21, 1353*
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Health was established.^ The Board was organized the very- 
next day with Mayor A. D. Crossraan as President and Dr.
Axson as Secretary. Dr, Hester was elected Port Physician 
and was placed in charge of the quarantine station at 
Slaughter-house Point (Algiers), at which all vessels from 
foreign ports would henceforth be required to stop before 
crossing the river to New Orleans. This plan of instituting 
a quarantine when epidemic yellow fever was already pre­
vailing, DeBow characterized as ridiculous.’*'̂' The Board 
was ordered to enforce sanitary regulations, and was granted 
ten thousand dollars to be used at its own discretion.
The consensus among the public seems to have been that 
the Council acted too late. The editor of the Crescent 
suggested that half the sum of ten thousand dollars spent 
six months earlier to clean the streets would have done much 
more good. He said that he believed the quarantine to be 
TTthe most salutary provision in the ordinance, and should 
be rigidly enforced. An Orleanian editorial also defended 
the quarantine. The success which had attended the employ­
ment of quarantine in other countries was noted, and then 
the editor added sarcastically: "Are we realy/~sic_7 so
much wiser, so much more advanced in science, and so much
^Apparently the only other beneficial measure 
adopted by the Council prior to its adjournment until Oc­
tober 1 was the granting of two thousand dollars to the 
Howard Association. DeBowTs Review, XV (1353)j 603.
^ I b i d ., pp. 613-14*
^ Crescent, July 26, 1353.
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freer from all the old rules and prejudices, than the little 
rest of the world?" The Orleanian denounced the Common 
Council for failure to help those already suffering from 
yellow fever:
The Common Council met yesterday, and 
they tell us they have made a Board of 
Health!--May God help the stricken ones!
Vie had hoped to have told to-day of things 
of charity and of confidence; but we can 
do no such things. For the future we 
will trust to our city council as we will 
for milk from the he-goat, ana silk from 
the spider.
Assistance for the afflicted poor was being provided, by a 
remarkable group of young men who on July 14 revived the 
benevolent organization known as the Howard Association.
The primary object of this institution was to see that the 
poor received medical attention. The Howard Association
1 7had been founded during the yellow fever epidemic of 1337> 
and was reorganized whenever New Orleans suffered most from 
pestilence. A high percentage of those who contracted 
yellow fever in 1B53 were classified as "indigent sick," 
and were provided with needed medicine and attendants.
Most of them were treated at their residences, but many 
were taken to hospitals and infirmaries where proper nurs­
ing could be made available. The Board of Health established 
for the use of the Howards several infirmaries as well as 
three orphanages to care for children whose parents had
■^New Orleans Daily Orleanian, July 26, 1$53* 
^Daily Delta, July 24> 1&53 •
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fallen victims to the plague, and relief was extended to
iddestitute widows. Newspapers printed each day a notice
from the Howard Association for the benefit of those in
need of help. This notice contained a list of practicing
physicians who unselfishly offered their services without
charge, and a list of apothecaries who volunteered to grant
assistance whenever summoned by the Howards. A list of
"Relief Members" was supplied in order that those requiring
19financial aid would know to whom to apply. 7
These ambitious projects resulted in considerable ex­
pense, but all the necessary funds and more were furnished
by the generous contributions of the citizens of New Or- 
20leans. In December the Howard Association issued a fis­
cal report on its operations during the past summer. More 
than eleven thousand cases of yellow fever had been treated 
by members of the Association, and nearly ten thousand of 
the victims were foreign born, stated the report. Total
expenses had been about $162,000, and the unused balance
21which remained was in excess of $66,000. Unfortunately
•^Orleanian, July 16, 1^53; Picayune, October 19j 
1$53 ; Crescent, September 1, 1853.
•^Crescent t August 10, 1$53.
The Howard Association also received funds from 
the people of New York, Washington, Philadelphia, and other 
cities in many parts of the country.
^Picayune, December 21, 1&53*
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the Howards would have ample occasion to use this surplus 
in the near future.
The month of August witnessed the climax of the epi­
demic. During a period of three weeks yellow fever mor­
tality averaged approximately tv/o hundred per day, the 
total for the entire month going well over five thousand. 
Ghastly scenes of suffering and death became omnipresent.
An editorial appearing in the Weekly Delta described the 
"Horrible Spectable" at one of the cemeteries:
The coffins were deposited on the 
ground by the cartmen, wno then left; 
there forty of them remained until yes­
terday morning, unburied. The action of 
the sun, through the frail enclosure, 
produced a rapid decomposition of the 
bodies, several of which swelled, so 
as to burst the coffins. Attracted by 
the unusually violent and offensive 
effluvia, several citizens in the neigh­
borhood. visited the spot, when the 
horrible sight was presented, of forty 
coffins unburied--through which the 
ghastly, reeking bodies of as many 
victims of the pestilence might be
seen, whilst the odor was almost over- • 77powering.^
Until nearly the middle of the month New Orleans 
newspapers claimed with some justification that the disease 
was confined in large degree to paupers and immigrants.^ 
But on August 11 the editor of the Daily Delta felt called
^ Weekly Delta, August 14i 1853*
23Dr. Axson asserted that "ninety-nine of every 
hundred dying, were of our poor and foreign population." 
New Orleans Monthly Medical Register, II (1852-53)> 130.
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upon to record publicly the startling truth:
Stilj onward stalks the dreadful 
pestilence tnrough our afflicted city.
Every minute seems to give it strength 
and vigor. Increased victims appear to 
snarpen rather than glut its savage appe­
tite. It leaps over all barriers and spurns 
all opposition. Beginning with the poor, 
the ignorant and desolate, it has acquired 
strength enough to defy all. the appliances 
of wealth, of comfort, of scie_.ce, and 
of art. It can no Ion. er be taunted 
with undue virulence towards the "lower 
classes." It has established, b> most 
gloomy proofs, its title to the epithet 
of a general leveler. The sick, the 
lonely, Lne gifted, the virtuous, the 
strong as well as the votaries of vice 
and destitution, the poor and the un- 
virtuous, the ignorant and imprudent —  
all alike, fall before the remorseless 
sickle of' this great destroyer, ana are 
gathered into one common harvest of 
death.
Business in New Orleans came almost wholly to a 
standstill. The New Orleans Price-Current managed to ig­
nore yellow fever until the August 13 Issue mentioned that 
"an unusually fatal epidemic" had dulled the market.^ The 
August 27 issue declared that the epidemic had completely 
deranged all business operations. "Very little produce, 
of any description, is coming in from the interior," the 
journal reported, "and as for our leading staple, Cotton, 
the supply seems to have almost entirely ceased at the 
moment; the backwardness of the crop, and the sickness in 
the city, and in some of the river towns, having combined
^Daily Delta, August 11, 1$53.
^ N e w  Orleans Price-Current, Commercial Intelli­
gencer and MerchantsT Transcript, August 13, H?53»
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to limit the early receipts. ,f‘"
ve]low Jack had begun to spread over the countryside. 
Heavy death tolls were bein'- recorded in cities, villages, 
and rural areas, althouvh most o'" those areas did not feel 
the full brunt of the tidal wove c-f disease until lent "tuber, 
the Crescent reported September 7 th=<t all parts of the 
country incl udir • areas ecnrinered exerrnt fro a veil on fever 
had bean attacked. Accord.; n-~ tc tins account hatch os had 
ceer 'isltea vy veil or fever "r!.n a 0.-1 f aine:ti ve fere,' 
and i n ; obile the pestil ence was ravinv "with a virulancy 
unprecedented. fh-3 presence of yellow "ever at Thibodaux 
was said to have "created a oenic smonr the citizens very- 
in---v on frenzy." At tultcn (near F.onrc-e) "inhabitants were 
.fleeiiv 1,0 the country, leavim-- scarcely any to take care
o nof the sick, 1 ire Alexandria led .-river uepublican de­
clared a few days later that only a few cases had appeared
in the Alexandria area, but despite the absence of immediate
2fcanver several families had moved to the pine woods. The 
Crescent, of September 13 mentioned a number of cities where
yellev; fever was prevailing. Amonm them were Plauuemine, 
Bayou Bara, Vidalia, Pointe Coupee, and. Baton loupe in 
Louisians; //oodville, Vicksburg, Pass Christian, and 
Biloxi in Mississippi; and Houston, Texas. The Baton
1353.
"°lbid., Aurust 27, 1353.
-^Crescent , September 7, 1353.
Alexandria led liver republican, September 10,
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Rouge Weekly Cornet affirmed that sixteen hundred cases had
been reported in the capital city, and very few families,
29black or white, had excaped the disease. ' Until well into 
October the number of cities and villages invaded by yellow 
fever continued to mount.
The most spectacular events were those enacted in the 
Crescent City during the month of August. MThe King of 
Terrors had full sway,” remarked DeBow, ’’hearses were con­
stantly passing, with hot haste through all the principal 
streets; and carts, wagons, and cabs, filled with the sick 
going to the hospitals, met the passer-by at every step.
. . . Many were founo dead in their beds, in stores, in the
■5Qstreets, and in other places.”"̂ The city officials who had 
failed to join thousands of other New Orleanians in their 
flight from peril during tne early stages of the epidemic 
were made the victims of fierce denunciation for failing to 
do anything. Furthermore, the question was raised as to 
what the Board of Health had done with the ten thousand 
dollars voted to it by the Common Council.
On August 19 the Board was driven by desperation to 
order purification of the air— not by sanitary measures, 
but by cannon-firing and tar-burning’. The newspapers had 
printed letters from older residents of the city describing 
the success which attended such efforts in the past, and
^Baton Rouge Weekly Comet, October 2, 1853• 
3%eBowf s Review, XV (1853)> 624*
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health officials could no longer postpone the experiment. 
Four hundred cannon discharges were to take place daily in 
the public squares, and tar was to be scattered profusely 
in the streets and set afire. The noise from the cannons 
greatly disturbed the sick, so the Mayor quickly ordered 
that part of the experiment terminated. The tar-burning 
was c o n t i n u e d . T h e  Board of Health was deluged with 
suggestions of all sorts. A letter appearing in the Daily 
Delta from one Thomas Maguire advised the adoption of a 
plan with a "more beneficial effect in banishing yellow 
fever from our city than all the medicine you can admin­
ister." He advised employing a marching band to parade 
the streets along which pestilence was raging with the 
greatest ferocity in order to raise the spirits of the 
suffering.̂ 2
The deplorable sanitary conditions in New Orleans were, 
in the meantime, coming under increasingly bitter attack.
It seemed simple indeed to ascribe the entire tragedy to 
filth which abounded on every hand. An editorial appearing 
in the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal described 
the slum area where the first cases of yellow fever were 
reported:
The streets in this vicinity, for 
the most part, were unpaved, or planked, 
and the culverts, gutters, etc., were
Ibid., pp. 626-27. 
-^Daily Delta, August 21, 1$53»
filled with water, saturated with filth 
and decaying vegetable and animal matter.
The crowded state of these huts and low
wooden tenements, with their floors steep­
ed in mud and water, is admirably calcu­
lated to generate and propagate the germ 
of a disease which had already been sown 
in their midst,33
The editor of the Orleanian urged the Board of Health to
create a sanitary commission to investigate trie circum­
stances which had given rise to the prevalence of yellow 
fever. Tc him the cause of the epidemic was clear: "Vie
have sinned against sanitary rules--with no sufficient 
sewers, with our water closets adjoining the cisterns, 
with intra-mural burials of our fellow creatures, with 
crowded closets upon damp, unventilated floors and per­
colation water nigh to the whole surface of our soil, why 
should we wonder that Death comes a bidden guest?"^
An entirely different viewpoint was held by one of 
Hew Orleans’ elder physicians, Dr. J. S. McFarlane. His 
unusual theory concerning the relation of filth to yellow 
fever was first made public in a letter to Mayor Crossman 
wnich appeared in the Daily Delta July 2$. McFarlane 
wrote: ”, . . 1  say, sir, that so far from believing
that the filth and impurities in our streets, yards and 
suburbs, have anything to do with the creation of a 
yellow fever atmosphere, I believe that, to a certain
33jjew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, X 
(1853-54),“ 275.
34orieanian, September 28, 1853•
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extent, they are calculated to retard its formation."35 
The Crescent was the first of many to flay the doctor 
unmercifully for what was generally regarded as an open 
display of ignorance or insanity. Its editorial of August 
2 concluded:
It is really ridiculous to assume 
that offensive matter operates as a pro­
tection against yellow fever, for although 
it may not directly produce that scourge 
of our city, it certain.i.y debilitates the 
system, and renders it more susceptible 
to the disease. It is a well-known fact 
that those who are uncleanly in their 
persons, and who dwell in the filthiest 
sections of the city, have been victims 
t the fever. Indeed, if filth be a 
protection, then ought New Orleans be 
the healthiest city In the world.
N.B.— Would it not be well, in 
pursuance of Dr. McFarlane's theory, to 
have a public laboratory established, 
where ail manner of nauseating fumes may 
be Chemically evolved, and furnished to 
every citizen t-> be carried in a nose 
bag? How about that?36
McFarlane, not to be deterred, immediately reiterated 
his contention that filth and offal tended to retard the 
spread of yellow fever. He defended his position by point­
ing out that yellow fever was not, in contrast to malarial 
fevers, a disease of miasmatic origin. Malaria had been 
prevalent in New Orleans since 1347 because there had been 
sufficient swamp drainage and tree-cutting to expose the 
the filth in the rear of the city to the sun's rays. In
35paily Delta, July 2$, 1853. 
-̂ Crescent, August 2, 1853•
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this way a miasmatic atmosphere conducive to malaria but 
not to yellow fever had been created. The excessively 
heavy rains of 1853 drowned the swamp area once again, he 
wrote, preventing the noxious exhalations which would have 
produced malaria and restrained yellow fever. ^
The editor of the Crescent was still unconvinced. He 
asserted that McFarlane was the only member of his pro­
fession who believed that filth in any way prevented yellow 
f e v e r . T h e  doctor then became noticeably hostile, causing 
the Crescent to announce its intention to say no more about 
McFarlane ’’unless in /~the_7 future he shall attempt to 
overwhelm us v/ith his mystical theories, or to befoul us 
with his vulgar epithets--in which case we promise him we 
shall not fail to meet him in his own style of controversy, 
however it may involve us in the necessity of immortalizing 
his folly by enshrining it in print.”39 Several months 
later DeBow wrote that McFarlane’s theory had been ridiculed 
throughout the world, and ’’its originator pronounced either 
a fool who deserved pity, or a knave who deserved the se­
verest punishment.
September brought gradual relief to the stricken city
-^Daily Delta, August 6, 1853; DeBow’s Review,
XVI (1850 > 464-H^;
^Crescent, August 8, 1853.
39jbid.} August 12, 1853*
^ DeBow’s Review, XV (1853)> 600.
of New Orleans, During the first week of the month approx­
imately one hundred persons became victims of the scourge 
each day, but successive weeks exhibited a noticeable re­
duction in the death toll. Not until October 13, when 
yellow fever fatalities numbered only about five daily, 
did the Board of Health regard conditions as sufficiently 
improved to warrant a declaration that the epidemic was 
officially at an end. Mortality figures for the epidemic 
are notoriously inaccurate because of the hundreds of un­
reported burials, but assuredly the victims of "black 
vomit" numbered well over eight thousand during 1$53»
The discussion pertaining to the origin of the outbreak 
and the means wnereby a similar calamity could be averted 
in the future was under way many weeks before the last 
cases were reported. Editorials appearing in the Weekly 
Delta during September took issue with the sanitationists 
by declaring that the epidemic proved that yellow fever 
was not generated by local causes. Attention was called to 
the admittedly salubrious atmosphere in such cities as 
Mobile, Pensacola, Natchez, and Vicksburg, each of which 
had been victimized by a devastating invasion of Yellow 
Jack.^ Dr. M. Morton Dowler, one of the cityfs most 
prolific writers on the subject of yellow fever, asserted 
his belief that the disease in question was "native, local,
^Weekly Delta, September 4> 1$> 1&53
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and annual” in New Orleans, but that very little was known 
as to its cause or why it should have prevailed with such 
severity in 1$53. One thing was certain, he said: 11. .
. . the application of quarantine to yellow fever, in our 
city, is neither useful, expedient nor humane, and deserves 
the unanimous condemnation of all concerned,^
Mayor Crossman pointed to the renewed interest in the 
contest between the contagionists and the non-contagionists, 
noting especially the influence of the epidanic in leading 
,Tvery many of our fellow-citizens to advocate the establish­
ment of a permanent and rigid quarantine as the only measure 
calculated to afford security for the future.”^  An in­
creasingly large faction in New Orleans had become con­
vinced that events more than justified granting quarantine 
another trial. The tragedy of 1853 injected the element 
of immediacy. Assuming the lead in publicly advocating an 
experiment with a new, "judicious” quarantine were the 
Picayune and the Bulletin, two of the city’s principal 
newspapers. The campaign was launched while the epidemic 
still raged, creating an uncommon receptiveness to any 
positive proposal.
The Bulletin carried a series of editorials which 
sought to show logically that yellow fever could not have 
originated in Louisiana, and that in each outbreak suffered
^^Daily Delta, October 6, 1353* 
^ Picayune, October 19> 1853.
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by New Orleans the disease had been imported. The existence 
of yellow fever in port cities of the United States was said 
to be a result of commercial contact wit.h the West Indies 
and other areas where that malady was indigenous. Further­
more, yellow fever was described as "eminently contagious 
and transmissable." Since science had been wholly unable to 
keep it under control, declared the Bulletin, the only remedy 
was to shut it out. Consequently, a rigid quarantine should 
be imposed against all vessels having in any way had contact 
with an infected port. The quarantine as proposed would 
operate twelve months of the year and thereby protect New 
Orleans from all foreign pestilence. The main quarantine 
station was to be located on the opposite bank of the 
Mississippi, downstream as far as Fort Jackson,^ and a 
lesser station would be established at the Rigolets and 
operate only from May 1 until November I. Quarantine offi­
cers were to be given extensive powers, resistance to their 
legal commands subjecting offenders to fine and imprison­
ment. The cost of the project, stated the Bulletin, would 
probably be little more than the present cost of treating
^During the latter stages of the epidemic the Board 
of Health established a temporary quarantine at Fort Jackson, 
about seventy-three miles below New Orleans. The purpose 
of this move was to prevent immigrants from arriving too 
soon and thereby providing Yellow Jack with new material. 
Orleanian, September 10, 1853; Weekly Delta, September 11,iw r.
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patients with infectious diseases at Charity Hospital.^
In August the Picayune began a series of lengthy edi­
torials aimed at convincing the public that quarantine de­
served a fair trial.^ first, it was demonstrated that the 
prevailing epidemic had been introduced by a ship from Rio 
de Janeiro. The editor, admitting that the utility of quar­
antine was open to question, avov/ed his conviction that 
events had demonstrated clearly the need for undertaking a 
thorough experiment. "Surely any pecuniary inconvenience, 
however great, which the enforcement of quarantine may 
occasion,1' he asserted, "is not to be balanced in the scale 
against the lives of thousands of human beings. . .
The editorials also lauded the sanitationists. There were 
many individuals, it was rioted, who were actively demanding
a nevi sanitary police system designed to prevent or destroy
miasma. The Picayune heartily endorsed this agitation:
Let our city establish and rigidly 
enforce the most stringent and energetic 
sanitary measures to insure its cleanli­
ness and the purity of its atmosphere and 
to guard in every possible manner against 
the local origin of the disease. But at 
the same time let us have a wise and well-
digested system of quarantine to protect
us against the possible importation of
^ Yellow Fever; its Causes and Consequences: A
Series of articles published in the New/ Orleans Bulletin, 
during the Epidemic of 1353 (New Orleans^ 1355) , pp. 4^-43 .
^Years later Dr. McFarlane accused the Picayune 
of having been responsible for the quarantine and for the 
creation of the State Board of Health. Daily Delta,
August 25} 1353.
^ Picayune, August 31> 1353*
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pestilential diseases from abroad. Such 
seems to us to be the course of a wise 
prudence.^®
The Picayune maintained that objection to quarantine 
regulations had arisen because of unwise enforcement pro­
cedures. This problem required immediate rectification:
■ "v'/e would have the most carefully matured and judicious 
quarantine regulations established and enforced rigidly, 
yet discriminately, and in a manner as little vexatious
goto commerce as possible. , . . Picayune editorials 
reiterated those same basic points time and again, appar­
ently with considerable effect. The editor asserted that 
the importation of yellow fever in 1353 was an established 
fact, making a quarantine necessary. The September 14 ed­
itorial urged a number of sanitary reforms which included 
draining the swamps all the way back to Lake Pontchartrain. 
Several editorials made the sensible point that no good 
reason could be found why those favoring quarantine and 
those favoring sanitation were always at odds. Sanitary 
measures did no harm, and quarantine, even if it should 
prove to be worthless, declared the Picayune, would pro­
duce no injury "beyond a little unnecessary expenditure 
from the municipal fiscus."^ A later editorial affirmed: 
"The wisdom and necessity of establishing a quarantine for 
our city may now be regarded, we apprehend, as a settled
^Ibid.
49Ibid.
50jbid., September 4> 14> 13, 25> October 25> 1353*
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question among the people of Mew Orleans.”
The Picayune of October 2 pointed to the need of a per­
manent board of health for New Orleans to take the place of 
the existing temporary one. The proposed organization 
would be in charge of sanitary improvements and would issue 
weekly mortality reports throughout the year so that the 
generally good health of the city would be demonstrated.
An October 9 editorial coupled the quarantine proposition 
with one urging the Council to create a permanent board of 
health. If legislation were deemed necessary, the Council 
was exhorted to have the matter brought up at the next 
meeting of the Legislature.^ This barrage of editorials 
continued for several months.
The temporary Board of Health, born during the height 
of the pestilence, carried on its work with commendable 
wisdom and.resolve. Infirmaries and orphanages were created 
to aid sufferers of the epidemic, sanitary measures were 
adopted to purify the air (although the Board hardly de­
serves credit for having instituted tar-burning and cannon- 
firing), a temporary quarantine was instituted as a pre­
cautionary device, and weekly mortality reports were made 
public. As the emergency neared its conclusion the Board 
of Health appointed a six-man Commission to gather infor­
mation pertaining to the cause and characteristics of the 
epidemic. The members of this "Sanitary Commission” were
^ I b i d ., October 2, 9» 1^53 •
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Mayor A. D. Crossman, and Drs. A. F. Axson, E. K. Barton,
J. C. Simonds, J. L. Riddell, and S. D. McNeil. Evidently 
Crossman was added to the Commission merely to give it an 
official flavor. In discussing the appointments, the 'Weekly 
Delta criticized the selection of a body composed almost 
entirely of physicians. "Besides the natural tendency of 
doctors to disagree,” warned the Delta, "this subject of 
yellow fever has been peculiarly the bone of contention of 
the faculty, scarcely any tvra concurring in the main points 
of its nature and history.” Carrying the attack further, 
the editor suggested that there might be a lack of public 
confidence in the Commission because of the belief held by 
many that doctors were "pecuniarily interested in the ex- 
istence of epidemics,"^ The Crescent emphatically dis­
agreed :
The Board of Health for this city have 
done well— acted wisely in selecting a com­
mittee of medical men for the investigation 
of medical matters. . . . We deem it very 
ungracious, untimely, and uncalled for in 
our contemporary in making any attack upon 
the constitution of the committee that 
would, in our view, tend to underrate or 
injure its position for usefulness in the 
discharge of the important task committed 
to its care, and from which, if faith­
fully executed, much good is expected to • 
result.53
The editor of the Baton Rouge Weekly Comet found no fault 
with the composition of the new sanitary board, but he did
^Weekly Delta, October 2, 1253* 
^Crescent, October 4, 1253*
plead with its members to accumulate facts rather than 
expound t h e o r i e s . T h e  Commission’s Report, however, 
was not forthcoming until December of the following year.
Without question the residents of New Orleans were a- 
roused during the autumn of 1£>53 as they seldom had been 
before. The usual lethargy was temporarily submerged. De­
mands vrere frequently voiced that some action be taken to 
forestall the recurrence of a disaster similar to the one 
which so recently had taken the lives of many thousands.
The Common Council, back in session after its hasty ad­
journment in July, immediately solicited views from some 
of the city’s prominent medical men as to its course of 
action. The doctors recommended adoption of an underground 
sewerage system, paving the streets with some hard material 
which would render them easy to clean, establishment of 
cheap bathing houses, provision for enlarged water works,
and completing the drainage of the lowlands around the
5 5cit y. ^
An ordinance was prepared by the City Council creating 
a city health department under a ’’Health Officer” who was 
to be appointed by the Council and receive a salary of six 
thousand dollars. The Health Officer was empowered to 
appoint as many deputies and employees as he might require. 
The proposed ordinance granted the Health Officer complete
^Baton Rouge Weekly Comet, November 6, 1$53« 
55paily Delta, October 19, 1$53 •
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control over all matters relating to the health and clean-
56liness of Mew Orleans. His powers would have been ex­
tensive— too extensive, thought some. The Health Officer, 
complained the Crescent, was being put in command of the 
entire police force, and the stipulation that he might 
''enter into any premises at any time between sunrise and 
sunset" was outrageous. The Crescent stated further that
the salary to be paid the Health Officer was excessive,
57and his appointive power would lead to corruption. This 
very controversial ordinance was considered by the Council 
several times, although no action was taken.
In December a substitute measure which would have 
created a permanent city Board of Health was examined by 
the Council. A Board of five physicians was to have been 
given virtually absolute power over all aspects of sani- 
tation and quarantine."10 The Semi - weekly Creole, a per­
sistent advocate of public health reforms, noted December 
2k that the entire matter of creating a health department 
for New Orleans had been laid on the table. Angered, the 
editor declared: "That, under existing circumstances, no
sanitary measures have been adopted, is a matter of aston­
ishment. Continued neglect, after the public disaster of 
last summer, is insane— nay, is a criminal trifling, which
5^Picayune, October 20, 1853• 
5?Crescent, November 25 > 1853* 
^Picayune, December 13» 1853*
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should not only excite public indignation, but be followed 
with the severest penalties."^
When the Legislature met at Baton Rouge in January 1354, 
the Picayune again called attention to the need for action 
in providing New Orleans with an effective quarantine. The 
editor stated that although police juries of the parishes 
and municipal authorities in the cities had in the past been 
granted powers necessary to enact ordinances and regulations 
to protect against the importation of contagious diseases, 
the powers had proven inadequate. A quarantine for New 
Orleans could not be effectual, continued the editorial, 
without the cooperation of the parishes below the city. 
Consequently, some sort of legislation to accomplish this 
objective was deemed necessary,^ A month later the Bee 
emphasized the need for a "complete, thorough and rigorous" 
quarantine, asserting that its utility or inutility could 
definitely be established by proper enforcement for a number 
of years. The point was made that this plan would in no 
way be incompatible with ether aspects of public health: 
the removal of filth, the supply of pure water, and free 
ventilation. Furthermore, according to the editor, the 
quarantine would be only "a temporary inconvenience, to­
tally insignificant in comparison with the evil and mis­
chief it is designed to correct." The Bee maintained that
59wew Orleans Semi-Weekly Creole, December 24, 1653. 
^Picayune, January 15, 1654.
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its position had strong support:
. . . the conviction is gaining ground 
that the Fever is an imported malady; that, 
having been brought hither from abroad, its 
advent may be prevented by judicious sani­
tary precautions, and that it is the bound- 
en duty of the State to essay quarantine 
regulations, and thus practically to solve 
the problem which has so J.ong agitated the 
public mind.61
The Baton Rouge Daily Advocate, one of tne many Louisiana 
journals expressing entirely different views, predicted 
that a disappointment lay ahead for the quarantinists:
We have too much confidence in the 
present Legislature, to think that they 
would enact the ridiculous stupidity of 
attempting to quarantine the State of Lou­
isiana, and the greater part of the Mis­
sissippi Valley, even if tne farce should 
cost nothing; but when so utterly pre­
posterous an experiment would necessarily 
involve an enormous expense to the State, 
already overburdened with taxes, it is 
beyond the range of conception that they 
could think seriously,of perpetuating 
the stupendous folly.
Governor Paul 0. Hebert told the state Legislature at 
the beginning of its 1854 session that the sanitary condi­
tion of New Orleans had become a matter of great importance 
to the rest of Louisiana. Railroads were rapidly making 
the most distant villages seem suburbs of the state's 
metropolis. Observation and experience, declared Hebert, 
had shown that epidemics were bred and fostered in large 
cities. Attention was directed by the Governor to New
^ N e w  Orleans Bee, February 10, 1854.
^Baton Rouge Daily Advocate, February 7» 1854.
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Orleans, presumed to be the focal point of infection, and 
he expressed hope that a recurrence of the scenes of the 
preceding year could be averted by proper attention to 
hygiene. The legislators were told that either they must 
do something or else grant the city of New Orleans suffi­
cient power to accomplish the needed reforms, Hebert 
asserted further that a great deal of attention should be 
given to the findings of the Sanitary Commission concerning 
the origin, character, and causes of the recent epidemic. ^  
On February 23 a joint resolution was offered to the 
House of Representatives:
Whereas, it appears to be the desire of 
the people of Louisiana that a quarantine 
should be established at some point on the 
Mississippi river, below the port of Nev, Or­
leans, for the purpose of preventing the 
spread uf contagious and infectious diseases, 
and believing the whole of the valley of the 
Mississippi deeply interested in the said 
quarantine, we believe that it should in 
part be made a national affair.
Be it therefore resolved, by the State 
and the House of Representatives of the 
State of Louisiana in General Assembly 
convened, that our Senators be instructed 
and our Representatives requested to use 
their best efforts with the General gov­
ernment to secure an appropriation for 
a quarantine at some point on the Mis­
sissippi^ river, below the city of Mew 
Orleans. ^
The resolution was based upon the findings of the Joint
^ Journal of the House of Representatives of the 
State of Louisiana"/ 1 3 (n.p., n.d.), p . 3•
^Ibid ., p . 36.
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Committee on Public Health which had been gathering opinions 
on the feasibility of a quarantine from various interested 
persons and orgainizations in Nev. Orleans. The Committee’s 
Majority Report declared New Orleans to be ’’the focus of 
all the Epidemics which have visited /"~Louisiana_7. ” Quar­
antine stations should therefore be located on the Mississippi 
and Atchafalaya rivers and a third one by the lakes. The 
Committee asserted its belief that yellow fever was infec­
tious, although, this assertion was immediately qualified by 
the following statement: ’’That yellow fever proper cannot
be imported and spread without the existence of an atmos­
pheric predisposition to tnat disease, your committee does 
not doubt.”
The Committee did not hesitate in announcing its con­
viction that yellow fever as well as other foreign diseases 
had repeatedly been brought to New Orleans in the hulls of 
ships. The Report attempted to fix the origin of the 1853 
epidemic on the ship Augusta which landed at New Orleans 
in Kay with some sick crew members. The problem of the 
appearance of immigrants at times when the city was ex­
periencing an epidemic was also noted:
We hold that to ship them to this port 
in the summer is immoral and unchristian, 
and that our safety, as much as theirs, re­
quires that they should not be allowed to 
enter our port, where death awaits them.
Compel the captain of a ship, arriving here 
in the summer, to land his passengers at 
the Quarantine ground, with provisions for 
their support, or quarantine such vessels 
until the sickly season is passed, and 
emigration to this port in the summer will 
soon cease.
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The Public Health Committee’s Majority Report contained what 
was regarded as an important statement by the Hew Orleans 
Chamber of Commerce that a quarantine would be "no obstruc­
tion to commerce and of great benefit to the city," The 
Report declared in conclusion: "Your committee recommend
a system of Quarantine, which whilst it will tend to pro­
mote the public health of the State, will throw as little 
restrictions as possible in the way of commerce."6?
The Counter Report of the Pp'olic Health Committee, 
written by the minority, opposed the establishment of a 
really effective quarantine system. Something termed a 
quarantine was devised, probably to placate public opinion. 
The Report maintained that the best means to insure the 
health of the state was to "keep the atmosphere pure in 
all localities by the removal of all decaying vegetable 
matter, freshly exposed earth mould, be, liable to be 
acted on by heat and moisture. . . ,
The Picayune, commenting on the Report, pointed with 
particular glee to the approval granted quarantine by the 
Chamber of Commerce. Picayune editorials, its readers 
were reminded, had often emphasized that epidemics did the 
commerce of New Orleans far more harm than a quarantine
65report of the Joint Committee on Public Health 
(New Orleans, 1$54T> pp. 3-6.
^ Counter Report of the Joint Committee on Public 
Health (New Orleans, 185477 P* 4*
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could possibly do. The editor remarked on the general 
agreement in New Orleans and in the Legislature that quar­
antine must be given another trial. ? A few days later 
the Picayune asserted that nineteen-twentieths of the 
people desired a quarantine, but showed obvious concern that
the legislators would soon adjourn without enacting a quar- 
63antine law. These fears were realized; the very next day 
the House postponed all quarantine legislation until the 
next session.
A week later the editor of the Picayune, having in his 
possession both the weak quarantine bill reported by the 
minority of tne Committee on Public Health and the much 
stronger bill proposed by the majority, expressed his as­
tonishment that those bills had been summarily disposed of 
by the Legislature. The bill reported b/- the Committee 
majority he rated excellent. This bill would have created 
a board of health composed of trie Mayor of New Orleans, six 
councilmen, the resident physician at each quarantine sta­
tion, two other physicians, and the Covernor as president 
ex-officlo. 'i'ne board was to have been granted full power 
to decide when and against whom a quarantine should be pro­
claimed. Because of the Legislative’s failure to act, the 
Picayune advised the City Council to establish the most
^ Picayune, March 9, 1 $ 5 4 • 
6'^Ibid., March 12, 1354.
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Qefficient quarantine possible under the circumstances. '
The editorial of April 6 revealed a tinge of bitLerness:
. . . what has New Orleans ever done 
towards the establishment of a medical 
police? vfnat is her sanitary system? She 
has none. There is nothing that can pre­
tend to the designation of a system of 
sanitary measures. Quarantine to protect 
her people against the introduction of the 
pestilential seeds of foreign diseases 
she has none. An internal police to pre­
vent the origin and spread of local mal­
adies, she will not adopt. The absence 
of either an external or an internal 
system of sanitary police cannot be 
viewed, under all the circumstances, 
otherwise than as exceedingly discred­
itable to the intelligence and public 
spirit of our city.7^
Echoing this sentiment the Semi-Weekly Creole declared:
H. . . all prudent communities have taken prompt measures 
to remove from populous neighborhoods all incitements of 
disease. . . . New Orleans alone has taken no step of pru­
dence— established no system of quarantine--adopted no
71sanitary regulations. . . .n
The debate continued. Some demanded a quarantine, 
whereas others argued for the enforcement of rigid sanitary 
measures; there were also those who advocated both, but 
above all there was, at least among the articulate, an 
increasingly strong conviction that public health reform 
was a matter of pressing importance. The return of Yellow 
Jack during the summer of 1&54 bolstered the position of
^ I b i d . , March 19> 1$54.
^Ibid . i April 6, 1354*
etni-Weekly Creole, May 2?, 1354-
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the reformers. The loss of thousands of lives (though 
only two thousand this time) always provided the surest 
means of arousing the public.
In December, 1$54 the long-awaited Report by the New 
Orleans Sanitary Commission appeared. This Commission, it 
will be recalled, had been appointed in October, 1853 by 
the Board of Health. It consisted of five of New Orleans’ 
most eminent physicians and mayor Crossrnan, who were in­
structed first, to inquire .into the etiology and mode of 
transmission of yellow fever; second, to report on sewerage 
and drainage problems; and third, to consider the desir­
ability of quarantine. The fourth problem assigned to the 
Commission was producing a thorough report on sanitary 
conditions in New Orleans, together with suggestions for 
their improvement.^ The Commission conducted lengthy in­
vestigations, gleaning information on the four topics under 
investigation from professional and non-professional sources 
in Louisiana and nearby states. The Commission sat as a 
Court of Inquiry in New Orleans daily for about three months, 
and one member was sent to Eastern cities to gather infor­
mation on their sanitary conditions and practices. Aid was 
solicited and obtained from the national government in the 
Commission’s efforts to acquire from the entire "yellow
?2B aton Rouge Weekly Comet, February 8, 1855; Daily 
Delta, December 12, 1854; Report of the Sanitary Commission 
of New Orleans on the Epidemic Yellow Fever, of 1855 (New 
Orleans,' 1854), pp. iii-iv.
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fever zone" facts pertinent to the problems under examina- 
73tion. The result was a 542 page Report, most of it the 
work of the Commission’s chairman, Dr. Barton.
The Sanitary Commission's Report contained a discussion 
of some length on each of the four matters which had been 
investigated. Dr. Axson and Dr. McNeil wrote the first 
part of the Sanitary Report, dealing with characteristics 
of yellow fever. Axson and McNeil concluded that the epi­
demic of 1^53 was of spontaneous origin, caused by "very 
peculiar meteorological conditions" combined with "local 
causes" (lack of adequate sanitary measures). Dr. Riddell, 
author of the second part of the Report, recommended a 
sewerage system for New Orleans. Basically, the plan was 
to allow river water to flow freely through the gutters, 
thereby carrying filth to the rear of the city. Dr. Simonds 
declared in the third section of the Report that the Com­
mission was unanimous in approving the establishment of a
n\
quarantine. This was indeed a surprising recommendation 
from a group of non-contagionists, but their point was that 
the problem of whether or not yellow fever was contagious 
or infectious could be dismissed. The yellow fever virus, 
thought the Commission, had often been introduced into New 
Orleans by vessels from infected ports. The virus tended
73Report of the Sanitary Commission, pp. iv-v.
74The Commission had recommended the passage of a 
quarantine law the preceding spring when the matter was 
being debated by the state Legislature.
to operate on an already vitiated atmosphere, thus producing 
an epidemic constitution. The benefit of a quarantine in 
preventing the importation of admittedly contagious and in­
fectious diseases, _i. _e., smallpox and typhus, was also 
mentioned.^
The final portion of the Report was the work of Barton.
A veteran sanitary reformer, this was his most ambitious 
effort at publicizing the need for cleaning the city of Hew 
Orleans in order to prevent future epidemics. Barton, assumed 
that most febrile diseases were variations of one basic dis­
ease. Yellow fever was an acute illness resembling rather 
closely the most severe malarial fevers, and was caused by 
an especially malignant composition of the atmosphere. Re­
gardless of the obvious inaccuracies involved in his think­
ing, Barton's recommendations were sound. He has earned a 
high rank among pioneers in public health by his persistent 
efforts to show the public that a large portion of New Or­
leans' shocking mortality could have been averted by proper 
sanitation. The "preventable mortality," asserted Barton, 
comprised more than half of the total mortality. Though he 
was primarily interested in New Orleans, Barton saw the 
problem of filth and disease as a general one:
75"Report of the Sanitary Commission of New Orleans 
on the Epidemic Yellow Fever of 1853 >tf New Orleans Medical 
News and Hospital Gazette, I (1854-55)j 529-31.
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Poverty, filth, intemperance, wretch­
edness and crime have a similar paternity.
Disease originates from them, and, taking 
the winds of the morning, it spreads itself 
to the uttermost parts of the earth. Wher­
ever it finds food it localises itself and 
becomes developed, and hence, under a cer­
tain concentrati :n, the inhabitants of the 
palace, as of the hovel, become its victims.
Hence, all the world is interested in san­
itary measures--in eradicating the seeds 
of disease, and tnus make a brotherhood of 
all mankind.'
Near the conclusion of the Commission1s Report, Dr. Barton 
listed seventeen recommendations for the improvement of 
sanitary conditions in Mew Orleans which were being offered 
to the Council. Allusion previously has been made to quar­
antine and sewrerage; in addition, draining the swamps, pav­
ing the streets, providing a more adequate water supply, 
removing slaughterhouses from the city, discontinuing bur­
ials in the city, and establishment of a powerful health
77department were also urged.
The Sanitary Report attracted a great deal of comment, 
both favorable and unfavorable, but with the former pre­
dominating. However, Dr. M. Morton Dowler and Dr, J. S. 
McFarlane found much in it with which they disagreed. 
Dowler1s exceedingly biting criticism was not directed at 
the Commission in general, but rather at Barton in partic­
ular, In the first place, remarked Dovrler, Barton had not 
only covered his own topic but those of the other four 
physicians as well, and in so doing had laid 1Tthe public
76Re port of the Sanitary Commission, p.
77Ibid., pp. 452-53.
purse under contribution for the publication of what he 
unwarrantably denominates a Report, but which is really a 
tedious book, abounding in absurdities, extravagances, and 
self-glorification, totally unexampled in the annals of the 
documents of our science." Dowler believed the cause of 
yellow fever to be unknown, and did not hesitate to crit­
icize both the sanitationists and the quarantinists for 
asserting theories lacking in foundation. He stated that 
for Barton to expect the public to finance expensive san­
itary measures and pay for a quarantine as well was utterly 
absurd. Barton’s comment about the possibility of making 
"yellow fever an impossibility in New Orleans" was singled 
out by Dowler for particular ridicule.^ McFarlane appar­
ently limited his criticism of the Commission’s Report to 
a denial that the recommendations would do any good.
A few months later Barton answered his critics with a 
polite and capable rebuttal. Dowler was not mentioned at 
all, and McFarlane was dismissed with the remark that he 
had been "endowed-with some extraordinarily queer notions." 
Barton did, however, direct a biting attack at those still 
refusing to admit that New Orleans was unhealthy. The myth 
that the Crescent City was blessed by unparalled salubrity, 
said Barton, had been "constantly dinned into the public
Morton Dowler, /~Review of the_7 "Report of 
the Sanitary Commission of New Orleans on the Epidemic of 
1353i” New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XI (1354- 
55)> 524-23.
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ear, until finally, it has become a kind of moral treason 
to admit that people die here at alll"?^
The popular demand for an effective quarantine and an 
adequate sanitation prograin gained momentum. Opposition to 
what were regarded in some quarters as expensive innovations 
had been strong enough to forestall legislative action on 
public health matters in 1354, but the restlessness engen­
dered by many of New Orleans’ leading physicians and news­
papers continued to grow. If there really was a heavy 
"preventable mortality," as Barton maintained, why not do 
something to reduce the total? Yet, with so little agree­
ment on all aspects of public health, what could be done? 
Fortunately the answer was soon forthcoming.
^Edward H. Barton, "Report read to the Academy 
of Sciences, New Orleans, in Defence and Explanation of 
the Report of the Late Sanitary Commission,” New Orleans 
Medical News and Hospital Gazette, II (1355-5677 9$, iOU.
CHAPTER IV
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE STATE BOARD 0? HEALTH
In January, 1$55 Hew Orleans was host to the Southern 
Commercial Convention. This Convention, with sessions ex­
tending over a period of six days, attracted delegates from 
Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Mary­
land, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Pennsyl­
vania, and Georgia. Indicative of the increasingly wide­
spread interest in public health, a committee on quaran­
tine was created with M. R. Jennings of T.ouisiana its chair­
man. On the fifth day of the Convention the following pre­
amble and resolution were reported by the committee and 
adopted:
Whereas, for the past two summers 
several of the southern States have been 
severely visited by the terrible scourge 
of humanity the yellow fever, tending more 
than any other cause to cripple the ener­
gies, impair the prospects, and affect the 
commercial as well as other interests of 
the country; and whereas ship fever, ty­
phus, typhoid, and yellow fevers, small­
pox, and other infectious and contagious 
diseases are imported into our seaport 
towns--
Resolved, That it is the opinion and 
firm conviction of this convention, that 
all the States bordering on the Atlantic, 
south of 33 degrees, and those on the 
Gulf of Mexico as far as the mouth of the 
Rio Grande, are bound by their commercial 
interests and their future prosperity in
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this Union of States, as well as by the 
cause of suffering humanity, to establish 
during the warmer months of the year, at 
their discretion a rigid quarantine in 
all their seaports, and ordinary marine 
communication with the ocean,1
Rufus Dolbear of New Orleans, speaking in favor of the reso­
lution, declared that his city was falling far behind New 
York in the matter of export trade, and placed the blame on 
recurrent epidemics. He ridiculed those who opposed quar­
antine because of a mistaken fear that the commerce of Newr 
Orleans would be injured.^ On the surface it appeared that 
even the Crescent City's commercial interests were anxious 
to give quarantine another trial.
In the meantime some New Orleans newspapers were again 
launching campaigns to goad the Legislature into enacting 
public health measures. The Semi-Weekly Creole, probably 
the Crescent City's most outspoken paper, carried several 
hard-hitting editorials calling attention to the need for 
quarantine and sanitation laws. One of the editorials, 
appearing early in 1655, opened with the statement: "Pub­
lic health is the most important element of public pros­
perity." This assertion was followed by such remarks as, 
"New Orleans has never adopted any measure of protection 
to public health which could be dignified with the name 
of a system," and, " . . .  the utmost negligence has been
iDeBow's Review, XVIII (1655), 630. 
^Ibid., pp. 630-31.
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evinced by city and state authorities, as trough human 
life were utterly valueless and all measures of precaution 
were entirely hopeless."^ A Baton Rouge paper declared:
". . . it is pretty certain that an impression now prevails 
with the public, and with the Legislature, which looks 
favorably to quarantine, as at least one of the means of 
securing the country against the annual occurrence of the 
terrible pestilence."^ Dr. Samuel A. Cartwrright, for many 
years a determined opponent of quarantine, conceded in a 
speech delivered to the State Medical Society: . .
public sentiment demands a Quarantine and . . .  it is use-
Kless to resist it."^ The Picayune, of course, concurred:
The first and paramount measure which 
demands the attention and the action of the 
Legislature, is the establishment / ~ o f J  
a quarantine for this city. Public senti­
ment is now clear and unanimous in favor 
of this measure. Even the old and most ob­
durate opponents of the quarantine system 
now concede the propriety of establishing 
a quarantine for this port, and are in ^ 
favor of giving the measure a fair trial.
As the legislative session neared its termination, however, 
the Picayune became worried that a quarantine might again 
fail of enactment despite "the unanimous and settled con­
viction of'the whole people of New Orleans, the opinions
•̂Semi-Weekly Creole, January 17, 1&55*
^Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate, February 1, 1^55• 
D̂aily Delta, February IB, 1$55*
^Picayune, February 27 > 1&55.
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of the highest medical authorities among us, the cautious 
and laborious conclusions of the late sanitary commission 
and the earnest recommendation of the Chamber of Commerce.
. . . ”7 Fortunately this fear was unjustified.
The measure entitled, ,rAn Act to establish quarantine 
for the protection of the State,” approved by Governor Paul 
0. Hebert March 15, 1$55, provided Louisiana with the core 
of a comprehensive public health program for toe first time 
in thirty years. This act was delayed in the Legislature 
for several weeks because of a determined minority, but 
chiefly through the pertinacity of Senator A. L. Trudeau, 
Chairman of the Health Committee, it was repeatedly brought 
before the Legislature until it passed. The vote in favor 
of the new quarantine law was fourteen to seven in the Sen-
date and fifty-five to eighteen in the House. As significant 
as the adoption of a state quarantine was the provision that 
the quarantine was to be administered by a new organization: 
a State Board of Health. Louisiana thereby became the first 
state to institute a permanent body whose functions it was 
to protect and promote the public health.
Most of the twenty-nine sections of the act dealt with 
the quarantine and the Board of Health. Quarantine was to 
be established on the Mississippi at a point at least seventy
7Ibid., March 11, 1555. 
aJournal of the Senate, Second Legislature— Second 
Session / l555_/, p. 72; Journal of the House of Representa­
tives , Second Legislature--Second Session TTl355_/, p". 142.
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miles downstream from Mew Orleans, the precise location to 
be selected by the Board of Health. The Board of Health 
was to consist of "nine competent citizens of the State," 
three to be chosen by the City Council of New Orleans, and 
the other six to be appointed by the Governor with the ad­
vice and consent of the Senate. The nine members were to
be "selected with reference to their known zeal in favor of
othe quarantine system,"-7 and were to be commissioned by the 
Governor for a term of one year. Each of them was required 
to take a special oath to enforce and comply with the pro­
visions of the act. The Board was to meet at least once 
each month from November 1 until June 1, and once each week 
during the warm months. The President of the Board was to 
be chosen by the other members and was to receive an annual 
salary of two thousand dollars. He was required to reside 
in New/ Orleans from where he v/ould superintend the quaran­
tine stations. The Board was to hire a Secretary who would 
also act as Treasurer; the Secretary was to receive a salary 
of fifteen hundred dollars. The Board of Health was author­
ized to employ all lesser personnel at the Mississippi Quar­
antine Station, to fix the term of quarantine for vessels 
which were detained (though a ten-day minimum was stipulated), 
and to make any regulations deemed necessary to effect a
^This very important provision was inserted by a 
last-minute House amendment. Journal of the House of 
Representatives $55_7j p. 139.
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,Tproper system of quarantine,"^
A quarantine station was also to be established on the 
Rigolets to protect the entrance into Lakes 3b. Catherine 
and Fontchartrain, and a third station was to be located 
on the Atchafalaya River. The authors of this act recog­
nized that these stations vjould be much less important 
than Mississippi Station, but they believed that sufficient 
commerce v/as being conducted on the Atchafalaya and through 
the Rigolets to ’warrant a quarantine. Atchafalaya Station 
v/as to remain in operation from May 1 until November 1; in 
addition, it had to remain open, as did Rigolets Station, 
from the time a quarantine proclamation was issued until the 
Board of Health voted to suspend quarantine for the season. 
The Resident Physicians and other officers and employees 
were to be chosen by the Board of Health.^
The most important officer in the new quarantine es­
tablishment was to be the Resident Physician at Mississippi 
Station. He was to be appointed by the Governor and re­
ceive a salary of five thousand dollars for his full-time 
job. Should help be needed, the Board of Health could 
authorize the Resident Physician to employ an Assistant 
Physician at an annual salary of two thousand dollars. It
^ Acts passed by the Second Legislature of the State 




was the Resident Physician’s duty to inspect all vessels 
entering the mouth of the Mississippi to determine whether 
’’cholera, yellow fever, pestilential, contagious or infec­
tious diseases” were present. He was empowered to grant a 
certificate declaring the vessel exempt from those diseases. 
However, if it should be determined that tne vessel had come 
from an ’’infected, district,” or had persons on board with 
dangerous diseases, it became the duty of the Quarantine 
Officer, as he was also called, to detain the vessel for 
a period of not less than ten days. The sick were to be 
compelled to disembark at the quarantine ground, after 
which the vessel would be fumigated, cleansed, and required 
to submit to any other rules and regulations which might 
be established later by the Beard of Health. All costs for 
these operations were to be borne by the captains and owners 
of the vessels. The basic charge for inspection was to be 
twenty dollars for ships, barks, and sea-going steamers, 
and fifteen dollars for all others. Of vital importance was 
a provision which declared, ”, . . the amount collected for
such inspections . . . shall form a fund for the support of
1 othe quarantine,”-^
When it became necessary to invoke a quarantine, the 
Governor was to issue a proclamation upon the advice of the 
Board of Health. The act required the Governor to declare 
’’any place where there shall be reason to believe a
^2Ibid,, pp. 472-74-
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pestilential, contagious or infectious disease exists to 
be an infected place," and to state the number of days 
vessels arriving from those places were to be detained in 
quarantine. After the issuance of a quarantine proclama­
tion, all vessels coming from places declared to be in­
fected were made subject to detention upon their arrival 
at any of the three quarantine stations. Masters of vessels 
refusing or neglecting to stop were to have their vessels 
sent back to the station to under-go quarantine, after which 
they might be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or 
both. Fines were also specified for breaches of regulations 
established by the Board of Health.
Mississippi Station was to bo equipped v/ith two hospi­
tals for the sick, a house for quarantine officials, and a 
store for freight talcen from vessels ordered to unload. A
sim  of fifty thousand dollars was appropriated to set up
13the quarantine stations as specified. J
The Board of Health was placed in charge of promoting 
sanitation in New Orleans, and was given power to cause the 
removal of any substance deemed detrimental to the health of 
the city. The commissioners of streets were ordered to con­
form to mandates from the Board of Health unless they were 
in conflict with city ordinances or state laws. The Board 
could pass and enforce sanitary ordinances for New Orleans,
13Ibid. , pp. 474-76.
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if the ordinances were approved by the Council. It was em­
powered also to issue warrants to any constable, police 
officer, or sheriff in the state to apprehend a person 
violating any of the provisions of the act. The Governor 
was directed to appoint a special police officer, designated 
as Marshal, who was made subject exclusively to the orders 
of the Board of Health and was required to reside at the 
Mississippi quarantine ground.
The Quarantine Act, as It was called, was the most 
significant law in the history of the public health movement 
in Louisiana. It is true that the quarantine and the Board 
of Health were concerned primarily with New Dr leans; three 
of the Board’s nine members were chosen by the City Council, 
and the Board was legally bound to carry on its official 
functions from the Crescent City. It is clear, however, 
that the framers of the act intended to create a State 
Board cf Health, and that New Orleans was given special 
representation on the Board only because her commercial 
interests were being jeopardized by the quarantine. This 
preoccupation with the state’s metropolis resulted from a 
generally-held conviction throughout the state that pesti­
lence was imported into New Orleans, and from this focal 
point, other areas were infected. Thus the Legislature 
overwhelmingly approved a measure which was, according to 
its own terms, to provide ’’protection for the State.”
■L̂ Ibid., p. 472.
The stipulation in the Quarantine Act requiring that 
Board of Health members be "selected with reference to their 
known zeal in favor of the quarantine system" was inserted 
by the House because the legislators, being aware of fac­
tional differences in New Orleans, undoubtedly feared, that 
the Board might fall into the control of non-contagIonists, 
thereby undermining the quarantine establishment. Opposi­
tion to quarantine and to the Board of Health centered in 
New Orleans from the beginning. Crescent City business 
leaders were especially irked by the provision in the act 
making the quarantine self-supporting. .In accordance with 
the new law all craft seeking to approach the port of New 
Orleans would thereafter be charged an inspection fee, and 
vessels required to undergo quarantine would be forced to 
bear all expenses incurred during the detention. Before 
long, newspapers, anti-quarantine physicians, and those 
interested in trade with yellow fever ports were denouncing 
the quarantine as "an unnecessary burden upon commerce."
Over this issue the continued existence of the State Board 
of Health was at stake.
The quarantine system was placed on trial in 1355. 
Although organizational difficulties made it impossible to 
inaugurate the quarantine until well into the hot season, 
apparently yellow fever was not introduced prior to the 
issuance of the Governor’s first quarantine proclamation.
The Board of Health Heport for 1&55 stated that yellow 
fever had been imported by the steamer Ben Franklin which
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arrived at the Mississippi Station three days after the
15quarantine was announced. As early as April 22 the Pic­
ayune exhorted the newly-formed Board of Health to take 
immediate action aimed at introducing quarantine and sani­
tation regulations. The Quarantine Act, asserted the editor,
not only legalized quarantine but also contemplated a system
16of local sanitary measures. The question of sanitation 
did not remain in the foreground, ana Picayune editorials 
during succeeding v.reeks gave much greater attention to the 
need for an immediate quarantine before the seeds of pesti­
lence were planted. A May 5 editorial declared: lrIt would,
indeed, be a burning shame to-New Orleans, if after the 
maturing and adopting of apparently a very complete system 
of quarantine it were rendered perfectly nugatory by the 
failure to put /~it J  into operation,
The Board of Health met in April and elected Dr. Samuel
IBChoppin its first President. Choppin, an editor of the 
New Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette and a vocif­
erous and persistent advocate of a strict quarantine, was 
described by the Picayune as "a gentleman . . .  in whose
•^Report of the Board of Health of the Stat e of Lou­
isiana to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives 
/ (New Orleans, 1356), pp. 9-10,
•^Picayune, April 22, 1&55.
17Ibid., May 5, 1355.
IBOnly four of the nine Board members were physicians.
Ill
energy, judgment, and fidelity the public may repose the 
fullest confidence."̂ *9 pr< p. D. Baldwin was appointed by 
the Governor to the important post of Resident Physician 
at Mississippi Station. The Board, in accordance with the 
law, chose the Resident Physicians for the other two sta­
tions. The Quarantine Station on the Rigolets was estab­
lished at Fort Pike, and Atchafalaya Station was located 
upstream from the Gulf where Wax Bayou flows into the 
Atchafalaya River. The site selected for the Quarantine 
Station on the Mississippi River was described by Dr.
Choppin as "spacious, well drained, and with a sufficiency 
of handsome shade trees. . . . "  Its location, according to 
Choppin, was on the left bank of the river seventy-twc miles 
below Nev: Orleans and thirty-four miles from the head of the 
passes. The quarantine ground had an eight acre frontage on 
the river and was forty acres deep.. As provided in the or­
ganic act, two hospitals (a "Main Hospital" and a "Minor 
Hospital"), a dwelling, and a warehouse were constructed.
At the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Stations, a steamboat
was utilized as a temporary hospital and dwelling until
20the permanent structures were erected.
The Board of Health enjoyed no honeymoon period during
1^Ibid., May 13, 1855.
^Report of the Board of Health / 1855 J } p. 3;
Nev; Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, II (1855-
55T,”1^~.
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the early months of its existence. The Daily Delta was 
hostile from the first, and before long nearly all New Or­
leans newspapers were assailing the Board for misusing its 
delegated powers. An editorial entitled, T,The Secret Board 
of Health,TT appearing in the Delta May 17, asserted indig­
nantly that reporters had been banned from Board meetings.
Of this restriction the editor remarked: "i/e can appreciate
the anxiety of these learned gentlemen to draw the veil over 
their professional quarrels, just as we comprehend, very 
clearly, the object of their dog-latin prescriptions and 
cabalistic doses,TT The public should be apprised of their 
proceedings, continued toe editor, "as a check and restraint 
upon that inherent and unconquerable disputatiousness'* of
Olthe medical profession. The May 30 resolution by the 
Board of Health proclaiming epidemic cholera present in Hew 
Orleans aroused the ire of the Delta still more, i/hen, 
eight days later, the resolution was rescinded, the editor 
commented that the whole thing had been "a mere medical 
hallucination." The mere rescinding of the original reso­
lution was not, he felt, sufficient to remedy the mischief 
already done, since many citizens had fled from New Orleans. 
"It may restore the confidence of our citizens in the health
of the city," he wrote, "but it will diminish their faith in
22the Board of Health." Mortality figures showed the
21Paily Delta, May 17, 1855. 
22Ibid., June 8, 1855.
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resolution to have been anything but a medical hallucina­
tion; 366 cholera deaths were recorded in hew Orleans during
the first half of .1355, most of them occurring at the begin-
23ning of the warm season.
The public was advised by some of the local journals to 
be cautious and not to expect a great deal from the quar­
antine or the Board of Health in 1355* The Picayune warned 
that the quarantine should have taken effect April 1 instead 
of two months later. Evidently, stated the editor, at least 
one season would be required to establish necessary regula­
tions and put the quarantine stations in efficient operating 
24order. "A Physician,” whose letter appeared m  the Hew 
Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, declared that the 
Board of Health had not yet been given sufficient power to 
deal effectively with local sanitary problems. The City 
Council, he felt, was too jealous of its authority to assist 
the Board in its legal pursuits. "Let the ’Board of Health' 
issue an order to the 'Commissioner of Streets’ tomorrow 
morning, and see whether it will be obeyed,” he asserted, 
"They would be laughed to scorn by the very scavengers.”
This physician possessed, however, ”an abiding faith” that 
the recently-elected Council would "offer the hand of con­
fidence to our Board of Health, and so far from throwing
2-%ew Orleans Medical Nev/s and Hospital Gazette,
II (1355-5^17 229-30.
^Picayune, May 31 j 1355.
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any obstacle in their way, will volunteer every facility 
in their power to the advancement of the great cause of 
hygiene.
The reason for the intense criticism of the Board of 
Health during the summer and fall of 1355 was the Governor’s 
quarantine proclamation of June 4. It soon became evident 
that many of the advocates of quarantine were unwilling to 
sacrifice in any degree tne commerce of New Orleans in order 
to enforce a really stringent quarantine. Governor Hebert’s 
proclamation, issued upon the advice of the Board of Health, 
declared: ’’All ships coming from any port in the Torrid
Zone, or vessel wtiich may have cleared from other ports, 
but has last sailed from a. port within the Tropics, r are_7 
subject to a Quarantine of not less than ten days. The 
ports of Savannah and Charleston shall also be included.”
The legality of the proclamation could be questioned be­
cause of failure to specify particular places, other than 
Savannah and Charleston, ’’where there was_7 reason to 
believe a pestilential, contagious or infectious disease” 
existed. The area placed under ’’interdict” ( a term used 
frequently by the opponents of quarantine) was vast, and 
the Board of Health certainly had no knowledge of the
^ % e w  Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
II (1355-5577 137-887
^/""Review of_7 ”An Act to establish Quarantine for 
the protection of the State,” New Orleans Medical and Sur­
gical Journal, XII (1355-56), 133.
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presense of disease in all of the ports included in the 
decree.
The proclamation stated that ships sailing from ports 
in the Torrid Zone would be subject to quarantine for not 
less than ten days. The cost of the detention, according 
to the Quarantine Act, had to be borne by the captain or 
owner of the vessel. Aside from the charges demanded for 
inspecting, cleaning, and fumigating the ship, a five dollar 
fee was assessed for the care of every sick person landed 
at the Quarantine Station. In addition, the ten days or 
rnore daring which the captain and crew were required to re­
main at the quarantine ground was' a period of time lost to 
profitable occupation. This alleged crime against commerce 
seemed especially grievous because reports reaching New Or­
leans almost invariably described the ports against which 
the quarantine had been proclaimed to be free from any kind 
of pestilence.
The Daily Delta, on June 24, displayed indignance over
the detention of the brig Mary Elizabeth which had sailed
for New Orleans from Havana. It seemed ridiculous to the
editor to quarantine Ma healthy ship, having no discoverable
27infectious matter on board." Three days later attention 
was directed by the Delta to the case of the Orizaba which 
had arrived at Mississippi Station from Vera Cruz. There 
was no epidemic in Vera Cruz, and there had been no sickness
^Daily Delta, June 24, 1^55
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on board the ship, declared the editor; yet a ten day de­
tention was required. The entire quarantine system was 
being defeated, he maintained, by stubborn adherence to 
the letter of the law. He reported further (although it 
was never confirmed) that all passengers on the Orizaba 
had been required to take an oath stating whether or not 
they had ever had yellow fever. Those swearing in the 
affirmative were supposedly given a permit to proceed to 
New Orleans, whereas those never’ having incurred the dis­
ease were "compelled to sun themselves for ten days in the 
society of the pragmatical and arrogant officials at tire 
station.
The Picayune joined tire Delta and other New Orleans 
newspapers in denouncing the administration of tire quaran­
tine. Detention should not be required, thought trie Pica­
yune , unless there was "probable danger." "The law under 
which the Board acts," continued the editor, "gives indeed 
a wide discretion to the officers appointed to carry it into 
effect; but there is nothing in it to justify the arrest of 
commerce carried on by healthy vessels with healthy ports.
. . ." The Pica?/une asserted further that the law forbade 
the Board of Health from stopping "clean and healthy vessels" 
unless they had sailed from ports previously declared "in­
fected" places. "The extreme rigoi^ exercised in this case 
/""the Orizaba 7 , averred the editor, is . . . unnecessary
2^Ibid., June 27, 1855
117
to the legitimate objects of the law, not required by any
of its directions, of no service to the public health,
oppressive to private interests, and very injurious to the
29commerce of the city." This was strong language for a
journal which a short time earlier had so energetically
advocated a strict quarantine.
The Delta's ■campaign against the quarantine and the
Board of Health proceeded without let-up. "The origin of
all the difficulties which have tended to make Quarantine
odious to our citizens can be discovered in the Governor’s
proclamation," declared the editor, "The responsibility
. . . rests on the Board, and on it alone." Consequently,
he continued, " . . .  the worst enemy of quarantine has been
30the Board of Health."^ A letter from an anonymous writer 
asserted: "No epidemics, no suspension of navigation in
our Western rivers, which have yet befallen us can be com­
pared in their deleterious effects, with this same procla- 
31m a t i o n . T h e  question of the legality of the proclama­
tion was brought to a climax June 29 'when the steamer 
Crescent City, arriving from Havana, refused to undergo 
quarantine and proceeded directly to New Orleans. The 
Quarantine Act stipulated that such violations would result 
in fines not exceeding two thousand dollars, or imprison­
ment not exceeding twelve months, or both, at the discretion
^Picayune, June 27> 1&55. 
^ D a i l y  Delta, June 29, 1355* 
^1Ibid.
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of the court. Possibly the captain of the Crescent City
was merely seeking to provide a test case, but regardless
of his motive the Board of Health was forced to take some
kind of action. One of the local newspapers summarized the
problem: "If this vessel runs the quarantine with impunity,
the whole action of the Board is a perfect farce, and they
32may as well abandon their trust at once."v The very next
day the Board proceeded against the captain of the Crescent
City in the ordinary form of complaint before a justice of 
33the peace.
The attitude of the Hew Orleans newspapers brought a 
fierce denunciation from the Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate.
The Delta was assailed for having referred to the Governor's 
proclamation as a "temporary hallucination." "The injustice 
and flippancy of /~that_7 journal towards the State Execu­
tive," declared the Advocate, "pander only to certain local, 
or, it may be New York influences." The Picayune and the 
Bulletin were especially vulnerable:
Look at their back numbers, and note 
the imposing procession of editorials, 
communications, letters, ic., made up of 
ingredients of dogmatic assertions and 
lachrymose lamentations, demanding, invok­
ing, imploring the Legislature to confer 
upon the afflicted city of Hew Orleans and 
the State at large, also the whole Missis­
sippi valley, the costly blessings of an 
experimental quarantine. . . . Quarantine*.
Quarantine I That was the only salvation 
for all, and something more for a few.
What mortal law-givers could resist such
3^Semi-Weekly Creole, June 30, 1£55• 
33picayune, July 1, 1855*
a bilious tide of tears and ink, with 
imprecations well stirred in1. Ours did 
not. But with flagrant inconsistency, now 
that the clamorers have got the great con­
summation of their wishes, they complain 
of its enforcement in the only manner to 
secure any possible blessings pertaining 
to it. We suppose they believe it a good 
enough thing theoretically and generally, 
but not specially, when it conflicts with 
their immediate interests or convenience.-^
The Board of Health, recognizing the June 4 proclamation 
to be of questionable legality, drew up a second proclamation 
basically as rigid as the first but with the additional fea­
ture that it conformed to the letter of the law. As announced 
by Governor Hebert July 10, the new proclamation in effect 
amended the previous one by specifying ports in wh Lch there 
was reason to believe pestilence existed. Included, in the 
decree were several ports in Cuba, Jamaica, Santo Domingo, 
and other West Indies Islands, as well as ports in Mexico,
Central. America, and the northern part of South America.-''
The Picayune, which had been urging a relaxation of the 
quarantine, seemed greatly disturbed about the attempt being 
made by the Board of Health to maintain a rigid, inflexible 
system. "Though the proclamation be within the letter of 
the law," commented the editor, "we are not persuaded that 
it is in compliance with the spirit and real intent or 
useful purpose of the law."-^
-^Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate, July 5j 1^55 • 
3 ^Picayune, July 11, 1355•
36Ibid.
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Shortly thereafter, as a result of mounting criticism, 
the Board published supplemental regulations anno,racing that 
one of its ’'discretionary powers” was to be exercised. That 
is, the Resilient Physician was authorized to permit vessels 
and passengers to come directly to New Orleans when found to 
be clean and healthy. The editor of the Picayune was re­
lieved that the "oppressive rules” had been suspended, but 
he felt that the quarantine modification would have been 
unnecessary if it had not been for the iniquitous procla­
mations. Both proclamations, he declared, though they were 
drafted by the Board of Health, actually deprived the Board 
of its discretionary power to allow healthy vessels to pro­
ceed without detention. In addition, asserted the Picayune, 
tne proclamation by requiring a ten day quarantine had di­
vested the Board, of its discretionary power to fix the time 
limit for the detention of vessels.^ These discretionary 
powers were given to the Board of Health by the Quarantine 
Act, continued the editorial, but tne proclamations placed 
health officials in a position where they could not legally 
modify their own regulations. The Board was urged to re­
quest the Governor to revoke his proclamation, thereby
3?The assertion was not exactly correct. Section 
six of the Quarantine Act granted to the Board of Health 
discretion in determining the number of days of quarantine, 
but this power was qualified by the provision that the de­
tention period was "not to be less than ten days.” Acts 
passed by the Second Legislature of the State of Louisiana 
. . . Il55, Act No. 336, p. 472.
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36restoring to itself its legal discretionary powers.
Whether legal or not, by easing the quarantine the
Board of Health had shown "symptoms of returning sanity
and common-sense," commented the Delta. The Delta modestly
credited the press with having prompted the "better spir- 
39it." Nonetheless, criticism of the quarantine and the 
Board of Health continued unrelenting. The Baton Rouge 
Weekly Comet, after referring to quarantine laws as "bar­
barism belonging to the dark ages," attacked the quarantine 
system on four counts: "First, the expense direct and
indirect. Second, the injury done commerce. Third, the 
conflict— direct with Christian principles, and Fourth, 
the absolute tendency the law has, to increase instead of 
diminish d i s e a s e . U n f o r t u n a t e l y  the editor failed to 
elaborate on the last two points.
The Board of Health was called upon by the Picayune 
to do something about the "muddy, disagreeable flavor" of 
the city's drinking water and also the stagnant water 
forming quagmires under many New Orleans homes. The Board 
was clothed with extensive powers to correct sanitary a- 
buses, asserted the editor, but virtually nothing had been 
d o ne.^ At tne next Board of Health meeting a resolution
■̂ Daily Delta, July 13, 1335*
^Baton Rouge Weekly Comet, July 14, 1655. 
^Picayune, August 15> 1655*
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was adopted notifying the Picayune that three times the City 
Council of New Orleans had rejected a sanitary ordinance 
drafted, by health officials, and therefore the Board con­
sidered its duties limi .,ed to matters involving the quaran­
tine. The editor of the Picayune, while agreeing that the 
Council had "deplorably neglected its part, of tne duty," 
claimed that the Board of Health, had been granted sufficient 
power to correct sanitary abuses without attempting to shift
I Oresponsibility.+
As the debate over public health policy continued, the 
state of Louisiana was for the third consecutive year vis­
ited by epidemic yellow' fever. Some twenty-six hundred 
died from that disease in New Orleans, and the pestilence, 
as before, was by no means confined to the Crescent City.
The epidemic spread throughout much of Louisiana and into 
neighboring states. Among the afflicted cities were Baton 
Rouge, Port Hudson, Plaquemine, Paincourtvilie, and Later- 
proof in Louisiana; and Vicksburg, Fort Adams, and Natchez 
in Mississippi. Natchez, famed throughout the lower Missis­
sippi Valley for its experiments with quarantine, failed in
L ̂1855 to prevent the introduction of yellow fever. In 
attempting to protect their citizens from the raging
42Ibid., August 17, 1855.
^ I'lew Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette,
II (1855-5^77 369-70; Picayune, September 25, 1855; Daily 
Delta, September 3, 1855*
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pestilence, the villages of Opelousas and Clinton adopted
local quarantines. The Town Council of Clinton passed an
ordinance ich forbade any person arriving from an area
where yellow fever was prevailing to come within the cor­
'dporation limits. Violators were to be fined fifty dollars.'1'1 
The Opelousas quarantine ordinance was similar, except the 
ban included not only persons, but also "Goods, Merchan­
dize £ sic_7 j Bedding, or other objects . . . supposed to 
convey or communicate the Yellow' Fever."^
The "triune" epidemics of 1853-4-5 brought to New 
Orleans, and to Louisiana as a whole, a frightful death 
toll. The advocates of quarantine had been able to use the 
1853 and 1854 epidemics in their campaign leading to the 
passage of the Quarantine Act, but the political situation 
was altered in 1855 by the return of Yellow Jack in the face 
of the quarantine. It seemed to many that the Board of 
Health had failed utterly in its primary task of utilizing 
the quarantine to prevent the importation of pestilence.
Had the quarantine been given a fair trial? Those 
favoring retention of this institution argued that one sea­
son was not sufficient to determine anything conclusive con­
cerning its merits. The New Orleans Medical Kews and Hos­
pital Gazette pleaded for a continuation of the quarantine 
and the Board of Health. The cost of the experiment had
^Clinton American Patriot, August 25, 1855* 
450pelousas Courier, September 22, 1855*
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not been great, it was argued, when one considered what 
epidemics cost New Orleans. In the past, trade had been 
diverted to other ports, immigration had been checked, the 
confidence of foreign capitalists had been lost, and prop­
erty values had remained low because of the cityfs inability 
to prevent frequent yellow fever visitations. The state, 
according to the Medical News, had the undoubted power to 
promote the health and prosperity of its citizens. Not 
enough had been done, declared the editor, to put into 
operation hygienic measures used elsewhere to combat dis­
ease. The state government had shown itself to be "penny- 
wise and pound foolish" in matters of public health. The 
Medical Kews editorial stated that the quarantine was "in­
trinsically good." and should be rigidly enforced against 
all infectious diseases the year round. The state was ex­
horted to direct every effort toward a campaign to destroy 
and prevent yellow fever. ""The thing is possible," con­
cluded the editor, "the expense should be counted as nothing; 
the means are simple and ample.
New Orleans newspapers felt very differently. The 
quarantine had been "vexatious to commerce," they said, and 
there was absolutely no proof that it could prevent yellow 
fever. Early in December the Picayune challenged the need 
for a twenty dollar inspection fee. The Quarantine Act
^ N e w  Orleans Medical News and Hospital Gazette, 
II (1S55-56T7 417-21.
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provided that ships, barks, and sea-going steamers were 
to be charged twenty dollars, and all other vessels fifteen 
dollars. These fees had to be paid at the Quarantine Station 
before the vessels were allowed to proceed to New Orleans.
The Picayune questioned the need for this requirement during 
the winter month.s when it was "only a ceremony in ninety- 
nine cases out of a hundred." The same editorial mentioned 
complaints about needless delay at Mississippi Station; ves­
sels arriving at night or late in tne day were said to have 
been compelled to wait until the next morning to be inspected. 
Supposedly some vessels had been delayed as much as twenty-
infour hours. A revision of the quarantine law was termed 
by the editor of the Picayune "absolutely necessary," Evi­
dently the revision he had in mind would have prevented any 
future proclamation from designating a large number of in-
j &fected ports. A week later the Delta called for the "to­
tal repeal or thorough modification" of the Quarantine Act 
by the next Legislature. The quarantine and the Board of 
Health, according to that journal, were despicable institu­
tions: ’
We commenced our experience of the 
beauties of quarantine when a Board of 
Health was organised, which assumed un­
limited authority over our commercial
^The Resident Physician at Mississippi Station 
immediately informed the Picayune that the story of delays 
at the quarantine ground was untrue,
^ Picayune, December 1355*
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interests on a plea of sanitary reform; 
and signalized its career by placing so 
many restrictions on vessels coming to 
this port, that our ordinary and legit­
imate trade was absolutely paralyzed for 
a while. All State officers were more 
or less subject to the Board, and the 
Governor had no more discretion or in­
dependent wall in the execution of its
commands than the Street Commissioner 
in City Hall or the Health Officer at 
the Station.^9
The Board of Health Report for 1355 j the first annual 
Report to the Legislature by the Louisiana State Board of 
Health, was drafted by the President of the Board, Dr,
50Samuel Choppin, and the Secretary, Charles A. Labuzan,
The Report contained first, an account of the establishment 
of the quarantine stations, and second, the Secretaryfs
financial report. The fiscal statement showed the Board
to be in debt by nearly seventeen thousand dollars, al­
though five thousand of the original fifty thousand dollar 
appropriation had not yet been collected, while Mississippi 
Station produced an income of nearly twenty thousand dollars, 
the Rigolets and Atchafalaya Stations provided revenue which 
could be described only as negligible. On the other hand, 
as Dr. Choppin and other quarantinists pointed out, the 
chief expenses (those attending the creation of the quar­
antine stations) had already been incurred. Choppin
^9paily Delta, December 11, 1355*
50The first Reports were rather short, and were 
invariably the work of the Board’s President. The Secre­
tary’s financial statement was attached, usually at the end.
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expressed his belief that in the future the quarantine 
establishments would, support themselves, but he said that 
at present he must ask for an additional appropriation of 
twenty thousand dollars. He told the Legislature that the 
state had a "solemn duty to protect its citizens, not only 
from foreign invasions and internal outbreaks, but also from 
the invasion and spread of diseases. The obligation," 
Choppin declared, was "imposed by the law of nations and 
of nature." New Orleans had suffered "incalculable losses" 
from the introduction and spread of epidemic diseases, 
continued the Report. The appropriation of fifty thousand 
dollars was, consequently, "but a- small capital to produce 
so enormous an interest as is to be expected from it. . . ."
Choppin reported that 1,149 vessels had been examined
at the three quarantine stations, and that only twenty-one
of those had been quarantined for having sickness on board
51or being in a foul condition. Figures were presented to 
show that goods imported from the West Indies, Mexico, and 
Central America amounted to only a small fraction of New 
Orleans’ total imports. Choppin concluded that the inter­
ruptions of commerce caused by the quarantine had not been 
serious at all. It seemed like a anall consideration when 
weighed against the health of the city and state.
The Report asserted that quarantine was based on two
^ H e  mad.e no mention of quarantines imposed against 
vessels having sailed from "infected ports,"
assumptions: first, that epidemic diseases were caused by
a specific contagion, and second, that healthy communities 
could be saved from contagion by keeping infected persons 
and articles at a distance. "The existence of quarantine 
lav/s and sanitary regulations in all of tne enlightened 
governments of the world,'1 asserted Choppin, "is a strong 
argument in favor of the policy of such establishments, for 
a system of such antiquity, and so constantly sanctioned by 
the test of strict investigation on the part of learned and 
practical men must be founded on true principles." Quar­
antine was described as a "most important auxiliary" in the 
battle to free New Orleans from "the odium of insalubrity." 
There could be no doubt, he said, of the influence of quar­
antine in excluding such admittedly contagious diseases as 
small-pox and typhus. .Choppin claimed that there was every 
reason to believe yellow fever could also be classified as 
a contagious disease and, he maintained, a thousand cases 
in Louisiana and Mississippi might be cited to prove this 
point. He expressed his conviction that the steamer Ben 
Franklin had imported the deadly yellow fever contagion into 
New Orleans in
Dr. Choppin believed it impossible to suppose that his 
antagonists possessed "that interest in the welfare of our 
people which entitles their opposition to respect." The 
Report stated that despite opposition to the Board of Health, 
the quarantine system put into operation the past summer 
had been "productive of much good." Mention was made
particularly that many immigrants had been kept away during 
the yellow fever epidemic. Choppin called upon his cohorts 
not to be discouraged in the face of ''opposition of ignorant 
bigotry on the one hand and of the basest mercenary intoler­
ance on the other.17 He concluded the Report by commending 
the members of the Board of Health for the "earnestness and 
diligence with which they labored amidst the outcries of an 
opposing community, and not.withstanding the vile abuses 
heaped upon them by mercenary newspapers. . . .Tl̂  "
The fate of the Board of Health was at stake as tne 
Legislature convened in January, IB56. The Board's oppo­
nents had from the beginning been more influential and 
articulate than its adherents. During the first month of 
the session a joint resolution was adopted "to investigate 
the accounts and acts of the Board of Health, and to ex- 
ai.iine the quarantine ■ system. "53 k special Joint Committee 
of the two Houses was appointed to carry out the terms of 
the resolution. The Co.niittee1s Report, made public in 
March, criticized the quarantine and the Board of Health, 
after which a recommendation was made for the repeal of the 
Quarantine Act. First, the Report criticized the bookkeep­
ing; procedures of the Secretary, declaring that it appeared 
the Board's business had been "rather loosely conducted."
5̂ -Report of the Board of Health £~1$55_7> PP* 3-12.
53Journal of the House of Representatives of the 
State of Louisiana'^  1356̂ 7 fBaton- Rouge~, 1^56), p. 41.
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Furthermore, she Committee alleged that the seven thousand 
dollars paid by the Board for the land upon which the Mis­
sissippi Quarantine Station was located was more than ten 
times what the land was worth. Al.. except twenty acres was 
a worthless salt marsh, claimed the Report, and the little 
good land which was available was subject to floods. The 
Committee stated that upon examining the book of the Resi­
dent Physician at the Mississippi quarantine ground it dis­
covered that most of the vessels subjected to detention were 
clean and healthy. In other cases, the Report asserted, 
unhealthy vessels had been permitted to unload their sick 
passengers and proceed to Rev/ Orleans. Another complaint 
was the unnecessarily large number of employees at Missis­
sippi Station.
The Report of the Joint Committee called attention to 
figures made public by the Secretary of the Board of Health 
indicating that nearly eleven thousand dollars had been 
expended on "furniture, medicines, provision, &c." for the 
Mississippi Station, whereas upon inspection the Committee 
concluded that all the furniture and moveable effects at 
the station could not have had a total value of more than 
one thousand dollars. It was noted too that quarantine 
officials had been very reluctant in providing the Commit­
tee with any information. Upon investigation of the prac­
tical operation of the quarantine, continued the Report, 
the Committee discovered general agreement that the quar­
antine experiment had proved "expensive, inconvenient, and
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extremely burthensome." The Committee reported its convic­
tion that "no modification of the law can be devised that 
will be of any essential benefit as regards public health; 
your Committee being satisfied that yellow? fever and cholera 
cannot be excluded by any system of quarantine." The Report 
concluded with a recommendation for the outright repeal of 
the existing law. It was signed by seven Committee members, 
and the eighth announced his agreement with everything in
the Report except the recommendation to terminate quaran- 
54tine . ̂
The House of Representatives proceeded no carry out the 
recommendation. On March 4 a measure entitled, "An Act to 
repeal an act to establish Quarantine for the protection 
of the State," was introduced into the House and referred to 
the Committee on Commerce. Ten days later the bill was re­
ported favorably from the Committee, and the opponents of 
the quarantine attempted to hurry it through the House.
Those wishing to see the quarantine continued argued that, 
a fuller discussion of the matter was necessary. Conse­
quently the bill to repeal the Quarantine Act was made the 
order of the day for the following Monday. When the bill 
came up for discussion March 17 it was evident that the 
overwhelming majority of House members were in favor of it. 
Those who opposed the bill offered two reasons for main­
taining the quarantine: first, it had not yet been given
5^Picayune, March 21, 1856.
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a fair trial, and second, the necessary buildings had al­
ready been erected and only a very small additional appro­
priation would be required during the next year or two. It 
appears, moreover, that many of the sixteen voting against 
the repeal bill disapproved of the administration of the 
quarantine but preferred to have the Quarantine Act amended 
rather than repealed.
The Senate debate on the bill to repeal the Quarantine 
Act was conducted along much the sarise line, but the final 
vote was entirely different. Senator V.'alker, the maverick 
member of the Joint Committee which had investigated the 
operation of the quarantinet spoke of "the wretched manage­
ment of the Board, and their lavish and profuse expenditure 
of the public funds," but he questioned the wisdom and jus­
tice of abolishing the quarantine as soon as it became self- 
sustaining. Furthermore, Walker critised the provision in 
the repeal bill for the appointment of a commissioner who 
was to receive jne thousand dollars for disposing of the 
property belonging to the Board of Health. Walker mentioned 
that his constituents were opposed to the precipitate abro­
gation of the quarantine. They felt, he said, that quaran­
tine should receive a fairer and fuller trial. Another solon 
remarked, that while he was convinced yellow fever could not 
be kept out of New Orleans by a quarantine, however rigidly 
enforced, he did believe the quarantine might prevent the 
introduction of such diseases as cholera, smallpox, typhus,
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and measles.
The proponents of the repeal bill argued that public 
opinion called for the end of quarantine; only the officers 
who received T,fat salaries” desired to have it continued.
The quarantine was alleged to have swallowed up large amounts 
of state funds and to have become ”a burden, a shackle, and 
a drag chain to commerce.” The opinion was expressed that 
the quarantine was ”wholly inoperative in warding off or 
preventing contagious diseases.”
Senator Berault, delivering the final speech on the 
bill, ably defended the quarantine and the basic principles 
of public health. The great charge against the quarantine, 
remarked Berault, vras its incompatability with the interests 
of commerce. He asked the members of Senate whether they 
were willing "to bow before and worship the golden calf of 
commerce.” They were not there solely to legislate in the 
interest of business, he thought; instead they should as­
sume a higher ground. The safety of their fellow men was at 
stake. He pleaded: . . this is a matter of humanity,
and not a case of dollars and cents.” The Senate voted sev-
55enteen to teri in favor of laying the bill on the table. 
Quarantine and the State Board of Health were to be given a 
further trial.
5^Reports of the House of Representatives, of the 
State of Louisiana~7  1$56_/ (Baton Rouge', 1356), pp. 59-60, 
64-5,* Journal of the House of Representatives / 18$6_/, 
pp. 69, 103, 107; Official Reports of the Senat e of the 
State of Louisiana / '185*6'/ (Baton Rouge, 1356) , pp. 70-71; 
Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana 
l_ 1^56_J (Baton Rouge, 1356) , pp. $4-35•
CHAPTER V 
THE BOARD GAINS ACCEPTANCE
Despite its inauspicious beginning in 1$55> the Board 
of Health managed to become a permanent state institution. 
Throughout its early history the basic problem was that the 
fate of the Board and of the quarantine system were very 
closely connected. Opposition to quarantine usually meant 
opposition to the Board of Health as well. The yellow fever 
epidemic of 1355 nearly resulted in the death of both, but 
fortunately the following two years brought respite from 
pestilence to the stricken city of New Orleans. The year 
1356, during which the quarantine was still very much on 
trial, was comparatively healthy, and this fact assured the 
continuation of the experiment for another year. Opposition 
by no means subsided, but public opinion was quite strongly 
on the side of the quarantine whenever it seemed to be a- 
chieving results.
At the opening of the 1357 legislative session, Governor 
Robert C. Wickliffe told the state lawmakers that although he 
had never been an advocate of quarantine, he had come to the 
conclusion that it would be "extremely inexpedient to repeal 
the laws establishing it, as a fair experiment has not yet 
been made, and it is now in such condition as to require no 
pecuniary aid from the State for its support." He called
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attention to the disregard for the law evidenced by some 
snip captains and commanders who dared not attempt law vio­
lations in the North where quarantines were more rigid. 
V/ickliffe seemed to be urging an amendment to the Quarantine 
Act providing stricter enforcement.^ A quarantine bill, 
probably not the type V/ickliffe desired, was introduced into 
the House of Representatives, but it failed of final pas- 
sage. Two changes contemplated by the bill were a reduction 
of the inspection fee on small vessels and the granting of 
permission for all vessels to pass directly to New Orleans 
without inspection between November 1 and May 1.
The first real change made in the quarantine came -in 
l$5l. A law approved March l£ supplemented the Quarantine 
Act of 1$55 by modifying some of the most important pro­
visions of the original act without necessitating any fun­
damental alteration in existing practices. The Board of 
Health was officially granted the pov,er (which it had been 
exercising) of extending the quarantine period beyond the 
number of days specified in the Governor's proclamation.
The Resident Physician was authorised to grant "persons 
acclimated and healthy," permits to proceed to New Orleans
^Official Journal of the Senate of Louisiana £  1&57.J7 
(Baton Rouge, 1857)t P* 5.
^Official Journal of the Hous e of Representatives of 
the State of Louisiana . . . j~1357 7 (Baton Rouge, 1#57), 
pp. S7-38.
^Crescent, March 2, 1#57*
while their vessel was in quarantine. Further liberaliza­
tion was found in the provision permitting "vessels out ten 
days from infected ports, presenting clean bills of health, 
not having nor having: had sickness on board, and . . . not 
in foul condition, . . .  to pass to the City after thorough 
fumigation by disinfecting agents. . .
The Resident Physician v/as not only given more "dis­
cretionary power," but he was also granted authority to 
administer oaths needed in obtaining; pertinent evidence 
concerning vessels, cargoes, and crews. As before, the 
Resident Physician was required to furnish a certificate of 
health to vessels "free from disease, not in a foul condi­
tion, and not from as infected district," These certifi­
cates were now to cost from five to thirty dollars (a 
modification of th- previous rates of fifteen and twenty 
dollars), the respective charges being: based upon the type 
of vessel and the point of origin. The new act also stipu­
lated tnat the Board of Health could, in cases of emergency, 
issue a quarantine proclamation with.out reference to the 
Governor. In compliance with a request from the Board of 
Health, the office of marshal was abolished. The Quarantine 
Act had provided the Board with a police marshal at the 
Mississippi Station, but the maintenance of this functionary 
was deemed by the Board a needless expense. The act of 1^5$ 
also reiterated many of the provisions of the 1&55 act
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regarding fundamentals of the quarantine system.^ This 
modification and clarification of the Quarantine Act marked 
the acceptance by the state Legislature of the permanency 
of the quarantine and the Board of Health*
The Governor of Louisiana issued a quarantine procla­
mation during each of the five years from IS56 to i860. In 
1356 no proclamation was forthcoming until July 21, at which 
time vessels arriving at New Orleans from several ports in 
the V/est Indies were made subject to the quarantine. The 
Picayune immediately criticized this action and also the 
state Legislature’s failure to modify the entire quarantine 
system "notwithstand ing the general complaint of its vexa­
tious interference with the commerce o f the c it y . ” As might 
have been expected, the primary objection was that ’’per­
fectly healthy" vessels sailing from ports designated as 
infected were detained ten days. The very issuance of the 
proclamation was the scat of the trouble, felt the Picayune, 
because "it makes the enforcement of quarantine against 
vessels arriving from such ports imperative, even when un­
necessary, and deprives the Board of the right of discrim- 
5ination."
According to later accounts in the Picayune, the "right 
of discrimination," or as it was otherwise known, the
^Acts of the Fourth Legislature of the State of 
Louisiana, at its First Session . . , I85I? (Baton Rouge, 
1853), Act No.~259, pp. 187-897
^Picayune, July 29, 30, 1356.
discretionary power, was employed by the Board of Health
and the Resident Physician later during the summer. On
August 1/+ it was reported that the brig Adams Gray, upon
arriving from Kingston, Jamaica, had been forced to undergo
a seven day (not ten day) q u a r a n t i n e T h e  following day
it was revealed that passengers and mail from the steamship
Philadelphia, quarantined ten days for having stopped at
7Havana, had been taken by tow boat to New Orleans. The 
Picayune, still not satisfied, maintained that the Adams 
Gray, the Philadelphia, and many other vessels should not 
have been quarantined at all because they had no sickness 
on beard. On September 29» after a period of two months 
in operation, the quarantine was suspended by tne Board of 
Health. The Picayune, taking cognisance- of the suspension, 
announced gleefully that exporters and ship owners would 
thereafter be able to send their goods and bring their ship 
to New Orleans "without any fear of any inconvenience from 
the sanitary regulations that have been in force during the 
summer.
Near unanimity of opinion existed among New Orleans 
newspapers as to the vexatiousness of the quarantine, but 
there was a decided difference of opinion on what should 
be done. The editor of the Crescent, whose views were
^Ibid., August 14, 1^56. 
7lbid., August 15> 1&56. 
^Ibid., September 30> IS56.
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similar to those expressed by the Picayune, declared some- 
whct reluctantly his belief that the quarantine had not yet 
been given a fair trial:
We have strong hopes that a salutary 
modification and improvement will be effected.
The laws are susceptible to useful amendment, 
in several particulars. They can be made 
to bear less heavily .upon commerce and com- 
mucation with near and distant ports, v.:Lth­
ou t imperilling the oublic health in the 
slightest possible degree. . . . We are
not as strongly in favor of quarantines as
we were some years ago. Our faith in
their efficacy ha s been shak en, but not q
quite shattered to the level of unbelief.'
The question of the constitutionality of the Quarantine 
Act was brought before the Louisiana Supreme Court late in
1356. The Board of Health, brought suit to collect the a-
mount of drafts drawn b; captains of certain schooners in 
payment for inspection fees at the three quarantine stations. 
The defendants, Pooley, Nichol and Company, alleged that the 
fees demanded at Rigolets Station and Atchafalaya Station 
were not legal because they had not been contemplated by 
the Quarantine Act. They based their case upon this point, 
although maintaining further that the act was unconstitu­
tional. The Court ruled that the provisions of section 
seven of the act which established the two quarantine sta­
tions should be extended to include the right to collect 
inspection fees. In other words the act did contemplate 
the imposition of those charges. As for the constitution­
ality of the law itself, the Court stated: TTIt is conceded
^Crescent, February 27, 1$57.
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by the argument, that the law is constitutional."'*'^
In 1357 the usual quarantine did not go into operation
until June 15. Two months earlier, however, Rio de Janeiro
was declared to be infected, and all vessels having sailed
from, touched, or stopped at that port were to be detained
ten days in quarantine.-*--*- On June 7 the Picayune warned its
readers that an unusually rigid quarantine 'was about to go
into effect. A thirty day quarantine was to be enforced
against all ports south of New Orleans where yellow fever
"usually or casually prevails." The adoption of a measure
so sweeping in its scope indicated that the Board of Health
believed its position to be reasonably secure. The editor •
of the Crescent questioned the legality of the proclamation,
and commented: " . . .  we think the Board of" Health' have
exceeded their powers, and done a very vexatious and very
useless thing, in the issuing of this order, and we hope
they will reconsider it before they put it into force,"
Probably in deference to this criticism, the Board did
change its instructions a week later and enumerated the
ports believed to be infected. The ports subject to the
latest "interdict" were located in the West Indies, Mexico,
12and northern South America.
-*-®3oard of Health of Louisiana v. Pooley, Nicol and 
Co., 11 La. Ann. 743. Report of Cases Argued and Determined 
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana and in the Superior Court 
of the Territory of Louisiana (St. Paul, 1907), Book 2&]
pp. 619-21.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1332, p. 126.
•^Picayune, June 7, 1357; Crescent, June 15, 1357.
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The new, severe thirty day detention period prescribed 
by the proclamation brought criticism fro;, even the strongly 
pro-quarantine New Orleans Medical News and. Hospital Gazette:
Unless a vessel be absolutely infected 
when she arrives at the ground, we cannot 
see the propriety of keeping her thirty 
days in limbo. If she has yellow fever on 
board, then, well and good; keen her forty 
or sixty days; but if she is clean and 
healthy, it seems to us that a detention
of e'ght, or ten days vail be quite suffi­
cient to -•rove whether any of her nassen- qq 
pers or crew will manifest the disease. . . .
The prestige of the Board of Health received a great boost
when for the second .straight year New Orleans was spared
a yellow fever epidemic. Public opinio . se uted to he more 
than ever convinced of the need for a stringent quarantine. 
However, most oh the city’s medical men were more inclined 
to adopt a wait and see attitude. The Board, of Health a- 
chieved a significant victory the folio, ing March when the 
state Legislature voted to retain and to supplement favor­
ably the Quarantine Act of 1355* The Board’s position was 
thereafter not nearly so vulnerable.
Another visitation of epidemic yellow fever seerned. to 
be the only tiling which could jeopardize the Board’s life, 
and unfortunately, Yellow Jack assailed the Crescent City 
in 1C5S with a ferocity exceeded only by the "great epi­
demic" of 1353* -n June a quarantine proclamation similar 
to those of previous years was issued by the Governor, and 
newspaper criticism of this action was equally as bitter
■̂3New Orleans Medical News aid Hospital Gazette,
IV (1357-5377 304.
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as before. Yellow fever appeared in July, but very little 
alarm was expressed at first. On August 1 one of New Or­
leans' medical periodicals reported in traditional fashion 
that yellow fever was "not anything like epidemic . . .  in 
Hew Orleans," and that the few cases which had appeared were 
almost wholly confined to the laboring class and those ex­
posed to the "vicissitudes of weather. As late as .August
10 the Daily Delta referred contemptuously to the "exagger­
ated reports" of yellow fever mortality in Hew Orleans.^
In actuality, the daily death toll by this time had already 
reached thirty. Four days later the same newspaper declared 
it absurd to deny the presence of epidemic yellow fever.
The Board of Health, in the meantime, had been pro­
viding newspapers with weekly mortality reports, but had not 
declared the existence of an epidemic. The Delta did not 
miss tne opportunity to call the public's attention to this 
fact. The first of a long series of articles by Dr. J. S. 
KcFarlane, the same physician who had been so roundly ridi­
culed five years before, was printed in the Delta August 15* 
A determined foe of both the Board of Health and quarantine, 
McFarlane was given the opportunity to attack with all his 
vigor the institutions he despised so deeply. Why, asked 
the old physician, had the Board of Health been created?
1/fIbid., p. 391.
-J-5paily Delta, August 10, iB^c. 
l^Ibid., August 14, 1B$B.
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If it was merely to keep a record of the dead, a schoolboy 
could have been employed. If it was to warn the public of 
the approach of danger, the recent death toll indicated how 
completely the Board had failed. Despite the heavy mortal­
ity, no epidemic had been declared. ilcFarlane gave a ”his­
tory" of quarantine which seemed to prove that yellow fever
was much less likely to prevail when no quarantine restric- 
17tions existed. The prevalence of yellow fever in 1353 at 
the very time a rigid quarantine was being enforced tended 
to lend credence to his claim. The Board of Health, and the
quarantine were, declared ilcFarlane, "two as useless, if
1 pnot pernicious devices as ever encumbered the city."-t-'"
In the?, ensuing weeks the epidemic became more deadly. 
Its full intensity was reached during the month of September 
when yellow fever took the lives of more than eighteen hun­
dred persons in New Orleans. The visitation was not com­
pleted until mid-November, and by then the mortality list 
had swelled to nearly forty-eight hundred. Strangely, the 
Board of Health, in the face of this staggering death toll,
•*-^Ibid., August 15, 1$5$* A much more reliable
authority, Dr. Stanford E. Chaille", agreed with McFarlane 
as to the efficacy of quarantine. Chaille"presented figures 
showing quarantines to be totally useless as a preventive 
of yellow fever in New Orleans and elsewhere. It appeared 
from Chailld'1 s study that epidemics were at least as bad, 
and usually worse, whenever a quarantine was instituted. 
Stanford E. Chaille', "Yellow Fever of 1353 in New Orleans," 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XV (1353-59),
1T7-T^
-̂ Daily Delta, August 25, 185$.
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did not acknowledge the presence of an epidemic. In at­
tempting to defend its position the Scor'd explained to the 
public that there were many definitions for the terra epi­
demic. Regardless of terminology, however, the Board’s 
failure to alert the public to the presence of yellow fever 
in New Orleans was inexcusable.
The unfortunate experience of 1o 5£ was undoubtedly re­
sponsible for the Board of Health’s decision to return in 
1&59 to a quarantine of only ten days. The more rigorous 
thirty day quarantine had been notably unsuccessful, and 
its reapplication would have been virtually indefensible. 
Early in May Governor V/ichiiffe proclaimed a quarantine 
against vessels arriving at New Orleans .from various ports 
south of the United States. The Delta claimed there v/as 
no information of an epidemic in any of those places, and 
denounced the proclamation as Vs. gratuitous oppression and 
annoyance of trie trade of t lie city.” It was pointed out 
that during lB'5’1 more than thirty thousand dollars had been 
extracted from vessels arriving from healthy ports at dis­
ease-stricken New Orleans. ’’Can folly and presumption go 
further than this?” asked the Pelt a , "Was there ever a peo­
ple that submitted so tamely to oppression and extortion as 
ohis population of New Orleans?” Anyone resisting the quar­
antine, declared the editor, "would be pursued by a pack of 
officials, that would never rest, until they hunted him down 
and made him pay, in the shape of costs and penalties, more
than John Hampden lost in resisting the ship mone;- tax of 
Charles the F i r s t . Tt̂  Fortunately, yellow fever did not 
return in 1559, and public confidence in the merits of quar­
antine was restored despite continued blasts from the local 
pr e s s.
The quarantine proclamation by Governor Thomas 0. Moore 
in June, 1560 differed from those of earlier years. Moore 
announced that the Board of Health had received information 
from the American consul in Havana concerning the prevalence 
of yellow fever there. Moore was convinced of the necessity 
for- establishing a quarantine against Havana "or any port in 
which any pestilential, contagious or infectious disease 
shall be ascertained by the Board of Health to prevail.TI The 
Borird was allowed at any time to lengthen the list of infect­
ed ports. The proclamation did not specify the number- of
days detention would be required, because Moore authorized
20the Board of Health to assume this power. On July 14 a
notice from the Board of Health office asserted that in
conformity to the Governor's proclamation and the emergency
powers granted to the Board by the 1555 amendment to the
Quarantine Act, a large number of ports were being quaran- 
21tined. The year 1560 was another comparatively salubrious 
19lbid., May 5, 1559.
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1552, p. 126. 
^ Daily Delta, July 30, 1560.
146
one for Nev.T Orleans, although nothing like unanimity of 
opinion existed as to the effect quarantine had on pre­
serving the public health.
^ !e Picayune, a. perennial advocate of public health 
reform, obviously doubted whether quarantine was beneficial 
to the city. It began a lengthy campaign in the spring of 
1659 directing public attention to various local sanitary 
problems. The Picayune, continually stressing sanitation, 
alleged that with the exception of maintaining the quaran­
tine stations, the Board of health had proven itself to be 
an "absolute nullity," The primary difficulty was seen to 
be the failure of the Board and the Street Commissioner to 
cooperate. The Street Commissioner should have removed 
nuisances when they were reported to him by the Board of 
Health, the editor declared. It was well understood, he 
continued, that the Board was not responsible for the inac­
tion, because in past years the Street Commissioner had often 
been apprised of nuisances without effect. Reports or sug­
gestions of any sort had not been welcome. The Commissioner 
did not recognise the authority of the Board of Health in 
matters affecting the condition of streets, yards, lanes, 
and gutters. The Quarantine Act of 1556 required the Street 
Commissioner to execute orders from the Board of Health, but 
according to the Picayune, this provision had been completely 
nullified by the qualification, "whenever not in conflict
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with the ordinances of the city."22 The Board o.f Health, 
it was revealed, had asked the state Legislature for greater 
power to achieve sanitary reforms. The Legislature decided 
that only the City Council could make this grant, and as a. 
result nothing whatever was aone.^
A year later t:.e Crescent, anxious to have toe city 
take act.on against the ubiquitous filth, remarked that in­
salubrity had been a major factor in retarding the growth 
of New Orleans:
The great drawback which New Orleans 
has always felt in her career of prosperity 
is probably her standing as regards health.
Our city has certainly the reputation a- 
broad of being an extensive grave-yurd, and 
the stoutest heart quails, the firmest cheek 
blanches at the idea of encountering, un­
acclimated , one of our summer q idenics,
It is difficult to realize, in its full ex­
tent, th- blignting influence that this 
state of things has exercised upon some of 
our most important interests. It has made 
the city a residence instead of a home.
. . . People come, forced by the exigencies of 
business and allured by the hope of gain.
They remain during the business season, but 
fly on the approach of summer, as from a 
pestilence. In this way they form and keep 
up a chronic dread of our climate, W ’ ich will 
never* permit tnem to settle down as permanent 
citi sens.24
Unquestionably, prospective residents of New Orleans were 
deterred by filth. A letter to the Picayune from "Civis." 
contains a vivid description of some sanitary problems de­
manding attention:
^Picayune, April 12, 1S59.
23lbid., May 29, 1359.
24q rescent, April 2, 1360.
Piles of garbage and reeking filth 
obstruct the streets and fill the gutters; 
pools of stagnant water, which have stood 
so long in undisturbed exposure to the 
rays of the sun that they are, even at 
this early day in the season, covered with 
a thick a id sickening green scum, which is 
continually agitated from beneath by the 
teeming millions of slimy insects gener­
ated in its filth. Here we see and smell 
a stinking mass of corruption accumulated 
from some kitchen, stable, brewery or dis­
tillery; there a dead dog, swelling and 
festering in the noonday sun; while a 
little further on we see a litter of eight 
or ten puppies lying in a gutter, half 
covered by the slimy mud and water, where 
some hardened wretch has drowned, t h e m . * ?
A Picayune editorial June 3, 1360 returned to the sub­
ject of the Board of Health’s failure to become active in 
promoting sanitation. The Board, as a sanitary commission, 
it was alleged, should have been supervising the removal of 
nuisances from streets, levees, buildings, lots, and vacant 
property, and recommending; a sanitary code to the Council, 
The jurisdictional conflict between the Board of Health and 
the Street Commissioner had prevented this, declared the 
Picayune. Board members had been doing nothing except keep­
ing the city’s raortuary records, stated the editor, "Else­
where,” he said, "so many sinecure offices cannot be found.” 
A recommendation was made that the Board appoint health ward 
ens to inspect certain districts once or twice a week and 
report the presence of nuisances to the Board and the Street 
Commissioner. The Picayune expressed hope that the
^ Picayune} April 22, 1360
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Commissioner would then be willing to assume his proper 
responsibility.^0
Public health was a national natter was well as a local 
one. Quarantine, especially, was attracting a great deal 
of attention in port cities. It was commonly felt that 
quarantines imposed by states and municipalities had not 
worked out well in practice. As a result, the years just 
preceding the Civil liar witnessed the convoking of four 
hational Quarantine and Sanitary Conventions. The Quaran­
tine Convention of 1357j Che first of the meetings, was the 
brain child of Dr. Wilson Jewell of Philadelphia. In 
he succeeded in convincing the Philadelphia Board -of Health 
to hold a national convention the following year to discuss 
quarantine problems. The letters of invitation described 
quarantine laws then in effect as "antiquated, defective;1' 
as "positively oppressive in their.operation upon the in­
terests of commerce, when rigorously exacted;" and as hav­
ing failed "in accomplishing the benevolent purpose for 
which they were originally formed." Uhat Jewell evidently 
had in mind was a revision of state quarantine laws to re­
duce their provisions to some common standard. The invi­
tations, signed by Jewell, "Chairman of the Special Com­
mittee on Quarantine," were sent to boards of health, 
boards of trade, and two regular medical societies in each 
of the principal seaboard cities. Present at the three-day
26Ibid., June 3, 1360.
convention held in Philadelphia in May were seventy-three 
delegates from nine states, nearly two-thirds of whom were 
physic ians.^
The city of New Orleans v;as represented at the conven­
tion, by five delegates, all medical men. The Board of Health
o aseat tnreo; the City Council, two. The Bee, which was very 
enthusiastic about tre convention, must certainly have been 
disappointed by the selection of two avowed non-contagion- 
ists, Edward H. Barton and James Jones, to represent the 
Council. The Bee had urged the appointment of "gentlemen 
who are free from prejudices either in favor of or against
pQa system, of quarantine." ' Nonetheless, Barton was honored 
by being elected vice-president of the convention.
Both contagionists and non-contagionists acre present 
in Philadelphia, with the former faction apparently having 
the majority. Two important propositions were postponed 
indefinitely by a unanimous vote: the first of these was
that "Yellow fever is not contagious, per se," and the sec­
ond asserted that yellow fever was "only propagated in a 
foul or infectious atmosphere, analogous to that which gave 
it birth,” Also postponed indefinitely was a key non-con- 
tagionist proposition asserting that quarantine, however
27Harold M. Cavins, "The National Quarantine and 
Sanitary Conventions of 1&57 to 1360 and the Beginnings of 
the Am erican Public Health Association," Bulletin of the 
History of Medicine, XIII (1943)> 404-405.
2^Picayune, May 21, 1357.
29Bee, April 23, 1357.
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rigidly enforced, could not alone protect a community .from 
the introduction or propagation of disease, and another non- 
contagionist proposition which stated that properly enforced 
sanitary measures could always protect a community against 
tne origination and extent ion of yellow fever, cholera, and 
typhus.
Twenty-three propositions, contai ning many signIficant 
points, were approved overwhelmingly by the convention. 
Smallpox, and under certain circumstances, typhus, cholera, 
and yellow fever, could be introduced into a community by 
foul vessels and cargoes, and diseased crews and passenger's, 
stated one of the propositions. The delegates decided, how­
ever, that those diseases could not become epidemic or en­
demic "unless there exist in t he community the circumstances 
which are calculated to produce such disease independent of 
the importation." These "circumstances" consisted of viti­
ated states of the atmosphere, from local causes, in con­
nection with peculiar meteorological conditi nos." Tne state 
quarantine regulations operative at the time were termed 
"inefficient, and often prejudicial to the interests of the 
community." Other significant points included in the prop­
ositions were that all vessels should, be inspected immedi­
ately upon their arrival, and no vessel should be admitted 
to a port between May 1 and November 1 until after its hold 
had been freely and fully ventilated.
Several of the twenty-three propositions contained de­
tailed recommendations for effecting an efficient quarantine
systt.rn. In general, the quarantine suggested by the con­
vention bore a striking similarity to that already in oper­
ation in Louisiana. It was recommended further that every 
community institute a Board of Health to promote sanitation 
and supervise the quarantine.^
An important development at the Quarantine Convention 
of IS5/ as the acceptance by tne delegates of a proposition
that similar meetings, designated National Quarantine and
qiL'anitary Conventions, would be held in the future.' Ac­
cordingly, a secorm convention convened in Baltimore in l'’t;'. 
to discuss the possibility of adopting a uniform system of 
quarantine laws. The lo59 convention in Mew York succeeded 
in drafting a sanitary code for cities. The delegates to 
this convention also accepted, by a vote of eighty-five to 
six, a resolution declaring: "In the absense of any evi­
dence establishing the conclusion that Yellow Fever has ever 
been conveyed by one person to another, it is the opinion 
of this Convention that the personal quarantine of cases of 
Yellow Fever may be safely abolished, provided that fomites
3^"Minutes of the Proceedings of the Quarantine 




of every kind be rigidly r e s t r i c t e d ,  " 3 2  j t  y s s;. f e t y  assume 
that non-contngi• mi s ts were fir: iy in control of the 1B5? 
convent '.on. A fourth convention was hold in Boston in 1160, 
bo.t national ooiitical developments wade farther meet i nrsj.  ̂ o
impossible.
The Louisiana Stale Board of Health sent three; of its 
members to the Quarantine Convention of Iff?: Dr. A.
Forster Axson, President of the board, Dr. Charles Delery, 
and Dr. 11. 3. Lindsay. Hew Orleans was represented again 
in 1S5J$, but no delegates from Louisiana participated in the 
last two convent!ons.^3
In the meant 1 ;:ie t e I o u i s i a n a Bo: ird of Health was de-
fending its posit i n on quarantine and sanitation as well
as other public he a j_ t h issues in Its a..nual Reports to the
state Legislature . The President of the Board (designat sd
a so _>tate health Officer) was largely responsible for the
material in these early Reports. Dr. A . F o r s t e r A x s o n occu
pied the post of B o a rd President from 1^56 until I860, and
32Bennet Dowler, editor of the Lew Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal, saw fit to discuss this resolution at 
some length. He thought it foolish to blame fornites for 
the transmission of disease when no one was quite certain 
what a fomite was. The unacclimated, he averred, could run 
from New Orleans at the appearance of an epidemic arid then 
return later to houses filled with "fomites” and still not 
contract the disease. Bennet Dowler, "Remarks on the Pro­
ceedings of the late Quarantine Convention, held at Lev/ 
York," New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XVI 
(1SS9-60T7 520-25•
33cavins, "National Quarantine and Sanitary Con­
ventions," ojp. cit., pp. 4 0$-1 2 .
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hi:> leadership ' -.j • a major factor .in tl e Beard’s survival 
duriip to one crucial year’s. "he four annual ueyoriL writ- 
ten by Arson a ug beer; described by Dr. Ben :'n-edmaa as 
"classics in public hea • t: st besmaashin m  - epidemiological
re a sort i nr. "jLv
A significant feature of the l:‘5o Report was an impor­
tant discussion of the etiology of .-yidcm'c diseases. Axson 
asserted that all eyoerience, profeslions. 1 os other.iso, 
attested to ch. existence of cextssin diseases which were 
contagious, others whLch were not only cont ,pious but also 
capable o being co’nsun i catec t; rougr the ••-tmosphere, and 
a third type of d isense brans, doted eut irtd y by self-diffu­
sion through tie atmosphere. The se 1 f-diffus i on occurred, 
Axson declared, even thong:, the atmosphere did not exhibit 
”a.r>y palpable morbid product recognisable by the senses or 
susceptible of being isolated from the medium in which it 
floats." Yellow fever and cholera, thought Axson, were a- 
rnong the disease falling into the second category because 
they could be spread throughout a community either by direct 
contact or by an atmosphere containin':ted with emanations 
from the bodies of the sick.
i/hat was the value of a quarantine? Axson maintained 
that the community had to be protected from viruses which 
were communicated by direct contact and from those which 
contaminated tne atmosphere. The oroblem in the case of
^ B e n  Freedman, "The Louisiana State Board of Health, 
Established 1^55»" American Journal of Public Health,XLI 
(1951), 1231.
yellow fever was the lack of agreement as to tne origin of 
the disease. Axson stated that "a majority of our profes­
sional citizens . . . contend that it oftener originates 
here, than is i,. ported from abroad.” The board of Health 
admitted, its inability to decide the liicit c or« ,-xXson virio 
certa in, however, that the very rnild visitation of yellow 
fever in 1$5>6 had resulted from contact ■ ith Vera Cruz. 
Epidemics since 1153 had manifested abundant proof, he 
wrote, that Yellow Jack by some means was transmitted from 
the afflicted to the healthy. Tne position that decaying 
organic matter (mi a area) could produce tills disease to the 
exclusion of other influences could not, claimec Axson, be 
reasonably affirmed in the fsee of 'no large mass of testi­
mony o'1 the past three years. Although "atmospheric states" 
induced "morbid >redispositions," the basic factor in the 
spread of disease, he asserted, was "morbid poison escaping 
from the bodies of the sick, which, when placed in contact 
with the healthy and susceptible, originates the same dis­
ease and thus becomes self-extended."
The Board of Health Report for IB56 declared that little 
likelihood existed that a vitiated atmosphere would attain 
an "epidemic constitution" without the introduction of a 
material virus, such as that of yellow fever. The purpose 
of the quarantine was to prevent the introduction of these 
deadly viruses. Axson was convinced of its efficacy:
". . . the whole tenor of observation and experience in 
regard to the portability of yellow fever virus through the
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medium of vessels is so complete, self-accordant and accu­
mulated, that no hardihood, however adventurous, will in­
vite an issue of this point." Axson noted, as had Choppin 
in the 1355 Report, the "inconsiderable . . . portion of our 
shipping and commercial interests" actually affected by the
quarantine.^^
The Report mentioned that the Board of Health had en­
countered grave difficulties b cause of the absense of proper 
facilities at Quarantine (Mississippi) Station, v/harves and 
suitable warehouses were not available for vessels liable to 
detention and required to unload their cargoes. Complaints 
of the inconvenience and loss sustained by "certain interests" 
because of this inadequacy were regarded by the Board as jus­
tifiable, The federal government, asserted Axson, had been 
approached and requested to comply with the provisions of a 
1799 law empowering the President of the United States to 
have wharves and warehouses constructed for the use of ves­
sels quarantined pursuant to the laws of any state. Axson 
revealed that he had written to Secretary of the Treasury 
James Guthrie concerning the matter, but had been informed 
by Guthrie that the government did not have the means to pro­
vide for the construction of the requested facilities. John 
Slidell, United States Senator from Louisiana, was asked by 
Axson to interpose with the government, but he received a
35fteport of the Board of Health, to the Legislature 
of the State of Louisiana / II56 / (New Orleans, 1857)',
pp. 3-11; 12-13.
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similar reply from Guthrie*^
The Report called attention to the need for a plan to 
reclaim all the swamp lands between the city and Lake Pont- 
chartrain. The health and wealth of New Orleans could 
thereby be greatly enhanced. "The grand idea," Axson de­
clared, was "to get rid of all the surface water covering 
the low lands in the rear of the city, to ventilate the 
city by opening up dry and accessible avenues to the lake, 
to convert its swamps into useful ornamental meadows, and 
thus eventually to ensure the spread and growth, of popula­
tion by inviting settlement on these reclaimed lands." Upon 
request by D m  Axson tne tity surveyor devised a drainage
** r'i
plan which was appended to the Reports'51
The 135o Report concluded with detailed mortality and 
meteorological tables ana the Secretary’s fiscal statement. 
Because of the unusual importance placed upon atmospheric 
conditions by most contemporary physicians, proper attention 
to meteorology was regarded as essential to any public health 
report. The Secretary’s statement revealed that the Board’s 
financial status had improved during 1356, the total debt 
having been reduced to less than six thousand dollars.^ 
Axson’s first Board of Health Report formed the pattern for 
those which followed. A feature of the early Reports was a
36Ibid., pp. 11-12, 19-20. 
37Ibid., pp. 13-15, 21-24. 
3aIbid., pp. 71-72.
health problems In Louisiana. Quarantine and sanitation 
were, of course, the major topics of concern. Copies of 
the Board's most important correspendence was sometimes 
att-" ched to the President's statement. Mortality and mete­
orological tables and a financial report usually foil owed, 
altliougn not always in this order. The Reports did not 
change greatly in appearance- until toe x abdication of much 
lengthier ones during tne seventies and eighties.
The annual Report for 1-57 devoted a great deal of 
attention to the Quarantine Convention held durin0 May in 
Philadelphia. After informing the state Legislature that 
the Congress of the United ft--ten Lao appropriated fifty 
thousand dollar.?, for the construction of "suitable ware­
houses, with wharves and enclosures" at Quarantine Station, 
a discussion of the convention was undertaken by Dr. Axson. 
Pointing to the difficulty of providing stanoardized quar­
antine regulations for ports located at different latitudes, 
Axson admitted that the convent on had been anything but 
a resounding, success. Even so, he avowed his belief that 
the labors of the delegates had been ''neither altogether 
barren nor uninstructivs." Medical opinion in the North, 
stated Axson, "was nearly unanimous as to tne non-infec­
tious nature of Yellow Fever," and the same had been true 
in the South until the epidemics of If53-55 demonstrated 
quite convincingly that ye H o w  fever -.as portable and in­
fectious.
Axson felt that the agreements reached in Philadelphia, 
most of which were sponsored by contagion!sts, represented 
a triumph for science. Observations since 1653 convinced 
many doctors, he said, that their preconceptions had been 
incorrect: "The array of facts had become too multiplied
and emphatic, to altogether negative the notion that pes­
tilential fevers were endowed with the attribute of con­
taminating those who were brought witnin their 1 ir.iMedi.hte 
influence.Tn The transportability of pestilence, continued 
the Report, had been affirmed by the convention delegates 
when they accepted propositions declaring yellow fever, 
cholera, and typnus among tne diseases that could be intro­
duced into a community by infected vessels. Axson called 
attention to the convention’s adherence to the ratner inter­
esting proposition which said in effect that imported yellow 
fever could be transmitted from person to person but could 
not become epidemic unless local circumstances were conducive 
to producing the disease independent of importation. Axson 
took exception to this implication that a vitiated atmosphere 
could in itself create yellow fever, asserting his belief 
that the atmosphere was "only a vehicle for its transmission 
like the other substances, that have become saturated with 
the morbid principle the yellow fever virus_7«"'^
The 1657 Board of Health Report took up the problem of
39fteport of the Board of Health, to the Legislature 
of the State of Louisiana / 1357 7 (New Orleans, 1858),
PP. 3-13.
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providing the state with a plan for the proper registration 
of every birth, death and marriage. Aside from the social, 
legal, and political importance of having this information, 
Axson averred: "All sanitary reform reposes on vital sta­
tistics whose legitimate functions are to define and indi-
; r\cate the sources of disease and deatu, lrl'J Reformers had 
been telling the public for years that the relative health­
iness or unhealthiness of Mew Orleans could not be accur*ate- 
ly determined unless a lav; was enforced requiring only 
authorized persons to record births and deaths. Statisti­
cal information, declared the Report, was regarded as 
essential to all public health surveys. M. Morton Dewier, 
prominent New Orleans physician and public health leader, 
asserted in 1356: "As it now is, whether v;e be smitten
with the pestilence or be comforted by the assurance that 
the public health is good beyond parallel, our histories 
of the passing state of things in this behalf, are crude, 
unsatisfactory, and inconclusive."^ Despite ail efforts 
the importance of vital statistics was not generally recog­
nized either in Louisiana or anywhere else. Shryock main­
tains that politicians of the era viewed professional ef­
forts to accumulate public health data as tricks of the
^°Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Morton Dowler, "A Cogitation of Public Health," 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, Ji.11 I (1356-57), 
295.
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doctors to increase their trade.^
Another problem Axson thought deserved attention was 
the excessive infant mortality caused by ignorant, untrained 
midwives. Axson for many years had been agitating for an 
effective state control of mid-wifery. In 1^5 L he denounced 
"those empty and pretentious women, whom a vicious public 
taste and a sense of false decorum have emboldened to as­
sume the most responsible duties at a most responsible cri­
sis in the life o.f every parturient mother. The 1S57
Report related that some years past Louisiana had a law pro­
viding for the licensure of persons attending women at time
of child-birth; this statute, it was noted, hr. d been repealed 
because of t he general belief that a monopoly was being cre­
ated. Axson told the Legislatur e : " . . .  you have reduced
to a common level in the estimation of the law, charlatanry 
and science, knowledge and ignorance, ana have encouraged 
the aresumptuous and the reckless to enter your firesides 
and to tamper with life at its most tender' and important 
crisis." The Report assigned to the midwives the responsi­
bility for the large number of still-born infants and for 
the large number who died of "infantile Lock .jaw.
^Richard H. Shryock, "Public Relations of the Med­
ical Profession in the United States: I600-lo70," Annals
of Medical History, Vol. 2, No. 3> P* 321*
^ N e w  Orleans Monthly Medical Register, I (1S51-52),
107.
^^Report of the Board of Health/" 1S57 7, pp. 17-21,
The Report, dwelled very briefly upon the problem of the 
very high mortality each year from consumption (tuberculosis 
One in nine of the total mortality vas from this cause, de­
clared. the Report. Only yellow fever and c:olera in their 
epidemic years cumbered more victims. The most important 
causative factors in the large number of consumption deaths 
among the poorer classes, thought Axson, were "bad food, 
insufficient ventilation in their sleeping apartments arid 
overcrowding, and the common hardships that beset the poor 
and the improvident wherever they are found in large num­
bers." Consumption took more lives in succeeding decades 
than any other disease in New Orleans, including yellow 
fever and cholera, but because the number of consumption 
deaths were rather constant throughout the year, epidemic 
diseases continued to attract the attention of most public 
health officials.^
The 155? Report was subjected to a bitter assault by 
Dr. D. M . P. Mercier of New Orleans. In a memorial to the 
state Legislature, Mercier sought tc discredit Axson’s 
quarantinist views. Mercier asserted: "This report a-
bounds in erroneous interpretations of facts, and in poet­
ical and fastidious lucubrations on matters entirely 
disconnected with the subject; and restricts itself to a 
disdainful silence with regard to patent and undeniable 
facts, the revelation of which, would have upset the
^Ibid . , p. 21.
163
edifice it was trying to build. Mercier then attempted
to disprove the primary theses of the contagionists. After 
an unusually lengthy discussion he concluded:
We think that we have given proof that 
yellow fever, cholera, typhoid fever and 
some other diseases, against the introduc­
tion of which in our community, quarantine 
was established, originate spontaneously 
here, wi thout the help of importation, 
spread here, and sometimes take the charac­
ter of epidemics. We come to the natural 
conclusion that quarantine cannot protect 
us against those diseases; and, therefore, 
becomes a useless measure, "vie have, /_ sic__7 
proved, besides that quarantine has been 
used in an injudicious and vexatious manner; 
that it is a nuisance to our business; that 
it was the cause of severe losses to many 
of our merchants; and, finally, that its 
result, in times not far off, will be to 
take away from our ports and direct to 
others ports, all our trade with Mexico,
Cuba, she West incies and South America.^'
The doard of Health Report for 155$, written after 
Louisiana had recovered from a devastating ye]low fever 
epidemic, consisted primarily of an attempt by Dr. Axson 
to defend the Board’s quarantine policy. Axson went to 
great lengths in his effort to prov*- that the yellow fever 
which appeared in New Orleans in 155£ had been imported on 
the ship Elizabeth Ellen and t. at it had been of a communi­
cable variety. The quarantine had failed to prevent the
^ D. M. P. Mercier, ”/~A Memorial_7 To the Honorable, 
the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the State of Louisiana. . . New Orleans Medical and Sur­
gical Journal, XV (1555), 221.
47ibid., p. 251.
164
introduction of the pestilence, he said, because its effec­
tiveness had been undermined by the 1353 law which modified 
the original Quarantine Act. Axson was alluding to the pro­
vision in the new law permitting vessels out ten days (he 
says fifteen) from infected ports and presenting clean bills 
of health to pass directly to New Orleans after having been 
fumigated. He noted that the Board had zealously opposed 
this "fatal deviation from all sail, rule and precedent in 
tie experience of quarantine measures." According to Axson 
the loll act modifying the quarantine overloobed the "essen­
tial circumstance of tainted cargoes, and of a pestiferous
atmc-sobere below decks," as in the case of the Elizabeth* *   -  --
Ellen which "had on board and in her hold morbific agencies 
of a character to induce sickness among officers and crew." 
Sickness, evidently yellow fever', hod b o:. present on the 
Elizabeth. Ellen during its voyage from the West Indian port 
of St. Thomas, the Report continued, but upon its arrival 
at Quarantine Station no sickness on board was discovered, 
so the vessel was fumigated arid allowed to proceed. The 
Elizabeth Ellen arrived in New Orleans June 4j and anchored 
next to the ship Independence. Within ten days the son and 
daughter of the captain of the Independence became ill with 
yellow fever and died. Soon other cases were reported, in­
cluding the men who had handled the corpse of the captain's 
son. Axson claimed that from the Elizabeth Ellen Yellow 
Jack had been diffused throughout a large section of the city.
The Report for 1353 presented a history of yellow fever
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in Louisiana and concluded: "It is . . . to be observed,
that the violent epidemic seasons have been coincident, with 
scarcely an exception, with its importat ion." The point was 
emphasised again that the quarantine lav; as it had opera ted 
in 1o 53 was defective, "not so mucr in principle as in the 
compensations it seeks to give to our commercial marine."
Axson maintained that the act had mads it impossible
for the Board of Health to det-in vessels regarded as being 
suspicious. Some amendments te the qua ran tin-- lav/s were 
suggested by Axson, 'the objective being to create a system 
of complete non-irx ̂ 'Course between hew Orleans and vessels 
arriving from yellow fever ports. be asserted that there 
would be no loss to the commerce of tne city, the only 
change being that suspicious ships would unload their cargoes 
at Quarantine Station instead of New Orleans. Susceptible 
goods (fomites) could be stored in the United States ware­
houses, soon to be built, and re-shipped later by the con­
signees or owners. Presumably, non-susceptible goods could
h ̂be taken to New Orleans without delay.
Axson sought to defend the Board from the abuse heaped 
upon it because of its inaction during the months of the 
epidemic. He explained that the Mayor had been informed at 
an early date of the prevalence of yellow fever, and a 
course of action had been suggested. It was not the Board’s 
fault, Axson insisted, that nothing was done. He was convinced,
^ Report of the Board of Health to the Legislature 
of the 5tate of Louisiana L /  (Baton Rouge, 1859),
pp. 3-29.
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he said, that the general public vvas ignorant of the fact 
the Board of Health had been given only limited powers:
By lav/ it is only a Board for the 
purpose of organizing and administering 
quarantine regulations. It has none of 
the attributes, nor can it exercise any of 
the functions of a Board of Health, save 
and except in subordination to city leg­
islation, and through the comity of city 
officials. The whole scope of its powers, 
as far as internal sanitary policing goes, 
is simply to advise and suggest, but not 
administer or enforce.
Axson declared that the Bo.-.rd of Health had not even been 
given the legal power to demand from the sextons a daily 
report of interments in the cemeteries, and yet the Board 
was supposedly custodian of Hew Orleans1 mortuary records.
A man was employed, he revealed, to copy interment totals 
from tire sextons’ bo o'-, s in order that the latest information 
could be published. Axson felt that mortality figures spoke 
for themselves, and a formal announcement in the newspapers 
of tne presence of an epidemic was unnecessary.^
The Retort of 1J>5# maintained that the Board of Health 
had desired in the past, and still did desire, to promote 
remedial sanitary measures. The sanitary powers granted 
to the Board by the Quarantine Act of 1855 had been nulli­
fied by the refusal of city authorities to cooperate. Ad­
vice had been given, stated the Report, but it was greeted 
with contempt or indifference. "By a singular accord of
49ib_id,, pp. 33-34.
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action, if not of sentiment," Axson declared, "city func­
tionaries of every grade and rank, ignored the existence of 
abuses of common decency and scandalous nuisances, end 
seemed bent on experimenting with the patience and endurance 
of our long-suffering citizens." The Report called attention 
to a number of abuses: hotels poured their ordure through
the chief avenues of the city; gut tors "swellered" with the 
blood and drainings of slaught er-pon s; streets smelled from 
the waste emitted by sugar refin eries; and unpaved highways 
were broadcast with filth of all description from gutters, 
yards, a.id stables. The Report stated further that the 
foremost causes of sickness and mortality in Mew Orleans, 
aside from the importation of disease germs from abroad, 
were bad sewerage, the existence of open stagnant drains, 
the continued presence of undrained marsh land, accumula­
tions of filth in the streets, and over-crowding of immi­
grants into badly ventilated buildings. Axson insisted that 
these omnipresent sanitary problems were not "active agencies 
in the production of our epidemics," although sickness and 
mortality were considerably enhanced by social abuses, and 
the cityrs reputation suffered.
Sanitary evils could be obviated easily enough, de­
clared Axson, by observing "a few plain but fundamental 
principles /""needs_J7M which he enumerated in the order of 
their importance. First, a system of levee draining from 
the swamp into Lake Pontchartrain was needed. Secondly,
New Orleans required a series of drains or sewers to carry
"fluid refuse" into the swamp at the rear of the city, from 
Wiich point the refuse would drain into the lake. A recom­
mendation for street paving; "as far and fast as circumstances 
will warrant” was included by Axson as part of principle 
number two. The city’s third great need was seen to be a 
more plentiful supply of water for use in keeping the streets 
thoroughly cleaned. Fourth, Axson suggested employing scav­
engers to remove at regular intervals the rubbish and impu­
rities which the water did not carry away. Fifth, a system
of regulations v.as deemed necessary to remedy the problem
SOof over-crowding in tne houses of the poor.^
The Report concluded by noting t. at vaccination
in Louisiana had not been as general or as faithfully per­
formed as it should have been, and that the Board had appro­
priated five dollars monthly to purchase fresh vaccine for 
gratuitous distribution among the planters and citizens of 
the state. The Legislature was reminded that the Board en­
joyed no legal power to enforce vaccination, even though 
experience had shown the wisdom of compulsory vaccination 
and re-vaccination. Even the "promptings of self-interest" 
and the "innate horror of small-pox" could not induce many 
people to submit to vaccination. In effect, the Report 
suggested that the Legislature enact a lav: providing for 
compulsory vaccination for Louisianians to protect them from
50 l b i d ., pp. 34-33.
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smallpox against their1 will.^
The Board of Health Report for 1359 j trie last written 
by Dr. Axson, reiterated the recommendations made in the 
1353 Report with regard to the enforcement of a stringent 
quarantine. " . . .  the quarantine regulations should be 
rigorous and precise," it was asserted, "designed rather to 
exclude for certain periods of time all intercourse with 
infected places, than to define the con.diti.ons under which 
such may be p^rmi ssable sic__7«,f Ships arriving at i'!ew 
Orleans from infected places should be required to remain 
in quarantine for a length of time to be aeter ined by the 
Board of Health, Axson stated. "Foul vessels, with their 
susceptible crews," as well as goods believed to be fomites, 
could then be detained as long as necessary. Anything short 
of that, declared the Report, "must emasculate the very pith 
and.substance of the law, and make of the whole system a. 
feeble and inert compromise of principles unworthy / of_7 
the intelligence, and deserving the prompt renunciation by 
the Legislature of the whole plan of quarantine.
The 1359 Report reaffirmed the desire of the Board of 
Health to take positive action to war... promoting better con­
ditions in New Orleans. The Quarantine Act of 1$55j it 
stated, had explicitly contemplated that both quarantine
51Ibid., pp. 33-39.
5^Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the 
Legislature of the State of Louisiana-/ 1359_/ (Baton 
Rouge, i960), pp. 3-4.
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and local sanitation were zo be parts of a program aimed, at 
protecting the people of Louisiana from epidemics. The 
Board had put quarantine into operation immediately, Axson 
declared; but the City Council, whose assistance was needed, 
failed to manifest any great interest In sanitary measures. 
Axson claimed that sickness and death often resulted from 
causes "directly amenable to judicious enforcement of sani­
tary regulations," He noted the existence of some diseases 
"whose very essence /  was_7 identified with putrefaction 
and filth. State health officials found it necessary 
to emphasise repeatedly during these pre-war years that the 
Board of Health was responsible for sanitary reform and wasj. »«
not merely an institution charged v:ith managing the quaran­
tine.
One of the basic problems preventing the inauguration 
of a real program of hygienic reform, the Iegislature was 
told, was that the Board had been "in complete or partial 
ignorance of the actual state of our population, of its 
numbers, the relative proportion of the sexes, color and 
ages; of their births and marriages; their occupation, the 
dwelling houses they inhabit, the supply of water and food, 
the prevalence of intemperance, crime and pauperism." How 
much was really known of the population of New Orleans?
Past censuses had not been detailed enough, according to 
Axson. "There is a long roll of mortality," he maintained,
^ Ibld., pp. 6-9.
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’’with its infinity of causes, destroying life or- impairing 
health, that must be explored before we can assume a people 
to be regularly advancing in its moral and physical growth." 
Accordingly, the Board of Health recommended, as it had in 
the Reports of 1$57 and IB^S, that a Registration of Births, 
Marriages, and Deaths be established for t e city of Mew 
Orleans and for the entire state. 51-
In i860 Dr, Axson was succeeded in the presidency of 
the Board of Health by Dr. Charles Delo'ry. Dele'ry* s Report 
for the year 1 6'>q 55 was much the same as those which preceded 
it, but it did contain an unusual theory of the nature of 
yellow fever-. Delery noted the abserrse of epidemic disease 
in New Orleans during IfoO; he declared that it could not 
have been a result of sanitary improvements because there 
had been none. He mentioned that the Council had since 
ordered a. general cleaning program, and beneficial results 
were anticipated. The few sporadic cases of yellow fever 
reported in i860 were not attributable to importation, 
claimed Delery, because the quarantine had been strictly 
enforced. The Board of Health was certain, he said, that 
the nineteen cases had originated in New Orleans. Delery 
generalized that perhaps indigenous yellow fever was
5^Ibid., pp. 9-14.
55The i860 Report was printed in both French and 
English, as were the 1857 and 1859 Reports. Lucy B, Foote, 
compiler, "Bibliography of the Official Publications of 
Louisiana, 1803-1934" (Mimeographed, Baton Rouge, 1942),D. 424•
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sporadic by nature, and only the imported variety tended 
to become epidemic. "Facts" were presented in the Report 
to defend this thesis, and it was suggested that there be 
further investigation. The Report concluded that quaran­
tine was essential because it protected New Orleans and the 
entire state from imported (hence, epidemic) yellow fever,^ 
According to the 1260 Report, many mortuary certifi­
cates had been given by persons unknov/n to the medical pro­
fession. Furthermore, stated Delery, mortuary records 
revealed that the number of still-born infants was much too 
high, he placed the blame for this situation on "la plus 
gross!ere ignorance" and the "deplorable incapacits" of the 
rnidwives. Many of them, he claimed, could not even write 
their own names. Someone else signed their certificates, 
and after1 the signatures the midwives placed their cross 
mark. Another serious abuse mentioned in the Report was
that of pharmacists who sold spoiled, falsified, and poi-
,. . 57sonous medicines . '
Deldry, after having investigated the damage done to 
Mississippi Station by a storm, presented in the Report an 
interest ring description of the area around the quarantine 
grounds. The station was located on the left bank near the 
river; behind it was Black Bay, separated from the station
^ Rapport Annuel du Bureau de Sante, a la Legisla­




by a prairie of some, twenty arpents _/ about tnirty acres_7. 
Because of the lack of elevation, the quarantine rrounds 
were subject to flooding, both iron: the river and the bay.
The buildings were protected by a series of levees, some of 
which had been constructed by t i.e state and some by the 
federal government. ̂
The financial status of the State Board of Health was 
fundamentally sound during the period preceding the Civil 
h’ar. Only in 1 $53) the first year of its existence, was 
the Board’s debt anything more than negligible. In IB56 
and 1357 its assets exceeded its liabilities, altnough 
during the throe succeeding years the reverse was true.
The i860 deport 3:owed the deficiency to be about sixty- 
six hundred doll rs, not a large sum for an institution being 
operated without e subsidy. The figures revealing the Board’s 
sources of income are very significant in indicating the rel­
ative importance of the three quarantine stations. In 1853, 
for example, quarantine fees from Mississippi Station brought 
in 403j403.50> which was about eighty-five percent of the 
Board’s total income. Rigolets Station, on the other* hand,
c9produced only $707.25) and Atchafalaya Station, only $210.00.'''7 
Summing up, the Board of Health was well established at the 
time war Intervened to complicate its early history. The 
Board did, however, continue to exist as a state institution 
until Few Orleans was occupied in 1362.
5^Ibid., p. 10.
^ Report of the Board of Health yf~l353_7> P« 52.
CHAPTER VI
PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW ORLEANS DURING THE CIVIL WAR
'With the outbreak of the Civil War the functions of the 
Board of Health were greatly curtailed. As might had been 
expected, the Board's fiscal stability was put in very seri­
ous jeopardy by the Union blockade. Since the Board of 
Health depended largely on quarantine fees for support, the 
shutting off of trade with New Orleans amounted very nearly 
to a mortal blow. The Report of the Board of Health for 
l£6l, written by State Health Officer G. A. Nott, informed 
the Legislature that the Board’s expenditures had been cut 
back "to the very lowest limit consistent with the preser­
vation of its archives and the protection of the public 
property.1' The salaried officers had suffered a great deal, 
declared the Report, but they had '’acquiesced patiently to 
the necessities of the time." According to Nott, the block­
ade also had its beneficial aspect; he credited it with 
having been partially responsible for preventing the inpor- 
tation of disease.
Nott stated that he did not wish to enter into an ex­
amination of the contagiousness or non-contagiousness of
^lBbl was the only year throughout a period of 
several decades in which not a single death from yellow fever 
was reported in New Orleans.
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yellow fever, but that he believed in granting the quaran­
tine complete support until its usefulness was positively 
disproved. Aside from yellow fever, he said, "unquestion- 
ably contagious diseases,” such as typhus and srallpox, 
could certainly be avoided by the strict observance of 
quarantine regulations. The Report noted with dismay that 
the Board of Health from want of power had tended to dwindle 
into a mere "Board of Quarantine,” void of other functions. 
In the public mind the Board held precisely this status, 
continued the Report, but certainly the framers of the 
Quarantine Act had not intended to restrict so narrowly the 
powers of the institution they created. Nott stressed his 
point by asserting that quarantine was looked upon by the 
Board of Health as being secondary in importance to sanitary
Oregulations.^
The Board’s Report for lB6l then called the Legisla­
ture’s attention to an old abuse: persons practicing
medicine, surgery, and obstetrics in Louisiana with no 
diploma of any kind. Death certificates, the Report de­
clared, had been obtained from these practitioners with 
great facility; inidwives were equally as generous. Nott 
claimed that the municipal ordinance prescribing the form 
to be observed by physicians in filling out death certifi­
cates had been loosely observed. On the mortuary returns,
^Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Legis­
lature of the State of Louisiana J (Baton Rouge,
1861), pp. 3-7.
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too often the cause of death was officially T,not stated."^
Mo further State Board of Health Reports were issued 
until after the war because with the occupation of New Or­
leans, control of the Board passed into the hands of the 
United States Army. Dr. 0. A. Nott evidently continued as 
State Health Officer until May 1, 1362 when Major-General 
Benjamin F. Butler, Commanding Officer of the Department of 
the Gulf, declared martial law in New Orleans. James Parton, 
a Butler eulogist, quoted the General as having stated that 
tr.e "sum and substance" of his plan for governing the Crescent 
City was to leave the municipal authority in the full exer­
cise of its accustomed functions. Butler announced his in­
tention not to interfere with the administration of the 
sanitary laws, although he changed his mind before long.^
State control over the Board of Health was relinquished 
immediately, and Butler appointed as its new President Dr. 
Thomas H. Bache, Medical Director of the Department of the 
Gulf, Bache was succeeded as Board President August 13,
1362 by Dr. Charles R. McCormack; McCormack was replaced in 
December, 1363 by Dr. Richard H. Alexander. Alexander ap­
parently retained the dual post of Medical Director and 
President of the Board of Health until the Federal occupa­
tion came to an end. The State of Louisiana did not resume
3fbid., pp. 6-7.
^James Parton, General Butler in New Orleans (New 
York, 1364), p. 295.
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control of the Board of Health until April, 1866.^
The appearance of federal troops in New Orleans aroused 
speculation among the resident po'.ulation concerning the 
probable fate of the invaders. The city had been free from 
epidemic disease for more than three years, and according to 
some, a pestilential visitation, especially yellow fever, 
was overdue. Hopefully, the newspapers discussed the effect 
the Louisiana climate and New Orleans filth would have on 
the unacclimated Yankees. School children, passing troops in 
the streets, taunted them with a song which proclaimed joy­
fully:
Yellow Jack will grab them up 
And take them all away.
General Butler noted the rumor that in churches prayers were 
being said that the pestilence might come as a divine inter­
position on behalf of the brethren.6
The occupation forces were very much aware of the danger. 
New Orleans* reputation for disease was w^ell known in the 
North. The approach of the hot season brought despondency
^Information regarding the tenure of the Medical 
Directors of the Department of the Gulf was obtained by 
Dr. Ben Freedman from the National Archives. Freedman,
TTThe Louisiana State Board of Health, Established 1855 
op. cit., pp. 1284-85.
^Elisabeth Joan Doyle, "Civilian Life in Occupied 
New Orleans, 1862-65" (Ph. D. dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, 1955)j pp. 56-57; Bee, May 7> 1862; Benjamin 
F. Butler, Butler*s Book (Boston, 1892), p.396.
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and even panic among Butler's officers, many of them asking 
permission to be transferred. The situation was especially 
bad from Butler's point of view, because he had not a sur­
geon in his army who had ever seen a case of yellow fever. 
Butler said that with regard to this disease the new Health 
Officer, Thomas Bache, "was utterly at sea." Butler, real­
izing the potential danger, quickly assumed personal control
7over most aspects of nublic health in New Orleans.
Butler concluded from what information he had that 
yellow fever was imported and that epidemics could be pre­
vented. He decided to rely on both quarantine and sanita­
tion measures, and pressed their enforcement more effectively 
than ever before in New Orleans history. According to Butler, 
a "very strict quarantine" was employed, "wherein thirty-two 
and sixty-eight pound shots /~were_7 the messengers to exe­
cute the health orders." Incoming vessels were stopped at 
Fort 3t. Philrp, five miles belov; Mississippi Station, and 
none was allowed to proceed to New Orleans without a per­
sonal order from Butler himself. Bucler believed the ten 
day quarantine which the state usually imposed was greatly 
inadequate, so he determined to enforce a quarantine in the 
literal sense: a forty day detention. As had been the
custom in Louisiana, the quarantine was applied against 
vessels with sickness on board and those having sailed 
from infected ports. This stringent quarantine was credited
^Butler, Butler's Book, pp. 393-400.
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by Butler with having averted a dangerous epidemic/'
General Butler also waged a campaign against the filth 
which for so long had been a characteristic feature of New 
Orleans. A message dated May 9 was sent, to tne Mayor and 
the Council urging them to act immediately to improve the 
sanitary conditions of the streets. "Resolutions and in­
action will not do," the message warned, "Active, energetic 
measures, fully and promptly executed, are imperatively 
demanded by the exigencies of the occasion." Butler noted 
that in New Orleans many starving men were available who
Qcould be recruited as a labor force to clean the streets.
'Hie Picayune frequently urged the use of the unemployed in 
this kind of work. A May 27 editorial noted that city au­
thorities had attempted to clean the streets and levees, but 
much more remained to be done. According to the editor, 
there still were streets "absolutely noisome and sickening 
to walk, so foul are the pestilential vapors that are con­
tinually reeking up from standing pools of feculant filth.
Butler was determined not to allow these odious con­
ditions to remain. On June 4 he sent a special message to 
General F. Shepley (acting Mayor of New Orleans) and the 
City Council. The message declared: "The condition of
^Ibid., pp. 401-403.
^The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies 
(Washington, 188277 Ser. 1, Vol. 6, pp. 723-24.
^Picayune, May 27, 1862.
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the streets of the city calls for the promptest action for 
a greater cleanliness and more perfect sanitary prepara­
tions. Tl Butler told the Council of his intention to take 
care of his troops, but the Council was informed that it 
would be responsible for the health of others in the city. 
The plan he proposed to city officials called for the em­
ployment of up to two thousand men during a period of at 
least thirty working days for the purpose of cleaning New 
Orleans. Unskilled workers were to receive fifty cents for 
ten hours' labor; skilled v;orkers would receive more. It 
was hoped the measure would have the salutary result of 
improving sanitary conditions while, at the same time, 
providing food for starving families. The Council adopted 
an ordinance embodying General Butler's proposals, the only 
change being that men employed by the city were to receive 
a dollar, instead of only fifty cents, for each ten hour 
day at work.
Almost from the beginning Butler found it necessary 
to supervise his own sanitation program. Important orders 
were soon issued providing a new sanitary code for New Or­
leans. The code compelled house dwellers to see that every­
thing on their premises was cleaned within twenty-four hours 
of daylight after they received notice to do so; they were 
also required to whitewash unpainted outside wralls. All
1^-Butler, Butler's Book, pp. 403-404; Picayune, 
June 7, 1362.
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refuse had to be placed in receptacles which were to be 
emptied twice each week (evidently by army personnel). 
Throwing anything whatever into the streets was prohibited. 
Anyone guilty of an infraction of the orders was to be pun­
ished by incarceration in the parish prison. Unlike similar 
sanitary measures in the past, Butler’s orders were enforced. 
An example of the coercion employed was the sending of Fed­
eral troops armed with bayonets to clean up the French Mar­
ket. While this ' as going on, Butler put tw .• thousand men 
to work cleaning all the drains, ditches, and canals in the
city. To aid them, the streets were flushed by all the water
] ?the New Orleans water-works could provide.
Surprisingly, it appears that Butler’s efforts were not 
especially successful. The newspapers certainly were not 
satisfied with Butler's sanitation program, or with that of 
his successor. Nonetheless, yellow fever did not take the 
heavy toll among Union troops so desperately feared in some 
quarters and hoped for in others. Only two cases were re­
ported in New Orleans in 1362, and they resulted from a 
temporary relaxation of the quarantine. When the cases were 
discovered, Butler ordered that only acclimated men could go 
near the victims, and everything which had been near them
was ordered burned. These orders were carried out, and after
13the death of the two patients, their bodies were cremated.
l^Butler, Butler’s Book, pp. 404-407. 
13Ibid., pp. 403-10.
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When General Butler was relieved of his command in New Or­
leans near the end of the year, he listed for the citizens 
of New Orleans in his "Farewell Address," two contributions 
he had made to the city in the realm of public health: "I
have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept from your 
borders," he said, and "I have cleansed and. improved your 
streets, canals, and public squares, and opened new avenues 
to unoccupied land."^
Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks, Butler’s successor, 
was less arbitrary, less concerned with public health prob­
lems, and too busy with military undertakings to accomplish 
a great deal in the way of advancing sanitation projects.
In March, 1G63, however, the City Council passed ordinances 
aimed at curbing a number of long-standing abuses. Garbage, 
offal, and other waste could no longer be cast into the 
streets, but must instead be placed in boxes for collection. 
Citizens were also forbidden to let garbage or offal remain 
in yards or private alleys for more than twreaty-four hours; 
to dump garbage into the river except at a specified place; 
to obstruct gutters, drains, and ditches; or to dig up 
streets without permission. Hogs were not to be kept in 
the First and Second Districts (the most populous residen­
tial areas), and vicious, loud, or troublesome dogs could 
not be allowed to run at large, stipulated other ordinances. 
Also forbidden was delay in the disposal of dead animals,
■^Parton, Butler in New Orleans, p. 605.
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allowing stagnant water to stand on one’s property, the use 
of manure to fill in lots, selling tainted meat, adulter­
ating food or drink, keeping spoiled food, and carrying night 
jars through the street in daytime. Other ordinances pre­
scribed the time and manner of emptying privies. Violators
were to be fined from twenty to one hundred dollars, and
15were to receive a thirty-day jail sentence.
Yellow fever was nearly as conspicuous by its absense 
in 1663 as it had been the previous year. A quarantine was 
proclaimed April 6 by Military Governor Michael Hahn against 
the usual Gulf and Caribbean ports. The proclamation stated 
that the Quarantine was to go into effect May 1, and the de­
tention period was established at not less than ten days.^^ 
Evidently it was felt that the forty day quarantine imposed 
by Butler had produced a noticeably adverse effect upon the 
commerce of New Orleans. The ten day quarantine was employed 
again in 1664 and 1665, and with the same result. Yellow 
fever and cholera continued to be nc problem whatsoever.
New Orleans was far from being a healthy city during the 
years of Federal occupation, but it was notably free from 
serious epidemics. The relative freedom from epidemic dis­
ease enjoyed by Union troops assigned to the Department of 
the Gulf seems to have come as a complete surprise to
-^poyle, "Life in New Orleans, 1662-65," pp. 67-66. 
^ Picayune, April 7» 1663.
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everyone, especially to the United States Sanitary Commission.
It appeared that calculations of the innate insalubrity of
17the New Orleans area had been erroneous.
A difference of opinion remained as to the cause for 
the long absense from epidemic yellow fever enjoyed by New 
Orleans between 1858 and 1867. If good luck cannot be con­
sidered a factor, Federal authorities must be given credit 
for their success in promoting health measures during the 
four years of the occupation, and the Louisiana State Board 
of Health is equally deserving of praise for its work during 
the remaining four years. The Board had been severely ham­
pered before ti e ivar by lack of agreement within the city 
concerning the merits of quarantine, and received no effec­
tive cooperation in achieving sanitation. Unlike the occu­
pation forces, it had been without power to accomplish its 
ends. The experience of the war years 'was used later by 
the Board of Health and other reformers in trying to prove 
that oublic health measures could be successfully enforced, 
and that Yellow Jack visitations could be prevented. The 
Board’s opponents pointed out that epidemic yellow fever 
had also failed to make an appearance during the three years 
preceding the occupation. Nothing, according to them, had 
been proven at all.
Inevitably the question was asked whether the quarantine
I7charles J. Stilled History of the United States 
Sanitary Commission (Philadelphia, l8&&), pp. 424-26u
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or the cleaning program deserved greater credit for having 
contributed to New Orleans’ good fortune during the war.
The citizens of the city were as divided and uncertain over 
this issue as ever. The quarantine ana the blockade (which 
had the same effect) reduced the city’s commerce sharply, 
thereby tending to provoke resentment. The 1365 quarantine 
proclamation of Governor James Madison Wells, issued shortly 
before the termination of hostilities, brought criticism 
from the Picayune« Editorials appearing in May and June 
voiced the same objections so often repeated during previous 
years. A large number of Gulf and Caribbean ports had been 
declared infected places, alleged the Picayune, without any 
positive knowledge that they really were infected. The army- 
controlled Board of Health was said to be at fault. The 
Governor should have been granted discretion to decide which 
ports were infected, the editor maintained, and no port 
should have been shut off from free intercourse with New Or­
leans unless it was found to be the seat of disease. The 
city's merchants have been complaining, the Picayune con­
tinued, but only because the quarantine was ’’injudicious," 
There would have been no objection at all, asserted the
editorial, if the proclamation had been based on reliable 
13information. The quarantine controversy was still very 
much alive.
Dr. E. D. Fenner, writing in 1366, lauded the work
■̂ Picayune, April 4> May 7, 1365.
186
done by the occupation forces in cleaning New Orleans:
The city may be said to have been 
cleansed and kept clean; at least when 
contrasted with any thing of the kind 
ever seen here before. It was a Hercu­
lean task, and, in our humble opinion, 
nothing short of military despotism would 
have accomplished it. The good work is 
not yet completed, but its salutary ef­
fects so far have been palpable, and 
ought to encourage us to carry it on to 
perfection.
Fenner reported that he had discovered from a conversation 
with the Sanitary C o m m i s s i o n e r s ^  that yellow fever had been 
imported during every year of the occupation. Mo epidemic 
had developed, he believed, because of "admirable local sani­
tary police." V/hether yellow fever was endemic in New Or­
leans, whether it was imported, or whether two distinct 
types of the malady existed, Fenner was certain, as he had 
always been, that yellow fever would not soread in anything 
other than a vitiated atmosphere. Dr. Fenner thus used the
experiences of the occupation to further his own sanita-
•  *  20 tionist- views.
Dr. Elisha Harris of New York, a member of the Sani­
tary Commission and a reknown public health leader, agreed 
with Fenner and others that the enforcement of sanitary
-^The United States Sanitary Commission was sent to 
New Orleans to investigate conditions after the close of the 
war.
2<̂ E. D. Fenner, "Remarks on the Sanitary condition 
of the City of New Orleans, during the period of Federal 
Military occupation, from May 1862 to March 1866," Southern 
Journal of Medical Sciences, I (1866), 23-24.
measures by the occupation forces had been a panacea for 
New Orleans:
Throughout the entire period of the 
provisional government_7 . • . > the Provost- 
jiarshal, the Military Governor, the Mayor 
(an appointee of the provisional govern­
ment), together with the Medical Director 
of the post and certain subordinate health 
officers have vigilantly administered the 
regulations reletting to municipal hygiene 
and cleanliness in New Orleans and vicinity.
During all that period the accustomed 
scourgings of yellow fever have been sus­
pended in that city, while the dire fore­
bodings and prophecies of the inevitable 
pestilence that would quick..y destroy the 
Northern soldiery on reaching the Gulf 
coast, remain unrealized. The conditions 
under which the "Crescent City” has ob­
tained this remarkable immunity from a
doom which her own bitter experience 
seemed to fasten upon her, are now as 
well understood as were the apparently 
inexorable causes of her former insalubrity.
Harris poin ed out that prominent New Orleans physicians 
such as Fenner, Barton, and Simonds had for years maintained 
that yellow fever epidemics could be prevented by civic 
cleanlinessj these men, he said, had bee- proven correct.
The quarantine deserved less credit, Harris continued, be­
cause, despite its rigid enforcement, cases of both yellow 
fever and smallpox, "the only infections feared or guarded 
against,” were detected in New Orleans. Dr. Harris espe­
cially emphasized the general salubrity enjoyed by the city
during the war years. He felt that New Orleans had never
in the past been blessed by such a remarkably high percentage
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of healthy residents.^
A few years later Dr. Stanford E. Chaille/of New Or­
leans, an amazingly prolific writer, upset the entire line 
of reasoning of Harris, Fenner, and almost everyone else by 
collecting and publishing available mortality figures. The 
war years had not been healthy ones, the facts revealed. The 
average mortality for the years 1363-65 was, in fact, dem­
onstrated to have been somewhat greater than for the 1356-60 
or the 1366-69 periods, even though 1353 and 1367 were epi­
demic years. This was true, stated Chaille' despite a quar­
antine r.oro perfect than civil government could possibly 
erect and an unprecedented sanitation program enforced by 
military authority. ChaiHe' admitted that he did not know 
the cause for this strange situation but he did note the 
unusually large number of unacclimated persons in New Or­
leans during the war. Many Federal troops as well as New 
Orleanians accustomed to leaving the city during the summer 
months had been present and were prime targets for disease.^2 
Chaille'’ s information showed the leading causes of 
death in New Orleans during the three war years to have been 
diarrhea and consumption, each of them causing mortality in
21-Elisha Harris, "Hygienic Experience in New Orleans 
during the War. Illustrating the importance of efficient 
Sanitarj*- Regulations," in Ibid., pp. 25-37*
^Stanford E. Chaille', "The Yellow Fever, Sanitary 
Condition, and Vital Statistics of New Orleans during its 
military occupation, the four years 1362-65," New Orleans 
Journal of Medicine, XXIII (1370), 563-33.
excess of two thousand. The occupation troops were espe­
cially susceptible to the former, and malarial fevers also 
took the lives of great numbers of unacclimated Yankees.
Other diseases killing more than a thousand during the 
three year period were dysentery and smallpox.2  ̂ pr , Eugene 
Sanger, a surgeon with the Third Division, 19th Army Corps 
in New Orleans, reported that scurvy (a leading cause of 
diarrhea), typhus, typhoid fever, and malaria were the four 
primary factors in causing "so much disease and such fearful 
mortality." The 173d Mew York Volunteers, occupying Baton 
Rouge, suffered most from "malarial fever of the intermittent 
type."2^ Public health measures apparently had little effect 
on Louisiana’s endemic maladies.
After Ray 1, 1362, when Butler and his men occupied 
New Orleans, the former State Board of Health, whose members 
had been chosen by the Governor and the New Orleans City 
Council, ceased to exist. The property of the Board was 
taken over by the Union Army, and remained in its posses­
sion during the next four years. The quarantine laws of
the state were administered by a Board of Health and Res-
25ident Physicians appointed by the Commanding General.
23Ibid., pp. 530-32.
2^The Medical and Surgical History of the War of 
the Rebellion, Medical VolT (Washington, 1379)» Part 2, 
p. 100; Part 3> PP • 415-16.
2^Report of the Board of Health to the Legislature 
of the State of Louisiana / lBb5 / (New Orleans, 1367), p. 3.
The State Board of Health of Louisiana was reorganized
April 16, 1G66. Dr. S. A. Smith was elected President by
the other members. Because a quarantine had been established
26a month earlier against cholera, the Board found it nec­
essary to elect Resident Physicians for the Atchafalaya and 
Rigolets quarantine stations and an assistant for Dr. P. B. 
McKelvey, the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station. 
Governor James K. Wells was notified of these developments 
and requested to effect the return of the Board’s property. ^  
Wells complied with the request by notifying Major-General 
E. R. S. Canby, the Commanding Officer of the Department of 
Louisiana. Canby referred to Lieutenant-General Dlysses S. 
Grant the question of whether the Board of Health should be 
allowed to return to civilian control. General Canby evi­
dently received an affirmative reply, because on May 15 he 
issued an order stating that "the enforcement of the Quar­
antine & Health laws of the State of Louisiana, will be 
turned over to the officers appointed under those laws, 
subject to the Military supervision and control required by 
the orders from the Headquarters of the Army. . . . ” The
2°Picayune, March 21, 1B66.
27Report of the Board of Health /~1866_7> p. 3*
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change, according to Canby1s order, was to take place May
The State Board of Health received from the interim 
Board only a small amount of movable property and, unfortu­
nately, only a small portion of the old records. The build­
ings and grounds at Mississippi Station were found by Dr. 
Smith to be in a condition described as "much dilapidated," 
The funds on hand and the records of the military adminis­
tration were denied to the State Board, even though Smith 
made a special request to the Medical Director of the De­
partment of the Gulf that the money be transferred. The 
claim was taken to Washington, but to no avail. The Board 
of Health was thus placed in the position of having to com­
mence operations after the war without cash assets, The 
serious financial plight of the Board was revealed in its 
Report for 1366. The total debt at th: end of 1366 exceeded
fourteen thousand dollars, and receipts had by no means re-
29turned to their pre-war level. The Legislature was asked
2^The State Board of Health has in its library the 
original letter from Canby to Wells informing the Louisiana 
Governor of the disposition he had made of the State Board of 
Health1s request for permission to reorganize, and it also 
has Canby1s order transferring the Board from civil to mili­
tary control. Copies of these manuscripts appear in The 
Louisiana State Board of Health Biennial Report, 1954-55 
(n . p., n.d.J, pp. 49-51.
^ T h e  problem was aggravated by the Legislature^ 
declaration that Louisiana money, which was depreciating 
rapidly, was receivable in payment for all state debts. 
Crescent, July 11, 1366.
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for an appropriation or a loan to enable the Board of Health 
to pay off its indebtedness. Smith, in making the request, 
assured the Legislature that he confidently expected that 
in the future, receipts by the Board of Health would equal 
its expenditures. His expectation went unrealized, and 
the Board continued to flounder in fiscal difficulties for 
years to come.
3°Report of the Board of Health /~1B66 7> PP* 3-4,
7-11.
CHAPTER VII 
THE BOARD’S POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT
The war changed very little insofar as Louisiana's 
health problems were concerned. Smallpox, Asiatic cholera, 
and yellow fever returned to New Orleans in epidemic pro­
portions during ensuing decades, although consumption^ and 
malaria, the most fatal endemic diseases, took a heavier 
toll in lives. Medical men still devoted a great deal of 
attention to seeking means for preventing epidemics, but 
success was sometimes long in coming. Vaccination was able 
gradually to conquer smallpox, and cholera disappeared from 
Louisiana after 1B73,  ̂but yellow fever remained an enigma, 
unsolved to the satisfaction of state health authorities 
until the twentieth century. In the meantime the contro­
versy over quarantine, involving both physicians and laymen, 
went on unabated, reaching a climax during the years fol­
lowing the epidemic of IB7S.
■^-Consumption came to be termed officially, phthisis 
pulmonalis. This disease did not become known as tubercu­
losis until the twentieth century.
^Leland A. Langridge, Jr., "Asiatic Cholera in 
Louisiana, 1&32-1&73" Tm. A. thesis, Louisiana State Univer­
sity, 1955), p. 126.
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In 1866 New Orleans was visited by a severe outbreak 
of Asiatic cholera. The assault came in two waves, the 
first occurring in the spring. A quarantine was proclaimed 
in March, but it came too late to influence perceptibly the 
course of the dreaded disease. By the time the State Board 
of Health was reorganized in April, cholera was on the de­
cline, and by June no cases whatever were reported. The 
second and more virulent v/ave descended upon the city during 
July, reaching a climax in August and September, and killing 
a total of about thirteen hundred persons in New Orleans 
during the last six months of the year. The Board continued 
to maintain a quarantine, but it was of little, if any, use 
after the epidemic had begun. Nothing, it seemed, could be 
done to curb the spread of the pestilence in New Orleans 
because the Board of Health’s functions were severely re­
stricted by inadequate powers and non-existent funds.
The Board of Health, acting with prudent resolve, an­
ticipated the recurrence of cholera, and prepared to give 
battle. Before the epidemic began, a ’’health ordinance” 
was prepared by a joint committee of the Board and the City 
Council. The ordinance was passed by the Board, approved by 
the Council, and published as a city ordinance. It specified 
fines of from five to one hundred dollars for the commission 
of certain offenses felt to be injurious to the public health. 
Among the offenses proscribed were throwing filth, offal, 
or putrid water in any yard, gutter, or canal; impeding the 
passage of water in any ditch or gutter; keeping a hog
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within the city limits; permitting any animal with a con­
tagious disease to roam at large; disentombing a human body 
without permission of the Board; selling poisonous medicine; 
adulterating any food or drink; throwing a dead animal into 
the river at any place above the water works; and offering 
resistance to necessary examination of private premises.
More important than the sanitary code was the section in 
the ordinance creating a special enforcement body of four 
Health Officers, New Orleans was to be divided into four 
districts (later known as sanitary districts), and a "med- 
ical practitioner" was to be assigned to each district by 
the Board of Health. The Health Officers, popularly re­
ferred to as Sanitary Inspectors, were to receive a salary 
of fifteen hundred dollars, and were to have the powers 
granted them by the Board.^
In compliance with the health ordinance, early in 
August the Board of Health stipulated the duties of the four 
Inspectors. The Inspectors were required to report to the 
Board twice each week all cases of infectious disease in 
New Orleans, and to report weekly on the condition of streets, 
lots, sewers, dwellings, distilleries, dairies, and slaughter­
houses. Each Officer was to inspect his district personally 
once each week. If he should receive a complaint about an 
infraction of the sanitary code, he was required to inspect 
the matter within twenty-four hours. The Health Officers were
^Picayune, July 10, 1866.
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also ordered to notify a policeman or a Deputy Street 
Commissioner concerning the removal of all nuisances. In 
addition, the Board of Health stated that the new health 
officials had to keep accurate meteorological tables.^
When the proposal to create four salaried Sanitary In­
spectors was under consideration, opposition to it was voiced 
in several quarters. One Council member protested that the 
new sanitary code could be enforced by the Street Commis­
sioners and their Deputies. Another Councilman, seeking to 
prevent the adoption of the ordinance, declared the new in­
spection system more tyrannical than martial law. The Pica­
yune claimed that the "supplemental sanitary police’1 were 
not necessary because a police force of five hundred officers 
and men and a street commission were already charged with the 
very same duties. According to the editor, there were al- 
reacy too many officials with an opportunity to evade respon­
sibility. Furthermore, he asserted, the salary to be paid 
the health officers was too small to attract leading physi­
cians, and too large for simply furnishing a periodic report: 
"As it is, such a position will result in nothing but a 
sinecure, and the most important work to be performed will 
be promptly pocketing the $1500 annually.
The Crescent, an outspoken advocate of the ordinance, 
declared the new sanitary inspection system to be "a great
^Ibid., August 9} 1866. 
5lbid., July 7, 10, 28, 1866.
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advance in the right direction.” The fear that a great deal 
of money would be squandered was ridiculous, declared the 
editor. ”How valid this objection is,” he remarked, "may be 
gathered from the fact that it is positively less than has 
been expended for similar purposes by any city having over 
fifteen thousand inhabitants throughout the whole country. 
. . .  We have carefully examined the ordinance prepared by 
the Board of Health, and we have no hesitation in saying 
that it is the most conservative and inexpensive we have 
seen throughout the whole country." A Crescent editorial 
did, however, manifest apprehension that "physicians in 
good practice, or physicians of intelligence and education, 
/~would_7 not forsake their profession for the pittance of 
$1500 a year." It was felt that only doctors could enforce
the sanitary code properly, because only they could deter­
mine with confidence what really was prejudicial to health. 
Awake to the connection between the health and the prosperity 
of New Orleans, the Crescent was an enthusiastic supporter 
of sanitary reform:
This much we know, that clean streets 
and clean dwellings are the invariable con­
comitants to low bills of mortality, and 
that filthy streets and filthy dwellings
are the inseparable companions of disease
and death. It is true that our investiga­
tions have not yet enabled us to ascertain 
the remote causes of disease--more especially 
of those epidemics which at intervals scourge 
humanity; but we do know that the intensity
of all epidemics is aggravated by neglect
of hygienic precautions. We know moreover 
that wherever filth abounds disease prevails, 
and that typhus, small-pox, cholera, and 
other epidemic diseases growr milder in their
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form just as they are combatted by the 
enforcement of cleanliness.
The 1366 Report of the Board of Health, written by the
State Health Officer, Dr. S. A. Smith, declared that the four
physicians appointed to inspect the sanitary condition of
the city were "men of energy and probity." They were said
to have worked zealously throughout the summer in enforcing
the sanitary code, and "the fact of their existence operated
as a constant spur to the Street Commissioners and to the
Police." Smith maintained that there were no city officials
whose service did more for the public good, and none from
whom taxpayers received more benefit for the amount of money
expended. After the cholera epidemic had run its course,
the Council refused to continue to pay the Health Officers
from funds in the city treasury. Dr. Smith, forseeing the
demise of the new inspection system, complained to the
state Legislature that the Board of Health was being deprived
of any influence whatsoever on the sanitary condition of New
Orleans. As in the past, the Council was being short-sighted
7in its approach to public health problems.
While the epidemic raged, the regular weekly meetings 
of the Board of Health were devoted largely to the matter 
of exposing sanitary abuses. The Sanitary Inspectors re­
ported August 15 that New Orleans still had dirty streets
^Crescent, July 3> 17> 1366.
^Report of the Board of Health /~l366-_7> P* 4.
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and gutters; rotten fish were being sold in the market; 
breweries and distilleries were guilty of "noxious exhala­
tions;1’ drainage was inadequate; and the slaughter-pens 
were found to be in a "very filthy condition."^ Toward the 
end of August the Board of Health put out a circular con­
taining recommended remedies for cholera.^ Nothing seemed 
to do any good, as the epidemic raged furiously throughout 
September. The number of cholera deaths finally declined 
in October, but sporadic cases persisted during the remainder 
of 1366.10
The following year, 1367, witnessed the first post-war 
yellow fever epidemic. The Board of Health, prior to the 
outbreak, conducted a spirited campaign to avert repeal of 
the health ordinance passed in 1366. At the beginning of 
the year the Legislature was asked for aid in retaining the 
services of the Sanitary Inspectors, but financial support 
was not forthcoming. The Mayor of New Orleans, in urging 
the Council to provide them adequate salaries, mentioned 
that the Health Officers appointed by the Board of Health 
in 1366 were still on the job. He instructed the Chief of 
Police to detail two policemen in each district to assist 
the Health Officers in enforcing the sanitary code,'*''*' It
^Picayune, August 15 > 1366.
9ibid., August 23, 1366.
-^Report of the Board of Health 1366__7> p. 5.
■*-*-Picayune, May 31 > 1367.
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was reported at the Board of Health meeting held June 4 that
the four Inspectors were faithfully performing their duties
despite the refusal of the Council to pay them and the re-
12fusal of the police to aid them.
The 1367 epidemic struck later than most of the yellow
fever outbreaks which preceded it. As late as August 14 the 
Picayune described the general health condition of New Or­
leans as good. A week later an increase in the number of
cases was noted by this paper, but its readers were comfort­
ed by the reassurance that at least seven-eighths of those 
attacked were foreigners or Yankees. On August 23 a com­
mittee of the Board of Health reported to the people of New
Orleans that yellow fever of a mild variety was still on the 
13increase. Six days later the Board finally admitted that 
Yellow Jack had reached epidemic proportions, but reiterated 
the assertion that the cases were of na very mild type.1'̂ *’ 
This optimism with regard to the supposed mildness of the 
disease proved to be wishful thinking. New Orleans had 
1,637 yellow fever fatalities in September, and a total of 
more than 3»100 for the season.^ The Board of Health found
12Ibid., June 5, 1367.
^ Picayune, August 14, 20, 2$, 1367.
^^Ibid., September 4, 1367.
5Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Leg­
islature of the State of Louisiana / 1367 / (New Orleans, 
1363), p . 13.
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that the quarantine and the use of disinfectants were to 
no avail. As one of the members remarked: " . . .  for a
disease so intangible as yellow fever, it is almost impos-
As before the war, the Howard Association was active
in alleviating distress. Early in September the Board of
Health called upon the Howards, a group of public-spirited
young businessmen, to reorganize in order to provide the
poor with assistance during the epidemic. It was reported
September 25 that the Howards had already aided, "personally
and pecuniarily," more than nine hundred needy persons in
New Orleans. MAge, sex, nationality or color are nothing
to them," remarked the editor of the Picayune. He noted
that donations of considerable size had been sent to the
Howards from Northern cities and corporations, and that
local merchants had also been very generous. The Howard
Association, it was reported, handled 4>192 yellow fever
cases in New Orleans during 1567, and granted relief to
6,197 additional persons. The Howards were not only active
in the Crescent City, but also performed meritorious service
in the adjoining towns of Jefferson City, Carrollton, Algiers,
and Gretna. These "good Samaritans" deserve a great deal of
credit for having relieved some of the gloom from an other-
17wise dreary pestilential season.
sible to find an antidote.
•̂ Picayune, October 30, IB67
^-?Ibid., September 25 
Medicine, XXI (1570), 414-15. 
1567; New Orleans Journal of
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New Orleanians were still baffled by the yellow fever
enigma: T,We are not aware that any new light has been
thrown upon the vexed questions of contagion and portability,
nor that its introduction from abroad has been established
with any degree of credibility,” declared the editor of the
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal. No class was
spared by the epidemic, he said; even natives of New Orleans
1$found they were not immune. The Picayune commented on the 
almost proverbial inability of doctors to reach accord on 
matters pertaining to yellow fever, declaring that "hardly 
any two of our physicians agree as to the nature of causes 
of the fever or fevers which have desolated our city.”^
Many years were to pass before the answers were found to 
some of the more perplexing problems.
The 1367 Report of the Board of Health informed the 
Legislature of the Board’s embarrassment for want of funds 
to meet current operating expenses. The appropriation made 
in 1367 had been insufficient to pay off the Board’s indebt­
edness, the legislators were told, because of the rapid fall 
in the value of state certificates. The Report also asserted 
rather bitterly that the Board of Health wag still ”in truth 
only a Quarantine Board for any practical purpose.” The 
large, general powers of the Board to watch over the health 
of the city were null, continued the Report, except when the
l % e w  Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XX 
(1367-63), 419.
•̂ Picayune, October 15 > 1367*
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Council was willing to cooperate. Dr. S. A. Smith, Board 
President and author of the Report, asked that health offi­
cials be given a broader grant of independent power. In 
describing the procedure used by the Board of Health during 
the yellow fever epidemic, Smith related: ’’Every house
where a case was reported as having occurred, was, under 
the direction of the Health officers, cleansed and fumigated 
with sulphurous acid gas and with carbolic acid. The prem­
ises likewise were subjected to the provision of the health
o nordinance, and the privies purified by sulphate of iron.”*
In 1868 no Board of Health Report was issued. The po­
litical situation in Louisiana caused the omission, as con­
trol of the Board passed from Democrats into the hands of 
Republicans. The six state-appointed Board of Health mem­
bers were among the large number of Democratic officials who 
lost their positions when the Radical regime was established 
in the state. Dr. Smith, the State Health Officer, and the 
five others had served since their appointment by Governor 
Wells in 1866, but Henry C. Warmoth, upon becoming Governor 
in 1868, decided that state health authorities should be 
members of his own party. A bitter wrangle developed between 
the dispossessed Board members and the new appointees. The 
six former members and the two Council-appointed members 
(the third having died) would not recognize the new, re­
organized Board of Health. When the new body assembled
20Report of the Board of Health /~1367_7> PP* 3-5»
8-9.
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November 6, there still had been no amicable solution to the 
controversy. According to Dr. C. B. White, the Board Pres­
ident replacing Smith, the outgoing members refused to re­
linquish their office, their books, or their money; they 
encouraged the bringing of law suits against the Board; they 
injured the Board1s credit; and they caused it much needless 
expense. White was especially concerned about the failure 
of the former Secretary and Treasurer, Dr. George W. Dirmeyer, 
to account for the money left in his possession. Suit was 
brought against Dirmeyer, and the decision was in favor of 
the Board of Health. The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, but no evidence can be found of a judgment ever hav-
21ing been given.
No question can be raised concerning the Board’s conti­
nuity during the Reconstruction crisis; it never ceased to 
function under Louisiana’s jurisdiction. There was merely 
a change in personnel, albeit an unharmonious one. The first 
Reconstruction Act, officially entitled, "An Act to provide 
for the more efficient government of the rebel States,"
while it did provide that Louisiana be included in a military
22district, did not destroy the state as a political entity,
A pronounced curtailment in the functions of the Board of
^ Annual Report of the Board of Health to the General 
Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1&69 (New Orleans, 1370), p. 5.
^Acts and Resolutions of the United States of Amer­
ica, Passed at the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Con­
gress, and the First Session of the Fortieth Congress (Wash­
ington, 1^67), pp. 6O-0I.
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Health was apparent in 1B6B, but state authority over public 
health was never relinquished.
Dr. C. B. White, who became State Health Officer in 
1B6B, retained this post for nearly eight years, until he 
was removed unwillingly when the political situation was 
reversed. During tnose years the annual Reports of the 
Board of Health to the state Legislature changed their ap­
pearance very noticeably. The President's report, the mor­
tuary report, the Treasurer’s report, and the meteorological 
report were still important features, although the latter 
was absent from the 1B69 Report, as it had been from the 
1&66 and 1B67 Reports of Dr. Smith. The important transfor­
mation was in the increased length of the Reports, a change 
occasioned largely by the inclusion of rather detailed re­
ports by the Sanitary Inspectors. Various special reports 
and other information pertinent to the operations of the 
Board were also attached quite frequently. The 1B75 Report, 
White’s last, was nearly 250 pages long, whereas his first, 
the 1B69 Report, contained only forty-six pages. The tend­
ency to present masses of detailed information reached its 
climax a few years later with the exceedingly long reports 
of Dr. Joseph Jones.
The financial condition of the Board was not favorable 
throughout most of this period despite generous legislative 
appropriations during the years of Radical rule. Dr. White 
stated in the IB69 Report that his predecessors had contract­
ed debts amounting to about twelve thousand dollars and had
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let the buildings at Quarantine Station on the Mississippi 
deteriorate. He noted that twenty thousand dollars had been 
appropriated by the Republican Legislature in 1869 to pay 
off the debt and provide needed 'repairs, but even this sub­
stantial amount was insufficient, according to White, be­
cause of the low price secured for the warrants on the 
treasury. The debt was paid, but the repairs had to be 
postponed. An additional appropriation of five thousand 
dollars in 1870 allowed the Board to complete the renovation
of Mississippi Station without relapsing immediately back
23into a state of indebtedness. ^
The Sanitary Inspectors played an increasingly impor­
tant role in executing the sanitation program of the State 
Board of Health. Sanitary Inspectors (originally called 
Health Officers) had first been appointed in 1866 and as­
signed responsibility for maintaining the cleanliness of 
certain districts in New Orleans. The Inspectors reported 
at the weekly and monthly Board of Health meetings, de­
scribing nuisances in their respective districts and sani­
tary operations which had been undertaken. The First 
Sanitary District comprised the old American sector above 
Canal Street; the Second District was the French Quarter 
from Canal Street to Esplanade; the Third District was the
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1869, pp. 5-6, 
30; Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the General 
Assembly of Louisiana . 187^~(New Orleans, 1871), pp. 6,
67.
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area below Esplanade; and the Fourth District (the former 
city of Lafayette) was adjacent to the First, above Felicity 
Street. All except the Fourth District extended from the 
Mississippi back to Lake Pontchartrain. In 1870 the Algiers 
area on the right bank of the river became the Fifth Dis­
trict, and the city of Jefferson, or Jefferson City, was 
annexed to New Orleans and became the Sixth District. The 
Sixth District constituted the part of New Orleans above 
Toledano Street as far as the city of Carrollton. Like the 
Fourth District, the Sixth extended back from the Mississippi 
to the lower limits of Carrollton, a city of considerable 
area which blocked New Orleans' expansion westward and north-
pi
westward. Carrollton was annexed in 1874 and was created
into the Seventh District, The Seventh was a narrow district
between Upper Line Street and Lower Line Street, stretching
from the river to Lake Pontchartrain. Lower Line became the
25boundary between the new district and the Sixth.
These districts were primarily political, but in 1866, 
when New Orleans consisted of only four districts, the 
health ordinance had provided an inspector for each. In
^Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Third Session ot the First Legislature 
. . . and at the Extra Session . . * 1870 (New Orleans,
1870), ex. sess., Act No. 7» PP« 3-31.
^Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the Third Legislature 
. . . 1874 (New Orleans, 1874)> Act No. 71, p. 19; Annual 
Report of the Board of Health of the State of Louisiana to 
the General Assembly^or the Year 1^77 (New Orleans, 1^7"§T, 
p. 114.
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1870, as part of a very important measure bearing the cap­
tion, "An Act to amend an act entitled 'An Act to establish 
Quarantine for the protection of the State,'" the Louisiana 
Legislature officially confirmed this policy. The new law 
stipulated that the Board of Health should appoint Sanitary 
Inspectors for each of the four New Orleans districts and 
one each for Algiers and Jefferson City> which almost imme­
diately became the Fifth and Sixth Districts of New Orleans.^
The Inspectors were to receive a salary not exceeding twenty-
27four hundred dollars, which was to be paid them by the city. ' 
During succeeding years these district Health Officers usu­
ally received two thousand dollars, marking an increase of 
five hundred dollars over the salary granted them prior to 
the act of 1&70. They were invariably members of the medi­
cal profession, although the law did not require it.
The 1B70 amendment to the Quarantine Act of 1$55 en­
hanced considerably the powers of the State Board of Health. 
Many of the Board's original powers were enumerated again, 
and four additions are worthy of note. The most important 
of these permitted the Board to pass and enforce sanitary 
ordinances for the city of New Orleans. Previously, all 
ordinances sponsored by the Board were required to have the
26The act creating the Seventh District stated that 
this new political unit was to have a Sanitary Inspector with 
the same powers, duties, and salary as the other Inspectors. 
Acts passed . . . at the Second Session of the Third Legis­
lature . . . 1#74» Act No. 71> P» 221.
2?Acts passed . . .  at the Extra Session . . . 1^70, 
Act No. 7» p. 31; Act No. 14* p. 55.
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approval of the Council. Secondly, the Board of Health was
granted power to sue in any civil court for the collection
of fines. A third significant provision declared that those
responsible for keeping the streets clean, notably the Street
Commissioner and Street Contractor, were to be held personally
liable for refusal to obey ”any necessary .sanitary order or
ordinance” of the Board of Health. Fourth, the Board was
granted control of the sanitary police, and in the event of
an epidemic, could call upon the Board of Metropolitan Po-
25lice for additional help. ' While the act of 1570 was cer­
tainly not all that health authorities might have aesired, 
the position of the Board of Health in attempting to effect 
sanitation in the Crescent City was materially improved.
The Board told the Legislature at the end of the year that 
the act had ’’greatly increased its labor, its opportunities 
for benefitting the community, its responsibilityhas some­
what increased its necessary expenditures, ana has immensely 
increased the amount of sanitary service accomplished.”^^
The Board of Health continued to have trouble with the 
New Orleans City Council. To the usual difficulties involv­
ing the enforcement of sanitary regulations, political dif­
ferences were sometimes added. The denunciations of the 
Council by the Board of Health tended to be rather bitter 
during the years after the war. The Board won a significant
2^Ibid., pp. 54-56.
29fieport of the Board of Health . . . 1570, p. 6 .
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victory in 1370 v/hen the Legislature granted it power to 
issue its own ordinances. One of the factors probably mo­
tivating the state lawmakers to enact this provision was 
the appeal made by Dr. White in his 1369 Report:
The Common Council of New Orleans . . . 
entertain a pleasingly favorable opinion of 
their own capacity judiciously to use power, 
and wisely to enact laws on all matters, 
those of hygiene included, but are unwill­
ing to trust the direction of sanitary 
matters to a body, fairly representing the 
interests of the community, and most of 
whom by education and experience may in 
sanitary matters be classed as experts.
The gross neglect of the health and 
life of the people shown by the Common 
Council of New Orleans (with some honor­
able personal exceptions) makes it evi­
dent that the power to pass and enforce 
sanitary regulations for New Orleans 
should be confided to the Board of Health 
as the only means of securing prompt and 
intelligent and therefore effectual care 
of the public health.30
The cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever scourges con­
tinued. The final cholera outbreak occurred in 1373, but 
the latter two diseases assailed New Orleans nearly every 
year during the seventies. The yellow fever epidemic of 
1373 took an exceedingly heavy toll of lives, although until 
that time, smallpox was the malady which seemed to attract 
the most attention. Mortuary statistics taken from Board 
of Health Reports are revealing: In 1370, 537 deaths from
smallpox were recorded in New Orleans; in 1371, only 2; in 
1372, 40; in 1373, 505; in 1374, 605; in 1375, 342; in 1377,
3^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1369, pp. 7-3.
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1,099; and in 137$ smallpox killed a total of 151 persons 
in New Orleans. ^  Each of the annual Board of Health Re­
ports during this era contained a discussion of the extent 
to which yellow fever and smallpox had prevailed during the 
preceding year. Another section of the Reports was devoted 
to a discussion of the supposed origin of yellow fever, its 
mode of transmission, and measures taken by the Board of 
Health to prevent its spread. As it was recognized by health 
authorities that smallpox had become a preventable malady, 
the Board repeatedly recommended to the Legislature the
enactment of laws providing free and compulsory vaccina- 
3 2tion.-3*
Overoptimism wiuh regard to general health conditions 
in New Orleans remained a serious problem for the Board of 
Health. The Board found that reform came slowly when pop­
ular fear and dismay were lacking. New Orleanians had for 
decades been self-conscious of their city’s reputation for 
insalubrity, and now, as before, they seemed more anxious to 
combat outside criticism than to support the Board of Health 
in its public health program. The newspapers, as might have 
been expected, were among the Board’s most persistent antag­
onists. They were unwilling to admit that the Crescent City
3̂ -No figure is given for 1376 because no Board of 
Health Report was issued in that year.
32jyiore detail pertaining to vaccination will be 
found in chapter VIII.
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was unhealthy, although they certainly did not express any 
doubt that it was filthy. The editor of the Picayune, 
scanning the 1373 Board of Health Report, confessed that 
one of his purposes was to discover "our real advantage 
. . . over other large cities of the Union." He noted from 
the Report that cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever had 
brought the death toll to nearly a thousand in New Orleans 
during 1373) but he felt that in a population of 200,000 
this mortality should be considered very small. The edi­
torial concluded with the hope that the continued health
of New Orleans would "prove to strangers our advantages over 
33other climes.
Evidently the 200,000 population estimate of the Pic­
ayune was conservative, because Dr. Chaille', an excellent 
statistician, placed the probable figure at from 210,000 
to 215,000, although the annexation of Carrollton (pop.
6,495) intervened between the two estimates. Chaille^em­
phasized in a number of articles the importance of accurate 
census figures, because the usual tendency was to exaggerate 
the city’s population. One of the evils caused by these ex­
aggerations, he maintained, was the resulting under-estima­
tions of the death rate, which in turn produced failure to
O Iunderstand the true sanitary condition of New Orleans.
33p icayune, March 10, 1374*
^Stanford E. Chaille', "The Vital Statistics of New 
Orleans, from 1769 to 1374)" New Orleans Medical and Surgical 
Journal, n.s., II (1374-75)> 4fS.
Dr. C. B. White, State Health Officer from 1868 until 
1876, persistently urged the Legislature to entrust the 
Board of Health with the registry of vital statistics. The 
1872 Board of Health Report recommended that nthe duties of 
the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths in the parish 
of Orleans, be made, by enactment, a part of the duties of 
the Board of Health, and that the fees exacted for this 
registration, go to its general support; thus relieving the 
State of an unnecessary burden of several thousand dollars 
a year." The Report recommended further that the Board be 
made ex-officio State Registrar of Vital Statistics.35 
the 1873 Report White informed state lawmakers that the 
Board’s financial difficulties would be considerably lessened 
if it were granted the fees collected for registration of 
births, deaths, and marriages in Orleans Parish. He pointed 
to the importance of compiling truly accurate vital statis­
tics, because these statistics, he said, were "the foundation 
of the science of H y g i e n e . E a r l y  in 1874 the Board di­
rected a communication to Governor William P. Kellogg, in­
forming him that fees derived from the registry of vital 
statistics would go a long way toward helping finance the
^^Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the 
General Assembly of Louisiana . . . T§72"'(New Orleans,
1373 J, pT~5j:
36Annual Report of the Board of Health, to the 
General Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1§73 (Mew Orleans,
1874), p. 10.
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state health organization.^7 A letter to the Picayune from 
"X" supported the Board*s position by pointing out that the 
fifteen dollars a day collected by the Registrar would pro­
vide income for the Board of Health which otherwise would
3 3come out of the state treasury.
Not until 1377 did the General Assembly transfer the 
registry from the Parish Recorder to the Board of Health.
The President of the Board, as provided in an important 
1377 law, was made ex-officio recorder of births, deaths, 
and marriages for Orleans Parish, and he, in turn, was under 
the general direction and control of the Board as a whole. 
All fees collected were to go to the Board. The new law de­
clared that all births and deaths were to be reported to the 
office of the Board of Health within twenty-four hours. The 
Board was also to be notified of all marriages by the "offi­
cer, priest, or ecclesiastic" performing the ceremony. The 
fee for recording births and deaths was set at fifty cents, 
and the fee for recording marriages was to be one dollar.^9 
Dr. White, in the 1373 Board of Health Report, and Dr. 
Samuel Choppin, in the 1377 Report, called upon the Legis­
lature to create local boards of health. White maintained 
that there should be an organization of this type in all
37pjcayune, January 3, 1374.
3^Picayune, February 3, 1374.
39Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the First Session of the Fifth Legislature 
. * • and at the Extra Session . . . 1877 (New Orleans, 
1377), Act No7“30, pp. 119-20.
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incorporated towns and villages in Louisiana. These local 
boards, White continued, should be given power to secure the 
enforcement of sanitary ordinances and provide for the prompt 
abatement of nuisances injurious to health. Furthermore, 
suggested White, they could be prepared to take action 
should there be an impending epidemic. White contemplated 
that the local boards of health would provide an ample supply 
of pure and fresh vaccine virus between November 1 and May 
31, and furnish gratuitous vaccinations.^ Four years later, 
after the Legislature had granted the State Board of Health 
the registry of vital statistics in Orleans Parish, Samuel 
Choppin, who was then Board President, recommended the in­
stituting of local boards in the country parishes to. keep 
records of births, deaths, and marriages. These Boards 
should also, thought Choppin, be empowered to promote san­
itation in their respective areas, especially by offering 
free vaccination to all. He stated that it might be feasi­
ble to constitute the police jury of each parish as its 
board of health, with the condition that a "suitable medi­
cal man" be elected secretary, executive officer, and reg­
istrar of vital statistics. All statistics so obtained 
would be reported each month to the State Boara in New Or­
leans.^
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&7?, pp. 12-13. 
^ -Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&77» p. 17.
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In 1882 the Legislature responded by passing, "An Act 
To provide for the organization of local boards of health 
in the State of Louisiana." The municipal authorities of 
all incorporated towns were authorized to constitute them­
selves local boards of health with power to pass ordinances 
for the prevention of contagious disease, to abate nuisances 
dangerous to the public health, to regulate drainage and 
ventilation for all buildings, and to record vital statistics. 
These boards of health were required to choose registered 
physicians as health officers. The police jury In each par­
ish was empowered to constitute itself a board of health for 
the parish, with powers identical to those granted to the
I O
municipal boards.
After 1871 White’s greatest problem in his post as 
State Health Officer was the mounting indebtedness of the 
Board of Health. For the first time since the war the 
Board was'solvent in 1870 as a result of the $25,000 which 
had been appropriated to it by the state Legislature in 
1869 and 1B70. At the end of 1871 the Board was again in 
debt, but only by about $1,800. This indebtedness White 
blamed on a "cyclone" which did $2,500 worth of damage to 
Mississippi Station.^ Dr. S. C. Russell, the Secretary
^Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Regular Session . ! . 1882- ("Baton Rouge, 
1382), Act No. 92, p. 114.
^ Annual Report of the Board of Health to the Gen­
eral Assembly of Louisiana . . . 1871~TNew Orleans, I872), 
pp. 9, 106-107.
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and Treasurer during the Republican era, reported at the
end of 1372 that the Board’s debt had risen to more than
$5,000, with the prospect of its becoming much greater.^
White noted in the 1373 Report that the debt had risen to
$6,200, and he asserted that if the Board had had enough
money to provide house-to-house vaccinations, the smallpox
epidemic which took the lives of more than five hundred
45persons in New Orleans could have been prevented.
Still greater attention was given to the unfavorable 
fiscal status of the Board of Health in the 1374 Report. 
White informed the Legislature that the Board’s debt was 
$10,000, and an appropriation of $26,000 was necessary to 
support the Board and the quarantine during 1375. This 
situation had been caused, he said, by the "deficient ap­
propriation’’ of 1373i and the failure of the 1374 General 
Assembly (Legislature) to make any appropriation at all. 
Furthermore, White declared, the operating expenses of the 
Board of Health had gone up since 1369, whereas receipts at 
Mississippi Station, its chief source of income, had fallen 
off from $25>00u to $19,000. He mentioned that the Board 
had been deprived of $2,600 because certain New York steam­
ship proprietors had succeeded in obtaining an injunction 
from a federal court forbidding the collection of quarantine 
dues from their vessels. Another factor contributing to the
44Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, p. 139.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1373, p. 10.
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Board's financial plight, asserted the Report, was the in­
creasing number of services rendered to the public. Prior 
to 1370, it contended, the Board of Health had performed 
fewer functions: no meteorological observations had been
made; no extended or systematic recording of the facts of 
epidemi.cs had been done; tin ere had been no laboratory work; 
no vaccine had been furnished to physicians; no purchase of 
scientific instruments had been made; and there had been no 
house-to-house inspections. Dr. White told the Legislature 
that unless financial aid was forthcoming, the entire quar-
inantine system was threatened with immediate dissolution.
The General Assembly finally relented, and in 1375 
appropriated $24,000 ,rfor the maintenance of health and 
qua rant i ne. However, the Board was able to get its
money only in installments, and debts could not be paid 
fast enough. At a special meeting held April 27, 1375» a 
declaration was made that no funds existed for the main­
tenance of quarantine, and after June 1 the quarantine would
49have to be entirely abandoned. A few days later Dr. White
^ I t  is true that the annual Reports from 1366 to 
1369 contained no meteorological information, but the pre­
war Reports did.
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1374, pp. 1,14-16.
^ Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana, at the First Session of the Fourth Legislature 
. . . and at the Extra Session . . . 1375 (New Orleans, 
1375), P. ^5.
49Picayune, April 23, 1375.
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wrote an official letter to Governor Kellogg describing the 
financial plight of the State Board of Health and the reasons 
why it had gotten so deeply into debt. .The most serious im­
mediate problem was the rapid diminution of revenue from 
quarantine dues during the first four months of 1$75. White 
pointed out that the Board's total receipts for April, 1&74 
had been $2,000 as compared to $400 for April, 1&75. Kellogg 
was informed that if the quarantine were to be continued, 
inspection fees would not meet one-fourth of the Board’s 
current expenses. White expressed his fear that the $24,000 
appropriation would prove to be insufficient. He complained 
that the Legislature had not yet given the Board of Health 
the expected registration of vital statistics (which would 
have provided a substantial income). White reported to 
Kellogg the Board’s decision that the quarantine could no 
longer be maintained after June 1. The Resident Physicians . 
at the Atchafalaya and Rigolets Stations had not received 
their 1S74 salaries, White stated; the boatmen and employees 
had not been paid since January; and the President and Sec­
retary of the Board had not collected their salaries during 
the past year. In desperation White told the Governor that 
the Board of Health could ”no longer be held responsible in 
any degree for the general health of the city, and especially 
its freedom from epidemic; and therefore it formally and 
officially declares to your Excellency its irresponsibility.”^
5°C. B. White to Governor William P. Kellogg, New 
Orleans, May 1, 1&75, in Governors’ Correspondence, Executive 
Department, Louisiana State Archives, Department of Archives 
Mss., Louisiana State University.
220
The twenty-four thousand eased the situation, but the 
problem was still serious because the Board continued to 
operate at a substantial deficit. During a meeting held 
March 24, 1$76 White told the other members that because the 
1B76 Legislature had failed to appropriate additional funds 
for the support of the Board of Health, the continued ex­
istence of the Board was very much in doubt unless the Gov­
ernor acted quickly to raise money. A resolution was adopted 
requesting White to present Governor Kellogg a statement of 
the Board*s financial condition along with a recommendation
that he place under its direction the registration of vital
51statistics and the inspection of meats.
The forecasts of the impending doom of the State Board 
of Health made by its members were aimed primarily at be­
stirring state officials to take action toward providing 
financial assistance. There is no evidence that the quaran­
tine or other services performed by the Board were curtailed 
at any time. No Board of Health Report was issued at the end 
of IG76, but the 1$77 Report revealed an indebtedness of 
nearly eight thousand dollars still extant. By this time, 
however, help had come, and the Board was deriving income 
from the registration of vital statistics and the inspection 
of coal oils to protect the public from explosions. Dr. 
Choppin, the new State Health Officer, manifested concern
^ Picayune, March 25, 1&76.
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over the debt, but the crisis had been successfully passed.^
Of the services performed by the Board of Health, the
maintenance of the quarantine continued to attract the most
attention. Although the quarantine was presumably operated
in the public interest, a general belief existed among New
Orleanians that this institution should be self-supporting.
But with the declining receipts from quarantine fees, the
three stations found it increasingly difficult to make their
books balance. The Quarantine Act of 18$5 stipulated that
the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station should receive
a salary of $5,000 and the Assistant Physician, $2,000, so
those expenses necessarily remained constant. Rigid economy
was exhibited elsewhere, however. For example, the salary
received by the Resident Physician at Rigolets Station in
1870 for four and one-half months service had been $1,390
(ten dollars per day); the Resident Physician at Atchafalaya 
53Station had received $300 per month for six months. By 
1874 their total yearly salaries had dropped to $$00 and 
$900 respectively; in 1875 their pay was down to only $400 
and $600.^ These two stations were operated only during
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1877» pp. 20, 
139-40, 14^7^
^During the early seventies this quarantine station 
was often referred to as Brashear Station, Brashear being the 
port near which it was located. After 1876, when the name 
Brashear was changed by the Legislature to Morgan City, the 
official title, Atchafalaya Station, was once again the com­
mon designation.
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1870» p. 70; 
Report oi1 the Board of Health , . . l874> 68-70; Report of 
the Board of Health . . . 1875, p* 75.
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the warm months, and very few vessels were inspected. Grant­
ing this, it is still difficult to understand how competent 
physicians could be obtained at salaries so unbelievably low.
The year 1876 brought the termination of Republican con­
trol of the Board of Health. At the annual organizational 
meeting held in April, Dr. Felix D. Gaudet was elected State 
Health Officer by a five-to-four vote, upsetting the incum­
bent, Dr. White. For eight years the Board had been com­
prised of six Republicans appointed by the Governor, and 
three Democrats chosen by the New Orleans City Council. For 
some undisclosed reason, in April, I876 two of the Republi­
can members, Alfred Shaw and Dr. William H. Hire, decided 
to vote with the Democrats and elect Gaudet the new Presi­
dent of the Board of Health and Dr. Y. R. Lemonnier, another 
Democrat, the Secretary and Treasurer. But that was by no 
means the end of it. Dr. White was unwilling to accept his 
defeat, and sought to use his political influence to void 
the election.
Governor Kellogg removed the two renegade Republicans 
from the Board, and replaced thei7i with Drs. S. C. Russell 
and G. W. Lewis, who were more to White’s liking. This 
change was made, it was alleged, because Shaw and Hire had 
failed to take the oath required of all Board members to 
support the quarantine system. White and most of the others 
had not taken this oath for years, but now the letter of the 
law was to be observed. Gaudet, Lemonnier, and Dr. J. F. 
Finney, the Democrats, quickly took the oath. White, however,
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maintained that the April election had not been valid be­
cause at the time it was held not all of the Board members 
had been duly qualified and commissioned. Those alleged to
have been improperly elected included Gaudet, Lemonnier,
55and the seven Sanitary Inspectors. At a Board meeting 
held in May Russell and Lewis were seated as Board members 
to fill the vacancies created by the absense of Shaw and 
Hire. White was then re-elected President and Russell was 
re-elected Secretary and Treasurer. Seven Sanitary Inspec­
tors were also chosen, making a full complement of two men 
who claimed to have been duly elected to each of the nine
r £
positionso
Both the Picayune and the Democrat lambasted White for 
having perpetrated this high-handed maneuver. Neither paper 
could understand why Dr. White was so determined to retain 
a $2j00-a-year job, unless he also received some undisclosed 
income. The Democrat mentioned that accusations of graft 
had been made, but nothing had been proven. The Picayune 
declared: "There must be something of profound considera­
tion in the offices attached to the Board; otherwise so 
lame an excuse for revolutionizing the former election would 
not have been a t t e m p t e d . I n  all probability the innuendos
^^New Orleans Democrat, May 5, 1576; Picayune, April 
27, 1576.
^ Democrat, May 6, 1576; Picayune, May 6, 1576 
£~afternoon ed._/.
_ ^Democrat, May 5, 1576; Picayune, May 6, 1576
[_ afternoon ed._/
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were misplaced, but it does appear strange that White, a 
first rate public health official, should have clung so tena­
ciously to an office providing relatively small remuneration.
White succeeded in getting an injunction against Gaudet 
and Lemonnier enjoining them from "usurping” the positions 
of President and Secretary. Lemonnier, however, refused to 
turn over the seal, the books, or anything else to White and 
Russell. Lemonnier steadfastly maintained that the entire 
matter would have to be decided in court; White, at length, 
agreed. The decision went against White and Russell, their 
case being dismissed and the injunction dissolved. The 
Court recognized Gaudet as President and Lemonnier as Sec­
retary, and enjoined their predecessors not to interfere with 
them in the performance of their duties. At the June 3 
Board of Health meeting, attended only by Republicans, White 
announced that he had written to Dr. Gaudet informing him 
that he and Russell proposed to relinquish their offices.
The other Board members still unwilling to surrender, would 
not approve this action, and adopted a resolution instruct- 
ing White to withdraw the proposition. A quick solution 
to the controversy did not appear likely, but before long 
a compromise was found. Drs. Lewis and Hire resigned, and 
Messrs. H. Bonzano and Alfred Shaw were accepted as Board 
members. Governor Kellogg agreed to let Gaudet become
^Democrat, May 9, 31» 1376; Picayune, June 2, 4>
1376*
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President of the Board with the understanding that Russell 
would be elected Secretary. Most of the Republican members 
were not satisfied, but the Court refused to hear an appeal 
of its original decision, so very little could be done. 7 
As a result of this disappointment, during the remainder of 
the summer only three or four of the total membership of nine 
usually attended the regular Board of Health meetings, the 
Republicans often being absent. It is unfortunate that in 
all the confusion attending the political dispute, the Board 
found it impossible to issue an annual Report for 1876. The 
eventual outcome was the complete reorganization of the 
Board by the Legislature, with a one hundred per cent turn­
over in its personnel.
In 1877 the Legislature passed, nAn Act to reorganize 
and render more efficient the Board of Health of the State 
of Louisiana . . . ,,T commonly called act number eighty.
Its most significant provision (on the surface, at least) 
was the extension of the term of Board members to four years, 
wath four (instead of six) of the nine members appointed by 
the Governor, and the other five elected by the City Council 
of New Orleans. The President and Secretary were to be e- 
lected by the other members in alternate years, and were to 
receive salaries of twenty-four hundred dollars and two 
thousand dollars respectively. The act granted the Board 
of Health authority to make all rules ana regulations
^Democrat> June 10, 1876; Picayune, June 18, I87 6.
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regarding vaccination, but this provision was partially- 
vitiated by including the condition that vaccination could 
not be made compulsory. Another provision granted the Board 
power to incur, with the assent of the City Council', T,such 
necessary and reasonable expense as occasion may warrant” 
in protecting and preserving the salubrity of New Orleans. 
These expenses were to be paid by the city, but only when 
they were within the budget appropriation of the Council.
The Board was required to forward each year to the Mayor 
and Council an estimate of anticipated expenditures charge­
able to the city of New Orleans. The estimate was to in­
clude the salaries and "reasonable expenses" of the Sanitary 
60Inspectors.
The 1&77 act prescribed a very unusual procedure:
Every year the Board of Health would be compelled to submit 
to the City Council a detailed statement of all income dur­
ing the preceding year and an estimate of its probable in­
come for the ensuing year; if the Board’s income for any 
year should exceed its expenditures, the surplus was to be 
paid to the city of New Orleans. The remaining provisions 
of the 1B77 act were concerned with clarifying the respon­
sibility of the New Orleans police to assist the Board of 
Health, clarifying the Board’s power to enforce the quaran­
tine, and granting to the Board the long-sought registry
^Acts passed . . . ah the Extra Session . . . 1&77, 
Act No. BO, pp. 117-lB.
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of vital statistics.^
As might have been expected, the Board of Health was 
not entirely satisfied with this reorganization. Dr. Samuel 
Choppin, who became Board President in 1 8 7 7 remarked in 
his annual Report that in effect the new act gave the City 
Council control over the Board’s expenditures, and hence, 
its operations as well. The Council was placed in a posi­
tion to thwart the entire sanitation program in New Orleans 
by failure to budget its money wisely. It had been given 
concurrent jurisdiction, said Choppin, over such things as 
the purchase of disinfectants, the salaries of the Sanitary 
Inspectors and the sanitary police, the rent on the offices 
of the Inspectors, and even the Board’s stationery.̂  Choppin
^ Ibid. , pp. 118-20.
^^choppin, it will be remembered, had also been the 
first State Health Officer, 1855-56.
^^This question was settled in 1885 by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. A lawsuit resulted from an attempt by the 
Board of Health to appoint Sanitary Inspectors and sanitary 
police for New Orleans at salaries in excess of those provid 
ed in the appropriation made by the City Council. The city, 
refusing to pay the salaries, maintained that its charter 
empowered the Council to fix the compensation of every offi­
cer, both city and state, whose salary it must pay, and to 
prescribe the number of officers. The action taken by the 
Board of Health was, according to the defendant, a deroga­
tion of this right. The Board relied on the act of 1877 
which empowered it to protect the health of New Orleans, 
but the Court noted that the same act stipulated that the 
Board could incur expense only with the assent and concur­
rence of the Council. The Board lost its case. The State 
ex. rel. Board of Health v. City of New Orleans et als.,
37 La. Ann. 894> Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana . . Book 44> pp. 571-72.
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also acknowledged displeasure regarding the action of one 
of the legislative branches in striking from the bill before 
its passage a section which would have empowered the Board 
of Health to prosecute violations of sanitary ordinances 
ir: criminal courts as misdemeanors punishable by fine or 
imprisonment. Furthermore, he declared, hog Orleans should 
not have been granted a majority of the representation on 
the Board of nea1th. Choppin reminded the Legislature that 
the origin.a] tb:-ory of its formation was to pa bo it a 3tr 1 e 
-o~-rd bhr city of New Orleans havin^ been allowed .special 
re- re .jta tion 1 n consideration o p its meat commercial in­
terests.0 "̂ It did seer s bit incongruous for a flute hoard 
of nealth to have five of its nine members chosen by a City 
Council.
^  lie port of the Board of Health . . „ 1377, pp. 13-19.
CHAPTER VIII 
SANITARY OPERATIONS
The Louisiana Board of Health, though theoretically 
responsible for the maintenance of public health throughout 
the state, did very little in promoting sanitary reform out­
side of New Orleans. The sponsors of the Quarantine Act of 
1&55 contemplated the Board’s function to be primarily the 
administration of the quarantine, but from the beginning 
the Board of Health had partial responsibility for main­
taining the cleanliness of New Orleans. Periodically the 
Legislature increased the powers of the Board and placed 
additional officials and employees under its control, and 
as a result, services rendered to New Orleanians tended to 
be constantly increasing*
Filth per se was commonly regarded as a source of dis­
ease, but there was a radical difference of opinion as to 
whether it was the primary cause. The germ theory of dis­
ease was still in its formative stage, although it was rap­
idly acquiring adherents. Not until near the end of the 
century was the fact definitely established that germs 
caused disease— not disease in general, however, but a 
myriad of specific diseases. It was only then that miasma 
(or miasm}, the supposed cause of much of the sickness, was
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proven to be imaginary. The result was a general realiza­
tion that filth had to harbor a certain kind of germ in
order to perpetuate a d i s e a s e B u t  this discovery came 
much later. In the 1374 Board of Health Report Dr. J. T. 
Newman, Sanitary Inspector of New Orleans' Second District, 
expressed his continued adherence to the miasma theory by 
asserting, in words which could as well have been written 
by Benjamin Rush:
Exhalations arising from marshes, low 
shores of rivers, undrained yards, alleys 
and privy vaults, constitute poisons of such 
intensity, that it .produces fevers of dif­
ferent types and severity. The last men­
tioned places generate a poison so highly
concentrated that animal life soon becomes 
impaired when continuously exposed to its 
influence. The form and severity which 
these emanations produce are in proportion 
to the amount of moisture and the heat of 
the sun's rays. It is by a consideration 
of the degrees of temperature that the 
relation of different types of fever be­
comes apparent. A moist and calm state 
of the atmosphere combined with excessive
•*-By 1379 the editor of the New Orleans Medical and 
Surgical Journal had already heard enough of "the hullaba­
loo that has been raised by heedless sanitarians about nox­
ious effluvia, foul drinking water, offensive sewer gas, 
and the exhalations of decaying animal and vegetable mat­
ter." He cited the case of Dr. Rudol Emmerich, "one of 
those redoubtable Germans who are always ready to sacrifice 
themselves on the altar of science." Emmerich selected two 
of the dirtiest open ditches in Munich, and proceeded to 
drink a quart or more of their undiluted contents daily.
By chemical and microscopic examination of the water he 
discovered that it contained fragments of garbage, dirty 
rags, hairs of men and beasts, and particles of fecal mat­
ter. After a month of drinking this .,:ost undesirable bev­
erage, Emmerich was as well as ever. He then persuaded two 
of his patients to imbibe that same concoction; they also 
suffered no ill effects. Emmerich concluded that "the use 
of the most foul and putrid drinking water produces no in­
jurious result on the system in health." New Orleans Med­
ical and Surgical J o u r n a l n.s., VII (1379-30), 430-31.
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heat, I have noticed are always favorable 
to an outbreak of epidemic fevers.2
It was probably a good thing that many New Orleanians sub­
scribed to this belief. It seems very doubtful that there 
would have been any serious effort at all to clean New Or­
leans merely for aesthetic reasons.
During the weekly and monthly Board of Health meetings 
and in the annual Reports the Sanitary Inspectors described 
sanitary conditions in their respective districts. Some­
times these district reports were rather brief, but often 
they were long and detailed, especially in the yearly sum- 
marizations which were included as part of the Board of 
Health Report to the Legislature. Among the problems dis­
cussed were the cleanliness of the district, the extent of 
sanitary operations, the merits of disinfection, the best 
method of disposing of the contents of privies, the proper 
location for slaughterhouses, proposals for an improved 
drainage system, overcrowding in the public schools, and 
the willingness of many individuals, especially Negroes, 
to submit to vaccination. Fortunately, interest in these 
matters was not confined to state health officials. Within 
the medical profession there was an ever greater tendency 
to assume responsibility for public health, and New Orleans 
newspapers were as anxious as ever to see their city clean 
and healthy. The state Legislature, whether under Republican
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&74, pp. 91-92.
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or Democratic domination, showed on occasions that it also 
was not unaware of health problems.
The sanitary abuse attracting the most attention was 
the deplorably filthy streets ana gutters. This problem 
was perennial, and one which no authority, either civil or
military, had ever been notably successful in solving. The
Sanitary Inspectors were often dissatisfied with the general 
condition of their district, but usually they asserted that
the worst nuisances had been abated. Dr. F. B. Albers,
First District Inspector, reported that at the time he be­
came Sanitary Inspector early in IB69, streets, gutters, 
yards, privy vaults, and many premises were in extremely 
filthy condition. According to a plan suggested by the 
President of the Board of Health, a thorough inspection 
program was carried out. "By the first day of July,” Albers 
declared, "the entire First District had been thoroughly 
inspected and cleaned, and its healthy condition can be, in
a great measure, attributed to the efficient manner in which
3it has been done."
Not so enthusiastic was Dr, Gustavus Devron, Sanitary 
Inspector of the Third District in 1$75, who expressed his 
regret that the old method of cleaning gutters persisted.
The contents of the gutters were thrown into the middle of 
the street, Devron declared, "there to dry or to be washed
^Report of the Board of Health . . , IB69, p. IS.
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back into the gutters by the next rain."^ In 1873 Dr. Joseph 
Holt, reporting on the Fourth District, described its sani­
tary condition as "excessively bad." This was caused, he 
said, by the absolute negligence of city authorities and 
their employees, the continual dumping of garbage into the 
streets, the filling of lots with waste from the dumping
ground, and finally, the failure to have the District prop-
5erly cleaned by sanitary engineering. These matters also 
drew comment from State Health Officers. White spoke in 
18?0 of the "very filthy condition of the streets," and 
Choppin, in 1878, expressed disapprobation regarding the
£custom of using kitchen garbage to fill in streets and lots.
Picayune persistently advocated that the Mayor and 
Administrators utilize the city’s water supply in cleaning 
streets and gutters. An 1871 editorial entitled, "Wash Out 
the Gutters," claimed that New Orleans' back streets were 
"very offensive to the eyes and exceedingly offensive to 
the nostrils and lungs." This condition could be remedied, 
thought the editor, by opening the street hydrants regular­
ly and often, thereby permitting decayed and offensive mat­
ter to be swept away from the gutters at least once each 
night. A few days later the Picayune complained about the
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1875> p. 139.
R̂eport of the Board of Health . . . 1878, p. 86,
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1870, p . 43;
Report of the Board of Health . "I . 1878, p. 15.
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spasmodic attempts made in the past to wash a few gutters
and scatter a disinfectant once or twice a season. There
had been no thorough, systematic, intelligent performance
7of duty by city officials,, The following May the same 
newspaper carried an editorial bearing the caption "Flush 
the Streets," with the sub-title, "Foulness Generates Dis­
ease." Despite the presence of "the incubating season of 
pestilence and disease," the editor complained, the Admin­
istrator of Improvements could noi be incited to perform 
his most responsible duties. It seemed a crime, he contin­
ued, that "with the mightiest river on the continent flowing 
at our feet, whose cleansing waters could daily wash away 
the ordinary offal of London and Paris combined, we still 
sicken and die for the want of its purifying presence."
A week later the Picayune proclaimed: "All the distin­
guished authorities upon the questions of sanitary reform 
are agreed that'the most efficient antidote for purposes 
of disinfection is simply pure water." Water, it seemed, 
was the great purifier which would solve the city’s "hygi­
enic complications." The plea of economy was mere mockery, 
averred the editor, because the cost of a single epidemic 
on the population, the commerce, and the industry of New 
Orleans would be more than quadruple the most liberal
?P icayune, September 16, 19> 1&71.
^Ibid., May 3, 1372.
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expenditures that could be made in cleaning the city.^
Shortly thereafter, Dr. White wrote to the Mayor sup­
porting the contention of the Picayune: "The Board of
Health earnestly recommend that whatever else be left un­
done, the street gutters be flushed every second night with 
large quantities of water . . .  so managed as to keep every 
gutter running full of water for at least thirty minutes." 
Dramatically the Picayune announced: "Let the water plugs
be opened, let the streets be drenched, and let the seeds
10of pestilence be washed away from our doors!" Unfortu­
nately it was not that easy. Five years later the follow­
ing comment appeared in a Picayune editorial:
It cannot be an impossibility, with a 
great river rolling by our doors, to keep 
these open drains at least partially cleansed 
with a regular supply of fresh water. But, 
year after year, the evil continues, and with 
returning summer, different localities of 
the cit}'- reek with a nauseous and poisonous 
atmosphere, as the contents of the foul 
ditches swelter under tlie hot sun, breeding 
wretchedness and disease. ^
Probably the most extensive functions performed by the Board 
of Health during the post-Civil War years were those connect­
ed with disinfection. Everything which might possibly breed 
disease was disinfected: ships, houses, streets, gutters,
clothing, furniture, privies, and so on. There seemed to be
9lbid., May 9, 1^72. 
10Ibid., May 19, 1S72. 
n lbid., July 16, 1&77.
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wide agreement, within the medical profession at least, 
that disinfectants could prevent the spread of disease.
Each Board of Health Report contained a great deal of in­
formation about disinfection procedures employed by the 
Board in striving to avert epidemics of yellow fever, small­
pox, and other maladies. Interestingly enough, health offi­
cials did not agree on the purpose of disinfection. Those 
tenaciously adhering to the theory that miasma produced 
sickness and the ever-increasing number of physicians who 
placed' the responsibility for disease on germs were at log­
gerheads on most issues, but regarding one matter they were 
in general accord: disinfectants could be found to prevent
epidemics.
The difference of opinion with respect to the purpose 
of disinfecting was clearly revealed in the Board's annual 
Report for 1372. Dr. C. B. White, the Board President, 
directed attention to a circular issued by the Board of 
Health to the citizens of Louisiana advocating the use of 
disinfectants and deodorants during the summer months. In 
the circular 'White evaluated the relative merits of various 
chemicals employed in disinfecting and deodorizing. The very 
fact White was so concerned about the effect of noxious odors 
upon public health indicates clearly that he believed in the 
death-dealing powers of miasma. The circular concluded by 
stating: "The Board of Health consider the destruction of
these foul odors from gutters and privies, as a matter of 
the greatest sanitary importance, and urges upon every
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householder immediately to use the means herein recommended,
to free himself and family from the noxious influence of
12these ill-smelling, unwholesome exhalations.” Dr. Alfred 
W. Perry, writing in the same Report, asserted: ”Our sys­
tem of disinfection is based on the propositions, 1st. That 
yellow fever is produced by an organic living germ. 2nd. 
That it is portable in ships, cars, clothing, etc. 3rd.
That it is solid and not readily diffused through the air, 
but sticks to solid bodies.” Perry discussed further the 
methods of destroying organic germs.^
An excellent concise account of the Board’s disin­
fecting and fumigating operations was recorded by one of 
the Sanitary Inspectors in the annual Report for the epi­
demic year 1B7#:
Disinfection with carbolic acid was 
commenced with the first case of yellow 
fever, and the acid, diluted with five 
times its bulk of water, was applied to 
the squares containing the cases of yellow 
fever--every yard, privy vault, and alley 
receiving a supply. In all, lj?66 premises 
were disinfected, and the streets around 
eighty squares were sprinkled with carbolic 
acid (ten per cent, solution). In applying 
the acid to the streets, the time of appli­
cation was late in the evening. The hand 
sprinkling was done in the day time. Not­
withstanding the thorough application, 
there was no abatement of the fever, and 
on August 14th it was discontinued. From 
that time until the close of the epidemic 
the Board of Health turned its attention 
to fumigation, and the rooms where yellow 
fever occurred were subjected to the fumes 
of burning sulphur. About five pounds were
•̂ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&72, pp. 51-54. 
-^Ibid., pp. 95-96.
burned in an ordinary-si zed room. The 
clothing and bedding of the sick were 
sprinkled with pure carbolic acid, 
fumigated with sulphur and boiled, the 
matresses /~sicJ  destroyed or made 
over.
The great yellow fever epidemic of 1S7£ shook the faith of 
some disinfection enthusiasts, but despite failure to avert 
the spread of disease, disinfecting and fumigating opera­
tions were continued, apparently without noticeable abate­
ment .
In lB$4 the Board of Health produced a circular primarily
on disinfection which was sent to physicians throughout the
state of Louisiana. The circular declared that diseases
communicable "of their own infection or contagion are to be
regarded and treated as enemies to be resisted and stamped
out." Isolation, cleanliness, and the use of disinfectants
were evidently envisioned as the means whereby this goal
might be attained. A special kind of disinfecting procedure
was prescribed for infected clothing; another for patients’
discharges; another for patients’ bodies; another for houses
and apartments; another for yards, stables, gutters, privies,
15and so forth; and another for corpses.
An important facet of the work performed by New Orleans’ 
Sanitary Inspectors was the conducting of frequent inspec­
tions. A typical record was presented by Dr. Gustavus Devron
•̂ Report of the Board of Health . . . 187S, p. 54.
. E. Hawkins Papers, 1$57-1929» Department of 
Archives Mss., Louisiana State University.
of the Third District in the Board of Health Report for 
1B75. Devron inspected seventy-four hundred premises dur­
ing the year, securing rather extensive information about 
general sanitary conditions. His statistics revealed, for 
example, the number of houses with hydrants, the number with 
cisterns, and the number with no water supply at all; they 
shewed also the number of houses used as dwellings, the num­
ber used as stores, and the number of vacant houses. The 
total number of rooms in the dwelling houses was recorded, 
as well as the number of persons, white and Negro, occupying 
those premises. In addition, Devron noted the condition of 
floors, roofs, and privies in the buildings he inspected.
The report disclosed the average amount of cistern water 
for each person in the seventy-four hundred premises, the 
average amount of water for each room, and the average num­
ber of persons for each room. Devron stated the number of 
inspections made during the year; the number of nuisances 
abated; the number of notices issued to empty, rebuild, 
repair, and disinfect privy vaults; the number of notices 
to clean premises, to repair houses, to fill lots, to con­
struct gutters, and so on. The number of yellow fever and 
smallpox cases reported in the Third District during the 
year was made public, as was the number of persons vacci­
nated, and the number of street blocks disinfected with 
carbolic acid. This report and many others indicate that 
the Sanitary Inspectors were assiduous in performing their
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j * • 16primary duties.
A problem which seemingly attracted too little atten­
tion from the Board of Health was the common practice em­
ployed by New Orleans markets of selling spoiled and 
adulterated commodities.-^ Furthermore, Inspectors fre­
quently found the markets to be disgracefully filthy. 
Greater concern was manifested about these conditions in 
l£66 than in the years following; evidently considerable 
progress was being made. Among the matters discussed at 
Board meetings during the summer of 1S66 were "tainted 
meat," "unripe and spoiled fruit," and "very bad flour."
In September one of the Inspectors reported that thirty- 
two butchers in the Poydras Market had been arrested for 
throwing offal about their stalls and not removing it when 
required to do so by law. Each of the careless butchers 
was fined five dollars. A month later the Sanitary Inspec­
tor of the Second District reported condemning diseased 
meat, and urged that the law against vending stale fish be
■^Report of the Board of Health . , . 1&7_5> PP*
141-42.
17Adulteration was by no means a new problem. An 
18$2 editorial in DeBow’s Review condemned the adulteration 
of "ardent spirits." DeBow asserted: "Beer is not only
adulterated with unwholesome ingredients, by retail grocers, 
but the brewers are in the habit of mixing up substances in 
their enchanting caldrons that are revolting to think of." 
He described the kind of adulteration used frequently in 
brandy, gin, rum, wine, and other liquor. DeBow^s Review, 
XIII (1852), 397-403.
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strictly enforced. He previously had told the Board that 
a regular trade confined solely to the sale of tainted meat
I Swas being carried on. Not until 1550 did the Legislature 
take cognizance of the danger and enact a statute to pro­
scribe most of these abuses. An act approved March, 1550 
made it illegal to adulterate or to sell an adulterated 
product. The same law prohibited the sale of "tainted pro­
visions or stale vegetables, or other articles of food, the 
sane being in a condition of decomposition, or unfit for 
food." A further ban was placed on the slaughter and sale 
of unhealthy livestock.*^
The French Market was often found to have contravened 
good sanitary practices. In 1574 a complaint was registered 
by J . T. Newman, Sanitary Inspector of the Second District, 
that the fish and shrimp houses "torture all the neighbors 
with their odors." His proposal was to move those houses 
to a floating boat on the river, "as decomposing fish is 
the most air-poisoning matter known." Three months later 
he remarked: "The only thing that keeps the market and
neighborhood healthy is a liberal supply of d i s i n f e c t a n t s . "20 
In his yearly report Newman mentioned that "meats of a very 
questionable character" had been sold in the French Market.
•^Crescent, August 29j 1566; Picayune, September 
19, 26, October 24) 1566.
i9Aets passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Regular Session . I l"5o0 TNew Orleans, 1350), Act-No. 237“ pp. 23-24.
^Picayune, June 6, September 5j 1574.
21+2
He said that he had compelled some butchers to throw away
21meat they were trying to sell. Newman’s efforts seem to
have been largely unavailing because he declared during the
following summer that the French Market had never been seen 
22more filthy.
Closely allied was the sanitary problem created by the 
city’s slaughterhouses. These establishments were apparently 
very numerous along the river f r o n t , 23 and were regarded al­
most universally as having an adverse effect upon the public 
health. Not only were complaints of noxious odors common, 
but it was maintained that offal from the slaughterhouses 
found its way into the river and made the city's drinking 
water unhealthy and foul. Most of the slaughterhouses were 
located above the water works, seeming to lend credence to 
this belief. In 1B69 Louisiana’s Republican Legislature 
passed an act which altered the situation radically. The 
privilege of slaughtering all the meat to be consumed in 
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes was granted to a monopoly 
corporation, The Crescent City Stock Landing and Slaughter 
House Company. Everyone else was prohibited from keeping 
or slaughtering any cattle, sheep, or hogs in the parishes
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1§74> p* 96.
^Picayune,■ July 24, l$7i>.
23A ccording to the 1B69 Board of Health Report, 
forty slaughterhouses were extant in the Fourth District 
at the end of that year. Report of the Board of Health 
. . . lBb9> p. 27.
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of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard. The corporation 
was required to locate its slaughterhouse at the lower 
extremity of New Orleans or below. The Governor was em­
powered to appoint an inspector to examine all animals in­
tended for slaughter in order to ascertain whether the meat 
was fit for human consumption.^
New Orleans butchers and stock dealers were very re­
luctant to remove themselves from the city, and according
to the Picayune, they tried to convince their fellow citi-
25zens that dirt was healthy. ' Undouotedly the Legislatures 
action in creating the monopolistic Slaughterhouse Company 
was open to criticism because many small dealers were de-
a /
prived of the means of making a living. The Board of 
Health, nevertheless, approved of this measure, and in 1870 
the Hirst District Sanitary Inspector asserted that better 
meats were sold in the markets after the new slaughterhouse 
went into operation. The reason given for the improvement 
was the success enjoyed by the new "Inspector of Beeves,
^Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the First Legislature 
. . . 1869 I~New Orleans, 1869) > Act No. 118, pp. 170-72.
^ Picayunet December 26, 1869*
2&It should be noted that the question of the con­
stitutionality of this monopoly went to the United States 
Supreme Court in 1873. The Court upheld the action of the 
Louisiana Legislature by a vote of five to four. The 
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, Cases Argued and Decided 
in the Supreme Court of the United States (Rochester, New 
York, I920), Book 21, Law. Ed., pp. 394-442.
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etc." in not permitting the slaughter of diseased animals.^ 
Some years later Dr. Gustavus Devron, Sanitary Inspector 
of the Third District, made a special report to the Board 
of Health concerning the Slaughterhouse Company. Devron 
referred to the act of 1869, which had established the mo­
nopoly, as a "sanitary measure." "Frequent inspections of 
the slaughterhouse buildings," he declared, "have proven 
the desire of the superintendent to maintain the same in 
a clean and proper condition, making the establishment not 
only a proper and valuable public institution but a sani­
tary one, as the law creating it had for a main object."
Dr. Devron presented statements from physicians and from 
residents living in close proximity to the new slaughter­
house, indicating that, to quote one of them, "its estab­
lishment has added to the general health of the city of Dew 
Orleans." Devron concluded that the remarkable absense of 
odor characteristic of the new establishment was made pos­
sible by the large amount of water supplied by its own
pumps and its system of draining all nuisances into the 
28river.
Dr. Choppin, the President of the Board of Health, 
complained in the 1877 Report that the meat inspector 
should not be a political appointee: "The inspection of
stock at the slaughter-house below the city and of meats
27fte£ort ojT the Board of Health . . . 1870, p. 57. 
^Report of the Board of Health . . . I87j>> pp.
247-53.
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intended for human consumption is a duty properly requiring 
the supervision of the sanitary authorities, and should be 
vested in the Board of Health.” Only persons qualified 
through education, Choppin maintained, could protect con­
sumers from decomposed and abscessed meat. The Legislature 
was told by Choppin that inspection fees would relieve the 
Board’s financial d i f f i c u l t i e s . ^9
Privies constituted another health problem. The usual 
procedure was to allow excreta to collect in a privy vault 
constructed of wood, iron, brick or other material, which 
was buried in the back yard. Whenever the vault became 
full, the fecal matter was hauled away by T,nightmen, ” so- 
called because they were hired to perform this odious task
at night. Health authorities as well as other citizens
30complained incessantly about the evils of the system, 
but they had difficulty in finding an adequate substitute. 
Remembering that the majority of New Orleanians, both med­
ical men and laymen, believed odors were injurious to 
health, it is little wonder that efforts were made to find 
some less offensive method to dispose of "night-soil." 
Typical recommendations were those of Dr. F. B. Albers, 
First District Sanitary Inspector in l£69:
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&77» p. 1$.
■^Note, for example, a letter from one D. J. Murray 
which appeared in the Picayune during the summer of 1B69. 
Murray complained that many of the privies were "filled to 
overflowing” before the nightmen removed the waste. He 
described the privy system as "most pestilential." Pic­
ayune, August 6, IS69.
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I would respectfully suggest that 
the present system of disposing of the 
contents of privy vaults by buckets and 
night carts be abolished; and the latter 
be made of iron or some other strong ma­
terial, and be air tight, and so con­
structed that the air would be exhausted, 
by which means all that would be required 
to fill a cart would be to turn a stop­
cock, and the contents of the privy could 
be transferred to the cart. Should night 
contractors also be required to disinfect 
those places shortly before emptying them, 
they might pursue their labors at all hours 
of the day, and there would be no occasion 
to poison the atmosphere of the city be­
cause people are asleep and do not know 
that the air reeks with disease-bearingstench.33-
Sanitary Inspectors frequently mentioned the nuisance 
of "defective privy vaults." Constant rains sometimes
brought the contents of the vaults to the surface of the 
ground, and there they remained. Many vaults, particularly 
the wooden ones, were rotten and completely useless. The 
soil was permitted to absorb the human excrement, or at 
least the liquid portion, thus constituting a health haz­
ard, especially if care had not been taken in properly 
locating the privy vault. In 1370 the Board of Health, 
exercising a newly-acquired power, adopted an ordinance 
stipulating that all privies built in the future had to 
be walled with brick or stone, laid in cement its whole 
depth, and constructed with a water-tight bottom. The 
vaults had to be buried in the ground at a specified depth,
33-Report of the Board of Health . . . 1369, pp.
13-19.
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and iher^ ^ 3  a prohibition a-sins! lcc.sit.in0, tnem close 
to streets or buildings. ine ordinance a .Iso stated that 
whenever a privy was filled to within one loot of the 
vault's surface, or whenever an ofTicer of the Board of 
Health .should so order, the fir ivy would have to be emptied 
within forty-eivht hours. removals were to be made between 
eleven o 1clock- p.m. anJ four o'clock a.m., and the contents 
of the vault had tc be deodorised before the removal could 
be made. Another ordinance, adopted about the same time, 
required the disinfecting or deodorising of privies when­
ever an order from health authorities was received by an 
owner or tenant.-^
The problem was considerably altered in January, 1271, 
when the state Legislature created another monopoly corpo­
ration, this one for the removal of night soil. The chanre 
was accomplished by the pa scape of TTAn Act tc improve the 
sanitary condition of the city of New Orleans, and to ^rant 
certain privileges to the Mew Orleans Sanitary and Ferti­
lizing Company." The preamble to the new law declared the 
health of the people to be of "paramount importance,Tt and 
stated ̂ further that "the soil of the city of Now Orleans 
J_ wa3_7 impregnated with noxious excrement, poisonin'.' ’sells 
and creatine exhalations injurious to life, health and com­
fort, all of which originate JTd_J in the sinks and vaults
3 2heport of the Board of Health . . , 1272, pp.
152-59.
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now in use." The law forbade the construction of any more 
privy vaults in New Orleans, and ordered the closing of 
the ones in existence. The New Orleans Sanitary and Ferti­
lizing Company was given the exclusive right, for ten years, 
to remove all fecal matter allowed to accumulate under the 
operation of the ,TDry Earth System." "Earth closets” with 
movable vaults which could hold at least twenty gallons 
were to be sold and rented by the company. The company 
could charge a maximum of one dollar for disinfecting and 
removing the contents of the v a u l t .
The Picayune was outraged at the establishment of this 
"odorous and obnoxious corporation.” The editor maintained 
that it was a "scheme . . . concocted to deplete the already 
depleted pockets of the people of New Orleans." A week later 
the Picayune printed a letter from the company defending the 
earth closet systein as an improvement added to the comfort 
and health of New Orleanians. The letter noted that Dr. 
White, the State Health Officer, was one of the supporters 
of the innovation,3^ No further criticism or commendation 
of the company can be noted; evidently, the law was'not 
enforced.
A similar corporation was chartered by the Louisiana
33Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Tirst~~£ession oi1 the Secon5~Legislature 
. . . l87l (New Orleans, 13*71), Act No. 102, pp. 16-17.
3 -̂Picayune, January 15 i 22, 1871.
Legislature in 1$74. The New Orleans Sanitary Excavating
Company was given the "exclusive privilege," for twenty-
five years, of cleaning and emptying privies in New Orleans.
Specific charges were listed for cleaning privy vaults,
based primarily upon the number of persons using them. The
privies were to be cleaned only once a year unless the
3 3Board of Health ordered otherwise. J The act was not at
all well received. The Picayune immediately denounced the
measure which created a "grand monopoly of night work,"
thereby depriving some of the cityTs Negro population of
their means of livelihood, and also establishing higher
charges.^ Dr. J. T. Newman remarked in the 1874 Board
of Health Report that the employees of the company had not
performed their duties well. Their method of removing the
"boxes," Newman averred, was "a gross violation of all hy-
37gienic principles."^' A different opinion of the company 
was manifested in the 1&75 Report. According to Dr. White, 
the introduction of an odorless apparatus for emptying 
vaults was "one of the most important sanitary events of 
the year and of the hygienic history of New Orleans." He 
asserted further: "The system works perfectly, the
^ Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the First Session of the Second Legisla­
ture . . . 1&74 (New Orleans, 1874*17 Act No. 46, pp. #3-36.
36pjLcayune» March 14, 1374.
3?Report of the Board of Health . . . 1#74* PP*
93-99.
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fearful nuisance of the old plan is abated, and the commu­
nity universally and cordially commend the change. The 
bucket and cart system is forever abolished."32 Two years 
later, however, with the Legislature once again under Dem­
ocratic control, the monopoly was liquidated. Eight com-
39peting companies were quickly formed.
Despite the introduction and use of the new apparatus 
for collecting accumulated fecal matter, the problem of 
defective privy vaults remained. Dr. Joseph Holt reported 
that in his District (the Fourth) they constituted "the 
greatest sanitary evil." "The wooden work of these vaults 
has long since decayed," he remarked, "leaving nothing but 
a common sink or pit, which quickly fills with water in wet 
weather, and overflows during a rain, flooding yards and 
gutters with liquid ordure."^ A year later Dr. Choppin 
declared emphatically that privies were the most dangerous 
enemies of the lives and happiness of Mew Orleanians.^
Hospitals and hotels had a far more difficult problem, 
because they had to find some sanitary means to dispose of 
great quantities of human waste accumulated in a short 
length of time. Charity Hospital had two large vaults
3^Report of the Board of Health . . . I275i pp.
32-39.
3^Report of the Board of Health . . . 12771 p. 10.
^QIbid., p. 71.
^-Report of the Board of Health . . . 1272, p. 27.
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situated on the hospital grounds which received the solid 
portion of the excrement. The liquid portion, however, 
was allowed to run into open gutters on Gravier and Common 
Streets, Those same gutters were also filled with urine 
from some of the city’s hotels. The stench greeting res­
idents of the area can well be imagined, but fortunately 
this abuse was pretty well eliminated by 1&77. Tiie St. 
Charles hotel was the first of the large structures to find 
a suitable means of disposing of its fecal matter. It was 
noted in the 1&7S Board of Health Report that a pipe had 
been laid by the hotel connecting its vault with the river.
A force pump emptied the contents of the vault daily.^
Another matter of great importance to all New Orleanians 
was that of drainage. Two closely related problems were 
involved: First, the question persisted as to how the
streets and gutters of New Orleans could best be drained, 
and second, it was commonly believed that if the swamps 
in the rear of the city were drained, New Orleans would be 
a much healthier place in which to live. Beginning in 1B67 
the Picayune carried numerous editorials advocating the 
adoption by the city of a system of underground drainage 
in order to "effectually prevent our sewerage from being, 
as now, a source of disease." New Orleans’ many open
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&75* ^9;
Report of the Board of Health . . • 1^77, p. 10; Report of 
the BoarcT oT'Health . . . 18?B, p. 2B; Picayune, August T7> 
TH77"
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ditches and canals, which carried refuse of all sorts into
Lake F'ontchartrain, had often been accused of being the
cause of pestilential visitations. Draining hew Orleans
was simplified considerably by its topography, which in
general constituted an inclined plane sloping northward
from the river to the lake. Metairie Ridge, skirting the
rear of tfte city, did provide some complications, however.
Though the Board of Health regarded drainage as a health
problem, formidable obstacles, which could be handled only
43by engineers, prevented immediate progress.
The City Council and the Chamber of Commerce were also 
vitally interested in this matter. In 1B69 the Council 
appointed a Board of Engineers headed by General Braxton 
Bragg. The Board proposed a plan for underground drainage, 
and described it as ”both simple and comparatively inexpen­
sive." Several years later Colonel Thomas S. Hardee, the 
City Surveyor, formulated a system of underground drainage 
which presumably would have aided in keeping the city clean, 
and would also have dried up the swamps.^ Limited drainage 
operations were attempted, but no comprehensive system was 
put into effect during the seventies. Lack of sufficient 
capital weighed heavily.
A typical complaint was made by Dr. Keber Smith,
^ Picayune, September 20, December 12, 1B6B.
^Ibid., December 7» 1^69; Report of the Board of
Health . . . 137£, pp. 255-61.
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Sanitary Inspector of the Fourth District, who declared 
that a lack of uniformity existed in the general plan of 
drainage. The whole rear of his district, he said, was 
"undrained by reason of irregularity of the level of the 
gutters, which are nothing more than ditches dug along the 
sides of the s t r e e t s . T h e  Third Sanitary District, com­
prising the lower part of the city, had the most serious 
drainage problem. Health officials were convinced that dis­
ease was the result. "This want of drainage," asserted the 
Board of Health Report for 1877, ,Thas always been a source 
of disease, the stagnation of water generating malarial 
fever, and the inhabitants will continue their just cause 
of complaint as long as the drainage system is not more
i 6properly carried out."^ Dr. Choppin remarked on the im­
portance of thorough drainage in reducing the number of 
cases of malaria^? and consumption. Action was needed, he 
told the Legislature, to provide thorough draining of the 
swamps back of the city, cutting down of all undergrowth 
between the city and the lake, and opening all streets, well 
paved or shelled to the lake, with gutters flushed from the 
river. Compliance with these recommendations, Choppin
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1869, p» 28.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1877> p. 56.
was generally known that swarnps and malaria 
were intimately associated, although virtually no one sus­
pected that malaria was actually transmitted by the Anoph­
eles mosquito.
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stated, would reduce the mortality of New Orleans more than
i a
thirty per cent.
The attention of the Board of Health was directed in 
1874 add 1875 to the unhygienic surroundings found at the 
parish prison. Sanitary Inspector J. T. Newman described 
in his reports the abominable conditions endured by the in­
mates. The most serious problem was overcrowding which, 
with ventilation dangerously inadequate, created conditions 
facilitating the transmission of disease. Newman reported 
in 1875 that the prison’s privy vaults had not been emptied 
for three years, and v/ere "full to overflowing.” He con­
cluded that the cells were ’’totally unfit for the accommo-
49dation of animals, much less men and women.”
The unsanitary conditions frequently found in New Or­
leans cemeteries constituted a long-standing public health 
problem, as well as being a bane to the aesthetic sensitiv­
ities of the city’s residents. The Sanitary Inspectors paid 
surprisingly little heed to the disgraceful conditions in 
some cemeteries, although it should be noted that the health 
menace was sometimes over-estimated, A lengthy and famous 
graveyard expose"- was written by Dr. Joseph Holt in the 1878 
Board of Health Report. Locust Grove Cemetery (known more 
commonly as Potter’s Field) was the object of his assault.
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1878, pp.
10-11.
49fieport of the Board of Health . . . 1874 > pp. 
96-98; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1875> pp. 113-14.
255
In this cemetery, characterized by numerous abominations, 
wer*e buried many of the poor people of New Orleans. One of 
the worst abuses, according to Holt, was the practice of 
burying, over a period of years, several bodies in a single 
grave. In doing so, old coffins were sometimes uncovered 
and bones scattered. Coffins were frequently buried only 
two inches below the earth’s surface where they could eas­
ily be uncovered and subjected to the rays of the sun.
Bodies were in this way exposed, creating a "disgustingly 
perceptible” stench. Holt described the problem created 
by epidemics, when dead bodies were piled in heaps awaiting 
burial. Residents near-by were correct in becoming alarmed, 
because flies swarmed from corpses into houses in the neigh­
borhood.
Dwellers in the Potter’s Field area petitioned the 
City Council, describing the intolerable conditions, but 
no action was taken. Holt said that he appended to the 
petition his official report, based upon repeated inspec­
tions. Potter’s Field was declared to be "an outrageous 
nuisance.” First, stated Holt’s report, good sanitary 
practice was not being observed; second, ”it /"Potter’s 
Field_7 was a violation of the plainest laws of humanity 
and instinctive decency, in the infliction upon the help­
less of such loathesome sights and disgusting smells;” 
third, residents in the vicinity were being injured by a 
rapid depreciation in property values. Holt declared that
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the Council did nothing about the Potter’s Field nuisance—
he would have located the graveyard elsewhere— because those
50who were buried there were poor, as were the petitioners.
Sanitary Inspectors reported frequently that public 
schools were in deplorable sanitary condition. After in­
specting a school building at the corner of Claiborne and 
St. Peter streets late in 1372, Dr. S. S. Herrick communi­
cated the following remarks to the State Health Officer:
The drainage is deficient, the gutters 
being out of repair. A portion of the yard 
is unpaved and too low. The earth closets 
are broken and offensive to smell; the privy 
structures need repairs; the urinal has be­
come a positive nuisance from faulty con­
struction and neglect. On the day of my 
visit two of the school rooms were de­
serted, having become intolerable from 
smoky stoves.>1
The 1375 Board of Health Report contained an unusually large 
number of similar accounts. Dr. White, commenting on con­
ditions in general, asserted that a majority of teachers 
were either ignorant of, or totally disregarded, ordinances 
of the Board of Health. Especially bad, thought White, was 
the crowding of jrounger children into low, badly-lighted, 
badly-ventilated rooms. ^  Dr. Herrick, reporting on the 
First District, attacked the problem statistically, by the
^Report of the Board of Health . . , 1373, pp.
90-93.
^ Picayune, December 2, 1372.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1375, p. 33.
use of charts. His point was that school children were
being over-crowded, and were thereby deprived of sufficient
53fresh air to retain good health. Dr. J. T. Nev/man, Second 
District, stated that he was "forcibly struck with the un­
hygienic surroundings and unscientific arrangement of the 
apartments devoted to school purposes." "A great many of 
the buildings are sadly deficient in light and ventilation," 
Newman declared, "and the desks and furniture are so situa­
ted as to almost exclude what little light the srriall win- 
dows afford."-' Dr. George K. Pratt, Sixth District, also 
manifested great concern about over-crowding in the public 
schools. Tuberculosis, he said, was often directly trace­
able to the breathing of impure air. Pratt was convinced 
that a child’s good health should not be jeopardized:
"The little learning which they get is not worth the sacri-
55fice of health which must be made to obtain it." '
Because smallpox was regarded as being preventable, 
the Louisiana Board of Health was active in seeking means 
whereby recurrent epidemics of this disease could be avert­
ed. Although it was generally recognized in medical circles 
that vaccination was the solution to the problem, convincing 
people that they should submit to this kind of preventive 
measure while still enjoying good health was no simple
53Ibid., pp. £9-97. 
3^Ibid., pp. 114-15* 
55Ibid., pp. 172-74*
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matter. With smallpox cases being present in New Orleans 
almost incessantly during the seventies, isolation (quar­
antine) and disinfection were the usual means employed in 
attempting to forestall an epidemic. One of the first or­
dinances adopted by the Board under authority granted to 
it by the act of 1370 prescribed procedures to be followed 
in the battle against smallpox. The ordinance granted to 
the Board power to remove smallpox patients to a hospital 
whenever it was deemed necessary for proper treatment or 
to prevent the spread of disease. The Board was empowered 
to quarantine and disinfect any place which might harbor 
smallpox infection. At the discretion of the Board of 
Health, infected clothing, bedding, and other material 
could be disinfected or destroyed. A further provision re 
quired that cases of smallpox and other diseases believed 
to be contagious or infectious were to be reported to the 
office of the Board of Health within twenty-four hours.
The most important section of the ordinance declared that 
no pupil could be admitted to a public school without a 
vaccination certificate from a practicing physician or 
visible proof of a successful vaccination. The Board, it
was stated, would at all times provide gratuitous vaccina-
56tion at the offices of the Sanitary Inspectors.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, pp.
154-56.
2 59
In 1$72 the Legislature created what became known as 
the "small-pox hospital.” The ”Act to establish an hos­
pital for small-pox and other contagious diseases” stipu­
lated that there should be an "exclusive hospital for 
small-pox,” and that all indigent cases of this malady 
should be sent there. The hospital could oe used for other 
contagious diseases at the discretion of the Board of Health.
The city was to pay the hospital on a per diem basis for
57treating the indigent. The Board of Health criticized 
the smallpox hospital during succeeding years because it 
was believed that patients were not well cared for, and 
little effort was being made to prevent the spread of the 
disease. In addition, the three dollar per day charge 
collected by the hospital on each patient was deemed ex­
travagant. At a Board meeting in 1876 a resolution was 
adopted requesting the Legislature to repeal "act Mo. 60,” 
and a year later the request was granted.^
The methods actually employed by the Board of Health 
to prevent the spread of smallpox were described by Dr. J.
T. Newman in the 1875 annual Report. When a patient was 
sent to the hospital, the room from which he had been re­
moved was immediately disinfected with gases "evolved from
5?Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the Second Legisla­
ture . . . 1872 TNew Orleans^ 1872), Act No"I 60, pp. 107-106.
^Picayune, February 5> 1876; Acts passed . . . at 
the Extra Session . . . 1877» .Act No. 16, p. 21.
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the common formula of the chloride of soaiura and the black 
oxide of manganese and sulphuric acid.” The clothes and 
bedding of the patient were immersed in boiling water. 
Patients isolated at home were allowed to see no one ex­
cept a nurse, and a yellow warning flag was placed in front 
of each infected dwelling as a notice to prospective visi­
tors. All suspicious localities were searched in order to 
discover concealed cases, of which there were many because 
of the "gross neglect” of physicians to report them. The 
Board of Health never' did receive anything resembling com­
plete cooperation. Newman mentioned that patients often 
were discharged from the hospital too soon and carried the 
infection with them. Patients isolated at home were fre­
quently visited by friends and relatives in spite of prom­
ises that they would observe regulations. According to 
Newman, some visitors paid with their lives for disregard­
ing the yellow flag.^9
A phenomenon which attracted a great deal of attention 
during this era was the disproportionately large number of 
Negroes who contracted smallpox. Dr. Newman remarked that 
although smallpox was not confined to any race or class, 
Negroes seemed to be much more susceptible. Furthermore, 
he stated, mulattoes tended "to enjoy an immunity against 
this malady proportionately as they 7~were_7 removed from
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1$7J>, pp.
100-101.
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the Harnitic stem." In 1677 Or. Joseph Holt noted that in 
his District, the Fourth, for every white person who became 
ill with smallpox, three Negroes contracted the disease.^ 
More significantly, he noted that ninety per cent of the 
cases occurred among the lowest class of blacks and whites. 
"Neither race nor color," Holt concluded, "confers immunity 
from or occasions special liability to the disease; the
AL "Iquestion is one determined by the social standard."
Vaccination was the only answer. Vaccination is the 
process of implanting the living virus of cowpox in a per­
son to protect him against smallpox. As early as 1669 the 
Board of Health introduced a program of gratuitous vaccina­
tion for all who desired it. Unfortunately there were 
many, especially Negroes, who did not avail themselves of 
the opportunity. The Sanitary Inspector for the Second 
District reported that in the schools he visited, five per 
cent of the white children were found unprotected, whereas 
sixty-six per cent of the Negro children were unprotected. 
Only children whose parents did not object were vaccinated, 
he declared. The Fourth District Inspector reported, in 
contrast, that he had vaccinated many Negro pupils, but
^ I t  was asserted that during the smallpox epidemic 
of 1672-73, four-fifths of the mortality in New Orleans was 
among Negroes even though they numbered only one-fourth of 
the population. New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, 
n.s., I (1673-74), 134.
^libid,, p. 100; Report of the Board of Health 
. . . 1677, pp. 65-66.
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found it impossible to vaccinate white children because of
& 2opposition from the school director. It should be point­
ed out that only a small percentage of adults had ever sub­
mitted to vaccination, and the Board of Health seemed 
reasonably content to concentrate on school children.
In 1S70 the Board adopted an ordinance which, among 
other things, made vaccination a requirement for admission 
to oublic schools. Each Saturday the Sanitary Inspectors 
furnished free certificates of vaccination to those entitled 
to them, and vaccinated at the Board’s expense all who ap­
plied for this service. Other physicians also performed 
vaccinations, and the Board of Health kept a supply of 
vaccine for "gratuitous distribution" to them. In its 1370 
annual Report the Board recommended a comprehensive plan 
which would have extended free vaccination throughout the 
state, thereby offering protection to all of Louisiana.
The 1672 Report contained the recommendation that vaccina­
tion be offered at every house in New Orleans. Two years 
later the suggestion was made that the Board establish a 
"bovine vaccine institute" to facilitate the distribution
Z. O
of the cowpox, or bovine, virus.
Free vaccination was not enough; the Board gradually
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1669, po.
21, 27.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1670, pp.
24, 26-29; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1872, p.
15; Report of the Board of Health . . . 1674, p. 106.
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began to advocate compulsory vaccination as well. It had 
been thought that the ordinance compelling school children 
to be vaccinated would suffice, but this ordinance was not 
enforced effectively. Moreover, not all children attended 
school. The Board of Health also publicized the need for 
re-vaccination, but its entreaties went largely unheeded. 
Basically, the reason health officials were insistent that 
the state adopt a system of compulsory vaccination was their 
conviction that popular ignorance and superstition would 
perpetually keep the percentage of those protected at a 
dangerously low level. To the amazement of physicians, 
not everyone wanted to be protected. The problems encoun­
tered were characterized by Dr. Holt:
The colored people do not avail them­
selves of vaccination in any measure as to 
the whites. In this connection we may ex­
plain why this disease is almost confined 
to the lowest class of whites and blacks.
Here we are apt to find naturally associ­
ated with the conditions of life favoring 
pestilence, indolence, slothfulness, igno­
rance. The negroes, of all others, hold 
with the most zealous faith the creed that 
"If it is Godfs will for them to have small­
pox they will have it; and if it is not his 
will they will not have it; and to get vac­
cinated is to tempt the Lord." Unfortu­
nately, on the part of the lower class 
there is an obliviousness to fear of the 
disease. They regard one of their number 
covered with the loathsome eruption with 
the same complaisance that the educated 
look upon varicella.°4
One of the leaders in the fight for compulsory
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&75, P* 14$*
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vaccination was Dr. Joseph Jones, who became the State 
Health Officer in 1880. Jones declared that between 186? 
and 1877 there had been 33>449 cases of smallpox and vari­
oloid (a mild form of smallpox) in New Orleans. This as­
tounding figure indicated to him that sanitary inspection, 
disinfection, and free vaccination, the means of countering 
the disease employed by the Board of Health, had not been 
of great value. It also indicated, he said, T,the most la­
mentable neglect of the great and sole means of protection 
against this disease, namely— VACCINATION.” The only 
methods which would really destroy smallpox in New Orleans, 
he concluded, were first, the constant supply to the Sani­
tary Inspectors and other practitioners of medicine of a 
sufficient quantity of fresh, reliable vaccine to meet the 
needs of the entire population, and second, compulsory 
vaccination. Jones, at the same time, advocated writh ardor 
the responsibility of the state for the maintenance of 
public health:
Each unprotected inhabitant who neg­
lects, or wilfully refuses vaccination, is 
a source of constant danger to himself, to 
his family, to his neighbors, and to the 
whole community; and the state has the pow­
er and the right to institute at the hands 
of competent medical men COMPULSORY VACCINA­
TION, for the full and equal protection of 
all her citizens.^
65joseph Jones, "Compulsory Vaccination. The Es­
tablishment of a Uniform System of Vaccination for Citizens 
and Inhabitants of the State of Louisiana by Legislative 
Enactment," Report of the Board of Health . . . 1877> pp. 
196-97, 204.
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Immediately after the Civil War the Board of Health 
found itself confronted with a strange, new public health 
problem. Each year more attention was given to the rapidly 
increasing number of deaths caused by coal oil explosions. 
Coal oils were coming into common use in New Orleans for 
illuminating purposes; danger was present because many of 
the oils had a flashing point which was too low. In the 
annual Report for 1B69 Dr. White stated that there had been 
fifty deaths by burning in New Orleans during the year, and 
most of them had been caused by coal oil explosions. He 
requested legislative action to keep unscrupulous dealers 
from flooding the market with dangerous illuminating flu­
ids. otl The following year the Board of Health adopted an 
ordinance regulating their sale, but the measure was voided 
by a court decision which declared that such regulations 
could be made only by the state. The Board then issued an 
address to the public with information about the relative 
safety of different petroleum products, and the Legislature 
was again urged to provide necessary legislation. The law 
recommended by the Board of Health would have created a 
coal oil inspector and gauger for each city and town in 
the state with a population of two thousand or more. The 
sale, gift, or delivery of any oil not having been in­
spected, or being found to have a flashing point of 110°
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&69, p. 19*
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Fahrenheit or lower, was to be prohibited.^ The Picayune 
also took cognizance of the situation, and asked the Gen­
eral Assembly for regulatory legislation. It asserted the 
need for a law to prohibit the sale of unsafe illuminating 
oil and the storage of large quantities of oil in thickly 
populated parts of New Orleans.^
Successive Board of Health Reports presented detailed 
information on coal oil explosions. The number of injuries 
and deaths mounted, and property loss was sometimes consid­
erable. Early in 1876 Dr. White told a Board of Health 
meeting that there had been 311 fatal coal oil accidents 
during the preceding nine years. He said that he had pre­
pared another bill for the General Assembly, this one to 
forbid the sale of any oil with a flashing point lower than 
125° Fahrenheit.^9 The act passed in 1877 was essentially 
the bill recommended by the Board of Health in 1870 except 
that 12$° was established as the minimum flashing point.
The sale, gift, or delivery of coal oil with a lower flash­
ing point was to result in a heavy fine unless the oil was 
stamped, "Explosive and dangerous." A still heavier fine 
was to be imposed if the oil was sold without having been 
inspected. In all parishes except Orleans the District
67Report of the Board of Health . . . 1870, pp.
12-22.
^ Picayune, September 25, 1871.
^ i b i d ., January 8, 1876.
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Attorney was made responsible for prosecuting cases against 
violators of the new statute. The Board of Health was as­
signed this duty in Orleans Parish. The lav/ declared that
the inspector and gauger of coal oils for Orleans Parish
70was to be an appointee of the Board of Health. The Re­
port of the Coal Oil Inspector became a part of succeeding 
annual Reports of the Board of Health. The Reports indi­
cated that it was not easy to enforce the provision in the
new law requiring a high flashing point for coal oils.
71However, a gradual improvement was noted, and there was 
a corresponding decrease in the number of explosions.
During the last month and a half of 1372 the Board of 
Health found itself faced with an "epizootic," i. e.t an 
epidemic affecting animals. The epizootic which visited 
New Orleans was a distemper that spread very rapidly among 
horses and mules. At a special Board meeting held November 
16 a communication was received from iV[ayor Benjamin F. 
Flanders requesting the Board’s opinion on a horse quaran­
tine and asking for cooperation in enforcing cleanliness 
and precautionary disinfecting measures in the large car
7°Acts passed . . .  at the Extra Session . . , 
13771 Act No. 37, pp. 60-62..
^ T h e  ratio of oils attaining "the standard of 
safety" was only fifteen per cent in 1377, hut this ratio 
advanced on an average of about four percentage points a 
year. The Coal Oil Inspector asserted that by 1334 about 
forty per cent of the oils inspected reached the standard 
of safety. Report of the Board of Health . . . 1373, p. 
140; Biennial Report of the Board of Health, of the State 
of Louisiana, to the General Assembly, 1334-T335 (Baton 
Rouge, 1386], p. l5d.
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and livery stables of the city. Board members professed 
ignorance as to what action should be taken, but they 
decided that a quarantine could not be maintained. A res­
olution was adopted recommending "a full and thorough ex­
amination and disinfection of all public and private stables 
be at once made under the direction of the sanitary inspec­
tors. rf̂
The inspection of stables began November 22, about the 
time the first cases were reported. The primary object of 
this work was to inform owners of animals how to put sta­
bles in satisfactory sanitary condition and how to treat 
sick animals. Only a week or so after the epizootic began, 
horses and mules throughout New Orleans were ill. Fortu­
nately the disease was not very malignant, mortality being 
about one or two per cent. Nonetheless, for several weeks 
transportation in New Orleans was greatly curtailed, and 
business suffered as a result. In treating the distemper 
simple remedies such as rest, warm blankets, soft food, and 
warm drinks were usually advised by the Inspectors. The
epizootic abated during December, but there were still cases
73present In the city at the end of the year.'^
Complaints of the failure of the New Orleans municipal 
government to cooperate in enforcing sanitary regulations
^Picayune, November 17, 1872*
73jbid., December 1, 21, 1872; Report of the Board 
of Health . . . 1872, pp. $4-86.
persisted. Ordinances adopted by the Board of Health 
beginning in 1870 proscribed most of the abuses suffered 
by the city for decades, but the sanitary poxice, detailed 
to assist the Board, were too few and too ineffective. In 
1877 the Legislature, seemingly aware of public health 
problems, enacted a law designed to correct the noisome 
condition in which the batture was usually found. The new 
law forbade any person, company, or corporation to drop 
offal, garbage, night soil, or dead animals from wharves or 
landings within Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes 
All waste had to be placed on boats at a nuisance wharf and 
towed daily to the lower limits of the city. There the ref­
use was to be emptied into the middle of the river. The
Board of Health was empowered to prosecute all violators of 
7 Athe law.
The Picayune, in June, 1878, carried a progressive 
editorial demanding the submergence of individual rights 
in the interest of public health. This editorial indicated 
a growing appreciation of the state’s responsibility for 
promoting the general welfare of its citizens. The editor 
believed that residents of Mew Orleans were ready to pay 
the price necessary to bring about a cleaner, healthier city
There is no municipal expenditure of 
which tax-paying citizens will complain 
less than that which is necessary to keep
Acts passed . . . at the Extra Session . . .
1877, Act No. 14, pp. 19-20.
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the city in a cleanly and healthy condition.
If the Mayor and Administrators expend 
every available dollar for this purpose, 
their action will be most approved by the 
most intelligent among the citizens of 
New Orleans; and even if they put a strained 
construction upon the law and go farther 
than a timid interpretation may warrant, 
their action will be justified in the eyes 
of those who consider the demands of public 
safety as equivalent to the positive pro­
visions of the statutes. It ought to be 
in the power of the Council to make the 
city pure, to give it clean streets, to 
divest it of all putrifying £"sicJ  sub­
stances, to supply it with abundant water, 
to secure cleanliness in all public places, 
to compel the prompt removal of all in­
fecting substances, to prevent the intro­
duction and sale of unwholesome provisions 
in public and private markets, to make 
filthiness in all its forms penal, and to 
forbid tne individual citizen from doing 
that which endangers the public health 
or interferes with the general safety.
To effect this, any required thoroughness 
of inspection should be employed, even 
though it might seem to the thoughtless 
to border on espionage. No citizen has 
a right to suffer on his premises a nui­
sance that endangers the health or in­
terferes with the sanitary comfort of 
his neighbors.75
These sentiments, and others like them, brought promise
for the future of public health.
75picayune, June 24, 1$7&.
CHAPTER IX 
THE QUARANTINE CONTROVERSY, 1366-73
During the years following the Civil V/ar the quaran­
tine issue continued to excite a great deal of bitter con­
troversy in Now Orleans. Never had there been conclusive 
proof that the quarantine could prevent the importation of 
yellow fever, even if it were conceded that yellow fever 
was imported at all. The efficacy of quarantine in dealing 
with smallpox was generally accepted, but strangely, the 
prevention of smallpox did not seem to be regarded as suf­
ficient reason for the imposition of a quarantine. Smallpox 
was not characterized by terrifying mass-mortality epidemics; 
furthermore, it was commonly supposed to be a Negro disease. 
The quarantinists, as aggressive as ever, pointed out that 
cholera- and typhus were also commonly listed among the im­
ported maladies. It was to no avail. Yellow fever held 
the center of the stage, and in the public mind, quarantine 
was thought of only in relation to it.
As before, the anti-quarantine faction was headed by 
powerful commercial interests opposed to any interference 
with trade. The prosperity of New Orleans was being sacri­
ficed, they said, t6 the quixotic notions of a few wilful 
men. The businessmen were ably seconded by non-contagionist 
physicians and most of the city’s nev/spapers. The Board
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of Health, returning to state control in May, 1S66, could 
not well ignore this concerted opposition. Federal mili­
tary authorities left the new State Board with a quarantine 
to enforce, but they could not transfer their enforcement 
powers. Attempting to pacify its most dangerous antago­
nists, the Board was necessarily cautious. The Crescent 
reported that at a meeting held in July uthe sentiment of 
the board was very manifest— that while everything neces­
sary to the preservation of the public health ought to be 
done, nothing whatever that could improperly or unnecessar­
ily trammel commerce or harass citizens ought to be toler­
ated."1
The quarantine did not prove to be very successful in 
1S66 or 1B67. Both cholera and yellow fever visited New 
Orleans in 1B66, and a serious yellow fever epidemic struck 
during the following summer. With the state suffering from 
fiscal difficulties during the post-war years, it is not 
surprising that the "useless expenditures" of the Board of 
Health came under attack. The Picayune remarked: "The
great machinery of the Board of Health as now in operation 
involves a heavy, and in some cases unnecessary expense."*' 
At a Board meeting in 1S67 Dr. Warren Stone, one of the 
members of the Board of Health, declared his inability to 
see any benefit produced by the quarantine, but he thought
■̂•Crescent, July 26, l$b6. 
■̂ Picayune, September 16, 1S66.
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that to satisfy the public, a rigid quarantine would have 
to be continued.^ The Board was criticized at the time 
of the l£67 epidemic for failing to do anything about a 
vessel impregnated with yellow fever which lay in port at 
New Orleans for more than a month. It was alleged that New 
Orleanians had been infected from this ship, and that the 
Board of Health had been apprised of the situation. The 
Board was charged with neglecting its duty to protect the 
residents of the Crescent City from contagious disease.^ 
Much to the Board’s dismay, a great epidemic followed.
In 1363, as a consequence of the adoption of Radical 
reconstruction, the quarantine was ordered by military 
authority. This quarantine was unique because it was en­
forced at the command of General Grant in Washington, and 
applied to every Southern port from Virginia to Texas. All 
vessels arriving from infected ports were ordered to be 
quarantined fifteen days and thoroughly fumigated. Vessels 
having "epidemic" diseases on board were made subject to 
fifteen days’ detention following the termination of the 
first case, after which they were to be fumigated. All 
civil and military authorities at ports within the five 
districts created by the first Radical Reconstruction act 
were commanded to make and enforce proper quarantine
3Ibid., July 3 i 1367.
^•Francis Barnes, "Yellow Fever in New Orleans,"
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, XX (1367-63), 
196-97.
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regulations. A month later the order was amended to extend
the detention period from fifteen days to twenty-one days.
The Picayune doubted the wisdom of attempting to enforce a
rigid quarantine, arguing that in the past such attempts
had failed. While conceding that Butler’s quarantine had
been successful, it had been, said the Picayune, a year-
round embargo, one which could not possibly be kept in 
5peacetime. There is no indication as to how efficiently 
the quarantine was enforced, but it should be noted that 
the year 1363 was relatively free from pestilence.
The Governor proclaimed a quarantine in 1869 and 1870, 
the detention period in 1370 being set fifteen days instead 
of the time-honored ten.^ Both yellow fever and smallpox 
attacked New Orleans in 1370, each of them taking well over 
five hundred lives; cholera mortality for the year was in 
excess of one hundred. The yellow fever outbreak was pri­
marily autumnal, as had been the case three years earlier 
when the death toll mounted to more than three thousand.
The most significant event surrounding the 1870 epidemic 
was the action taken by Texas. The Governor of that state 
proclaimed a quarantine against New Orleans, an act which, 
according to the Picayune, cost the Crescent City millions
^Picayune, May 2, June 6, 16, 1868.
6New Orleans Journal of Medicine, XXIII (1870-71), 
^74; Picayune, May 27, 1869.
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7of dollars in trade. New Orleans was outraged, but 
trouble vras only beginning; her neighbors wanted protec­
tion .
A national system of quarantine was suggested as the 
solution. New Orleans, some maintained, could not then be 
discriminated against. The New Orleans Republican advo­
cated this plan; the Picayune did not agree. Commenting on 
remarks by the editor of the Republican, the Picayune clar­
ified its own position:
We agree with him as to the damaging 
effects of quarantine upon commerce, as to 
its glaring defects, as to its peculiarly 
pernicious influence upon this city, as to 
the unscrupulous advantage taken of quar­
antine as a pretext by rival cities, as to 
its perversion for local objects, as to 
the inconvenience and damage of many sys­
tems inconsistent with each other and often 
conflicting, and especially as to the obso­
lescent old notion on which our damaging 
and pernicious system is founded. But 
while concurring fully in the diagnosis of 
the disease, we dissent from the prescrip­
tion for its cure. The Republican calls 
for the establishment by Congress of a 
national system of quarantine to super­
sede the present local laws and regula­
tions, claiming the authority of Congress 
to make such laws, under the general grant 
of power to regulate commerce. Whether 
the right to prescribe quarantine regula­
tions exist in Congress or not, or under 
whatever specific branch of powers such 
right may be claimed, there is no assur­
ance that such 1 X . 7  national system 
might not become an instrument of oppres­
sion. Unquestionably Congress has the 
right to forbid local rules detrimental 
to commerce, and a law prohibiting States 
and cities from arresting vessels, goods
^Picayune, October 30 , 1$7Q.
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and passengers, except for named causes, 
would be of beneficent operation. But 
whatever Congress may do, the present 
absurd quarantine ought to be abolished.
The Picayune, the paper which led the way in promoting es­
tablishment of the state quarantine in 1355, became a bitter 
critic of this institution during the early seventies. The 
city’s prosperity should not be sacrificed, the Picayune 
maintained, to a device which had proven itself worthless:
Our commerce with the countries south 
of us is growing in extent and importance.
We cannot afford to have it interrupted 
every year, for five or six months, for 
the sole purpose of affording a delusive 
security to a few hundreds of timid and 
unacclimated visitors or residents. The 
great business of this metropolis must not. 
be suspended to gratify caprice, or in 
compliance with a superstitious conception.
The quarantine has done no known and pos­
itive good; it has done an immeasurable 
amount of known, felt and positive hurt.
It has done more to paralyze and dwarf 
our trade and influence than anything 
else.9
In September, 1371 Texas again imposed a quarantine 
against New Orleans. The Picayune blamed Dr. G. W. Peete, 
the Health Officer at Galveston, for the outrage, because 
he was alleged to have obtained the proclamation from the 
Governor of Texas. At the insistence of Hew Orleans mer­
chants Governor Henry C. Warmoth of Louisiana wrote to the 
Governor of Texas, informing him that New Orleans had had 
only five cases of yellow fever, and that the Texas quarantine
% b i d . , January 29, 1371* 
9Ibid.,, January 19, 1371.
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was a serious impediment to commerce. The businessmen 
of New Orleans held a special meeting at the Merchants' 
Exchange on Common Street and adopted a resolution condemn­
ing the Galveston Board of Health and the Governor of Texas. 
Dr. Peete, declared the editor of the Picayune8 invited 
the quarantine so that he might profiteer.^ The climate 
of opinion in New Orleans was evidently one of hostility 
toward Galveston because of the conviction that the quar­
antine was a malicious attempt to injure the commerce of 
a competitor. It was probably true that Galveston was 
anxious to have a state quarantine levied against New Or­
leans in retaliation for the frequent inclusion of Gal­
veston on the lists of ports proclaimed to be infected by 
the Governor of Louisiana,
Dr. White called the attention of the Legislature to 
newspaper talk about the uselessness of quarantine regula­
tions, but added that the Board of Health was "decidedly 
in favor of their continuance and thorough enforcement. TT~^ 
Shortly thereafter, the merchants and the Chamber of Com­
merce of New Orleans appealed to the Legislature to repeal 
or revise the Quarantine Act. The Beard of Health was under 
attack from the commercial interests of New Orleans because 
it was a state institution, with a majority of appointments
-t-Qlbid., September 29, 1S71.
^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1^71? pp. $-9.
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being made by the Governor. Business circles repeatedly 
asserted that the Board should be run by the city. Fur­
thermore, the businessmen considered it grossly unfair that 
the Board should depend upon the taxation of commerce for 
most of its income. The "Quarantine Tax" was repeatedly 
assailed from many quarters, but the Legislature could not 
be moved.
In the meantime the United States Congress was dis­
cussing the quarantine. A joint resolution of the House, 
passed March 1, 1.372, sought to provide "a more effective 
system of quarantine on the southern and Gulf coasts."
This resolution directed the Secretary of War to detail 
one of more medical officers of the regular army to visit 
every port and town on the Gulf of Mexico subject to in­
vasions of yellow fever. The officers were to confer with 
authorities in those ports and towns relative to the es­
tablishment of a more uniform and efficient system of 
quarantine. In addition the officers were to ascertain 
all facts pertaining to epidemics in the area and how those 
outbreaks could be prevented. The investigators were to 
make a detailed report of their findings to the Secretary 
of War.
The House resolution was amended by the Senate, the 
most important amendment being sponsored by Senator William
^Picayune, March 10, 16, 1372.
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P. Kellogg of Louisiana. It stipulated that the medical 
officers were not to find a means to prevent epidemics, but 
rather they were to determine "whether any system of quar­
antine /"wasJ  likely to be effective in preventing inva­
sions of yellow fever, and if so, what system /~~would_7 
least interfere with the interests of commerce at said 
ports." Another amendment provided that the investiagion 
was also to Include towns and ports on the Atlantic coast 
which were subject to yellow fever. The resolution as 
amended was concurred in by the House. In New Orleans it 
was remarked that the acceptance of the amendment was "an 
auspicious recognition by Congress of the weight of tie 
enlightened and liberal sentiment which regards all known 
systems of quarantine as essentially ineffective, and as
equally barbarous and pernicious in their restrictions upon
13commerce." J
The Board of Health adopted a new practice in 1372. 
Full and detailed health reports were sent every week to 
all principal cities of the North, Northwest, and South­
west, each accompanied by a special remark that New Orleans 
was free from epidemic diseases. The reports were sent 
particularly to points of importance in the Mississippi
The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates
and Proceedings of the Second Session, Forty-Seconcf Con­
gress '.  ̂  ̂ [Washington, D. C., 1872) Part 2, p. 1330;
Part 4> p* 3435; Part 5> pp. 4094-95; Picayune, May 21, 
1372.
Valley.Unquestionably this innovation was adopted be­
cause of the feeling among Nev.? Orleanians that their city 
had been harmed in the past by unconfirmed rumors and un­
verified reports. But nothing could pacify the opponents 
of quarantine. "Medicus" wrote to the Picayune that the 
proclamation of a quarantine in 1372 was "a proclamation 
of commercial war.” It was certainly not true, he said, 
that yellow fever prevailed in all of the ports in the vast 
region south of New Orleans included in the quarantine. 
”Medicus” remarked: "It really looks like a systematic,
concerted plan to annihilate the commerce of this unfortu­
nate place.” Editorial comment in the Picayune remained 
unfavorably disposed toward quarantine. ”Yeliow fever, 
according to the sapient Drs. White, Warmoth « Co., is 
always imported on shipboard in the shape of some sort of 
foreig;n merchandise,” declared the editor, "The effect of 
this theory is to furnish a handsome and lucrative business, 
in dull seasons, to a lively set of quarantine officials."^ 
The Board of Health, as immovable as ever, informed 
the Legislature that it did not feel justified in recom­
mending any change in existing quarantine regulations.
Dr. C. B. White, the President of the Board, told the law­
makers: "The scientific sanitary desideratum in quarantine
•̂ Picayune, July 9> 1372.
-*-5ibid., June 13, July 21, 1372.
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is, /~sicJ  certain, rapid disinfection of the loaded 
vessels by agents not inimical to craft or cargo, and it 
is in this direction that inquiry in the immediate future 
should be made."^ Ever greater attention did seem to be 
given to disinfection during the seventies. This change 
was caused primarily by the rise of the germ theory of 
infection, although miasmatists were likewise inclined to 
believe that disinfectants represented something of a pan­
acea. In order to destroy germs (or odors) disinfection 
was used on streets, buildings, personal belongings, and 
so forth; and it was also a feature of the quarantine.
The process was nothing new, but greater emphasis was being 
placed upon its efficacy.
One of the New Orleans Sanitary Inspectors, Dr. A. W.
Perry, told, the American Public Health Association in 1375 
that a means existed to protect a port by quarantine with­
out delay to commerce. In the past, he asserted, even the 
strictest quarantines had failed to keep out foreign dis­
eases such as yellow fever and cholera because of failure 
to destroy all of the germs. Demanding a lengthy detention 
period for vessels having sailed from infected ports, thought 
Perry, was the method of quarantine least dependable, most 
costly, and most oppressive to commerce. The solution to
the problem was to disinfect the ships with gaseous or
volatile disinfectants applied with a special apparatus
•^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1372, p . 10.
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soon to be adopted by the Board of Health of Louisiana. 
Perry claimed that every part of the vessel and every crev­
ice of the cargo could then be reached.^7 Dr. White agreed 
with Perry. In the 1873 annual Report he complained that 
the Board had not been given ample funds to experiment with 
disinfection. White avowed his conviction that only by the
use of disinfectants could ships and their cargoes be ren-
18dered harmless to a community.
Every summer a quarantine was proclaimed by the Gov­
ernor of Louisiana upon the advice of the Board of Health 
in spite of persistent opposition. The 1874 proclamation 
by Governor Kellogg declared the usual yellow fever ports ' 
on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean to be infected. 
Vessels from those ports were to be detained for ten days, 
"or for a longer period, as may be considered necessary by 
the Board of Health.” New Orleans newspapers were indig­
nant. The Picayune suggested that ship owners offer re-
19sistance to the imposition of quarantine fees. 7 A man 
mentioned as having successfully defied the Board of Health
■^A. V/. Perry, "Effectual External Sanitary Regula­
tions Without Delay to Commerce," Public Health Reports and 
Papers Presented at the Meetings of the American Public 
Health Association in the Year 1873 (New York, 1875)> I» 
437-40.
-^Report of the Board of Health . . . 1873i p. 18. 
-*-9picayune, June 17} July 30, 1874*
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was Charles Morgan, owner of a large steamship line. Mor­
gan had, in May, 1&74, received an injunction from the 
Circuit Court restraining the Board from collecting quar­
antine fees from his steamers. The injunction was issued 
by Justice Bradley of the United States Supreme Court, 
during one of his visits to New Orleans. The Board of
Health repeatedly maintained that its revenue had been
20seriously reduced by the Court’s action. ' In 1$76, when 
the Board tried to delay some Morgan steamers, Bradley 
issued a further restraining order. Dr. Choppin prepared 
to ignore the ruling, but he was warned by Morgan’s attor­
neys that he could be prosecuted for contempt of court.
21Choppin evidently succumbed to the threat.
The Board of Health was told by Morgan’s attorneys 
that further injunctions could be secured easily because 
the Louisiana quarantine was clearly unconstitutional. It 
was alleged that the constitutional prohibition against the 
levying of tonnage duties and the regulating of commerce 
by a state had been violated. Dr. Joseph Jones, when he 
became State Health Officer in lBGO, was informed at once
20see Report of the Board of Health . . . 1$74» p. 
15; C. B. White to Governor William P. Kellogg, New Or­
leans, May 1, 1$75, in Governors’ Correspondence, ojs. cit. ; 
Minutes of the Board of Health meeting held August 16,
1377i in the Picayune, August 17, 1377•
2^Leovy and Kruttschnitt to Samuel Choppin, Presi­
dent of the Board of Health, New Orleans, August 4> 1377', 
Harry J. Leovy to I. N. Marks, New Orleans, May 19, 1$6Q, 
in Joseph Jones Papers, 1^32-1919, Gummed Stub File Book, 
Business Papers, Department of Archives Mss., Louis.i.ana 
State University.
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that the injunction still applied. Courts had frequently 
found quarantine charges unconstitutional, Jones was told, 
so it was the duty of the Morgan Company to resist their 
payment. In one of the letters received by Jones, the 
company sent a check for one hundred dollars "as a contri­
bution” to defray the running expenses of the Board of 
Health. Another letter contained a free pass for Jones 
and his family, good on the Morgan railroad line. The 
pass remained unsigned by Jones, indicating that he did not
• x. 22use it.
Jones continued in his efforts to collect quarantine 
dues from the Morgan Company. The matter finally went to 
court near the end of lS3l. The District Court ruling 
held that Morgan was correct and that the quarantine sys­
tem of Louisiana which had been established in 1#55 was 
"illegal” (unconstitutional?). Several other companies 
then brought suit against the Board of Health. The Board’s 
very life was placed in imminent peril.^ It was finally 
saved in January, 1384, by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and 
later by the Supreme Court of the United States (May, 1836).
^Leovy to Marks, May 19, 1380; Attorney's Depart­
ment of Morgan's Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steamship 
Co. to Jones, New Orleans, May 26, 1830; Chas. A. Whitney 
and Co., managers of the Morgan Co. to Jones, New Orleans, 
May 2$, 1880; Morgan Co. to Jones, New Orleans, July 14» 
1880, ibid.
^ Annual Report of the Board of Health, of the State 
Louisiana, To the General Assembly for the Year 1883 
TBaton Rouge, 135477 PP« clxvi-clxix.
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Basically, the argument used in court by the Morgan Company 
was that the inspection fee which was demanded of all ves­
sels was unconstitutional. Act number sixty-nine, passed 
by the General Assembly of Louisiana in 1332, was singled 
out for- special attack. This law established a new list 
of fees, based upon the size of the vessel to be inspected, 
which the Resident Physician at Mississippi Station was re-
p J.quired to charge. The Board of Health argued that all
fees and charges imposed on vessels by the quarantine laws
of the state were exactions in compensation for services
rendered, and were not taxes. No tonnage duty, within the
meaning of the Constitution, was being charged, the Board
maintained, and no regulation of commerce was involved.
Both the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court concurred in the Board1s contention. The
latter Court indicated that the quarantine laws established
by Louisiana were a rightful exercise of the state’s police
power for the protection of health. The inspection fee was
25a part of all quarantine systems, said the Court.
^^Acts passed . . .  at the Regular Session, . . . 
1332, Act Wo. 69, P* 90.
^Morgan’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and Steam­
ship Company v. The Board of Health of the State of Louisi­
ana, 36 La. Ann. 666, Report of Cases Argued and Determined 
in the Supreme Court of Louisiana . . . , 0£. cit., Book 
43, pp. 416-21; Morgan’s Louisiana and Texas Railroad and 
Steamship Company, Plff. in Err., v. Board of Health of the 
State of Louisiana and the State of Louisiana, 113 U. S. 
455, Cases Argued and Decided in the Supreme Court of the 
United States, o£. cit., Book 30, Law Ed., pp. 237-43*
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After many years of litigation, the State Board of 
Health of Louisiana had triumphed. Jones noted in 1334 
that the Morgan Company was indebted to the state of Lou­
isiana by an amount exceeding fourteen thousand dollars.
Other companies were likewise thwarted in their effort to 
undermine the quarantine for their own pecuniary gain. One 
of these companies, the Cromwell Steamship Line, owed the 
Board eighty-four hundred dollars. The Board of Health 
had many crises during its early history, but probably none 
was quite as crucial as the one involving the contentions 
of Charles Morgan.
Many of New Orleans1 leading physicians drafted in 
1375 a "Petition to the Board of Health in regard to Quar­
antine." Among those signing were Dr. A. Forster Axson, 
former State Health Officer, and Drs. Stanford E. Chailie'' 
and S. M. Bemiss. According to the petitioners, the quar­
antine experiment had failed to protect New Orleans from 
yellow fever, and the city’s commerce had been seriously 
damaged by the repetition of the quarantine. The Board 
was asked not to recommend any future restrictions on vessels 
from infected ports other than to require disinfection and
the removal of the sick, the detention for which was not
27to exceed twenty-four hours.
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1333, p.
clxxi i.
27^ew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
II (1374-7TJT 9 ^
The Hew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal supported 
the petitioners. State authorities, explained the editor, 
had been left with no discretion in quarantine matters. 
Whenever legal notice was given that a port was infected, 
the law required the imposition of a quarantine. It was 
also deemed unfortunate that Board of Health members were 
selected on the basis of "their known zeal in favor of a 
quarantine system" despite the quarantine’s "entire infea­
sibility and impracticability at the present time." Dis­
infection, declared the editor, was much more effective as 
a disease preventive than was detention. The Picayune also 
found much to laud in the petition, because editorially 
that paper had written off quarantine years before. Fur­
thermore the sentiment of the community was said to favor 
the petitioners. About two weeks after the petition was 
drawn up, the Chamber of Commerce appointed a committee to 
confer with the Board of Health concerning modifications 
which could be made "in the onerous restrictions in the 
present quarantine l a w . "23
The Board of Health, at a special meeting in June, 
1$75) succumbed to the pressure and adopted a resolution 
which perceptibly modified the quarantine. The ten day 
quarantine period, stated the resolution, was thereafter 
to be regarded as having begun on a vessel’s date of
23lbid., pp. 960-62; Picayune, May 2, 11, 1& 75 -
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departure from an infected port. It was easy to understand 
why the Picayune should have expected that under this new 
arrangement nvery trifling embarrassments” would be en­
countered by commerce; in many cases it must have virtually 
eliminated detention altogether. Fortunately the resolu­
tion apolied only to ships with a clean bill of health, and 
an indefinite detention was still to be enforced if actual
cases of yellow fever were found on board. The critics of
29quarantine seemed satisfied.
The satisfaction was short-lived. Two weeks later 
tne Board’s cleansing and disinfecting procedure on ships 
in quarantine was assailed as being abusive. The assail­
ants were passengers aboard a steamship which had arrived 
at Quarantine Station from Vera Cruz, and accordingly been 
detained. They complained that their rooms had been flooded 
with water and carbolic acid, and because of constant rains, 
the dampness throughout the ship was unbearable. They had 
also been molested, they declared, by an immense army of 
mosquitoes. Furthermore, two doctors who were among the 
passengers asserted that the close proximity of vessels 
at the quarantine ground had been conducive to the spread 
of disease. The combination of disinfection and detention, 
they said, had placed the health of the passengers in 
jeopardy. The Picayune commented that the doctors had 
pretty effectually established ’’the proposition that the
29pjcayune, June 12, 1875*
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quarantine regulations at 1'Jew Orleans, apart from their 
fatal effect on the trade of the city, are absolutely 
prejudicial to the health of the passengers, and therefore 
provocative of the very large dangers they are assumed to 
prevent. "^0
A few days later a reply to the accusations of the 
passengers by Dr. M. A. Southworth, the Resident Physician 
at Mississippi Station, was printed in a New Orleans paper. 
All charges about the health of the passengers being endan­
gered by detention were denied. Southworth maintained that 
the rooms on board ship had not been flooded with water and 
carbolic acid; they had only been "freely sprinkled." The 
Picayune stated in rebuttal that no criticism of Southworth 
had ever been intended because he was only doing his duty. 
It was the Board of Health and the quarantine law which 
were at fault. The law, much to the disgust of the editor, 
required that Board members be professed adherents of the 
quarantine, an institution which he described as "a use­
less, cumbrous, impotent compromise with the yellow fever 
31problem.”
The period of quarantine was materially reduced by 
the Board of Health in 1375. According to Dr. Southworth, 
vessels more than ten days from an infected port were quar­
antined only about eight hours. Moreover, Southworth told
^ Ibid., June 23, 1375.
33-lbia. , July 2, 1375-
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the General Assembly that vessels arriving before the ten 
days had elapsed were permitted to continue to New Orleans 
one day early because he counted the date of departure from 
the quarantine ground as one of the ten. He relied on dis­
infection, fumigation, and aeration, he said, and was not 
greatly concerned about the detention period.^2 q. w. R. 
Bayley, a Board of Health member, urged the Chamber of 
Commerce of Newr Orleans to adopt a resolution recommending 
that the Legislature grant authority to the Board of Health 
’'to permit, at its discretion, the passage of vessels from 
infected ports to the city, after the same have been satis­
factorily and thoroughly fumigated and disinfected, in lieu 
of the prescribed time-detention called for by the existing 
quarantine law.” Bayley was motivated, as was Southworth, 
by a conviction that the ’’time-detention” principle had 
proven unworkable, or even useless. Bayley was also inter- 
ested in pacifying the business community. J
In the meantime, talk of a national quarantine pro­
ceeded apace. Throughout the Mississippi Valley there was 
mounting dissatisfaction with state and local quarantines 
because they were said to be ineffective. Southworth 
stated in the 1$75 Board of Health Report that he did not 
believe the national government would in-cerfere with state 
quarantine laws. Congress had previously recognized, he 
said, that the right to establish and regulate a quarantine
33Ibid., p. 23*
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was among the reserved, powers of the states.^ Southworth 
may have said this in all seriousness, but he must have 
been aware that a very real threat of federal intervention 
in quarantine matters existed. During the previous year, 
1$74> a bill which would have instituted a general quaran­
tine had actually passed the House of Representatives.
The quarantine measure of 1874 was introduced by Con­
gressman F. G. Bromberg of Mobile, who claimed that because 
of an inefficient quarantine at Pensacola in 1873 > yellow 
fever was transported by rail to Montgomery, in his state, 
where at least one hundred persons had died from the disease. 
Bromberg pointed out that Shreveport and Memphis had suffered 
fearful, epidemics in 1873 because a disease-laden vessel
had been allowed to proceed through the quarantine to New 
3 5Orleans. If a national quarantine had been in existence 
in 1873 j he concluded, thousands of lives would have been 
saved. The bill provided that the Surgeon-General of the 
Army, the Surgeon-General of the Navy, and the Supervising
3/*Tbid., p. 215.
3^Harvey E. Brown, the Army surgeon sent by the 
Secretary of War to investigate quarantine procedures in 
compliance with the joint resolution of Congress previously 
described, reported in 1873 that "when the disease /~yellow 
fever_7 prevails at New Orleans, it invariably, after some 
weeks, breaks out in those towns having a steamboat commu­
nication with the city, and that those towns having no 
steamboat communication (as Vidalia, opposite Natchez) al­
ways escape; and that those who establish a local quarantine, 
and refuse to prevent the landing of steamboats during its 
prevalence in New Orleans, also escape." Harvey E. Brown, 
Report on Quarantine on the Southern and Gulf Coasts of 
the United States (New York, "T873)»" P • 11^
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Surgeon of the Marine Hospital Service were to form a board 
to make quarantine regulations which would apply to all 
vessels arriving in the United States from foreign coun­
tries. It was made mandatory that all regulations have the 
approval of the President. States and muncipalities were 
to be allowed to maintain their own health and quarantine
regulations if they did not conflict with the national 
36system.
Congressman Samuel S. Cox of New York offered an 
amendment (which was accepted by Bromberg) that, in ef­
fect, virtually nullified the rest of the measure. The 
amendment substituted a declaration that the national 
quarantine was not to be ,rso construed as to apply to the 
health regulations and quarantine measures maintained by 
States or municipalities” in place of the previous ban on 
local regulations which were in conflict with the proposed 
federal quarantine. Cox, a defender of states1 rights, 
was in reality opposed to the very principle of a general, 
uniform quarantine establishment. He felt that quarantines 
should be left to state and local authorities because the 
type of regulations needed varied from port to port. The 
wants and needs of New York, San Francisco, and New Or­
leans, for instance, were not the same, Cox averred, and 
a board in Washington could hardly do justice to all of
36congressional Record; Containing the Proceed­
ings and Debates of the Forty-Third Congress, First 
Session (Washington, D. C., 1374)» Vol. 2, Part 5j pp.
4562-63.
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them. He revealed that New York had just instituted "a 
perfect quarantine establishment," costing two million 
dollars. Cox was convinced that the original quarantine 
bill, as proposed by Bromberg, would have endangered this 
establishment, and would thereby have jeopardized the in­
terests of the port of New York City. The adoption of his 
amendment, he said, rendered the bill "comparatively harm-
'ijless."y ' The Congressman from New York had a strong argu­
ment, and one which was to be heard again.
The Louisiana quarantine was modified quite radically 
in 1676. The General Assembly, in harmony with the new 
conviction which seemed to be growing on all sides, revised 
the quarantine law to leave the question of detention at 
the quarantine stations completely to the discretion of 
the Board of Health. All vessels arriving from infected 
ports had to undergo disinfection, fumigation, and puri­
fication, but then they could be allowed to proceed with-
3 Sout any further detention. The Board, under different 
leadership during the summer of 1$76, did not hesitate to 
take advantage of the new law. Ships from infected ports 
were quarantined only twelve hours, during which they were 
disinfected with sulphurous acid gas and carbolic acid.
Upon their arrival at Mew Orleans, the cargoes were also
37lbid., pp. 4564-65.
Acts passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana, at the Second Session of the Fourth Legisla­
ture . I . 1675"" (New Orleans’̂ 1676 j, Act No. 66, p. 110.'
294
disinfected. It was decided that unacclimated persons 
arriving frorr. yellow fever ports would be quarantined for 
six days, because the Board felt that six was the average 
number of days it took for one exposed to yellow fever to 
come down with the disease. Passengers embarking from 
points where yellow fever did not prevail were made to 
suffer no delay other than the time required for the Resi­
dent Physician or his assistant to make a general inspection 
■anof the vessel. 7
The "new Board of Health" which came into existence 
in 1B77 apparently was satisfied with the results obtained 
the previous summer when the modified quarantine was in 
operation. The Board seemed convinced that thorough^dis­
infection and inspection could insure New Orleans against 
all danger from epidemic diseases.^ Although 1877 was 
free from epidemics, things did not go very smoothly. The 
Resident Physician at the Rigolets reported to the Board 
that schooners passed his station without stopping, "and 
often cursed the honorable Board of Health," The Board 
declared that no provision to enforce the collection.of
39picayune, July 7, 23, October 3j I876. 
4-°Ibid., May 13, 1377.
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quarantine dues existed.^ Toward the end of the season 
a Picayune editorial asserted that quarantine laws had be­
come loose and inadequate, and reported a movement afoot 
to have the Legislature repeal the laws ”or so amend them 
as to conform with the necessities of public health and 
commerce in this city.” TIIn its present form,” continued 
the editor, ”the quarantine act is scarcely comprehensible, 
and even where comprehensible is often found impractical or 
injuriously destructive.”^  Nonetheless, no legislative 
action was taken for several years.
The Louisiana Board of Health adopted a new view of 
yellow fever in the 1B77 Report to the Legislature. Dr. 
Samuel Choppin, the Board President, wrote:
The Board of Health accept the theory 
that yellow fever is a zymotic disease, 
contagious in its nature by the multiplica­
tion of its germs, the infecting distance 
of which is at first short; that it trav­
els upon surfaces, and like the orange, the 
banana, and the sugar cane, is an exotic, 
its cradle being the Antilles; and, there­
fore, have earnestly endeavored to prevent• *> t'its introduction into New Orleans by a 
more rigid system of quarantine and the 
use of disinfectants.^
4-llbid., June 29, 1$77; The 1B?7 act which reorgan­
ized the Board of Health (Act I\!o. £0, ex.. sess., o£. cit.) 
stated that a person violating any of the rules, regula­
tions, or ordinances of the Board of Health pertaining to 
quarantine, or refusing to allow a quarantine officer to 
inspect or disinfect a vessel, could be sued by the Board 
for damages not in excess of five hundred dollars for each 
offense. It is uncertain why the Board of ilealth found 
itself unable to prosecute.
^Picayune, September 30, 1$77*
^ Report of the Board of Health . . . 1&77, p * 13 •
This was the first time the Board had officially taken an 
unqualified contagionist stand with regard to Louisiana’s 
most feared enemy. Dr. C. B. White, State Health Officer 
during most of the decade following the Civil War, had 
been a confirmed adherent of the belief that miasma pro­
duced disease. Some of the Sanitary Inspectors, and per­
haps some of the other Board members as well, had accepted 
the germ theory of disease, but this theory did not become 
official dogma until 1$77»
Choppin pointed out that only one case of yellow fever 
had been reported in New Orleans during 1S77. A man with 
this dreaded malady arrived from Havana in November, but 
he did not become ill until after his ship had docked at 
New Orleans. As soon as he died, everything he had touched 
and every place he had gone were disinfected with carbolic 
acid. Choppin stated that three lessons had been learned 
by the absence of yellow fever in 1&77. The first of these, 
he said, was that yellow fever could be completely destroyed 
in New Orleans by an unusually severe winter; second, the 
quarantine system was useful; and finally, there was rea­
sonable hope that Yellow Jack could be conquered by the
44combined action of frost, quarantine, and disinfection.
Dr. Choppin was a staunch defender of the much-maligned 
quarantine. He told state lawmakers that ten cases of
^ Tbid. , pp. 14-15*
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yellow fever had been intercepted at Mississippi Station 
in 1877 > and two more, at Rigolets Station. He maintained 
that the mere use of disinfectants locally in New Orleans 
would not suffice to prevent an epidemic. The quarantine 
should be retained, asserted Choppin, although he agreed 
that the detention period was unimportant. He was satis­
fied that careful inspection and thorough disinfection of 
incoming ships had proven adequate to arrest the importa­
tion of any foreign pestilence.^
The 1877 Report also contained some other important 
recommendations. It was noted that Charles Morgan and 
some other ship owners had successfully resisted quarantine 
exactions. The Legislature was asked to modify the quar­
antine charges so that they could not be construed to be 
taxes on tonnage. The fees, it was suggested, should be 
graduated according to the work performed. Choppin ad­
mitted that the fees might have been too high, but they 
had to help defray the Board’s expenses in New Orleans as 
well as pay for the maintenance of the quarantine stations. 
The Legislature was urged to memorialize Congress on "the 
absolute necessity of passing a law authorizing the States 
to levy a tax for quarantine purposes upon all shipping, 
as a matter of self-protection."^
^5lbid., p . 15,
^6Ibid., pp. 15-16.
The following March Senator James 33. Eustis of Loui­
siana introduced a bill which would have authorized states 
to impose a tonnage duty on vessels for the purpose of 
maintaining a quarantine. The bill was never reported out
in
of committee. The Picayune remarked that Congress had 
never in the past made such a grant of power, but the 
preservation of public health was an objective vital enough 
to merit an exception. If Congress had the right to levy 
duties to protect domestic manufactures, asserted the Pic­
ayune, it must certainly also have the right to bestow 
power on states to impose duties to protect the health of 
the nation’s seaports. Furthermore, continued the editor,
T'. . .we are compelled to act upon the assumption that 
yellow fever may be imported, and that it can be excluded 
by a rigid system of quarantine. These expressions 
seemed strangely out of place in the Picayune which, al­
though it had always manifested an interest in public health 
measures, had long considered quarantine exactions an anath­
ema. Significantly, this journal was soon to become a loyal 
defender of the state quarantine and the State Board of 
Health.
During the month of April, 1$7$ the Board became
^Congressional Record: Containing the Proceed­
ings and Debates of the Forty-Fifth Congress, Second 
Session (Washington, D. C., 1$7$) , Vol. 7> Part 2, p. 1&22.
^ Picayune, March 22, 1$7S.
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involved in an interesting dispute with the fruit dealers 
of Mew Orleans. The trouble stemmed from the effect the 
fumes of sulphurous acid gas had on the color of bananas.
The schooner Clara L. Dyer, with a load of bananas and 
cocoanuts from Jamaica, was subjected, to fumigation and 
disinfection according to the usual procedure at Mississippi 
Station. In the process some of the bananas were discolored. 
The captain of the vessel immediately lodged a claim against 
the Board of Health for damages amounting to thirty-five 
hundred dollars. Dr. Choppin was present when the cargo 
was unloaded, and he maintained that not twenty per cent 
of the cargo was injured. He reported to a Board of Health 
meeting held April 4 that some of the ripe bananas had been 
"bronzed,” but that their taste has not been vitiated. The 
green ones were not affected at all. It appeared that the 
Board of Health did not intend to do anything about the 
matter.^
The following morning the fruit dealers held a meeting. 
They complained that because of the effect the sulphurous 
acid gas had on the bananas, a cargo valued at thirty-five 
hundred dollars was sold at auction for nine hundred dollars. 
The dealers adopted a resolution protesting against any 
further fumigation of fruit cargoes. One of the reasons 
given for the resolution was: "it has never come within
^9ibid., April 5, 1373.
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our experience or knowledge that any single case of conta­
gious fever was ever brought to this city on a fruit vessel 
or by medium of a cargo of fruit.” A petition to the Gov­
ernor was also adopted alleging that a repetition of the 
proceedings in the Dyer case might result in breaking up 
a prosperous trade. Choppin’s story of the moderate 
effect of fumigation on the bananas was laid open to ques­
tion by a letter printed in the Picayune April 6:
The ripe ones xvere turned the color 
of very dark leather, and their taste was 
very materially affected; the green ones 
were nearly black, and I am confident when 
turning ripe will become entirely so. I 
witnessed the sale of the cargo, and the 
loss was at least 75 per cent of what the 
fruit would have sold for had it not been 
injured by the process of ’’fumigation.”
Should this thing continue, I desire to 
say to the people of New Orleans that the 
fruit trade, so far as the bananas are 
concerned will be entirely broken up.
Many of the consumers are afraid to eat 
it, dreading they will be poisoned, and 
in fact it looks bad enough to ’’poison me.”50
Choppin attempted to end the matter by ordering the 
Resident Physician at Mississippi Station to allow the 
fruit dealers to remove their fruit prior to fumigation.
He absolutely refused to allow vessels from Jamaica or any 
other yellow fever port to by-pass the quarantine, because 
he believed it was a matter of history that the great epi­
demic of 1353 had been introduced by a vessel from Jamaica.
5QIbid., April 6, 1378.
Choppin felt that importers would regard the new arrange­
ment as being satisfactory, but this was not the case.
Near the end of May the Board was served with an injunction 
restraining it from quarantining and fumigating a fruit 
schooner arriving from Jamaica. Choppin hastened to the 
judge who issued the injunction, and successfully con­
vinced him that the order endangered the entire system by 
which the Board was seeking to keep yellow fever from New 
Orleans. He told a Picayune reporter that the Board was 
conducting a great quarantine experiment. "The efficacy 
of quarantine and disinfection was to be thoroughly test­
ed," he declared, "and should they again prove successful, 
any fear of the introduction and prevalence of yellow 
fever in this city would be at an end."^ The Board de­
pended on disinfection in 1^76 ana 1$77} and had been 
elated with the results; one more year, felt Choppin, 
would establish the utility of this approach to quaran­
tine. Much to the chagrin and dismay of everyone, within 
a very short time the Crescent City was to be visited by 
one of its most devastating yellow fever epidemics.
^ I b i d ., April 10, 11, June 1, 1$7$-
CHAPTER X
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF HEALTH
In I878 yellow fever scourged the Mississippi Valley 
and the Gulf Coast as never before. Although mortality 
totals in New Orleans were less than in 1853 and 1858, the 
1878 epidemic devastated a wider area. The exact number 
of deaths cannot be accurately ascertained, but most esti­
mates placed the total figure at about twrenty thousand.
What caused the disastrous visitation of Yellow Jack?
Many residents of the Mississippi Valley thought they knew 
the answer to this question; the Louisiana Board of Health 
was held responsible.
As frequently happened, the epidemic failed to reach 
its peak until late summer and early autumn. It was not 
until the latter part of July that the presence of yellow 
fever in New Orleans first attracted attention. A Picayune 
editorial appearing July 24* while imploring the Board of 
Health to publish all facts relating to the health of the 
city, mentioned that fourteen cases of yellow fever had 
been reported during the past few days. All of the af­
flicted were said to have been unacclimated, and therefore 
no cause for alarm existed among habitual residents of the
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Crescent City.'*' The following day a Picayune editorial
informed the public that twenty-one cases had been reported
by the Board of Health, eleven of which terminated fatally.
The Board was fully convinced of its ability to confine
those cases, declared the editor, and no apprehensions were
2being entertained that the disease might spread.
The Mew Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, appearing 
August 1, evidently anticipated a large-scale outbreak. The 
possible origin of the latest pestilential invasion was 
discussed, but no conclusion was reached. The Board of 
Health was attempting to stamp out yellow fever by disin­
fection, reported the editor, but this device was proving
3less effective than before.
Local quarantines against New Orleans had in the past 
years presented only a minor problem, but in 1878 the Cres­
cent City found itself nearly isolated. Alarm and dismay 
regarding action taken by some localities was manifested by 
the New Orleans press as early as August 1. The right of 
self-protection was admitted, but exclusion and non-inter­
course were said to have been carried to ridiculous excesses. 
Such places as Houma, Bayou Sara, and Vicksburg quickly 
established rigid quarantines against Mew Orleans when news 
of yellow fever circulated, but Mobile, which suspended
•̂ Picayune, July 24, 1878. 
2Ibid., July 25, 1378.
^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s,,
VI {1873-797, 177-79.
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rail communication, bore the brunt of assaults from Cres-
4cent City newspapers.
Mobile had a perfect right to quarantine, but not to
establish a blockade against interstate commerce, asserted
the Democrat. Placing an absolute embargo upon commerce
between New Orleans and Mobile, continued the editorial,
was a power reserved exclusively to the Congress of the
United States. The Democrat suggested that restrictions
had not been established for sanitary reasons, but only
because the Alabama city was jealous of New Orleans and
sought to destroy her trade. The Picayune felt that
"senile fear" rather than jealousy had motivated Mobile to
create the questionable quarantine. The Louisiana State
Board of Health adopted a resolution declaring the Mobile
quarantine "unnecessarily harsh," and requesting that
through passenger and freight trains be allowed to pass
5after undergoing fumigation and disinfection.
During ensuing weeks the number of local quarantines 
multiplied. According to the Picayune, all principal towns 
in Louisiana and most small villages within three hundred 
miles of New Orleans had fenced themselves in by adopting 
restrictions forbidding intercourse writh Louisiana’s dan­
gerously infected metropolis. Included in the list of
^Democrat, August 1, 1378; Picayune, August 1,
1373.
^Democrat, August 1, 1373; Picayune, August 2,
1373.
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major cities imposing quarantines were Natchez, Memphis, 
Galveston, Pensacola, Cairo, and Cincinnatti. On August 6 
Democrat spoke of a "reign of terror" in the South, 
and stated that it had become impossible to give the number 
of towns and villages which had quarantined against New Or­
leans. A week later the Picayune asserted: "The quaran­
tine against this ciay by the landings along the bends is 
working serious injury to our local packets, which are 
debarred from putting off their persons or merchandise at 
these various points."0
By mid-August the number of new cases of yellow fever 
reported every twenty-four hours had reached one hundred, 
and the daily death toll was averaging about twenty. The 
Board of Health at this time considered declaring the ex­
istence of an epidemic, but decided against it chiefly 
because many cases of yellow fever were of a very mild 
variety. Two days later, however, the Howard Association 
announced to the public its intention of granting aid to 
the destitute sick. The Picayune reported August 20 that 
the Howards were sending nurses and physicians wherever
they were needed, and were supplying afflicted families
7with food and other necessities.
The Board of Health continued delaying the proclamation
°Picayune, August 1, 13, 187$; Democrat, August
6, 1878.
7picayune, August 16, 20, 1878; Democrat, August
17, 1878.
of an epidemic, believing it unwise to create undue alarm. 
Mortality from yellow fever passed the thousand mark before 
the Board was ready to admit that the disease was prevail­
ing in the Crescent City. Partly justifiable was a fierce 
attack on the Board and its President, Dr. Samuel Choppin, 
by the Chicago Times. Louisiana health officials were 
accused of having suppressed information regarding the 
real extent of the epidemic. This unfavorable opinion of 
the Louisiana Board of Health was evidently a general one 
throughout much of the Mississippi Valley and the Gulf 
Coast. "In their criminal endeavor to shield themselves 
from isolation, brought on by quarantine restrictions," 
declared a Corpus Christi psper, "they have endangered the 
lives of thousands, and have laid themselves open to a just 
censure from the world."
Mew Orleans felt the full brunt of the epidemic during 
September when approximately nineteen hundred Mew Orleanians 
succumbed to yellow fever. By October the number of cases 
reported since July 1 was approaching ten thousand, and 
mortality from Yellow Jack wras nearing three thousand. 
Throughout the first half of October the toll continued to 
mount, with some fifty lives each day being taken by the 
remorseless invader. As was expected, the epidemic faltered 
during the latter part of the month and receded sharply.
^Democrat, August 20, 30> 137$•
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Staggering death figures were also being reported by other 
cities and villages, especially Memphis. Finally, on Novem­
ber 7 the Board of Health announced it was safe for absen­
tees to return to New Orleans.^
Gradually the surrounding areas suspended their quar­
antines against New Orleans. But some localities chose to 
be unduly cautious and retain their restrictions after the 
danger was gone. The Democrat of November 11 urged the 
immediate raising of quarantines everywhere; trade was said 
to have already suffered enough. When Galveston declared 
its intention of maintaining a quarantine until December
20, that city was accused of intentionally seeking to injure
10New Orleans commercially.
Long before the epidemic had run its course, a three- 
man Yellow Fever Commission was appointed by the Surgeon- 
General of the United States. This action was taken in 
response to petitions and individual appeals made to 
President Rutherford B. Hayes, calling upon him to create 
a special body to investigate the epidemic. Dr. Samuel 
M. Bemiss of New Orleans, the President of the Commission, 
let it be known early in October that sessions would be 
held in the Crescent City for about one week before the 
Commission moved on to other cities. New Orleanians having
^Ibid., November 10, 1&7$.
IQIbid., November 11, 13, 1376.
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information on the origin, spread, or prevention of yellow 
fever were asked to present this information to the Commis­
sion either orally or in writing. A few days later a 
circular letter was addressed to the public containing 
twenty-five questions which it was hoped "all intelligent 
citizens and lovers of humanity” would answer promptly.
In this way the Commission presumably expected to gather
11all important facts relative to the epidemic of 1373.
Shortly thereafter, the Louisiana Board of Health 
created a Yellow Fever Commission of its own. Dr. Choppin 
stated that the object of this Commission was "to inquire 
into the cases of the prevailing epidemic, and to make a 
report to the Legislature, so that action could be taken 
with a view of preventing its recurrence.” Choppin ap­
pointed five Board members whose duty it was to investigate
12the course of yellow fever throughout Louisiana. Com­
paratively little was heard of this state Commission, how­
ever, because the federal appointees attracted an unusual 
amount of attention.
A report from the Commission headed by Dr. Bemiss was 
to be presented to the annual meeting of the American Public
^ Picayune, October 4, 6, 1373; Democrat, October 
7, 1373; J. M. Woodworth, "A Brief Review of the Organiza­
tion and Purpose of the Yellow Fever Commission," Public 
Health Reports and Papers Presented to the meetings of the 
American Public Health Association in the Years 1327-1373 
(Boston, l"330) ,
12Picayune, October 12, 1373; Democrat, October 12,
1373.
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Health Association^ in Richmond, Virginia during the 
latter part of November. The Association extended invi­
tations to all state and municipal Boards of Health and to 
public-spirited citizens interested in seeking protective 
measures against yellow fever and other dangers to the 
public health.^ Dr. Choppin announced his intention to 
be present at Richmond in order to show that yellow fever 
was of foreign importation. As early as August Choppin 
was convinced that the epidemic had been caused from germs 
imported by the steamship Emily B. Souder. He now ex­
pressed his determination to recommend to the American 
Public Health Association that in the future absolute non­
intercourse be imposed against the West Indies and other 
yellow fever ports during the summer months.^
The response by the Mew Orleans press to Choppin*s 
propostion was immediate and decidedly unfavorable. The 
newspapers stated that the general public was likewise 
opposed to the extreme solution for the yellow fever prob­
lem proposed by the President of the Board of Health. The 
editor of the Picayune asserted his conviction that New 
Orleans could not afford so costly an experiment merely to
The American Public Health Association was an 
organization which included in its membership most of the 
nation’s public health leaders. It had been organized in 
1872, and held annual meetings beginning in 1873* Smillie, 
Public Health, pp. 297-305*
-̂ Picayune, October 16, November 10, 1878.
^^Democrat, August 30, November 16, 1878.
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settle the question of whether or not yellow fever was
always imported from tropical regions. He suggested a
less energetic quarantine, similar to the one serving New
York City so successfully. Neither the Picayune nor the
Democrat would concede that all yellow fever epidemics re-
16suited strictly from outside causes.
Some New Orleanians, declared the Democrat, were 
suggesting the termination of all efforts to quarantine 
their city. On November 21 a meeting of bankers, insurance 
agents, and citizens interested in fostering trade with 
tropical countries was held. A committee was formed to 
persuade the state Legislature to modify or repeal the 
existing quarantine. Editorial comment in the daily papers 
was as much opposed to this action as it was to Choppin’s 
non-intercourse proposal. It seemed clear that the result 
of easing the state quarantine would be a barrage of shot­
gun quarantines which would ’’hermetically seal” New Or­
leans from the interior. Many localities had successfully 
used these ’’lawless, unconstitutional” quarantines, imposed 
by force, to discontinue all contact with the Crescent City 
during the summer of 1$78> and it was assumed that this 
same device would be used in the future upon very little 
provocation. ^  The Picayune presented the problem clearly:
-^Picayune, November 21, 137$; Democrat, November
22, 1873.
^Democrat, November 22, 1878, Picayune, November
23, 1878.
311
Whether justly, or unjustly, New Or­
leans is held responsible for the epidemics 
which has recently desolated so many cities, 
towns and villages in the Southwest. Wheth­
er justly, or unjust!;'', New Orleans is ac­
cused of having transmitted to the country 
a terrible and fatal disease against which 
she might have guarded by rigorous quaran­
tine, or by proper sanitary measures with­
in her own limits. Whether reasonably, or 
unreasonably, those communities demand 
that New Orleans shall prevent the recur­
rence of such a calamity, on penalty of 
a total severance of relations with her, 
such as, if repeated from year to year, 
would compass her certain ruin.^°
Dr. Bemiss presented to the American Public Health 
Association a detailed report of the investigations con­
ducted by the Yellow Fever Commission in the Mississippi 
Valley. The committee to which this report was referred 
expressed its approval with the work done by the Commis­
sion. Bemiss, writing in the New Orleans liedical and 
Surgi cal Journal, stated that the report he delivered at 
the Richmond meeting was not complete, and that the Com­
mission’s final report would be forthcoming later. He 
asserted that the Commission was in unanimous agreement 
on several important points. First, declared Bemiss, 
yellow fever could not in a single instance be shown to 
have been of indigenous origin; second, in most towns, 
testimony of importation was direct and convincing; third, 
transmission of yellow fever was wholly by human inter­
course, including fomites; fourth, disinfectants had
■^Picayune, November 23, 187&*
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proven useless; and finally: "Quarantines established
with such a degree of surveillance and.rigor, that absolute
non-intercourse is the result, have effectually and without
exception, protected those quarantined fro:;: attacks of 
19yellow fever." The Commission evidently agreed with 
Choppin with regard to the merits of non-intercourse.
Dr. Choppin, as he had promised, told the American 
Public Health Association that' the Emily B, Souder intro­
duced the Cirst cases of yellow fever into New Orleans in 
I'-'yB, He asserted his conviction that yellow fever was
an exotic disease, always imported. The only certain
preventive, he maintained, was non-intercourse between 
April and November with ports where the disease was in­
digenous. Conditional quarantines could not be effective,
concluded the Louisiana official, because of laxity in
20enforcement and the cupidity of commercial men.
Not everyone agreed with Bemiss and Choppin. Dr.
D. C. Holliday of New Orleans also presented a paper at 
the Richmond meeting in which he implied that the Yellow 
Fever Commission had distorted facts in a manner which 
seemed to indicate that yellow fever was invariably the
result of importation. Yellow fever was indigenous to
■^Reports and Papers . . .  of the American Public 
Health Association . . . 1377-1873, IV7~J55-$6, 361^21 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s., VI (lS7$-79)>
W5-JUT.
20Reports and Papers . . .  of the American Publ_ic 
Health Association . .1877-12?!, IV, 190-20F:
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New Orleans, thought Holliday, and quarantine was a useless 
21extravagance. The Picayune, editorialising on the diver­
sity of opinion supposedly found among doctors, assailed 
the entire medical profession for stubbornly adhering to 
preconceived opinions and failing to rely upon scientific 
testimony. Year after year, continued the editorial, the 
public was bombarded with T,the same round of inconclusive 
argument, and contradictory opinion; the same array of 
evidence to show that yellow fever is indigenous and en­
demic, and the same array of facts to prove that it is
importable and transmissible.11 The Democrat expressed
22similar dissatisfaction witn physicians.
The movement for an effective national quarantine 
was now making rapid headway. A bulletin from Washington 
dated November 25 indicated that Congress was ready to 
establish a national quarantine against yellow fever.
Upon the convening of Congress a week later, President 
Hayes commenced his annual message with a discussion of 
public health. Hayes spoke of the great loss of life 
and wealth and the intense suffering caused by the recent 
epidemic. A general public sentiment had been awakened, 
he said, in favor of a national sanitary administration to 
control quarantine. He urged Congress to give the subject
2lIbid., pp. 237-39.
^Picayune, November 28, 1878; Democrat, November 
26, 1373.
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early and careful consideration.^3
Even before the devastating yellow fever outbreak of 
1#7$, the possibility of establishing a central quarantine 
authority was being discussed widely. Earlier in the year 
a convention held at Jacksonville, Florida considered this 
matter at length. The delegates, representing key cities 
of the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, presented a memorial 
to Congress reciting the dire results of frequent epidemics. 
Quarantines administered by state and municipal authorities 
were ineffective, maintained the delegates. Therefore, 
concluded trie memorial:
we believe that the remedy for the 
correction of these evils is within the 
constitutional powers of the general 
government, and we pray for the protec­
tion of the public health, and for the 
promotion of commerce, that your hon­
orable bodies will replace the existing 
methods by a uniform and effective sys­
tem of quarantine on the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts.24
Congress responded very feebly by passing a law,
April 29, 137$, which provided feoeral assistance to local 
quarantine officers. United States consuls residing in 
foreign ports having contagious or infectious diseases 
were ordered to report to the Supervising Surgeon-General 
of the Marine Hospital Service whenever a vessel left that
23pi cayune, November 29, 1^78; Congressional Record
• • • Forty-Fifth Congress, Third Session (Washington,' 1879), 
Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 3.
^^Mjscel1aneous Documents of the Senate of the 
United States, Forty-Fifth Congress, Second Session (Wash­
ington, 1S73) Vol. 2, Document No. 42, pp. 1-3*
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port for the United S totes. The Mari ne Hospital Service 
was then to notify the proper state and municipal officers 
at the port of destination. "There shall be no interfer­
ence in any manner with the quarantine laws or regulations
as they now exist or may hereafter be adopted under State
o 5laws," declared the act. Despite this measure’s obvious 
weakness, by granting authority to the Marine Hospital 
Service it was within a few years to loom as very signifi­
cant legislation.
When Congress convened the following December, state 
quarantine regulations were not nearly so sacrosanct. 
Senator Isharn Harris of Tennessee, the foremost leader of 
the formidable faction in Congress seeking a strong na­
tional quarantine, successfully secured the adoption of 
a resolution proposing the appointment of a Joint Committee 
to investigate and report on the best means of preventing 
the introduction and spread of epidemic diseases in the 
United States. The Committee was to be composed of four 
senators and five representatives, according to Harris’ 
proposal, and would be given power to employ experts and 
scientists to visit recently infected localities to obtain 
full and accurate information.
^ Statutes at Large of the United States of America, 
Forty-Fifth Congress, Second Session, I§7$-79 "(Washington, 
w m >  XX,
^ Miscellaneous Documents of the Senate of the 
United States', Forty-.Fifth Congress, Third Session (Wash­
ington, "T^79T» Vol. 1, Document No. 2, no p.
As finally constituted, the Congressional Yellow 
Fever Commission, as it was commonly called, was made up 
of twelve members, six from each house. To aid the in­
vestigation, this Committee, or Commission, appointed a 
n3oard of Experts" comprised largely of physicians. On 
this Board were the eminent New Orleans doctors, Cnaille/ 
and Bemiss, and Colonel T. S. Hardee, also of New Orleans, 
the lone non-medical man among tne appointees.2? The 
experts met in Memphis December 2c, and there they received 
instructions to collect facts regarding the epidemic of 
1&73 and to meet in Washington January 15. Their cnief 
objective was to determine to what extent importation had 
been responsible for tne epidemic, and how future importa­
tions of infectious and contagious diseases could be avert­
ed. In addition, a joint sub-committee of three senators 
and three representatives was sent to New Orleans to take 
testimony from leading medical and commercial men, and a 
similar sub-committee v/as dispatched to Memphis. These 
sub-committees later submitted their findings to the Board
Of}of Experts to assist that body in formulating conclusions.
2?0n D ecember 21 Congress adopted a joint resolu­
tion appropriating fifty thousand dollars for the purpose 
of investigating the origin and cause of epidemic diseases, 
especially yellow fever and cholera, and the best method of 
preventing their introduction and spread in the United 
States. Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Fifth Congress, 
Third Session (Washington, 1&79), p." 4>?7.
2^Report of the Committees of the Senate of the 
United States, Forty-Fifth Congress, Third Session (Wash­
ington ,~T^797) Vol. 2, Report No. 734> pp. 1-2.
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The Joint Congressional Committee reported February 
7, 1379, a week after the Board, of Experts, had delivered 
its official recommendation that a national board of health 
be created to assist in preventing epidemics. Nearly all 
yellow fever invasions, the Committee report asserted, 
could be traced with certainty or a high degree of proba­
bility to a new importation. Furti.ermore, no conclusive 
proof could be found that yellow fever was indigenous to 
any part of the country. Non-intercourse with ports where 
epidemic disease prevailed was the only certain means of 
preventing importation, continued the Report, but next 
best was a national quarantine involving strict sanitary 
measures to be observed by vessels at the port of depar­
ture, with careful inspection and thorough disinfection of 
those vessels before being allowed to enter the United 
States. With respect to the question of whether Congress 
had authority to legislate on this matter, tne report de­
clared that Congress1 constitutional power to regulate 
commerce should not only include the promotion of commerce 
but also the prevention of importable epidemic diseases.
To reassure the states, the Committee expressed its opinion
that Congress had no power whatever to supersede or inter-
29fere with their individual quarantine regulations.
A lav/ based upon the recommendations of the Joint
29jbid_., pp. 2-3.
Committee and the Board of Experts was passed by Congress 
March 3j 1^79* This new statute, r,An act to prevent the 
introduction of infectious or contagious diseases into the 
United States, and to establish a National Board of Health,11 
provided a framework for the national quarantine many re­
formers hoped would be adopted later. A National Board of 
Health consisting of seven regular members appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate 
was created. In addition, the National Board was to include 
a medical officer from the army, the navy, the Marine Hos­
pital Service, and the Department of Justice, 'bringing the 
Board’s total membership to eleven. The seven appointive 
members were to receive ten dollars each day when on duty; 
the other four were entitled to no pay. The new organiza­
tion was empowered to frame all necessary rules and regula­
tions authorized or required by the act, and to make special 
investigations aimed at promoting its objects. The National 
Board of Health was to be primarily an information-gathering 
agency with power to advise state and national officers on 
questions which in the Board’s opinion might tend to pre­
serve and improve the public health. Fifty thousand dollars
was appropriated to pay the salaries of Board members and
30to cover other expenses.
The Louisiana Board of Health, in the meantime, had
30i Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Fifth Congress, 
Third .Session, XX, 4o4-B5.
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produced its annual Report for 1C' 7 3". Dr. Chop pin asserted 
as before that yellow fever made its appearance in New Or­
leans as a result of two cases reaching the city aboard 
the steamship Emily B. Souder. The purser and one of the 
engineers had passed inspection supposedly suffering from 
neuralgia, but they later died of yellow fever after having 
spent some time in New Orleans. Choppin, noting that more 
than four thousand had died in the Crescent City during 
the epidemic, directed attention to the fact that Galveston, 
Mobile, Shreveport, Monroe, and Natchez had completely es­
caped the disaster, presumably by their shotgun quarantines. 
The lesson to be observed, thought Chop in, was that there 
could be no mediocrity in a quarantine; it had to impose 
ins urmount a ble barriers between healthy and infected com­
munities. The failure of moderate quarantine and of dis­
infection to resist yellow fever in 1378 indicated to 
Choppin that Louisiana must strengthen its quarantine sys­
tem. Choopin, representing the State Board, asserted that
the only solution appeared to be a six month ban on all
31commerce between New Orleans and infected localities.
Governor Nicholls sympathized with Choppin’s position 
on quarantine. Nicholls told the General Assembly at the 
beginning of the 1379 session that individual good must
3-IAnnual Report of the Board of Health of the State 
Louisiana to the General Assembly for the Year 1378 
"(New Orleans, 1879)> pp. IT 13-1A*
3 20
yield to public good. Even if the quarantinists were 
eventually proven wrong, declared the Governor, it seemed 
better to injure the trade of a few New Orleans business­
men than to jeopardize the lives of hundreds of thousands
in the Mississipoi Valley. Nicholls lauded trie Board of 
Health, and asserted that the Board would not have recom­
mended a quarantine at all if there ’were not sufficient 
grounds for believing the quarantine was yielding some 
benefit .3^
A bill was introduced into the Legislature to repeal
the act of l#7o which had eased the quarantine. The pro­
posed bill empowered the Board of Health to detain at its 
discretion all vessels from "ports where yellow fever gen­
erally prevails, and from ports where other contagious 
diseases are reported to exist" for a period not exceeding 
sixty days. This modification would undoubtedly have tended 
to produce a rigid quarantine, but the bill was d e f e a t e d . 3 3  
When the General Assembly adjourned without granting the 
Board of Health any supplementary quarantine powers what­
ever, the New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal was 
indignant:
The truth might as well be recognized: 
there is a groundless jealousy on the part 
of the average legislator, as well as the
3^Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives, of the State of Louisiana . . . 1^79 
TNew Orleans, I'S79) > p. 17.
33ibid., pp. 40, 122, 144.
321
average citizen, towards the hoard of 
Health and the medical profession in 
general, because they are prominent ex­
ponents of progress in science. It is 
only a new chapter in the long history
of the warfare of science against igno­
rance and superstition, in which the 
people resist at every point the civili­
zation which science proffers.34
Popular resentment against the legislators for having 
failed to strengthen the state quarantine system was great, 
but business interests opposed to quarantine were influen­
tial and well organised. As in the past, this latter 
faction was ably seconded by some of the local press and 
physicians who were still convinced that epidemics resulted 
primarily from local causes. The New Orleans Times, a
leading daily newspaper, declared that the State Board of
Health knew very little about the yellow fever outbreak in 
1#7'3, but had collected rumors and conjectures to bolster 
its theory that the epidemic could have been averted by 
a rigid quarantine.35 ^ committee of the New Orleans Med­
ical and Surgical Association, a new organization, asserted 
that Choppin’s proposed plan to enforce absolute non-inter­
course between New Orleans and the West Indies would create 
a vicious system which existed only during the "barbarous 
ages," and had been abolished by the good sense and prac­
tical knowledge of civilised nations. Quarantine "has
•^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
VI (1373-7WT £7o3
^ % e w  Orleans Times, March 6, 1879.
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never prevented . . . yellow fever,n the committee report 
maintained, and even the existing system was said to in­
terfere unjustifiably with the city’s commercial rela­
xa­tions .
Despite the failure of the Board of Health to obtain
legislation putting teeth into the state quarantine, Dr.
Choppin was roundly excoriated in some circles for having
the audacity to advocate non-intercourse. The entire
Board, in fact, became the object of considerable abuse.
Dr. F. Loeber, one of the Board members, was led to protest
Choppin's remarks in the 1S?3 Report concerning the need
for non-intercourse. Loeber seemed satisfied when informed
the Report was intended to represent only the views of the
Board President. This represented an innovation, because
in the past the annual Reports were submitted to the entire
17Board before publication. '
In March, 1379 some Crescent City civic leader's, m o s t l y ’ 
businessmen, organized the Auxiliary Sanitary Association 
of Hew Orleans. The object of the Association was to aid 
public officials in improving the sanitary condition of the 
city. Charles A. Whitney became President and Dr. C. B, 
White, former State Health Officer, was chosen Sanitary 
Director. Dr. Choppin and a committee of three from the
■^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
VI (1373-7977
37pemocrat, March 12, 1379.
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Board of Health met with the Auxiliary Sanitary Association 
April 15 and were reassured by the "Sanitarians" that the 
new organization had no intention of finding fault with 
legally-constituted health authorities. The Times refused 
to acknowledge this pronouncement and remained of the opin­
ion that the Association had been established to emphasize 
Hew Orleans sanitation as opposed to the "foolish and ob­
stinate quarantine craze." Referring to the Board and As­
sociation as "essentially antagonistic," the Times remarked:
If the Board of Health chooses to 
devote its time and its revenues to the . 
maintenance of a vicious and injurious 
system of quarantine, the Citizens’ As­
sociation will raise money and organize 
endeavor with a view to accomplishing the 
more serious and necessary and sensible 
ends which the Board ignores. That there 
could be harmony of aim or sympathy of 
opinion under the circumstances is out 
of the question.39
The Picayune and the Democrat claimed that the public de­
manded harmony between the twro organizations, but Times 
assaults on the Board of Health were unrelenting.
Opposition In New Orleans to the Board’s quarantine 
policy ■■.as probably greater in 1B79 than it had ever been 
previously. Dr. Choppin, the victim of much of the oppro­
brium, was in the meantime re-elected unanimously by the 
other Board members to serve as President for another year. 
Choppin announced that his zeal and fixity of purpose were
3&lbid., March 29j April 6, 1B79-
39Times, April 16, 1&79.
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undiminished, ana that he was determined to maintain a 
strict quarantine. Almost immediately after reorganisation 
the Bo,rd of Health advised Governor Micholls to issue a 
quarantine proclamation effective May 1. The quarantine 
was to be enforced against vessels from all West Indian 
ports, ports south of Texas along the Gulf of Mexico (in­
cluding the Bay Islands), ports on the mainland bordering 
the Caribbean Sea, and all ports along the Atlantic coast 
of South America as far south as Buenos Aires. The deten­
tion period established for vessels included in the proc­
lamation 'was twenty days, indicating clearly that the Board 
of Health had reversed its policy of depending largely upon 
disinfection. But the Board was soon to find that en­
forcing a twenty day quarantine would not be easy.^
At least three newspapers, the German Gazette, the 
Times, and the City Item, vigorously attacked, the Board of 
Health and its quarantine policy, and suggested that the 
Auxiliary Sanitary Association represented more faithfully 
the interests of Mew Orleans. The Times claimed that public 
opinion was opposed to the rigid quarantine, the number of 
persons supporting it being ’’literally insignificant.”
The Democrat and the Picayune denounced the Board's antag­
onists, emphasizing the need for promoting confidence in 
Louisiana health authorities at home and throughout the
^ Picayune, April 5* 12, IE?79.
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Mississippi Valley. If the Times were to continue its. 
"vicious and dangerous policy," asserted the Democrat, 
surrounding states would invoke shotgun quarantines at the 
slightest provocation, and New Orleans commerce would be 
as effectually destroyed as if another epidemic appeared.^ 
The problem had to be faced: if New Orleans did not main­
tain a rigid quarantine against supposedly infected ports, 
inland towns would quarantine New Orleans.
Seemingly the Board stood firm in its determination 
to enforce the twenty day quarantine despite the generally 
unfavorable reaction from the press. The pressure mounted, 
however, which evidently led the Board of Health to find a 
scape-goat. Dr. P. 3. Carrington, the Quarantine Officer 
at Mississippi Station, had been vilified frequently in 
the newspapers and elsewhere since the epidemic of the 
previous year because he had allowed the Emily B. Souder 
to pass the quarantine. Early in May, 1£>79 a resolution 
was adopted by the Board asking Governor Nicholls to re­
move Carrington, ostensibly because he had mistreated the 
captain and crew of the bark Peter a few days before. 
Nicholls directed Choppin to call a special meeting of the 
Board of Health to formulate a precise statement of reasons 
why Carrington should be removed. The Governor coupled 
this action with a mild rebuke to the state health officials
^Democrat, April 15, IB, 28, 1$79; Times, April
15, 1879.
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for having yielded to public clamor. Choppin agreed with 
Nicholls, and declared that Carrington was in no measure 
responsible for the epidemic of l6?6. The fault, said 
Choppin, lay in the law of 1676 which permitted vessels to 
be detained only for fumigation and disinfection. A ma­
jority of the Board members then concluded that the harried 
quarantine official was competent.
How did the public feel about the new quarantine?
This question was hotly disputed. The i-ica> une maintained 
unqualifiedly that its views supporting the Board of Health 
were also held by most Mew Orleanians.^ The Times, on the 
other hand, asserted that nine-tenths of the intelligent 
citizens of the Crescent City agreed with its policy of 
objecting to an embargo being placed upon commerce. The 
so-called embargo, also referred to as "Choppinism,n was 
destroying the life o.f the city and injuring the prosperity 
of the state, claimed the Times.̂
Indicative of the resentment against Choppin, he re­
ceived an anonymous letter signed by his f,best friend” 
which contained a warning that some one was getting ready 
to kill him if he refused to relent on the quarantine issue.^
^Democrat, Kay 3> 1679*
^ picayune, April 30, 1679 /""afternoon ed._7.
^Times, Hay 2, 1679.
^Picayune, May 6, 16?9*
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Immediately the Times was accused of having: fomented the 
threatening; letter by its daily diatribes against state 
health officials. As usual, the Times had a slashing 
reply: "The TIMES confines itself to argument and fact,
but it is hardly to be wondered at if the Dagos and long­
shoremen and the hundreds of other laboring people should 
have a different way of expressing their resentment."^*
Two days later Choppin countered by denouncing the Times 
as a "communistic paper," and requesting the editor to send 
a reporter to replace the insolent one previously given
i nthe assignment of attending Board of Health meetings.
Dr. Choppin told a Board meeting May 8 that not a 
single medical or sanitary organization from any state had 
protested against. Louisiana quarantine restrictions or the 
general policy of the Board of Health. At this very same 
meeting, however, a resolution was adopted creating a com­
mittee to consider whether modifications beneficial to New 
Orleans commercial interests could be made in existing 
quarantine regulations without impairing their effectiveness. 
It Vv»as noted that a few modifications had already been made, 
and Co'J.onel T. 3. Hardee asserted that the 3oard should be 
ready to eliminate "any rigorous or unnecessary hardships 
in our quarantine system, where they can be pointed out
^Times, May 7, 1379.
^Democrat, May 9> 1379
as existing without reasonable cause and to the detriment 
of public interests.” The Committee on Quarantine Modi­
fications reported a few days later, the only significant 
recommendation being that quarantine restrictions against 
vessels arriving from some of the Bay Islands be relaxed.
The Governor issued a proclamation effecting that change.^ 
This meager modification, goaded the Times, which had 
expected much more, into a new round of vehemence. Appar­
ently, complained the editor, the state government was 
completely submissive to the ”iiare-brained experiments and 
arrogant policy” of the state health authorities. ’’Unless 
some check be put upon the violent and arbitrary tendency 
of the Board of Health,” he continued, "New Orleans will, 
in the course of a very short while, be fit for nothing but 
pastureland and might as well be abandoned to that use.”
The Times spoke of an ”1 irrepressible conflict' between the 
scientific speculations of doctors and the monetary specu­
lations of merchants,” and asserted that the United States 
Supreme Court must determine the limitations of state police 
powers. The Board of Health, maintained the Times, had not 
only been quarantining but also interfering with commerce.5® 
Relief was rather quick in coming. At a special meet­
ing June 3 the Board, after a heated discussion, voted five
^ Picayune, May 9, l£79*
49Ibid., May 13, 15, 1379.
^ Times, May 16, 25, 1^79.
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to four in favor of reducing the quarantine to ten days. 5̂ - 
T*le Times rejoiced in what it called "a signal triumph of 
common sense, as expressed in public opinion, over the 
tyrannical and arbitrary pretentions of authority as ex­
pressed in a body of small officials.” Reduction of the 
detention period to ten days was by no means a complete 
remedy, declared the editor, but it was encouraging as an 
explicit confession that the Board of Health had erred.
The exasperating fact, he continued, was that the Tfmis­
chievous folly” was ersisted in "until it crippled the 
whole system of our foreign commerce." The Times sug­
gested the adoption by Louisiana of a "scientific quaran­
tine” based upon the system employed by the state of 1\!ew 
York.52 No further change was made, but states nearby 
were of the opinion that modifications had already weakened 
the Louisiana quarantine to a dangerous extent.
The great yellow fever epidemic of 13?S which deci­
mated much of the Mississippi Valley brought with it an 
almost immovable distrust of Louisiana health officials. 
Whether justified or not, a strong feeling had arisen that 
only through some agency other than the Louisiana Board of 
Health could this vast area feel secure from epidemic dis­
eases which might be transported up the river, Instances,
51peinocrat, June k, 1B79*
52Times, June 5, 6, 1$79.
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often questionable, were pointed out when numerous local­
ities h:id been infected from New Orleans. This fear was 
made manifest by the many shotgun quarantines imposed 
against the Crescent City during the 1$7& outbreak. The 
fear did not subside; now these localities wanted organ­
ized protection against imported disease to avert a future 
disaster.
Growing, out of the experience of 1$7B the Sanitary 
Council of the Mississippi Valley was organized the follow­
ing spring. This Council consisted of delegates from state 
and local boards of health and from sanitary associations 
throughout the Valley. The National Board of Health was 
also represented. The avowed object of the Council was to 
promote interstate sanitation and prevent the spread of 
epidemics. Dr. Choppin was present at the organizational 
meeting in Memphis held April 30, but the Louisiana State 
Board of Health did not continue active participation when 
it became evident that the Council’s views regarding quar­
antine administration on the lower Mississippi were basi­
cally antipathetic to those of Louisiana health authorities. 
At first, relations were friendly, but the jurisdictional 
conflict shaping up between the National Board of Health
and the Louisiana Board found the Sanitary Council of the
53Mississippi Valley supporting federal health officials.
^Picayune, May 5> 1$79> December 7 j 1&S0; Smillie, 
Public Health, pp. 321-23*
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Soon after the establishment of the National Board 
of Health in March, 1-379) President Hayes nominated as 
members of this body seven eminent physicians including 
Samuel M. Bemiss of New Orleans, the Board’s first Presi­
dent , and James L. Cabell of the University of Virginia, 
who succeeded Bemiss as chief executive a short time later. 
At the organisational meeting held in Washington April 1, 
the seven appointees were joined by medical officers from 
the army, the navy, the Marine Hospital Service, and the 
Justice Department. Bemiss was chosen President by the 
other members, and Dr. Thomas J. Turner, U. 3. N., was 
elected Secretary.'’'̂
Just what the functions of the National Board of 
Health were to be was still very much open to conjecture. 
The provisions of the organic act were disturbingly vague, 
but apparently the Board had little real power. Bemiss, 
speaking to the Louisiana Medical Society, explained that 
his organisation intended to make sanitary surveys, to 
collect information on public health matters, to appoint 
scientific commissions to carry on investigations, and to 
advise proper sanitary legislation for states and for the 
federal government. He said that the National Board would 
cooperate with state and local associations and boards of
^Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the 
Senate of the UnitecT States of America from MarcE 2l,
1'379)" to^March 3> 183r,~rh~clusive (Washington, 190TT,
HIT, Tg;'"''Democrat, April 3, T379«
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health. With regard to quarantine Bemiss asserted that
the National Board of Health had no powers beyond those
5 5of an advisory and cooperative character.
Support for a national quarantine was growing ail the 
while, and rather surprisingly, even the New Orleans press 
was not averse. The Picayune favored a national quarantine 
in the hope that the additional protection would reassure 
inland communities and thereby prevent shotgun quarantines. 
The Times also favored a national quarantine, apparently 
believing that state boards would then automatically sur­
render their powers in this matter. Quarantine would 
probably never prevent yellow fever, declared the Times, 
but under a national system New Orleans would not be the 
only port to suffer from this foolish policy. This jour­
nal disliked seeing ports with what were alleged to be
more intelligent quarantines winning over all the trade
56previously going to the Crescent City.
The question of granting quarantine authority to the 
National Board of Health was already being taken up by 
Congress. The bill under consideration was introduced by 
Senator Isham Harris from Tennessee, the state most dis­
trustful of Louisiana health officials. Harris held the 
conviction that federal authority in this matter should be
55pjcayune, April 10, 1579*
5^I_bid., April 12, 1$79; Times, April l£, 1^79•
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as complete as possible. Foremost among the supporters of 
Harris' bill were congressmen and senators from the Missis­
sippi Valley whose views corresponded pretty closely with 
those of the Tennesseean.
Opposition was by no means lacking. The rights of 
states and the rights of commerce, thought some, were being 
sorely jeopardized. Senator Hamlin of Maine believed the 
bill's provisions unnecessarily harsh, insisting that it 
was unwise to place the country's entire navigation in 
the hands of a few men. Senator V-hyte questioned the 
constitutionality of the provision granting the federal 
government power to go into states and interfere with 
their quarantine regulations. Representative Rice of 
Massachusetts pointed out that court decisions had con­
sistently regarded quarantine laws and regulations as
57police matters reserved to the states. '
The Harris bill, when finally passed, bore a title 
almost identical to the measure adopted in March: "An
act to prevent the introduction of contagious and infec­
tious diseases into the United States." It now became 
unlawful for a vessel from a foreign port where contagious 
or infectious disease existed to enter the United States 
except in accordance with the act's provisions, the rules
^Congressional Record . . . , Forty-Sixth Con-
gress, First Session (Washington, 1$79)>""Vol. 9, Part 1, 
p7 bHH;'^[bId., Vol. 9, Part 2, pp. 1540-41, 1642.
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and regulations of state boards of health, and rules and 
regulations made in pursuance of the act. The new law 
went on to state that vessels from diseased ports would 
thereafter be required to obtain from a United States con­
sul or medical officer a certificate describing the sani­
tary history of the vessel.
The National Board of Health, according to section 
three, was to ,Tco-operate with and, so far as it lawfully
/  might_7i aidtr state and municipal boards of health in
the execution of their respective rules and regulations 
to prevent the introduction of epidemic disease from for­
eign countries and frovn one state to another. At ports 
and places in the United States where state quarantine 
regulations did not exist, the National Board of Health 
was to report the facts to the President who could then 
order the National Board to make necessary rules and reg­
ulations which were to be enforced by state sanitary au­
thorities. If state authorities failed or refused to enforce 
them, the President was empowered to detail an officer or 
appoint a proper person for that purpose.
The National Board of Health was authorised by the 
act to establish rules and regulations which vessels 
sailing for a port in the United States would be required
to observe at the port of departure (if the port were in­
fected) and on its voyage. It was made the Board’s dut}r 
to obtain information on the sanitary condition of foreign
335
ports from which disease might be imported into the United 
States, and consular officers were to assist by providing 
weekly reports. State and local health authorities in 
the United States were ordered to issue weekly sanitary 
reports. The National Board was to provide rules and reg­
ulations to be observed at ports of destination in the 
United States with regard to inspection and treatment of 
vessels from foreign ports upon their arrival. No vessel 
was to be allowed to discharge cargo or land passengers 
without a certificate from the health officer at a quar­
antine station.
An appropriation of $500,000 was provided the National 
Board of Health. Disbursal of these funds was to be under 
the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, based upon 
estimates of expenditures made bv the Board and approved 
by the Secretary of the Treasury. The most important pro­
visions of the 1S7S act which gave the Marine Hospital 
Service certain limited powers over quarantine were re­
pealed by this new law. Finally, the tenth and last sec­
tion of the act declared that the entire statute was to
53remain in force no longer than four years.
The Louisiana State Board of Health was not especially 
alarmed at first that the National Board with its new
^ Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Sixth Congress, 
First Session (Washington, 1330), XXI, 5-7*
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powers v.'ould encroach upon the "prerogatives" of state
officials. However, Choppin did warn that the National
Board could not in any way interfere with existing state
regulations. Louisiana had adopted a stringent quarantine,
he said, because yellow fever was regarded as a foreign
.foe, and the people of the state had a right to enact
59measures for self-preservation.
In July, 1379 New Orleans again became involved in 
quarantine difficulties with other communities. Fortu­
nately, 1-379 did not become another great epidemic year 
in the Mississippi Valley, although yellow fever did gain 
sufficient foothold to renew the panic of the previous year. 
Memphis bore the brunt of the onslaught, but Mew Orleans, 
though not seriously infected, again fell victim to the 
shot-gun. On June 10 the Louisiana Board of Health, hoping 
to avert quarantines against New Orleans, adopted a quaran­
tine of its own against Memphis which was on its way toward 
another disaster. The Board was attacked by the Times for 
having acted with "indecent and foolhardy haste,"^ but if 
it had held fixedly to its stand in this matter, possibly 
New Orleans would have been saved grievous difficulty.
The first city to quarantine New Orleans was Galveston, 
a nearly perennial trouble-maker. The quarantine was
59pjcayune, June 11, 1379.
^Times, July 13> 1379.
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adopted by the Galveston Board of Health July 10 primarily 
because the Louisiana Board had not adhered to a policy of 
strict quarantine against the infected city of Memphis. A 
few days later the Galveston Board voted to continue the 
restrictions because of "the reasonable probability of 
yellow fever occurring in New Orleans." The Louisiana 
Board of Health protested the quarantine, and the Democrat 
editorialized bitterly: "It has been a question whether
the frivolous ami flimsy pretexts that have been advanced 
for taking such steps in former years have been as much of 
an incentive in the matter as has the furthering of a self­
ish interest on the part of the city of Galveston to crip­
ple the commerce of New Orleans and thereby to advance its 
own.
Pensacola v>as next. Only a short time after Galves­
ton acted, the Florida port imposed a quarantine against 
all points west of Mobile and south of Cairo, Illinois, 
excepting only the Texas seaports. The Mayor of Pensacola 
wrote to Choppin telling hirn that if good conditions per­
sisted in New Orleans, intercourse would be restored„ He 
pointed out that it was logical at the time to treat New 
Orleans as infected because an epidemic wras raging in 
Memphis, and word had been received of suspected cases of
^ Picayune, July 22, 23, 1379*
6^1 bid,} July 20, 1079; Democrat, July 19, 1079.
yellow fever in the Crescent City. Shreveport, in the
meantime, quarantined boats, mail, and all conveyances
/ ̂
from New Orleans. Many other quarantines followed, but 
the situation did not become as serious as it had been the 
previous year.
A few cases of yellow fever did appear in New Orleans 
toward the end of July, but the city suffered no important 
outbreak during the entire season. Memphis was not so 
fortunate, and by the first of August was virtually iso­
lated. The Louisiana Board of Health and the New Orleans 
press, fearing the extention of non-intercourse in the 
Mississippi Valley, publicised vigorously the good health 
prevailing in the city, asserting that no cause for alarm 
existed. Nonetheless, exaggerated reports of yellow fever 
in the Crescent City were published elsewhere, causing the 
Democrat to remark that a systematic plan appeared to be 
afoot to ruin the city's business,^
During August many of the places quarantining New Or­
leans removed their restrictions. Acting Governor Louis 
A. V/iltz, who succeeded Francis P. Nicholls as Chief Exec­
utive of Louisiana, encouraged this action by issuing a 
proclamation to the state and the country declaring New 
Orleans to be in excellent sanitary condition and free from
63picayune, July 24> 29» 1379. 
^^Democrat, A.ugust 7j 1G79.
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6 5yellow fever. Before the proclamation was made public 
the Times printed another diatribe against the state quar­
antine. The editor, mindful of the localities maintaining 
restrictions on intercourse with New Orleans, reminded his 
readers that the Louisiana Board of Health had imposed a 
rigid quarantine against supposedly infected vessels in
order to prevent isolation of the city from behind. This
16policy failed to achieve its goal,J he continued, and 
nineteen-twentieths of the intelligent people of the region 
involved were against quarantine. The Times, now becoming 
dramatic, asserted: "Civilization itself is threatened
in this frantic reaction toward the practices of barbarism* 
Manhood, simple humanity, brotherly love--all go down alike 
before the brutal onset of the superstition which stalks 
abroad in the guise of quarantine.
A committee of about fifteen businessmen called upon 
Acting Governor Wiltz August 20 to get relief from alleged 
quarantine evils. They presented a petition with a lengthy 
list of signatures. The petitioners said they favored "a 
rational system of quarantine,” and implied the quarantine
^5jbia., August 17, 1379*
^ T h e  Times seemingly forgot that the quarantine had 
been substantially modified early in the summer. This policy 
of easing restrictions against incoming vessels unquestion­
ably contributed to the distrust of Louisiana health offi­
cials felt throughout much of the Mississippi Valley and 
Gulf Coast, thereby provoking shotgun quarantines.
^Times, August 11, 1379*
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maintained by the Btate Board of Health was the opposite.
New Orleans trade was paralyzed and its commerce lost to 
other portSj claimed the petitioners, and consequently 
property holders, ship owners, merchants, shopkeepers, and 
so on were losing money. The Board of Health was said not 
to enjoy the confidence of New Orleans or of other communi­
ties. The petition concluded with a request that the Board 
be reorganized, and the lav; of 1376 requiring only brief 
detention for incoming ships be enforced by a new group of 
health officers.^
Governor hiltz was very tactful in handling the peti­
tioners, agr eing to a rational system of quarantine, but 
informing them that he could, not remove state officials 
appointed by ex-Governor Nicholls, He said, that he would 
meet with the Board of Health in order to consider a modi­
fication of the quarantine proclamation. At a special Board 
meeting held the following day, Board members defended tneir 
quarantine policy, reminding the Governor that New Orleans 
in 1379 was one of the healthiest cities in the nation. The 
petitioners' elusive concept of a "rational quarantine" was 
treated sarcastically. At a later meeting one of the mem­
bers remarked that a petition with five times as many sig­
natures could have been gotten in support of the Board. 
Within a week some merchants, steamboatmen, and railroad
^ Picayune, August 21, 1379*
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companies drew up a petition defending the Board of Health 
and its quarantine policy. Surrounding areas, they recog­
nized, demanded that a rigid quarantine against the impor­
tation of epidemic diseases be maintained, ana failure to 
do so would result in New Orleans becoming ’’hermetically 
sealed” from the interior. Inland commerce, said the
69Board’s defenders, was much more vital than foreign trade.
At the Board of Health meeting September 11 a letter 
was read from Dr. Bemiss, representing the National Board. 
The letter suggested that a request be made to the Governor 
for the relaxation of the quarantine on October 1, a month 
earlier than usual. After that date, according to Bemiss, 
vessels should be given permission to proceed up the river 
immediately unless they recently left an infected port or 
had sickness of an infectious nature on board. Even in 
those cases detention should be only long enough for the 
State Board to determine whether it was dangerous to re­
lease the vessel. Five days later the Board adopted a
resolution asking the Governor to modify the quarantine
, 70substantially as Berniss had recommendea.
During September the Board’s chief problem was at­
tempting to secure removal of remaining local quarantines 
against New Orleans. Repeatedly, resolutions were adopted 
declaring that excellent health conditions existed in the
69ibid., August 22, 23, 1879; Democrat, August 31,
1879.
^Democrat, September 12, 1879; Picayune, September
17, 1879.
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city and imploring other cities to remove all restrictions 
on free intercourse. The National Board of Health, and the 
Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans joined in 
the appeal. Some localities relented, but the Crescent 
City was not entirely unfettered until winter.
The National Board of Health had been quite active 
during the summer of 1B79j although a great deal remained 
to be done before it could plav a major role in quarantine 
matters. One important accomplishment was the formulating 
of rules and regulations to be observed by railroad and 
steamship companies to prevent transfer of disease from 
one state to another. Little objection could be found to 
this reform. However, in July Choppin received a letter 
from Dr. Turner, Secretary of the National Board, informing 
him that funds were being made available to the Louisiana 
Board with the understanding that rules and regulations 
approved by federal health officials would be adopted for 
the quarantine of New Orleans. Choppin, hoping to clarify 
any misunderstanding, asserted that adoption of recommenda­
tions made by the National Board of Health did not interfere 
with the rights of state and local authorities, because the 
National Board was simply a cooperative body without juris­
diction over other boards. In no way, he said, could the 
National Board undermine the sovereignty of states under 
the quarantine law or any other law. According to an 
editorial appearing in the Picayune early in September,
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nearly twenty thousand dollars had been appropriated by 
the National Board of Health for sanitary improvements in 
Louisiana alone. The editor appeared satisfied with serv­
ices rendered by federal health officers and agents during 
71the summer.
Nothing could conceal the undercurrent of apprehension 
felt in Louisiana regarding future federal interference with 
the state quarantine. The Democrat, commenting on the 
indiscriminate use of quarantine by Galveston and Mobile, 
asked what benefit the National Board of Health had been.
The National Board confined itself to spying out sporadic 
cases of yellow fever, claimed the editorial, instead of 
preventing embargoes. The Democrat was especially dis­
gruntled because reports of suspected cases of Yellow Jack 
in Louisiana had been telegraphed all over the country.
The editor continued with a bitter blast: ’'Perhaps no
official body, with, so pompous and ostentatious a name and 
such huge pretentions, has ever made itself so ridiculous 
and accomplished such injurious results.1’ The vitriolic 
editorial concluded: "We have had enough of the National
Board of Health.
^ Picayune, July 17> August 1, September 9> 1^79*
^Democrat, October 3> 1879*
CHAPTER XI 
DR. JONES AND STATES1 RIGHTS
The Rational Board of Health anticipated important 
results from its efforts to improve quarantine procedures 
on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Of vital interest to 
Louisiana health authorities was the National BoardTs 
proposal to establish a quarantine station on Ship Island, 
located just off the Mississippi coast in the Gulf of Mex­
ico. Dr. Bemiss, New Orleans member of the National Board 
of Health, let it be known in September, 1&79 that this 
project was in the offing, although details were not made 
public. Dr. A. N. Bell of New York, representing the 
National Board, visited the Crescent City a short time 
later and reported that the Mississippi Quarantine Station 
operated by the Louisiana Board of Health was located in 
the worst possible site which could have been found. At 
Mississippi Station, said Bell, communications with New 
Orleans could not be prevented, infected ships could not 
be separated from healthy ones, mosquitoes were ferocious, 
and accommodations for the sick were crude and unsatisfacto­
ry. Consequently he recommended that the proposed Ship Is­




The Ship Island project evidently met with considerable
approbation in New Orleans. The Democrat reminded its
readers that only infected vessels were to be sent to the
new quarantine station, whereas those presenting a clean
bill of health^ would be permitted to proceed up the river 
3at once. At a November meeting of the Auxiliary Sanitary 
Association, optimism was expressed that government as­
sistance in providing an adequate quarantine would not 
only tend to prevent the introduction of disease but also 
to protect inland commerce by allaying apprehensions in 
rural areas.^
The Louisiana State Board of Health remained unim­
pressed by the enthusiasm for the National Board exhibited 
in some quarters. At an October meeting Dr. Choppin, the , 
State Health Officer, charged the National Board with being 
derelict in its duty under the law by withholding necessary 
funds from state and local boards of health. It was the 
legal duty of the National Board to cooperate with and aid 
other public health organizations, Choppin averred, but
-̂Democrat, October 10, 1879*
2A certificate of good health granted by a medical
officer#
•̂Democrat, October 13 > 1879*
^Proceedings of the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary 
Association Meeting oT-November &, 1879 (n.p., nTd.), in 
Jones Papers^ Gummed"S"tub File Book"J Business Papers, op. 
cit.
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these latter agencies alone had the authority to determine
how the money was to be spent. Mention was made of ten
thousand dollars denied the Louisiana Board of Health during
5the past summer because of a technicality.
Support for the National Board of Health was clearly 
manifest at the seventh annual meeting of the American 
Public Health Association held in Nashville, November 13-21, 
1$79. Dr. Gustavus Devron of New Orleans expressed his 
view that maritime quarantine should be left exclusively 
to the National Board, and state boards should only gather 
statistics and enforce rules and regulations of federal 
officers. Dr. E. A. James of Chattanooga stated that the 
work of controlling disease should be left to ’’that govern­
ment having the greatest power and the longest purse.” The 
Association adopted resolutions commending the National 
Board for its service to the country, and recommending 
additional investigations into a number of diseases. Con­
gress was requested to appropriate sufficient funds to 
provide the best talent and apparatus for these investiga­
tions. The existing quarantine law and the rules and regu­
lations of the National Board of Health were declared to 
have accomplished ’’great good," and no change in the law
^Picayune, October 10, 1379*
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was recommended
The Times, seldom found lacking in abusive criticism,
stated that the resolutions adopted by the Nashville
Convention could not have been less satisfactory to the
people of the South. The National Board of Health had
been ”a disastrous failure,” continued the editorial, and
if not improved, should be abolished. Evidently because
it adopted the undesirable resolutions, the American Public
Health Association was described by the Times as being
”narr’ow-minded, unprogressive, professionally prejudiced
and exhibiting poverty of resource in sanitary science to
7a remarkable degree.”
The first annual Report of the National Board of 
Health, written by its President, James L. Cabell, listed 
the Board’s principal operations during the year l£79. 
First, declared Cabell, the National Board had sought to 
determine the proper relationship which should exist be­
tween a national quarantine system and those maintained 
by states and municipalities. A second undertaking men­
tioned in the Report was the collection by the Board of 
information regarding sanitary conditions in some of the 
most important cities and towns in the United States.
^Public Health Reports and Papers Presented at the 
Meetings of the American Public~H'ealth Association in the 
Year l879~TBoston, 1880),V, 22&, 23l; frjew Qrleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal, n.s., VII (l&79-&Of7 652.
?Times, November 23, lo79*
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Another of the Board’s important operations was the sending 
of a commission to investigate yellow fever in Cuba, and a 
fourth was the collecting and collating of the sanitary 
laws of the United States and the states. Cabell went on 
to enumerate fourteen services performed by the National 
Board of Health in promoting public' health.
Under provisions of the act of June 2 the National 
Board issued to state and local authorities a set of rules 
and regulations for securing the best sanitary conditions 
on vessels arriving in the United States from infected 
ports, and another set of rules and regulations aimed at 
securing the best sanitary conditions on railroads and 
river boats. The Report mentioned also that a total of 
seventeen inspectors had been appointed to visit quaran­
tine stations and report on their condition. The inspec­
tors were instructed that yellow fever was the disease 
presenting the gravest danger, and special attention should 
be given measures to prevent its spread. Physicians and 
communities were to be impressed with the importance of 
recognizing promptly the first cases of yellow fever, the 
inspectors v;ere told, and all suspicious cases were to be 
watched carefully. Detailed reports of these cases were 
to be preserved and forwarded to the National Board by 
state and local authorities.
The great majority of existing quarantine establish­
ments, contended the Report, did not possess facilities
349
adequate for properly dealing with infected ships. Only 
nine fully-equipped quarantine stations were necessary to 
protect the country from disease, continued Cabell, and 
these stations would free most American ports from the 
burdensome expense of purchasing costly apparatus. The 
Report stated that the proposed quarantine station on 
Ship Island would treat infected vessels destined for 
Gulf ports between Pensacola and New Orleans (including 
those two ports), and would be one of three stations to 
be equipped and maintained entirely by the federal govern­
ment.
Quarantine stations were also to be established on 
the Mississippi River at New Orleans, Vicksburg, Memphis, 
and Cairo, declared the Report. Competent inspectors 
would examine all boats traversing the river, Cabell stat­
ed, and would grant certificates as to the sanitary condi­
tion aboard the vessels.
Cabell mentioned the yellow fever epidemic which pre­
vailed in Memphis during the summer. More than two thousand 
cases and nearly six hundred deaths were recorded. The 
figures for the state of Louisiana in 1$79 were 745 cases 
and 162 deaths. Cabell noted the many local quarantines 
employed to prevent communication with Memphis, and as­
serted that those quarantines had been obstructive to 
commerce and unnecessary. The difficulty, he thought, was 
that people had to rely on them because none of the state
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boards of health was prepared for the emergency. The Lou­
isiana Board of Health was said to be merely the New Or­
leans Board of Health with power for quarantine purposes. 
However, Cabell’s Report asserted with gratification "that 
the operations of the State and local boards aided by it 
£~the National Board of Health_7 were harmonious and sat­
isfactory, and that all the officers of these boards showed 
great interest in the work, furnishing information and
drendering services of great value to the board. . . . ”
The National Board’s annual Report for 1&79 also 
contained a ’'Report on Quarantine at New Orleans,” by Dr.
J. H. Rauch. Rauch had visited the Crescent City in June 
with instructions to ascertain general sanitary conditions 
existing in the city and to investigate quarantine pro­
cedures used by Louisiana health officials, municipal 
sanitation, Rauch reported, left little to be desired, 
but he was very critical of the state quarantine. He 
noted the Louisiana Board’s action in reducing from twenty 
days to ten days the detention period required of vessels 
arriving from infected ports. Moreover, Rauch remarked, 
even at the time the twenty day quarantine was in force, 
vessels proceeded to New Orleans after a detention ranging 
from twenty-four hours to eighteen days— as a rule, from
°Annual Report of the Nat 
1&79 (Washington’7 1879) » PP* 5-22
ional Board of Health,
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three to five days.9
The Louisiana Board of Health was placed on the defen­
sive by the criticism of its quarantine policy from influ­
ential New Orleans sources who thought the restrictions 
too rigid, and from national health authorities and others 
outside Louisiana who maintained they were not rigid enough. 
Surprisingly, Choppin did not strike back at these critics 
in the State Board's annual Report for 1&79. He admitted 
that during May so much pressure was applied to Board mem­
bers that a majority, acting individually, consented to 
the release of vessels from quarantine before the expira­
tion of the twenty day detention period. He noted the 
liberalization of restrictions in the fall as soon as this 
action could safel_y be taken. Choppin felt called upon to 
reiterate his conviction that "conditional” quarantines 
could never be made effective, and "the only absolutely 
safe policy /~was_7 non-intercourse for certain months, 
enforced by positive lav/." Choppin’s Report credited 
rules and regulations established by the National Board 
of Health for the regulation of inland quarantine with 
having served to remove the apprehensions of interior 
communities, thereby averting a rash of embargoes,^
9ibid., pp. 45&-61.
IQAnnual Report of the Board of Health of the State 
°* Louisiana to the General Assembly for the Year 1879 
TNew Orleans, 1880j, pp. 17-23.
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The Louisiana State Board of Health started off the 
year IB30 on a sour note. Governor Louis A. Wiltz, in his 
message to the state Legislature, manifested antagonism 
toward the quarantine adopted by the Board the previous 
year. The Board’s primary duty, he said, should be to 
warn the people of the state concerning dangers to the 
public health and to advise all necessary precautions 
and preventive measures. Wiltz maintained that no reason 
existed why New Orleans should be walled up against the 
outside world. "Thorough cleanliness and rigid sanitary 
regulations at home, seconded by rigid exclusion of in­
fection and contagion, must be the chief reliance of the 
public for safety,” the Governor’s message asserted, "but 
these may be secured effectually without putting an embargo 
upon all commerce and all intercourse with the outside 
world.” Speaking for. the state’s industrial and commercial 
interests, Wiltz implored the lawmakers to find a means 
of adequate protection which would not paralyze business.^ 
Despite this appeal, no legislation was forthcoming.
The Ship Island project of the National Board of 
Health remained very much in the news. Dr. John S. Bill­
ings, Vice-President of the National Board, addressed a 
meeting of the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary Association
•̂ Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives of the ‘State of Louisiana, at the Reg-" 
uTar Session . . • T33(3 (New""'Q’rleans~| 1880), p. 17J!7~*
353
in December, explaining that Ship Island appeared to be 
the best location between Key West and New Orleans for a 
quarantine station. The idea, explained Billings, was to 
secure all possible safeguards against infection with as 
little restriction upon commerce as was compatible with 
this protection. The Sanitary Association resolved to 
recommend that a national quarantine station be established 
on Ship Island, and stated that its Influence would be 
utilized to obtain legislation for Louisiana and the fed­
eral government making state and national quarantines
12harmonious and effective. A month later the Democrat 
came out strongly in favor of the Ship Island Quarantine, 
Some advantages \'iere mentioned which Ship Island presumably 
would have: good accomodations for vessels, facilities
for rapid discharge and disinfection, and pure salt breezes 
from the Gulf of Mexico. It was suggested that persons 
forced to stay there during detention might indulge in 
surf bathing, fishing, and boating. Ship Island, asserted 
the Democrat, would be of "incalculable benefit to New 
Orleans."^
Dr. Choppin at no time displayed outright opposition 
to the establishment of a federally-controlled quarantine 
station on Ship Island. But Choppin’s three-year presidency
•̂2Picayune, December 2, 1$79*
^ Democrat, January 20, lSBO.
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of the State Board, terminated early in lSSO. New men were 
appointed by the Governor, and on April & the reorganized 
Board took office, Dr. Joseph Jones, upon being chosen 
President by the other members, announced his intention 
to work in harmony with the National Board of Health and 
the Auxiliary Sanitary Association. Jones, however, soon 
became an implacable foe of the National Board, and did 
more than any other individual to bring about its demise.
A former Confederate officer, Jones refused to yield state 
authority to an encroaching federal agency.
The National Board of Health did not wait long in 
testing Jones1 spirit of cooperation. On April 10, two 
days after Jones became President, he received a letter 
from Bemiss stating five propositions with regard to the 
Ship Island Quarantine and asking him three questions about 
the Louisiana Board’s official attitude toward the project. 
Bemiss stated as reasons for establishing the Ship Island 
Quarantine that danger from importation of epidemic diseases 
would be diminished by detaining infected vessels at a dis­
tance from the coast; passengers and crews would receive 
good accommodations; and prompt, thorough disinfection would 
be provided. The second proposition asserted that vessels 
required to stop at Ship Island would be those with in­
fectious diseases, those sailing from infected ports, and 
those compelled to do so by quarantine regulations of Lou­
isiana, Mississippi, or Alabama, The last proposition
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reassured the Louisiana Board that the Ship Island Quaran­
tine was to be entirely cooperative with sanitary organiza­
tions engaged in the same work of protecting United States 
citizens from pestilence.^
The questions put to Jones involved the willingness 
of the Louisiana Board to help enforce the rules embodied 
in the second proposition, its willingness to order back 
to Ship Island vessels attempting to proceed to New Orleans 
in contravention of the rules, and its willingness to ac­
cept bills of health and certificates of disinfection from 
the chief medical officer at Ship Island without subjecting 
vessels bearing them to further restrictions. The ques­
tions were submitted by Jones to the state Attorney-General, 
J. C. Egan, whose reply was dispatched to Bemiss April 22. 
Egan stated that in his opinion the State Board had power 
to order vessels back to Ship Island— Jones believed the 
Board did not have this power--when by doing so the secu­
rity of the state would be enhanced. But, said Egan, the 
lav/ confided largely in the discretion of the State Board 
of Health regarding quarantine matters, and this trust 
could not in any manner be delegated. Egan stated further 
that the law contemplated the personal service of state 
health officials, and therefore bills of health and
•̂ Annual Report of the National Board of Health,
1SS0 (Washington, 1881J, p. 603.
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certificates of disinfection from an officer of the Nation­
al Board could not be conclusively satisfactory.^
Several days before Egan’s opinion was known, Jones 
expressed disapproval of the Ship Island project. The new 
State Health Officer asserted that even if he had power 
to send vessels back to Ship Island, he had no disposition 
to do so because it might criople the commerce of the Mis­
sissippi Valley. Jones steadfastly maintained that the 
quarantine stations operated by the Louisiana Board of 
Health provided the Valley adequate protection from imported 
diseases. The National Board, he insisted, should according 
to the law grant financial aid to Louisiana authorities so 
that existing quarantine establishments could be repaired 
and re-equipped. Early in July Jone3 submitted to the 
National Board a request that ten thousand dollars be 
appropriated for this purpose, and a like amount be placed 
at the disposal of the Louisiana Board in the event of an 
epidemic. The National Board's outright refusal to provide 
this kind of aid Jones attributed to the animosity excited 
among federal officers by his refusal to agree that all 
infected ships should go to Ship Island.
An important achievement of the National Board of
•^Ibid., pp. 603-604.
■^Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana, for the Year l^^Q /"lixtracts 7~(New Orleans, 
n .d l.), pp. 5O", 54-5^
Health in l&BO was the establishment of the Mississippi 
River Inspection Service. This new service was aimed at 
preventing the spread of epidemic diseases along the river, 
at the same time avoiding unnecessary obstruction to trav­
el and traffic during the prevalence-of disease. The 
Board’s annual Report noted its success in having made 
possible continuous sanitary supervision of vessels in 
transit between New Orleans and Cairo, Illinois during 
the summer months. Intermediate quarantine stations were 
set up near Vicksburg, near Memphis, ana near Cairo; all 
vessels traversing the river in either direction were re­
quired to stop. The Report maintained that improved sani­
tary conditions on steamboats, barges, and other vessels 
had been secured, and confidence in threatened communities
had been created, thereby averting the shotgun quaran- 
17tine. The rules and regulations adopted by the National
Board of Health for the Inspection Service, and also the
rules and regulations pertaining to railroad travel were
presented to the Louisiana Board in May. Two weeks later
the committee appointed by Jones to consider the rules
reported unanimously in favor of granting support to these
new undertakings. However, the Louisiana Board was some-
1Swhat provoked because it had not been consulted earlier.
-^Report of the National Board of Health, 13&0, p.
2g.
-̂ Democrat, May 21, lBSO; Picayune, June 4, 18&0.
Early in May a quarantine proclamation was issued by 
Governor Wiltz; it was to go into effect May 10. Vessels 
from Havana, Vera Cruz, and Rio de Janeiro were made sub­
ject to the quarantine. Vessels with clean bills of 
health and no sickness on board during the passage were 
to be allowed to proceed up the river after thorough dis­
infection. Those with sickness on board or known to be 
dangerously infected were to be detained at the discretion 
of the Louisiana Board of Health, The Democrat declared
the quarantine fair and just, and asserted that all rea-
19sonable men would support it. Unfortunately, incidents 
involving the Louisiana quarantine were soon to widen the 
breach between state and national health officials.
Seeking to promote friendly relations with the Loui­
siana Board, Dr. Cabell, President of the National Board 
of Health, wrote an unofficial letter to Jones May 27. 
Cabell said it was the desire of his organization to co­
operate with Louisiana health authorities "without in the 
slightest degree usurping any of their rights or desiring 
to supersede them in respect to any of their powers.” He 
told Jones that originally the National Board had not 
wanted any quarantine power and desired only to grant 
financial aid to state boards, but Congress would not 
permit dispersal of government funds without government
■̂ Democrat, May 5, lSBO.
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control. Congressmen from the Mississippi Valley, he 
wrote, insisted that the National Board be given general 
authority over a system of quarantine which would be out­
side state jurisdiction.
Cabell informed Jones that after the previous summer 
several municipalities had made urgent applications to the 
National Board of Health for quarantine stations to protect 
their own and neighboring ports. According to Cabell, the 
applicants, all of whom were ports on the South Atlantic 
and Gulf Coasts, alleged the want of necessary funds to 
maintain a proper establishment. Cabell explained that a 
few fully-equipped stations were being set up by the Na­
tional Board so that ports unable to acquire adequate 
equipment and facilities to handle infected vessels could 
avail themselves of assistance. Cabell’s friendly tone 
prevailed until the last paragraph of the letter. Then 
Jones was reminded of the legal duty imposed upon the 
National Board to report to the President of the United 
States the failure or refusal by a state to use proper 
measures to keep out infectious disease. Cabell assured
Jones that should the necessity to take this action arise,
20his organiztion would not shirk its responsibility.
The National Board persisted in its stand that Missis­
sippi Station was no place for infected vessels. The point
^J. L. Cabell to Joseph Jones, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, May 27> l&SO, in Joseph Jones Papers, Gummed 
Stub File Book, Business Papers, o j d . cit.
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was made many times that vessels proceeding to the Missis­
sippi Quarantine, nearly forty miles upstream, had ample 
opportunity for contact with the nearby shore. Ship Is­
land, it was argued, not only was a healthier spot, but 
it was located several miles from the mainland. Dr. Jones 
investigated Mississippi Station in June and remarked at 
a Board meeting a few days later that the site was well 
chosen, remarkably healthy, and commanded the mouth of 
the river. It could not be superseded, he declared, by 
another quarantine station removed from the banks of the 
Mississippi. Jones hurled defiance at the National Board 
of Health by asserting: "However and whenever detained
and quarantined, ships must again undergo thorough in­
spection and be submitted to rigid quarantine regulations
whenever they enter the gateway of the Valley of the Mis-
• „  21sissippx
Several times during the spring and summer of 1&S0 
the National Board of Health was accused by the State 
Board and the New Orleans press of intentionally or un­
intentionally exciting needless yellow fever alarms 
throughout the country. In April the Associated Press 
reported that eleven deaths from "malignant yellow fever" 
had been recorded in New Orleans during the four-week 
period ending March 27. The National Board was said to
^ Picayune, June 16, 1BS0.
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be the source of information. Dr. Thomas J. Turner,
the Board Secretary, wrote to Governor Wiltz, informing
him that the erroneous report resulted from a mistake by
the telegraph operator. Jones was not satisfied because,
as he pointed out in a letter to Turner, the mistake had
caused great excitement in hew Orleans, in Louisiana, and
22in neighboring states. Dr. Turner later became the vic­
tim of bitter epithets when he untactfully predicted that 
New Orleans would be visited by violent yellow fever within 
a month. Turner, declared an editorial in the States, was 
the chief among the medical charlatans and scientific 
jackasses spawned by the National Board of Health. 3̂
The worst was yet to come. A serious incident in­
volving the state quarantine occurred in July, and reper­
cussions from it produced widespread ill feeling during 
the remainder of the year. This incident v/as the belated 
appearance of yellov/ fever aboard the Swedish bark Excel­
sior after its release from Mississippi Station. Accord­
ing to Jones, the Excelsior had been at Rio de Janeiro, 
an infected port, from April 13 to May 10, and arrived 
at Mississippi Station June 24. No yellow fever had 
occurred on the vessel either at Rio or during the voyage. 
The Excelsior was detained twelve days in quarantine, and
^Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . . . ll%0, pp. 65-67.
23New Orleans States, July 16, lBBO.
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the entire cargo of thirty-six hundred sacks of coffee 
was thoroughly aired and fumigated with sulphurous acid 
gas. The ship itself was said to have been cleaned care­
fully.
Jones related that on July 5 the Excelsior reached 
New Orleans. Five days later he visited one of its crew 
members at Touro Infirmary and found symptoms of yellow 
fever. Immediately the Civil Sheriff of Orleans Parish 
was ordered to seize the apparently infected vessel and 
have it towed back to the quarantine station. The Excel­
sior was returned to quarantine July 11 and this time was 
not released until August 1$. A few additional cases of 
yellow fever were noted aboard the Excelsior between July 
11 and July 14. Jones declared that every effort had been 
made to protect Louisiana and the Mississippi Valley from 
disease, and these efforts were crowned with success be­
cause no case of yellow fever was propagated from the Ex­
celsior.
In other states this incident brought condemnation 
of the Louisiana Board of Health and its President. One 
case of yellow fever in New Orleans was enough to excite
^Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . . . l M O , pp. 34-42. Jones also pointed proudly 
to his resolute handling of the Vanguard case. In may the 
Vanguard, a British vessel, refused to stop at Mississippi 
Station, and proceeded to New Orleans without a permit.
The Civil Sheriff was promptly alerted, and the Vanguard 
was removed from the Crescent City and placed in quaran­
tine, ibid., pp. 25-2$.
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general anxiety in some places. Almost immediately upon
hearing about this case, health authorities in Mississippi
and Tennessee imposed quarantines against the ’’infected1'
city. On July 16 the Mississippi State Board of Health
issued a proclamation noting that coffee from the Excelsior
was stored in a New Orleans warehouse, and therefore trains
and water craft departing from New Orleans would not be
allowed to enter Mississippi unless inspected by an officer
of the National Board of Health. Persons from New Orleans
could not enter Mississippi without a certificate from an
officer of the National Board stating they had not been
2 5exposed to infection. J
The Tennessee State Board of Health issued an order 
restricting certain vessels leaving New Orleans from land­
ing in Tennessee unless they presented a certificate of 
inspection from an officer or agent of the National Board 
of Health. A month later the two Memphis members of the 
Tennessee Board wrote the Acting Governor of Louisiana, 
Samuel D. McEnery, explaining the reason for the quaran­
tine. They pointed out that when New Orleans neglected 
proper precautions and allowed infected vessels to enter 
the city, the law of self-preservation demanded that the
^ Quarantine Proclamation of the Mississippi State 
Board of Health, July' l'6, 1 &80] fn.p., n.d. J", in Notebook 
and Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (1&80), Louisiana State 
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, Louisiana 
State Office Building, New Orleans, Louisiana.
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rest of the Mississippi Valley, so often scourged from
New Orleans, take steps to confine the infection to the
community which permitted it to enter through negligence
or indifference. The Tennessee quarantine order, McEnery
was told, prevented panic and shotgun quarantine. The
Tennessee health officials explained that restrictions
on intercourse between their state and New Orleans would
have been even more stringent if it had not been for the
general confidence placed in the River Inspection Service
of the National Board of Health.^
New Orleanians were outraged at the action taken by
Mississippi and Tennessee. The Times denounced the boards
of health of those states for their precipitate orders,
and suggested they send competent men to the Crescent City
27to discover the truth about its salubrity. The Democrat 
blamed the National Board of Health for not publicizing 
the healthfulness of New Orleans. Jones wrote Governor 
McEnery, delivering an official protest. The quarantines, 
he said, were "unnecessary, unwise, ungenerous and uncon­
stitutional . Jones remarked to Dr. C. P. Wilkinson, a
quarantine physician at Mississippi Station, that it seemed
^Report of the National Board of Health, 1830,
pp. 5&-60.
27Tj.mes, July 22, 1880.
^Democrat, July IS, 1380.
29lbid., July 23, 1830.
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impossible to satisfy the fears and avarice of surrounding 
states and cities because of their prejudice against the 
Louisiana quarantine.*^
. Most of the restrictions imposed by Tennessee and 
Mississippi against New Orleans were removed after two 
weeks. However, Mississippi and the city of Mobile con­
tinued to ban coffee from New Orleans, fearing that it 
might be part of the Excelsior1s cargo, and therefore 
infected. The National Board of Health became involved 
when its Supervisor of Inspectors in New Orleans, Dr. C.
A. Rice, publicized the Mississippi and Mobile coffee or­
ders, At a. meeting of the Louisiana Board of Health July 
29 Rice was roundly denounced for allegedly having exceeded 
his authority by prohibiting shipments to places in Missis­
sippi and Alabama. The next day Jones wrote Governor Mc­
Enery protesting Rice’s action. He described it as ’’ille­
gal, unconstitutional and destructive of the commercial 
relations of the individual States.
A few days later Dr. Rice wrote the Governor explain­
ing that the coffee order issue was a tempest in a teapot. 
Rice conceded that the National Board of Health had no 
powrer to forbid the shipment of coffee or any other article
30jones to Wilkinson, New Orleans, July 17> 1&3C, 
in Notebook and Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (1BB0), 
op. cit.
^ Picayune, July 30) August 1, l££0.
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from a port not declared to be infected. The publication 
of the Mississippi and Mobile orders, he said, was simply 
to notify shippers and public curriers that these orders 
existed. The National Boars of Health, McEnery was told, 
had performed a valuable service by warning shippers that 
coffee had been declared contraband of quarantine and 
would be returned.^2
New- Orleans also had trouble with Galveston again.
Early in July it was reported that Galveston was considering 
the adoption of a quarantine against the Crescent City. No 
action was taken, but a month later, after the Excelsior 
affair, two members of the Galveston Board of Health vis­
ited New Orleans to get the truth regarding the Louisiana 
quarantine. The cm' ef concern of the two Galveston health
officials was the seventy-two hour detention which was 
»
being required of vessels having arrived from the infected 
ports of Havana and Vera Cruz. They let it be known that 
unless the detention period was extended, the Galveston 
Board would almost surely quarantine New Orleans. Jones 
received a letter from Dr. R. Rutherford, Texas State 
Health Officer, which contained an almost identical warn-
33m g .
Galveston health authorities, including Rutherford,
^2xbid., August 6, 1830.
33pemocrat, August 5, 6, 1.330.
seemed convinced that the seventy-two hour detention would 
permit a vessel from Havana or Vera Cruz to complete its 
voyage to New Orleans in five days. Members of the Loui­
siana Board of Health protested this conclusion, but agreed 
to humor the Galvestonians by modifying the quarantine.
At a special meeting held August 9 a resolution was adopted 
requiring that ten days elapse before vessels sailing from 
infected ports would be allowed to dock in New Orleans. 
Seventy-two hours of that period were to be spent at the 
Mississippi Quarantine for disinfection, fumigation, and 
observation. The visitors from Galveston were satisfied, 
and no further difficulties were recorded from this quarter 
during the remainder of the year.
While the controversy with Galveston was raging, the 
New Orleans press, as in other years, suggested that the 
motives of the Texas City were anything but pure, Galves­
ton was said to be promoting its own business interests at 
New OrleansT expense. The Times stated that Galveston’s 
quarantines were aimed at keeping New Orleans merchants 
out of Texas at the beginning of the business season.^
The following are the last two stanzas of a six stanza 
verse appearing in the Democrat (Governor 0. M. Roberts 
of Texas is speaking to Rutherford):
-̂ Ibid., August 6, 10, 1&$0.
^^Times, August 9> 1$$0.
We must not stop at any means 
Our seaport's trade to save, sir:
So telegraph from New Orleans,
And I will do what best it seems—
Give them the benefit of the doubt 
By— keeping all the people out.
Go find the "germ"— at least pretend 
That you have found it there;
Then quickly me a message send 
(And please prepay it at your end),
Galveston then will feel serene, .
V/hen Wet-Nursed by our Quarantine.3°
Fortunately, in 1880 the expected Galveston quarantine did 
not materialize.
During September and October another serious clash 
occurred between the Louisiana Board of Health and the 
National Board. On September 3 Jones was advised that a 
fatal form of fever had appeared in Plaquemines Parish, 
below New Orleans. The exact location of this minor out­
break was at Point'd la Hache and Point Ilichel, in the 
vicinity of Mississippi Station. The question immediately 
arising was whether-the malignant disease which had at­
tacked the region bordering the lower extremity of tr.e 
Mississippi River was yellow fever.^7
Dr. Jones telegraphed several doctors in the general 
area of the outbreak to get all the facts about the cases, 
and to inform him at once as to their conclusions. The 
general, although not unanimous, consensus among the
3^Democrat, August 8, 1880.
3?Report of the National Board of Health, 1880, 
p . 57; Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . . . 1880, pp. 127-28.
examining ohysicians was that the disease in question was 
an unusually severe form of malarial fever. The accumula­
ted facts were laid before the Louisiana Board of Health 
September 9. The Board meetings were open to the public 
and press, stated Jones, because the Board wanted the 
public to know the truth, hoping that confidence would 
be engendered and panic thereby avoided. But by this 
time the National Board of Health had also acted. Dr. 
George M. Sternberg, U. S. A., a prominent public health 
official, had been dispatched to Point sa la Hache and Point 
Michel to investigate, and on September 10 he submitted a 
very controversial report. Sternberg concluded that the
twenty cases he visited were not severe malarial fever,
3 Abut were mild yellow fever.
Dr. Bemiss, calling attention to Sternberg’s report, 
notified Jones that the National Board of Health was a- 
vailing the Louisiana Board of funds necessary to procure 
disinfectants, to pay sanitary police and inspectors, and 
to meet other expenses incurred in preventing the spread 
of fever. Jones refused the offer, and commented later 
that if it had been accepted, rigid quarantines would have 
been established against New Orleans, inflicting panic 
and incalculable damage. As it was, he said, the National
3^Report of the National Board of Health, l&gQ, 
p p . 6Q7-609; Report of the BoalFH 'of lie alt h of tEe State 
of Louisiana . . . I'EEO, pp. 127-T5*
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Board of Health had nearly provoked a panic by telegraph­
ing the country's leading business centers stating that 
seventy-five cases of yellow fever had appeared around 
Quarantine Station. On September 23 the State Board 
adopted resolutions bearing a preamble which stated that 
the National Board of Health had "deliberately attempted 
. . . to create a Yellow Fever panic." A resolution re­
quested officers of the National Board to instruct their 
representatives in Louisiana to conform tneir conduct with 
the law by merely extending aid whenever asked to do so by 
Louisiana health authorities. The Louisiana Board of Health 
pledged itself to alert the entire c untry promptly should 
an epidemic disease be detected, and to keep the public
truthfully informed about trie health of Mew Orleans and
39the surrounding area.
In the meantime a neutral commission had been created 
to investigate the fever in Plaquemines Parish. Dr. Stern­
berg, representing the National Board of Health, was a 
member of the commission along with Dr. J. P. Davidson of 
the State Board of Health and Dr. J. D. Bruns of Mew Or­
leans. All three were presumably authorities on yellow 
fever, but their conclusions regarding the fever they 
investigated differed greatly. Sternberg reiterated his 
earlier findings that the disease in question was yellow 
fever, possibly resulting from cases on the Excelsior.
39figport of the Board of Health of the State of
Louisiana . , . 1 ^ 0 , pp. 133-35.
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Davidson and Bruns maintained with equal resolve that the
disease was malarial fever which appeared in an especially
dangerous form because of increased acreage planted to rice 
i+0in the area. Rice, thought some, was an unhealthy mode
of agriculture, being a prolific source of severe malarial 
fevers. New Orleans newspapers, eager to dispel fear, 
publicised the conclusions of Davidson and Bruns, but 
scarcely mentioned Sternberg’s minority report at all,
Jones steadfastly held to his position that no yellow 
fever had been present.
Dr. Bemiss and. Dr. R. V/. Mitchell of Memphis, members 
of the National Board of Health, did not hesitate to sup­
port Sternberg's findings. Sternberg's reputation as an 
authority on yellow fever was imnressive, but in New Or­
leans it was said that his knowledge of the disease was 
"tenth rate." Two Memphis newspapers, always extremely 
critical of the Louisiana Board of Health, printed the 
Sternberg report together with some acid comments of their 
own. The Memphis Appeal declared the report would probably 
convince doubters that Louisiana health authorities were 
insincere, and would strengthen the general conviction 
that except through the National Board of Health people 
upstream had no guarantee that quarantines in Mew Orleans 
would be faithfully enforced. The Memphis Avalanche
^QReport of the National Board of Health, 1&&0,
pp. 57, 607-1$.
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asserted that Jones was an uncompromising opponent of 
quarantine, and that the Louisiana Board of Health had 
made war upon many of the nation’s public health organ­
izations as well as upon ’'every individual who has ventured 
to express an opinion not in consonance 'with its methods 
of suppression, misrepresentation and total neglect of 
ordinary sanitary measures;”^
This controversy stirred the New Orleans press to 
denounce the National Board as mischievous and worthless, 
and Sternberg as an ignorant charlatan, unfitted for his 
position.^ The Ship Island Quarantine, completed during 
the summer, was also subjected to another barrage ■ f crit­
icism. The States, among others, complained that the new 
quarantine was vexatious to commerce because ships had to
J  O  'sail nearly 150 miles out of toe way. 1 The National 
Board of Health was accused by the Picayune of having 
ruined New Orleans’ coffee trade. The editor noted that 
the entire country had been warned about purchasing coffee 
from New Orleans, but no mention at all was made when 
infected vessels brought the same commodity to New York 
or Baltimore. The National Board, he said, lacked a truly 
national policy. "It is simply a great Government incubus
^ Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . . . 0, pp. 140-42.
^2Times, September 21, 1BB0; Democrat, November 6,
1SB0.
^ States, August 27, 1$£0.
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that has cast its entire might upon the commerce of New 
Orleans,” continued the editorial, "It is a monstrous 
humbug and should be abolished at once."^
Jones vas at all times anxious to continue his verbal 
assaults on the National Board of Health, with or without 
justification. Late in 1SB0 Bemiss was assailed with 
particular bitterness for having had the audacity to 
criticize the Louisiana Board in the New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal. Jones set out to showr the "inate 
rottenness" of the entire editorial. In the first place, 
he said, Bemiss had from the beginning assumed an attitude 
of decided enmity toward him. The Ship Island Quarantine 
Jones described as a "preposterous scheme" which, if it 
had been enforced, would have destroyed Crescent City 
com::,eree without protecting the Mississippi Valley. Jones 
declared 3emir;st statement that he, Jones, was opposed to 
quarantine to be absolutely false. Finally, Jones accused 
Bemiss of having originally accepted the majority report 
on "Rice Fever," but later of having reported one hundred
t C
cases of yelloxv fever in Louisiana during lBBO.
On November 19 Governor Wiltz and three Louisiana 
Congressmen met with Jones and three other members of the 
State Board of Health. - The purpose of the meeting, said
^Picayune, October 10, lBBO.
4-5Ibid., November 5) 1#$0.
the Governor, was to discuss the health and commerce of the 
state. Wiltz expressed his desire that the Congressmen 
should be well informed on questions involving Louisiana's 
commercial interests and quarantine regulations when those 
subjects came up in Congress. Mr. I. N. Marks, a prom­
inent Board member, spoke of the persistent hostility 
manifested by the National Board of Health toward Louisiana 
health officials. The National Board, asserted Marks, 
endeavored to excite suspicion and distrust of the Loui­
siana Board, and gave birth to sensational reports which 
interfered with New Orleans commerce. Jones declared that 
state quarantines had in all instances been rigidly en­
forced, and the Ship Island quarantine would make a very 
weak substitute. The National Board's quarantine powers 
were calculated to produce continued collisions with 
state boards, Jones averred. Jones and Dr. Felix Formento 
suggested repeal of the act of June 2, 1$79 which granted 
the National Board of Health its authority in quarantine 
matters.^
New Orleans was host to three important public health 
conventions held simultaneously during the last month of 
lGGO. The American Public Health Association scheduled its 
annual meeting in the Crescent City, so the Sanitary Council 
of the Mississippi Valley did likewise, and the Louisiana
^ Ibid. , November 20, lBBO,
375
Board of Health, envisioning the presence of many prominent 
public health leaders, planned a special Quarantine Confer­
ence, On August 26 the Louisiana Board adopted a resolu­
tion requesting Jones to invite state and municipal boards 
of health to send delegates to New Orleans where subjects 
’’vital to sanitary and commercial welfare” were to be 
discussed. The National Board of Health was also asked 
to take part in the meetings. In October Jones wrote to 
the governors of Southern states and to the mayors of
prominent cities concerning the upcoming Quarantine Con-
L.1ference, hoping in this way to stimulate action.
The three conventions met from December 7 through 
December 10, It was well known that in all of them the 
major topic of discussion was to be the status and effi­
cacy of the National Board of Health. At the meeting of 
the American Public Health Association Dr. Sternberg 
presented a paper, ’'Yellow Fever and Quarantine,” highly 
critical of the Louisiana quarantine. Sternberg empha­
sized disinfection as opposed to detention as the best 
means of forestalling importation of infectious diseases. 
The disinfection procedures employed by the Louisiana 
Board of Health he believed to be inadequate. The quaran­
tine at New Orleans was virtually worthless, Sternberg 
declared, because of unique problems encountered in the
^Democrat, August 27> October 22, 1$B0; New Or­
leans Medical and Surgical Journal , n.s., VIII (1S^0-'§T), 
2^9-90.
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Crescent City: the numerous waterways providing several
approaches, the extended commerce, the strong opposition 
to quarantine from some businessmen and physicians, and 
the difficulty in obtaining an efficient administration 
of the state quarantine system. Mississippi Station was 
located very poorly, Sternberg asserted, because of the 
ease with which contact between infected vessels and the 
area bordering the river was possible.^
The American Public Health Association was told by 
its President, Dr. J. 3. Billings, who wa.; also Vice- 
President of the National Board of Health, about the 
general sentiment in the country supporting the National 
Board. The Association’s Advisory Committee on Sanitary 
Legislation urged Congress to make suitable appropriations 
for the National Board of Health so that it could continue 
its work; the Committee noted that the National Board did 
not desire to have its powers increased. Dr.- J. D. Bruns 
of New Orleans was somewhat critical of the National Board 
of Health, particularly because two of its members, Bemiss 
and Mitchell, accepted Sternberg’s minority report on the 
fever in Plaquemines Parish rather than the majority re­
port which denied the presence of yellow fever. Sternberg, 
according to Bruns, knew very little about fevers in the
^Public Health Papers and Reports Presented at 
the Eighth Annual Meeting o£" the American Public Health 
Association, 1880 ( B o s t o n , Vi, J51-57.
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lower Mississippi Valley. Bruns’ position was not sup­
ported by the Association, the outcome being the adoption 
of a resolution declaring that whenever there was doubt 
respecting the nature of an outbreak of disease, national, 
state, and local health officials should give the benefit 
of the doubt on the side of safety. ^
Far more important than anything done by the American 
Public Health Association was the adoption of two provoca­
tive resolutions by the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi 
Valley. The first resolution, offered by Drs. Pinckney 
Thompson and J. V/. Holland of Kentucky, stated:
Whereas, experience has shown that 
measures of quarantine under the sole 
direction of local and State Boards of 
Health have not succeeded in protecting 
this valley from invasion from yellow 
fever; and,
Whereas, our people habitually view 
with distrust all announcements and sani­
tary acts of local boards, when those acts 
and announcements are of a character to 
affect the commercial interests of the 
locality directly concerned;
Resolved, that in our* opinion the 
General Government alone, acting through 
its constituted sanitary agents, should 
have the direction and control of na­
tional and maritime quarantine.
After the adoption of this resolution Dr. J. H. Rauch of
Illinois presented another of equal significance:
Whereas, There is unfortunately a 
want of confidence with regard to the 
prompt furnishing of information by the 
health authorities of New Orleans with
^Ibid., 385-86; Picayune, December 9> 11, 1880,
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reference to infectious and contagious 
diseases; Therefore,
Resolved, That in the opinion of 
this Council it would undoubtedly tend to 
the restoration of confidence if the State 
Board of Health would request the National 
Board of Health to place an inspector 
at the Quarantine Station and one in New 
Orleans, who shall have access to the 
records of the /~Louisiana__7 Board of 
Health, and be furnished every facility 
for obtaining reliable information with 
regard to all cases deemed suspicious, 
and especially with regard to yellow fever.50
By adopting these resolutions the Sanitary Council of the 
Mississippi Valley aligned itself squarely on the side of 
the National Board of Health in the battle being waged be­
tween federal and state health officials over the question 
of quarantine jurisdiction.
The Quarantine Convention called by the Louisiana 
State Board of Health produced nothing of significance.
The Louisiana Board1s Committee on Arrangements prepared 
a program with the avowed aim of securing the adoption 
of "a regular and uniform system of quarantine and of such 
sanitary measures and precautions as yf would_7 best facil­
itate the interests of the public health and those of 
commerce and Inter-State relations.'1 This elaborate pro­
gram was almost totally disregarded because there was too
50New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
viii (lSSo^I), 691-9 3 .
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little harmony and too little time.^ It is not at all 
surprising that there should have been resistance to the 
scheduled plans, because the obvious intention of Loui­
siana health authorities was to frame a quarantine agree­
ment among state and local boards of health which would 
have reduced the National Board of Health’s dominion.
Dr. Jerome Cochran of Alabama introduced to the Quar­
antine Conference some resolutions defending the National 
Board and its actions. Edward Fenner, representing the 
Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans, supported 
Cochran by reading resolutions adopted only two days 
earlier by the Crescent City Chamber of Commerce. No 
local board of health, said these latter resolutions, 
could carry into effect sanitary measures necessary to 
avert the spread of disease and to protect commerce. The 
National Board of Health was said to be beneficial to New 
Orleans because of the widespread confidence it held. 
Jumping to the defense of the Louisiana Board, I. N. Marks, 
one of its members, pointed out that the Chamber of Com­
merce comprised only a small fraction of New Orleans busi­
nessmen. Jones accused federal health officers of having 
spread false reports that yellow fever prevailed in
51lbid., pp. 688-89; Quarantine Convention called 
at the request of the Board of Health of the State of Lou­
isiana, to 8e~~held in the city of New Orleans, PecemBer 
7-l0, ltfgU . . . [New Orleans, TB80), pp. 4-1?•
Plaquemines Parish. Cochran*s proposals were defeated, 
and eventually a compromise was found. A resolution was 
adopted directing the appointment of two committees, one 
representing the Atlantic and Gulf states, and the other 
the states of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys. Each 
committee was to formulate a schedule of rules and regula­
tions dealing with quarantine and sanitary matters. The
schedules were to be submitted to the individual states
52for ratification and adoption. This resolution was of 
little importance, end all concerned seemed to regard the 
Quarantine Conference as a failure.
The results of the three conventions influenced the 
opinion of at least one Crescent City newspaper. The 
Democrat, although never an enthusiastic adherent of the 
National Board of Health, printed a long series of edi­
torials advising a conciliatory policy toward this organ­
isation because of the respect with wnich it was regarded 
by health officials and the general public in other places. 
The Louisiana Board of Health, asserted the editor, did 
not have the confidence of a single hamlet or community 
outside the state. The Democrat declared its confidence 
in the Louisiana Board, but stated that shotgun quarantines 
were more to be feared than yellow fever. The editor 
remarked thoughtfully: T,If, by making timely and reasonable
5^Picayune, December B, 10, 1$S0; New Orleans Med­
ical and Surgical Journal, n.s., VIII (loBO-^lT, 690.
3 Si
concessions to the fears and the desires of our neighbors, 
we can secure a fair and temperate and friendly treatment, 
should, we not be foolish as well as wicked to r e f u s e ? " ^
The State Board of Health found similar sentiments 
expressed elsewhere in the Crescent City. The New Orleans 
Medical and Surgical Association adopted a report by its 
Committee on Quarantine stating that the responsibility 
for keeping infectious and contagious diseases out of the 
Mississippi Valley should belong to the federal govern­
ment because it alone was capable of exercising super­
vision satisfactory to all interested communities. The 
report contained three specific recommendations which 
would enhance federal control of the Louisiana quarantine.
A health inspector of the National Board of Health, de­
clared the report, should be stationed at Eadsport to
r j
keep dangerously infected vessels out of the Mississippi. * 
It was recommended that a representative of the National 
Board be present at all meetings of the State Board of 
Health, and have access to all the State Board’s documents 
and reports. The report advised that a Board of Experts 
consisting of Bemiss, Jones, and a neutral member be or­
ganized to examine suspicious cases of yellow fever and
53pemocrat, December 12, 22, 1330.
^Dr. Jones appointed an inspector for Eadsport 
and the surrounding area in August, 1330. Of course, this 
inspector was an official of the State Board of Health.X
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to telegraph its decision to the National Board of Health.
These recommendations, approved in January, lBSl by the
Mew Orleans Medical and Surgical Association, were agreed
to early the following month by the Auxiliary Sanitary 
55Association. The Louisiana Board of Health was finding 
sovereignty.increasingly difficult to maintain.
emocrat, January 23 > February 10, 1331.
CHAPTER XII 
THE STATE BOARD OF HEALTH VICTORIOUS
At a meeting held In February, 1331, the attention 
of the Louisiana Board of Health was directed to a letter 
from the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley. The 
Board was reminded of the resolution adopted at the Sani­
tary Council’s recent meeting expressing want of confidence 
in New Orleans health authorities, and advising the Loui­
siana Board to request the National Board of Health to 
place an inspector at Mississippi Station, and another 
inspector in New Orleans who would have access to the 
records of the State Board of Health. Six Board members 
were hostile to this proposal, the others wishing to 
propitiate the Sanitary Council. The Board President,
Dr. Joseph Jones, declared that a majority of communities 
and boards of health outside New Orleans did have confi­
dence in the statement of Louisiana health authorities; 
Jones asserted further that he would rather resign than 
submit to a spy. Mr. I. N. Marks stated that the entire
scheme was an insult to the Board and the integrity of 
1its members.
The Democrat expressed disappointment in the Board’s
1Picayune, February 11, 1331.
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attitude. Neighboring states clearly did not place trust 
in pronouncements of the Louisiana Board of Health, de­
clared the editorial, and although the distrust was un­
justified, it could not be ignored, or New Orleans would 
again be threatened by local quarantines. The Democrat1s 
position was made very clear: "Popular excitement on the
subject of yellow fever has become so formidable and so 
widespread, so intense and so unmanageable, that we per­
ceive the wisdom of conciliating rather than opposing 
it."^ The Times, even more concerned, asked its readers: 
"Shall.we insist that its /"the Sanitary Council*s_7 very 
reasonable request shall be granted, or shall we support 
our State Board of Health in its effort to preserve what
it is pleased to consider its dignity and prerogative,
3and run the risk of having our commerce ruined?
The Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New Orleans 
came to the forefront in defense of the National Board 
of Health. Its President, Charles A, Whitney, asserted 
that only by acceptance of the Sanitary Council's prop­
ositions could premature and unnecessary restrictions on 
commercial and personal intercourse with the Crescent City 
be averted. Early in April the Association urged the 
Governor to exercise his authority to grant the two
^Democrat, February 12, lBSl.
^Times, March 10, lSSl.
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requests of the Sanitary Council.^-
Dr. James L. Cabell, President of the National Board 
of Health, asked Jones to make public the State Board’s 
official stand on these propositions. At the March 10 
meeting Mr. Edward Booth, speaking for the rest of the 
Louisiana Board, asserted that the proposition involving 
the inspector to be stationed by the National Board at 
the Mississippi Quarantine involved legal difficulties, 
and had been referred to the Board’s counsel and the state 
Attorney-General. Cabell was informed that agents of the 
National Board might have access to mortality reports, 
since this was a public right. In doubtful and suspicious 
cases of infectious disease, a representative or agent of 
the National Board of Health could be included when the 
State Board called consultations with experienced physi­
cians. Booth stated that Louisiana health authorities 
approved the resumption in 1331 of the sanitary inspection 
of railroad and river craft at New Orleans.**
On one issue the Louisiana State Board was adamant 
in its refusal to cooperate with federal health officials. 
Cabell and others repeatedly pressed the matter of re­
quiring all infected ships arriving at the mouth of the
R̂eport of the National Board of Health, 1330 
(Washington, 183T7, pp. 233-89.
5Annual Report of the Board of Health of the State 
of Louisiana to the &eneraT"Assembly~Tor the~Year~T53T 
jNew Orleans,"TT332J, p p . 333*1 336-37.
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Mississippi River to go to Ship Island for detention and 
treatment. Local medical organizations and the New Or­
leans press urged compliance, but the State Board of 
Health steadfastly refused. A member of the State Board 
had declared, said Cabell, that if this plan were adopted: 
’’Louisiana would no longer need protection. It would be 
entirely ruined, and would soon disappear from the family 
of States. Dr. Jones stated several times that New Or­
leans commerce was threatened by the Ship Island Quaran­
tine. In the 1330 Board of Health Report Jones pointed 
out that sending vessels to Ship Island would necessitate 
their traveling considerable distances out of the way:
95 miles from Eadsport, 130 from Mississippi Station, and 
211 from New Orleans. However, his conclusion that com­
merce would be driven from the Mississippi River was very 
questionable, because only infected vessels, a small per­
centage of the total number, would have been subject to 
this requirement.^
Opinion in the local press was far from unanimous 
in support or condemnation of the State Board of Health1s 
position. The Picayune and the States were among the 
Board’s leading defenders. The latter journal declared:
^Report of the National Board of Health, 1333 
(Washington, l33vT» P* 51-
^Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . . . TF3D',~pp. 6U-5I.
3 #7
"The direct control of our quarantine should be left to 
our local authorities who, from their personal experience 
and close contact and familiarity with the disease /""yellow 
fever_7> are best qualified to enforce such measures as 
may be adopted for its prevention." The Democrat and the 
Times were convinced that the State Board was pursuing a 
dangerous policy. The antagonism it displayed toward 
the National Board of Health, the Democrat noted, had 
resulted in the resignation of one of its members who 
desired a more conciliatory policy. The Democrat de­
scribed the State Board's stand as one of "jealousy, 
churlishness and general folly." The editor said he 
envisioned no remedy from Jones and the others directing 
the state’s quarantine system. Jones' mind, he averred, 
was not remediable. "We see nothing for the people save 
to ask them to resign," continued the editorial, "and to 
put this request in such a shape as to prove beyond all 
cavil that it represents the patriotism and intelligent 
sentiment of the entire community." The Times suggested 
that the existing Board make room for one which would
adopt a policy acceptable to the people of New Orleans
9and the Mississippi Valley.
The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley
^States, March 31> lddl.
9pemocrat, March 17> 29* 1SB1; Times, March Id,lddl.
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continued to grant strong support to the National Board 
of Health. At a meeting held in April, 1331 the Council 
reaffirmed its stand. The Louisiana Board of Health was 
requested to invite the National Board to appoint and 
maintain inspectors at New Orleans, Mississippi Station, 
and Eadsport. Louisiana health officials were warned that 
if they failed to act in good faith the boards of health 
represented in the Council would be compelled to take into 
their own hands the matter of providing quarantine pro­
tection. Emphasized especially was the need of excluding 
infected ships from the Mississippi River.
Shortly thereafter, Governor Wiltz granted the Na­
tional Board of Health permission to station an inspector 
at the Mississippi Quarantine. The State Board had earlier 
taken the position that it was without power to decide this 
question; the Governor had been asked to assume responsi­
bility. Dr. G. F. Patton, a former state quarantine offi­
cial, was appointed to the new post. Patton resided at 
Mississippi Station during the summers of 1331 and 1332, 
but as might have been expected, he quickly wore out his 
welcome.
The National Board of Health also created another 
new office, that of Supervising Inspector. Appointed to 
this office was Dr. Stanford E. Chaille', one of the
^Democrat, April 25, 1331.
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Crescent City’s most prominent and most respected physi­
cians. According to his instructions, ChaiHe' was re­
quired, as the National Board’s "representative and chief 
executive agent in New Orleans," to obtain the earliest 
possible information of the existence of yellow fever; 
to secure, as nearly as practicable, uninterrupted 
commerce between New Orleans and other places; and, if
yellow fever should break out, to cooperate in averting
11its spread. In attempting to obtain early information
of doubtful, suspicious, and unquestionable cases of
yellow fever, Chaille'issued a circular to physicians in
New Orleans and farther downstream. Physicians were urged
to report immediately all cases of yellow fever so that
protective measures could be taken and neighboring states
notified of the whole truth, thereby forestalling panic
12and shotgun quarantines. Chaille'said later he was not 
satisfied with the response to this circular. Further­
more, after attending three State Board of Health meetings, 
Chaille''concluded that very little could be learned there.^ 
On May 12 Dr. Chaille'presented the Louisiana Board 
of Health with five propositions which were answered a week
•^Report of the National Board of Health, 1331 
(Washington, 188277 P* 291.
•^circular No. 1 in Scrapbook, ChaiHe''(Stanford E.) 
Manuscripts, Rudolph Matas Medical Library, Tulane Univer­
sity, New Orleans, Louisiana.




later. The proposition stating that all doubtful and 
suspicious cases of yellow fever should be reported to 
Chaille^ and that he be allowed to investigate in the 
company of a person appointed by the State Board was un­
hesitatingly accepted. The second proposition called for 
a modification of the State Board’s resolution requiring 
a unanimous opinion from its recently created Investigating 
Committee on yellow fever cases. Chaille^’s position was 
that both the National Board member and the State Board 
member of the Committee should be permitted to issue a 
minority report on any case which had been investigated.
In reply the Louisiana Board of Health asserted that two 
reports might tend to confuse the public mind and create 
panic. Chaille^ in proposition three, asked permission to 
appeal to physicians, medical and sanitary organizations, 
and so forth to get information regarding the earliest 
yellow fever cases. No objection was expressed, so as 
previously noted, he made this appeal. Proposition four 
stated that the National Board of Health should cooperate 
with local health authorities in restricting the spread 
of yellow fever. The State Board agreed, and suggested 
that aid not be limited only to times when epidemics were 
already prevailing.
The fifth proposition presented the key point. Ves­
sels from infected ports should be examined at Eadsport, 
declared Chaille' and if infected, or if there was reasonable
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ground for suspecting infection, those vessels should not 
be allowed to proceed without a certificate from the In­
spector of the National Board of Health at Ship Island. 
This proposition, as expected, was turned down by the 
Louisiana Board of Health. Mississippi Station was said 
to be better located~and better equipped to protect the 
Mississippi Valley than was the nearby federal quarantine 
station. To stop ships at Eadsport, and send them to 
Ship Island, continued the State Board’s reply, would be 
to abandon the power and authority conferred upon state 
health officials by law. The Board also claimed it had 
no power to order vessels out of Louisiana waters to a
" j  I
quarantine station over which it had no jurisdiction.
Chaille/protested the position taken by the State
Board of Health on the fifth proposition by stating that
the number of ships which would be sent to Ship Island
would be so small that it could have little effect on
New Orleans commerce. Furthermore, he declared, no place
in the United States had proven itself as liable to yellow
fever as Mississippi Station; infected vessels should
therefore be kept away, ChaTlle''maintained that there
was no valid legal obstruction to prevent sending them to
15the Ship Island Quarantine. After carefully inspecting 




the state quarantine grounds Chaille^ remarked in his Daily- 
Record and Reports that no accomodations were provided 
healthy people subject to detention. They had to remain 
aboard their ship during the entire quarantine period. 
ChaiHe** felt too that cleaning and disinfection procedures 
at Mississippi Station were not thorough enough.^ The 
States, totally unconvinced by these assertions, declared: 
"The arguments of Dr. Chaille/in favor of compelling ships 
bound for this port to proceed, under certain circumstances, 
to Ship Island, and there remain for a certain period, are 
unsatisfactory, and the Board of Health’s position on the 
subject is impregnable on both the law and the facts.
There is no occasion, no reason, no shadow of justifica­
tion for any such interference with the commerce of this 
city
The Louisiana Board of Health’s annual quarantine 
against supposedly infected ports went into effect May 1. 
According to the quarantine proclamation issued by Gov­
ernor Wiltz, ships arriving from Rio de Janeiro,' Vera 
Cruz, Havana, and Aspinwall (Colon) were to be detained 
seventy-two hours at Mississippi Station. As in previous 
years, Galveston denounced the Louisiana quarantine on
^Stanford E. Chaille/', Daily Record and Reports,
Apl. 26th, lSBl, in Chaille'Manuscripts, loc. cit.
^States, June 20, lBBl.
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the grounds it afforded inadequate protection. Conse­
quently on June 9 the Board requested the Governor to amend
the quarantine proclamation to provide a detention period
IBof ten days instead of only three.
A few days later a committee of ship agents approached 
Jones, protesting the quarantine modification. They said 
they represented a large number of ship agents and commer­
cial men. On June 15 Dr. F. Loeber resigned from the Board 
in protest against the lengthening of the detention period. 
He said the amended proclamation was "not suggested by 
experience or sanctioned by science and sound judgment, 
but by fear and caprice." Loeber predicted the ten day 
quarantine would paralyze New Orleans1 export trade, at 
the same time increasing the danger of epidemics by 
keeping clean, healthy vessels in an infected atmosphere.
Trouble developed later in the summer between Dr. 
Patton, the National Board’s inspector at Mississippi 
Station, and state health authorities. Jones became irate 
when in August Patton mistakenly notified the National 
Board of Health of a suspicious case of yellow fever at 
the quarantine ground. A month later Dr. J. F. Finney, 
the Resident Physician at Mississippi Sta'tion, called the
•̂ Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . , . iffgl, p. 426; UT N. John to’TJr. JosepTT” 
Jones, Galveston, Texas, May 7, lBBl, in Notebook and 
Scrapbook of Dr. Joseph Jones (lBBl), Louisiana State 
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, loc. cit.
^picayune, June 14, 17> 1B&1.
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State Board’s attention to aspects of Patton’s conduct 
which he felt were improper. The United States Consul 
General in Rio de Janeiro also protested the "very im­
proper course" pursued by Patton in publicizing false 
statements made by a ship captain that a physician in 
the Brazilian capital sold certificates of inspection
and disinfection without actually performing those serv-
20 / •  ices. At the end of l88l ChaiHe' replied to charges
made by Jones against Patton and the National Board of
Health. Chaille/ remarked that with reference to Patton,
Jones’ accusations had "committed great injustice by in-
21ference, omissions and forgetfulness."
In December Dr. Jones sent to each member of the 
state Legislature a copy of the Board of Health Report 
for 1831 and a letter directing attention to Louisiana’s 
total freedom from infectious and contagious diseases 
during 1880 and 1881. Because of this exemption, Jones 
averred, the commercial and material prosperity of New 
Orleans and the entire state had been greatly increased, 
and friendly relations had been maintained with surround­
ing states. These happy conditions were said to have 
resulted from "the efficient and rigid quarantine and
^Report of the Board of Health of the State of 
Louisiana . , . ltH?l, pp. 4 1 Pica~yune, September 30, 
October 2$, 1881. -
^Stanford E. Chaille/ The La. State Board of 
Health in its Annual Report for 1881 versus the National 
Board of Health, Reply in Behalf of the Latter (New Or­
leans, 1382), p. 3.
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enlightened execution of the sanitary laws of the State." 
Jones declared the State Board had accomplished this with­
out "one farthing" from the National Board of Health— a
statement which was denied by Berniss— or from any other 
22organization.
Governor McEnery seems to have been greatly impressed 
by Jones' assertions. In his message to the General As­
sembly the following May, McEnery mentioned the "unprec­
edented health" enjoyed by Louisianians during the past 
two years, and said it had been "in a large measure due 
to the untiring energy, careful and intelligent discharge 
of duty, firmness and courage in combating prejudices, of 
the members of the State Board of Health. . . . "  The 
state quarantine had proven a success, the Governor con­
tinued, and the Board's recommendations for its improve­
ment should be carried out„2^
Antagonism between state and national health author­
ities did not ease in 1882. Issues were much the same 
as in the past, although before the summer had ended the 
eventual victor in the struggle had been quite clearly 
determined. In April Governor McEnery, at Chaille^’s 
request, again extended to the National Board of Health
^Picayune, December 10, 1881; New Orleans Medical 
and Surgical Journal, n.s., IX (1881-82J, 617-13.
23pffjcial Journal of the Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, at the Reg­
ular Session . . . 1882 (Baton Rouge"J 1882), p* 15*
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the privilege of stationing an inspector at the Mississippi 
Quarantine. However, McEnery insisted that this inspector 
subject himself to the regulations of the Louisiana Board 
of Health, and provide aid and assistance to the state 
Quarantine Officer. He declared that the National Board’s 
inspector should not supervise, control, or direct the 
actions of the Quarantine Officer, or in any way inter­
fere with his performance of duties imposed upon him by 
the laws of Louisiana.^
The New Orleans Times-Democrat loyally backed the 
National Board of Health during the spring and summer of 
1882, even though the writing on the wall was becoming 
increasingly distinct. Health authorities in New York, 
Baltimore, and other cities were joining the Louisiana 
Board of Health in calling for an end to federal inter­
ference in local sanitary matters. The Mississippi Valley 
was strongly behind the National Board, but elsewhere its 
support was not formidable. The Ship Island project had 
never been accepted by the Louisiana Board despite its 
approval by some New Orleans newspapers and most of the 
local medical organizations. The Times-Democrat. reminding 
its readers of the shotgun quarantines of 1878 and 1379> 
called upon the public to manifest clearly its sentiment
^Proceedings of the Board of Health, Vol. 2 
(April-August, 1832], Manuscript in the Louisiana State 
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, loc. cit.
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in favor of the National Board of Health. "The only 
course for us," stated the editor, "is a frank and hearty 
acceptance of the overtures of the National Board, and a 
grateful recognition of the benefits involved in their 
presence and cooperation."25
The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley stated 
its position during its annual meeting held at Cairo in 
April. The work of the National Board of Health was 
granted official approval, and Congress was urged to make 
necessary appropriations to enable it to continue its 
functions. The National Board was asked by the Council 
to re-establish its Inspection Service on the Mississippi 
River and on railroads, and to place on duty in New Or­
leans and other Southern ports an inspector to supervise 
the shipment of all goods by river and rail. The Sani­
tary Council resolved also that the National Board should 
maintain an inspector at Eadsport who would act conjointly 
with an officer of the Louisiana Board in excluding infected 
vessels from the river. Another very important resolution 
endorsed the immediate passage by Congress of the contro­
versial Harris Bill which would have extended the quarantine 
powers of the National Board of Health beyond I8B3 .
Congress, however, was not very favorably disposed
25k ew Orleans Times-Democrat, April 9, 29> May 
14, 1SS2.
2^New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
IX (1381-3577 870-71.
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toward federal health officials, especially with regard 
to quarantine jurisdiction, and before long the National 
Board had its authority materially reduced. In order to 
operate effectively the National Board of Health required 
a substantial annual appropriation, but in 1332 the amount 
it received was scarcely enough to keep it alive. Envi­
sioning the termination of the national quarantine, the 
Mississippi Valley fought tenaciously to preserve un­
diminished the power held by the organization it consid­
ered its greatest benefactor.
Opposition to the National Board was stronger in 
the House than in the Senate, The total appropriation 
provided by the House to sustain the Board was only 
$17,500. The Senate voted an amendment to raise this 
figure to nearly eighty thousand dollars, but the House 
would not agree. In discussing the question of the Sen­
ate amendment Representative Simonton of Tennessee argued 
that efficient quarantine on the Mississippi River was 
essential. Boards of health, cotton exchanges, and cit­
izens throughout the Mississippi Valley, he declared, had 
sent telegrams imploring Congress to increase appropria­
tions for the National Board of Health.. Representative 
Reagen of Texas asserted that four vessels had been sent 
to Ship Island during the summer of 13S1, any one of which 
could have introduced a yellow fever epidemic. Congress­
man Butterworth of Ohio agreed that disease had to be
399
kept from the country, but maintained that the Marine 
Hospital Service was adequately organized and equipped 
to perform this function. He regarded the National Board 
of Health as a needless bureau.
Congressman Dunn of Arkansas said that either the 
National Board should be abolished outright, or Congress 
should grant it enough money to perform its services 
effectively. The Mississippi River Inspection Service 
was particularly important, stated Dunn, because without 
it people living in the Mississippi Valley were at the 
mercy of the Louisiana Board of Health. Local boards, 
he continued, did not satisfy public demands; the pro­
tection they provided was not adequate. Dunn believed 
the Marine Hospital Service incapable of handling the 
momentous task of preventing importation of epidemic 
diseases. He urged that a strong National Board of Health 
be retained. Representative Cox of New York, a leading 
opponent of the National Board, made it clear he would 
not vote for the Senate amendment. f,Not one dollar is 
for the preservation of health," he declared, Mit is 
simply to pay salaries to men around Washington who are 
doing no good, but only starting rumors about the prev­
alence of disease here and there, for the purpose of 
being enabled to draw their salaries.
^Congressional Record . . . , Forty-Seventh 
Congress, First Session (Washington, 1&$2), Vol. 13>
Part 7* ppT 6$9l-902.
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With the refusal of the House to concur in the Senate 
amendment, the appropriation bill was sent to a conference
committee. There the House had its way; the National
- -
Board was to get only a fraction of the money it requested. 
Senator Isham Harris of Tennessee, the Board’s firmest 
adherent, said he would vote against the report of the 
conference committee. The National Board of Health, 
according to Harris, had spent an average of $153,000 a 
year during the first three years of its existence and 
needed a minimum of $121,000 to continue its functions 
properly. If other senators had witnessed scenes of death 
in Memphis, he averred, they would not be so anxious to 
agree to a niggardly appropriation for the organization 
which protected the entire Mississippi Valley. Harris 
stated he did not know of a board of health (aside from 
that of Louisiana) or a sanitary organization anywhere 
that did not desire the maintenance of the National Board 
of Health.2g
The Times-Democrat, seeing the National Board in 
imminent danger, protested the crippling of an institution 
which it maintained was needed desperately. It reminded 
readers of the shotgun quarantines in 1373 and 1379. An 
editorial appearing July 27 remarked that on the surface 
the primary cause of trouble between the Louisiana State
2gIbid., pp. 6949-50.
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Board of Health and federal health officials was the
extreme states’ rights views of Dr. Jones. The Times-
Democrat implied, however, that perhaps the battle Jones
was waging against the National Board was more of a per-
29sonal fight than one based upon principle. Upon careful 
appraisal of evidence in this controversy, the author is 
convinced the Times-Democrat was on the right track.
Dr. William G. Austin, a member of the Louisiana 
Board of Health in 1879> came to the defense of the Na­
tional Board by asserting that the hostility manifested 
by Congress toward it was regretted by every sanitarian 
in the country. Austin declared further: ,TNo State or
local board can, in the exercise of their limited police
powers, effectually prevent the importation of contagious 
and infectious diseases without the cooperation of the 
National Board of Health. . . .’’̂ 0 The Memphis Appeal 
remarked that the discontinuance of the Mississippi River 
Inspection Service would be ’’most unfortunate, if not a 
national calamity.” *̂*- The Memphis Avalanche stated that 
local and state boards had proven utterly incompetent to 
deal with national public health problems. Residents of 
the Mississippi Valley were urged by the Avalanche to wage
29Times-Democrat, June 22, July 9, 21, 27» 1882.
3°Ibid., July 11, 1882; Picayune, July 15> 1882.
^Memphis Appeal, July 12, 1882, in scrapbook, 
Chaille^ ManuscriptsTioc. cit.
402
vigorous protests against the proposed action of Congress 
to destroy the usefulness of the National Board of Health.^ 
Editorial comment in New Orleans newspapers was as 
divided as ever regarding the merits of the National Board 
of Health. The States thought Congress would be acting 
wisely if only a meager appropriation for the "National 
Board of Sensationalists" was voted. The editor said he 
had held from the beginning that the National Board was 
an "utterly useless body." His chief complaint was that 
anxieties had been needlessly stirred in the past by sen­
sational reports emanating from national health officers, 
and these same officials, he said, were presently trying 
to inflame the country with apprehensions of the spread 
of pestilence if the Board's authority should be undermined. 
The National Board's river and rail inspection services 
were beneficial, asserted the States, but they could be 
operated equally as well by the marine and army medical 
corps. Dr. John Hamilton, Surgeon General of the United 
States Marine Hospital Service, declared that the river 
inspection service could be performed without charge.
Jones was enthusiastic concerning Hamilton's proposition 
to have the Marine Hospital Service take over this duty.
Both Jones and the States believed Hamilton's agency to




On August 7 the appropriations bill finally passed, 
with the National Board of Health receiving a substantially 
smaller grant than had been requested, although its fate 
was not immediately clear. The total appropriation for 
public health was $16$,000, but $100,000 of this amount 
was to go to the President of the United States to aid 
state and local boards of health prevent the spread of 
disease in the event of a threatened or actual epidemic.
The disposition to be made of this "epidemic fund" was 
left open to' speculation. Fifty thousand dollars was 
earmarked to state and local boards of health to aid 
them in carrying out their rules and regulations aimed 
at preventing the introduction and spread of contagious 
and infectious diseases. Only eighteen thousand dollars 
was to go directly to the National Board, and this entire 
amount was for salaries, rent, light, fuel, stationery, 
and so on. Mention of inspection services and quarantine 
stations was conspicuously absent.3^
The question arising upon passage of this measure 
involved the ultimate dispensation to be made of the 
$150,000 appropriated for aid to state and local boards 
of health. The National Board promptly put in its claim
33states, July 14, 27, 1$$2; Picayune, July 2$,
1$$2.
3^Statutes at Large, Forty-Seventh Congress,
Session I (Washington, 1$83), XXII, 315*
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to the entire amount, but this once proud agency was about 
to go down to utter defeat. President Chester A. Arthur 
temporarily turned over to the Secretary of the Treasury 
the $100,000 epidemic fund which could be expended only 
in the face of an epidemic. Dr. Hamilton of the Marine 
Hospital Service as well as the National Board of Health 
asked to be given possession of the money. The Secretary’s 
decision was in favor of the former, and shortly thereafter 
word was received from Washington that the National Board 
had virtually lost all hope that it could still acquire 
the fund.^^
The government's decision on the fifty thousand 
dollar appropriation was more definite. The Comptroller 
of the Treasury ruled that the National Board of Health 
might select the local boards of health and quarantine 
stations to receive aid from this fund, but he also de­
clared that no part of the money could be used for in­
spection stations existing solely under the National 
Board's authority. Unquestionably this blow ended the 
effectiveness on the National Board of Health; the Board 
was left with practically no capital with which to contin­
ue operations. Dr. Chaille''commented that this decision 
would result in "grave misfortune" for New Orleans because 
residents of the Mississippi Valley relied upon reports
35picayune, August 15, 21, l£$2.
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issued by federal health officers regarding health in the 
Crescent City. The Louisiana State Board of Health, 
viewing the Comptroller1s decision very differently, was 
overjoyed. At a Board meeting held August 17 the Presi­
dent of the United States and the Secretary of the Treas­
ury were commended for their wisdom in giving the epidemic 
fund to Dr. Hamilton’s agency, and the Board members re­
solved they would cooperate with the Marine Hospital 
Service in all measures to preserve the public health. 
Simultaneously they asked for half of the fifty thousand 
dollars in the care of the National Board in order to
 ̂Aimprove the state’s three quarantine stations.
Even though the National Board of Health was severely 
crippled, it was not entirely dead. During October the 
Times-Democrat printed a series of editorials in its de­
fense. The state quarantine was said to be ruining New 
Orleans’ coffee trade by detaining for ten days all ves­
sels from infected ports. New York, asserted the editor, 
had won the coffee trade by adopting a more practical 
quarantine. The solution to this problem, he continued, 
was to allow the National Board of Health to devise a 
uniform quarantine system for the entire country. The 
National Board was lauded for the aid it granted Pensa­
cola during the yellow fever epidemic which had been
3^Ibid., August IB, l£$2.
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raging there. The National Board’s effective response
to the emergency was compared to the ’’dilatory red-tape
system” of the Marine Hospital Service. Pensacola was
said to have appealed for aid to the latter organization
for two months, but it had failed to act. The editor of
the Times-Democrat found it easy to understand why two
days earlier the American Public Health Association had
’’unanimously and enthusiastically” endorsed the National
37Board of Health instead of the Marine Hospital Service.
At this annual meeting of the American Public Health 
Association Dr. James L. Cabell, President of the National 
Board of Health, spoke of the embarrassing position in 
which his organization had been placed in being charged 
with important duties and yet deprived of the means of 
executing them. Cabell directed attention to the report 
of a senate committee which had investigated the best 
means of preventing the introduction and spread of epi­
demic diseases. The committee credited the National Board 
with having accomplished highly important results which 
could not have been accomplished by any other agency. The 
President of the American Public Health Association, Dr.
R. C. Kedzie of Michigan, denounced ’’the hostile indif­
ference of Congress and the Executive to the National 
Board of Health.” ’’The painful conviction abides with
37Times-Democrat, October 1, 7» 20, 1B82.
407
us," asserted Kedzie, "that a fearful blunder has been 
made in . . . crippling the National Board of Health, and 
that we have been guilty of the folly of changing front 
in the presence of the foe.r|3&
Dr. P. H. Bailhache of the Marine Hospital Service, 
and also a member of the National Board of Health, stated 
that the Marine Hospital Service, under the Treasury De­
partment, had in the past conducted quarantine without an 
appropriation, and at present had at least one medical 
officer in every port in the United States. Bailhache 
felt that the National Board should never have been given 
control over the quarantine. Colonel Haddin of Memphis, 
a leader of the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Val­
ley, disagreed with Bailhache. He did not believe the 
Marine Hospital Service to be as effective, and noted 
that its certificates of inspection were not valued as 
highly as those of the National Board of Health. Most 
others at the convention agreed with Haddin; the Marine 
Hospital Service, they believed, could not be trusted to 
perform requisite tasks.^
A Picayune editorial discussed the possibility that 
the National Board of Health might yet be revived. The
3^Public Health Papers and Reports Presented at the 
Tenth Annual M eeting of the AmericanPublic Health Associ­
ation,~1882 (Boston, T383)» VIII, 12, 72-74*
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proper place for quarantine powers, declared the Picayune, 
was in the Treasury Department, because only it could 
control commerce. The Treasury Department, continued the 
editorial, had in the Marine Hospital Service and the 
revenue cutter service as organized machinery for in­
spection, and should therefore be entrusted with all 
national health and quarantine matters. The editor could 
see no reason for setting up a special body of men in­
spired by local interests, with private and personal 
jealousies, and pay those men to find disease where it did 
not exist.^ Opponents of the National Board of Health 
pointed out that prior to June, 1$79 the Marine Hospital 
Service had controlled the national quarantine, and it 
would automatically regain control if the National Board’s 
quarantine powers were allowed to lapse.^
Senator Harris and some of his colleagues continued 
the fight to save the National Board of Health. Harris 
reported in January, 1SS3 that his committee on the pre­
vention of epidemic diseases recommended the repeal of 
section ten of the quarantine act of June 2, 1&79. This 
section made the law operative for only four years.^ If
4-Qpjcayune, November 6, 1BS2.
^■The quarantine law passed April 29, 1$7# would 
then be in effect again.
^ Reports of Committees of the Senate of the United 
States, Forty-Seventh Congress, Second Session~TWashington, 
lU83), Vol. 1, Report No. 942, p. 1. This was the report 
to which Dr. Cabell referred during his address to the 
American Public Health Association.
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Harris had been successful in securing that legislation, 
the National Board's quarantine powers would have been 
extended indefinitely.
The Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley* which 
had worked closely with the National Board of Health, man­
aged to keep up agitation for retaining the Board and for 
restoring its past authority. A very important meeting 
of this body was held at Jackson, Mississippi April 3-4, 
1$&3. The Council’s Executive Committee in issuing its 
call for the meeting directed attention to the diminished 
powers of the National Board, and also to the Louisiana 
Board’s attitude toward the New Orleans Auxiliary Sanitary 
Association and other state boards of health in the Mis­
sissippi Valley. Several days before the meeting convened, 
the Louisiana State Medical Society, the Orleans Parish 
Medical Society, „nd the New Orleans Medical and Surgical 
Association urged the Louisiana State Board of Health to 
cooperate with the Sanitary Council to maintain unob­
structed commerce and travel in the Valley during the 
coming summer. On March 27 the State Board appointed a
committee to confer with the three local medical organ- 
43izations.
The conference was held March 31; its object, as 
stated by the Chairman, was to establish a basis of
•̂3Picayune > March 23, 2$, lSo3 ; Times-Democrat, 
March 2$, 18$3•
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cooperation and harmony among the bodies concerning action 
to be taken at the Sanitary Council’s Jackson meeting, due 
to convene a few days later. The State Board was asked 
whether it would be represented at Jackson, and what as­
surances it could give that all cases of yellow fever and 
suspicious fevers would be reported promptly to health 
associations in the Mississippi Valley. Mr. I. N. Marks 
replied that it was neither desirable nor expedient for 
the Board to be represented at Jackson. A few members, 
he pointed out, could not bind the rest of the Board to 
any course of action. It was the Louisiana Board’s duty 
to protect the city of New Orleans, the state of Louisi­
ana, and the entire Mississippi Valley, Marks declared. 
Marks later refused to endorse resolutions lauding the 
Sanitary Council.^
At a meeting of the Louisiana Board April 2 a res­
olution stating that the Board "would maintain a rigid 
quarantine during the summer months, give boards of health 
in surrounding states prompt information on the appearance 
of yellow fever in New Orleans, and keep its health records 
open was passed unanimously. The resolution declared 
further that the Board’s resources for quarantine pur­
poses were adequate to guarantee no interruption in the 
service. Regarding the Jackson meeting, mention was made
^Picayune, April 2, l£&3
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by Dr. Edward Booth that legally constituted authorities 
(the Louisiana State Board of Health) could not properly 
send delegates in an official capacity to an irrespon­
sible, though respectable, volunteer assemblage of citizens 
(the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley). ̂  The 
Board’s stand made good sense to the Picayune. The Sani­
tary Council assumed the Louisiana Board would neglect 
and ignore its duties, remarked the editor, and still had 
the effrontery to ask the Board to participate in a move­
ment to place itself under surveillance.^
The meeting of the Sanitary Council at Jackson was 
conducted in an atmosphere of emergency. Dr. Bemiss, a 
member of the National Board of Health, had announced 
recently that his organization had only enough money to 
continue inspections until June 2. Bemiss noted, however, 
that the Treasury Department had ordered the Marine Hos­
pital Service to carry on inspections without charge.^7 
Among the resolutions adopted by the Council were first, 
the President of the United States should be petitioned 
to place the $100,000 epidemic fund in the hands of the 
National Board of Health; second, if the National Board 
were deprived of its inspection powers, the Sanitary
^ Ibid., April 3, 1S33.
^6Ibid.
47ibid., April 2, 1332.
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Council was to commence issuing certificates of inspection 
to be accepted as valid by boards of health in the Valley, 
provided the inspections were carried on under rules and 
regulations prescribed by the National Board; and third, 
states were recommended to make voluntary contributions 
to continue the river and rail inspections. A fourth res­
olution recommended to health organizations in the Valley 
was the adoption of the system of inspection, isolation, 
disinfection, and quarantine advocated by the National 
Boara of Health. Finally, the Louisiana Board of Health’s 
promise to cooperate with the Sanitary Council was cor-
) ddially approved and acknowledged. The editor, of the 
New Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal was sorry the 
Louisiana Board did not choose to be represented at Jack­
son; he believed its presence at the meeting would have
engendered a more general feeling of confidence in health
49reports emanating from New Orleans.
Seemingly, the greatest immediate concern was over 
the Sanitary Council’s first resolution, i. _e., that the 
$100,000 epidemic fund be placed at the disposal of the 
National Board of Health. The Secretary of the Treasury 
decided several months before that the fund would go to 
the Marine Hospital Service, but the money had not yet
^ N e w  Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal, n.s.,
X (Igd2-S3T7“352.
^Ibid., p. 851.
been transferred. The Sanitary Council, shortly after the
meeting’s adjournment, sent a petition to President Arthur
requesting that the $100,000 be channeled to the National
Board. This petition, according to the Times-Democrat,
represented the desires of nine-tenths of the people of
SOthe Mississippi Valley. Memphis threatened a rigid 
quarantine against New Orleans if the money were not 
granted to the National Board of Health. ^  The Louisiana 
Board, as adamant as ever, adopted a resolution urging 
the President to turn the fund over to the Marine Hospital 
Service, and another resolution endorsing the Marine Hos­
pital Service "unequivocally." The State Board’s efforts 
were rewarded; in May Dr. Hamilton wrote to Jones thanking 
hi m for his help, and informing him that the Marine Hos­
pital Service hacl finally received the money.
The State Board of Health next.became involved in an 
embroglio with the Auxiliary Sanitary Association of New 
Orleans. Editorial comment was unfavorable to the Board, 
but its stand was' unwavering. The Board refused to accept 
any financial assistance from the local Sanitary Associa­
tion, contending the aid was illegal. The States, a 
journal ordinarily defending the Louisiana Board, suggested 
that the Board had become too pugnacious and sensitive, and
^Times-Democrat, April 6, 1SS3. 
^ Picayune, April 12, 1SS3. 
52ibid., April 20, May 29, •
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urged it to cooperate with the Association.53 The Times- 
Democrat denounced the Board’s policy of hostility and 
warfare. Dr. Formento, a Board member was quoted as 
having said that differences between the two public 
health organizations were ’’strictly personal and alto­
gether unnecessary.” Formento blamed the Board of Health 
for the conflict and repudiated its action. The Times- 
Democrat asserted that the Board preferred to see the
health of New Orleans residents suffer rather than accept
54aid "so generously and courteously proferred.1ty
On June 2 the quarantine powers held by the National 
Board of Health four years terminated abruptly. The Sani­
tary Council of the Mississippi Valley, still manifesting 
no faith in Louisiana health officials, assumed control 
of the river and railroad inspection services July 1.
The Memphis Avalanche reported July 7 that the Council 
had established inspection stations at New Orleans, Fort 
Adams (Mississippi), and President’s Island (near Memphis). 
The Avalanche noted a remark by Colonel Haddin, the Council 
President, asserting that although his organization had 
no money it was backed by the moral influence of thirteen 
states. The Marine Hospital Service, still not in full 
possession of the quarantine stations, was said to be
53states, May 30, 1BB3*
54Times-Democrat, May 30, 31> 1833.
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nervously awaiting d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e  Memphis Public 
hedger stated that local health authorities preferred to 
follow the dictates of the Sanitary Council rather than 
the Marine Hospital Service.^
The Louisiana Board of Health, seconded by the Pic­
ayune , remained strongly in favor of the Marine Hospital 
Service. Dr. Jones referred to Hamilton, its number one 
officer, as custodian of the government's quarantine 
authority and its highest agent in the work of public 
hygiene. The Picayune maintained that steamboat inspec­
tions should be performed by the Marine Hospital Service 
instead of the Sanitary Council of the Mississippi Valley. 
The Sanitary Council was said to be a voluntary organiza­
tion proposing to subsist its agents on involuntary con­
tributions from river commerce. Without a shadow of legal 
status, declared the Picayune, the Council was undertaking 
to tax transportation and to prescribe conditions of travel 
and traffic between states. The editor regarded the Coun­
cil's refusal to recognize inspection certificates issued 
by the Marine Hospital Service to be absurd. The Sanitary 
Council was also assailed for attempting to "resuscitate" 
the National Board of Health, which according to the
55picayune, July 9, 1$$3.
56oiipping from Memphis Public Ledger in the Board 
of Health Notebook and Scrapbook (1883)> Louisiana State 
Board of Health Library Historical Collection, loc. cit.
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Picayune, had fallen dead under the weight of its own
57unsavory record. '
Meanwhile, on May 1 Louisiana’s seasonal quarantine 
went into effect in compliance with the provisions of Gov­
ernor McEnery’s quarantine proclamation. Vessels arriving 
from several West Indian, Mexican, and Brazilian ports 
were made subject to a ten day detention during which the 
vessels and their cargoes were to undergo cleansing and 
disinfection. Vessels arriving from other West Indian 
ports and from ports on the Isthmus of Panama and the 
northern coast of South America were to be inspected, and 
then cleansed, disinfected, and detained as directed by 
the Louisiana State Board of Health. McEnery ordered 
quarantine officers to enforce the regulations energeti­
cally, and requested the Board of Health to prosecute 
violators vigorously.^
By the end of May complaints were being registered 
in New Orleans newspapers that the quarantine endangered 
the city’s commerce. The fault lay, declared the Times- 
Democrat, with ’’the arbitrary rendering of its provisions 
by the State Board of Health.” The quarantine against 
Jamaica and Colon was described by the same journal as
57picayune, July 10, 13> 1333*
^Quarantine Proclamation of Governor Samuel 
Douglas McEnery in the Board of Health Notebook and Scrap­
book (1333), Louisiana State Board of Health Library His­
torical Collection, lac. cit.
’’illogical, unreasonable and unjust.” Speaking of the 
danger to commerce, the Times-Democrat * s editor asserted: 
’’Capital and enterprises are employing every energy to 
promote it during half the year, while during the other 
half there is a perpetual clamor for more rigorous measures 
to restrict and destroy it.”-^
Later during the summer this criticism was greatly 
modified. Noting the danger of having large numbers of 
infected vessels quarantined at Mississippi Station, the 
Times-Democrat once again advocated the use of Ship Is­
land as a protective measure. Ship Island had been aban­
doned early in July by the National Board of Health, but 
its quarantine facilities were taken over before long by 
the Marine Hospital Service. The State Board and the 
Governor were very much aware that New Orleans, the en­
tire state of Louisiana, and the Mississippi Valley were 
in imminent danger from the infected ships undergoing 
detention at this very time at the quarantine ground.^
This perilous situation called for immediate action.
At a special meeting of the State Board of Health held 
July 23, attention was focused on a letter from Governor 
McEnery which declared Mississippi Station to be virtually 
an infected port. The safety of the city and the state,
59t imes-Democrat, May JO, June &, July 13, 18S3.
^Picayune, July 6, 20, I B B3; Times-Democrat,
July 23, 24, 1333.
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and the highest public interests, said the Governor, de­
manded a rigid quarantine. The response to McEnery's 
appeal was quick and decisive. With only one dissenting 
vote the Board adopted a resolution requesting the Gover­
nor to proclaim non-intercourse with yellow fever ports, 
and to order all infected vessels out of state waters.
Feeling in the Crescent City toward the Board's non­
intercourse policy seems to have been generally favorable. 
The Picayune declared that the city had never been as 
unanimous before in demanding a perfectly rigid quarantine. 
Among others, the Cotton, Stock, and Produce Exchanges 
were said to favor non-intercourse.^ The Times-Democrat 
remarked that New Orleans could no longer be charged with 
carelessness and recklessness in health matters. ''No city 
has become more active and energetic than this in sani­
tary matters," declared the editor, "none give .more time 
and consideration to them."
This widespread approval of the new, rigid quaran­
tine was short-lived. The Chamber of Commerce, meeting 
August 16, passed a resolution commending the Board of 
Health for its vigilant and effective execution of state 
sanitary laws, but recommending that the proclamation of
^Picayune, July 24 > 1$$3«
62Ibid., July 24, 1$$3.
63Times-Democrat, July 2$, 1$$3.
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non-intercourse be modified immediately. ^ A week later 
the Picayune noted that non-intercourse had been combatted 
from a sanitary, a commercial, and a legal point of view. 
Non-intercourse was staunchly upheld by the Picayune be­
cause it was said to provide certain protection, whereas 
a less absolute system did not. On legal grounds non-in­
tercourse was justifiable, asserted the Picayune, because 
it was based on the right of self-protection. Apparently, 
concluded the editorial, the majority of New Orleanians
and other residents of the Mississippi Valley warmly ap-
6*5proved this rigid policy. '
Agitation against non-intercourse continued. Upon 
request of the Chamber of Commerce and various New Orleans 
commercial exchanges, the Board of Health relented early 
in September and abolished non-intercourse. The ten day 
quarantine was then re-established, remaining effective 
until November 1. The Times-Democrat believed the adop­
tion of non-intercourse saved New Orleans and the area 
downstream from a visitation of Yellow Jack. The Missis­
sippi Valley, asserted the journal, certainly had no cause 
for complaint with regard to protective measures employed 
to avert epidemics in l£$3.^
^Picayune, August 17, 1$&3.
^ I b i d . , .August 25, l£$3•
^Ibid.j September 7* October 5> 1$$3> Times- 
Democrat, September 7> 1$33 •
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The National Board of Health was still in existence, 
however, and its adherents were evidently as vociferous as 
ever in proclaiming the need of having its quarantine 
powers restored. The American Public Health Association 
resolved in November, 1883 that the act of June 2, 1879» 
from which the National Board had derived its quarantine 
authority, was ”a wise and judicious measure,” and Con­
gress was advised to re-enact this measure, ^  The annual 
report of the National Board of Health for 1883, the last 
yearly report issued by the Board, printed resolutions 
adopted by many leading sanitary organizations throughout 
the United States. These resolutions wrere in support of
the National Board, lauding its past accomplishments, and
68urging that it be revivified at once.
Early the following year the Picayune remarked on the 
attempt being made to ’’resurrect” the National Board of 
Health. This move was unwise, thought the editor, be­
cause the Marine Hospital Service met all requirements 
for supervision of national sanitary matters including 
quarantine. The Marine Hospital Service was said to have 
nothing to gain by concealing the truth or by manufac­
turing falsehoods. According to the editorial, the
^Congressional Record . . . , Forty-Eighth Con­
gress, First Session (Washington, 1884), Vol. 15, Part 1, p. 
47ST"
^Report of the National Board of Health, 1883 »
pp. 215-26.
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National Board of Health had sometimes carelessly re­
ported fever or the suspicion of fever, and had not 
adhered to the facts. The country had been unnecessarily 
alarmed, and commerce injured. New Orleans had been free 
from epidemics for several years, continued the Picayune, 
which indicated that existing precautions were the most
efficacious.
These comments by the Picayune were superfluous; 
the battle had already been won. Congress had decided 
to allovf the National Board to continue its existence 
as a virtual nonentity. Meager appropriations were pro­
vided the Board until 1833, and after that, none at all.
In 1393 the National Board of Health was officially abol-
70ished by act of Congress.
Dr. Joseph Jones, after serving Louisiana as State 
Health Officer during four eventful years, found it 
necessary to relinquish his post early in 1334. Governor 
McEnery, paying tribute to Jones, told the state Legisla­
ture: "Courage, energy, vigilance and sagacity have
distinguished his administration, in which he has won 
new honors and the gratitude of our p e o p l e S u c c e e d i n g
^^Picayune, January 17, 1334.
^Statutes at Large . . . , Forty-Seventh Congress,
Session II (Washington" 1893), XXVII, 452.
7-*-0fficial Journal of the Proceedings of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana at the Reg­
ular Session . . . H?34 (Baton Rouge, 1834), pp. 13-144
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Jones as President of the State Board of Health was Dr.
Joseph Holt, who was appointed to the Board only a week
before its annual organizational meeting in April. At
this meeting Holt was elected President over Dr. Felix
Formento by a vote of six to two. To reassure the public,
the Board then adopted resolutions stating first, that it
was the fixed and irrevocable policy of the Board of Health
to apply quarantine restrictions against all ports where
contagious or infectious disease existed, and to suspend
all communication with those ports if necessary; second,
that it would exercise sleepless vigilance against the
outward threat of epidemic disease, and called upon Texas,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida to do likewise; and
third, that sanitary organizations (including boards of
health) from other states xvere to be granted unrestricted
access to all records and health reports of the Louisiana
Board of Health, both at the quarantine stations and at
72its central office in New Orleans.
The choice of Dr. Holt, a former Sanitary Inspector, 
as President of the Board was a popular one, The Times- 
Democrat referred to Holt as a man of "indefatigable en­
ergy . . . , highly esteemed, and well known throughout 
the country and in every way admirably suited to the
^Picayune, April 13» 18&4.
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position to which he has been elevated."^ However, Dr.
Formento, piqued at having been denied the post, resigned
with the statement that evidently his services had not
been appreciated. Formento was senior medical member on
the Board of Health, and had for years tried to create
a spirit of conciliation and cooperation with sanitary
organizations in Louisiana and adjoining states. He felt
he had earned the presidency, but the other Board members
74had elected the newcomer, Joseph Holt.
On April 14 the Board of Health held a special meet­
ing and resolved to request the Governor to proclaim a 
quarantine effective May 1. As in 1S83, two lists of 
ports were provided; vessels from some ports were to be
detained ten days, and vessels from the others were to be
75detained for a period which the Board might direct.
This quarantine proved inadequate according to Holt’s 
standards. Holt recommended June 9 that vessels arriving 
from ports in the West Indies, Mexico, Central America, 
and Brazil, which under the Governor’s April proclamation 
would have been quarantined ten days, should be detained 
for a period of forty days. The Board agreed, with only 
one dissenting vote, the result being that Louisiana had
73Times-Democrat, April 14, 1$&4.
74pj.cayune, April 15, 1&&4*
75ibid.
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a forty day quarantine (a quarantine in the literal sense) 
for the first time since General Butler’s occupation of
*7 f \New Orleans during the Civil War.
i
Not satisfied with this extremely rigid quarantine, 
Holt told a meeting of New Orleans businessmen that he 
was trying to get a twenty-five thousand dollar appropri­
ation from the Legislature in order to install an effi-
77cient disinfection apparatus at Quarantine Station.
Holt was determined to provide the entire Mississippi 
Valley with optimum protection. The State Board of Health, 
with the threat to its sovereignty seemingly erased, was 
ready to pursue its vitally important task with renewed 
vigor.
?6Ibid., June 10, lBG4o
77joseph Holt, Quarantine and Commerce . . . 
(New Orleans, n.d.}, pp. 11-14#
CHAPTER XIII 
SUMMARY
The public health movement was among the country’s 
major reforms of the nineteenth century. One hundred years 
ago Americans were questioning the right of the state to 
interfere with the liberty of the individual to secure 
the health of the next generation. Could the community 
compel a person to undergo isolation or inoculation or 
other preventive measures for the purpose of protecting 
society? Victory over conservatism in public health 
matters did not come at once, but was achieved only 
through the determined efforts of dedicated reformers 
over long periods of time. A generally favorable climate 
of social responsibility has been one of the great advance­
ments of recent decades.
Within the medical profession a similar transformation 
was taking place. To the traditional obligation of caring 
for the sick, many nineteenth century physicians were em­
phasizing an additional one: that of seeking a means to
prevent epidemics. Although preventive medicine was cer­
tainly not unheard of prior to 1&Q0, organized public 
health programs were uncommon. Recognition that medicine 
is partially a social science could not be grasped overnight.
The state of Louisiana earned for itself an enviable
425
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place of distinction in public health advancement. Chiefly 
because New Orleans was notoriously susceptible to epidem­
ics, Louisiana established a Board of Health nearly a 
decade and a half before similar action was taken by any 
other state. The Board had a tenuous existence at first, 
but it attained permanent status within a few years 
through public appreciation of its accomplishments. State 
control of the Board of Health was maintained except dur­
ing the four years following the occupation of New Orleans 
during the Civil War.
Prior to the creation of the State Board of Health 
the Crescent City’s reputation for filth was all too well 
known. Early attempts to promote sanitary reform had not 
been noticeably successful, even though in some cases an 
organized program was employed. Unfortunately, the work 
done by the State Board in furthering sanitation in the 
Crescent City was often forgotten. The Board found it 
necessary to remind the public quite frequently that it 
was charged with the task of improving sanitary conditions 
in New Orleans and was endeavoring to do so.
The issue of the state quarantine captured the center 
of attention. The quarantine, along with the Board of 
Health, was instituted by legislative action in 1&551 an<i 
remained an extremely controversial matter during ensuing 
decades. When the quarantine failed to avert the out­
break of an epidemic disease, the Board’s future was in
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jeopardy; when the quarantine seemed to be succeeding, 
sentiment in the Board’s favor was formidable. Despite 
determined opposition to the Board of Health from some 
sources, public opinion tended more and more to regard 
highly the work being performed by state health authori­
ties. Although yellow fever was not conquered until the 
twentieth century, some success was being achieved in the 
prevention of other maladies.
The appearance of the National Board of Health in 
1$79 created a new problem. The State Board was faced 
immediately with the question of whether to cooperate 
with this organization. Residents of the Mississippi 
Valley, believing health officials in New Orleans and at 
Mississippi Quarantine Station incapable of preventing 
the spread of yellow fever, urged Louisiana to accept 
offers of assistance coming from Washington, Primarily, 
the objective was to keep vessels thought to be carrying 
Yellow Jack and other presumably contagious diseases 
from entering the Mississippi River. Louisiana health 
authorities refused this aid and continued to go it alone.
Had state health officials been willing to work hand 
in hand with the National Board, important results might 
have been attained. Nevertheless, the State Board of 
Health, having taken the measure of the interloping fed­
eral agency, proceeded with its excellent program for the 
betterment of health conditions in Louisiana. Services
425
performed by the Board have been increased steadily ever 
since. Louisiana*s nineteenth century public health 
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